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Consumer Power to Change the Food System? 
A Critical Reading of Food Labels as Governance Spaces: 
The Case of Açaí Berry Superfoods 
 
Christine Parker,* Hope Johnson** and Janine Curll*** 
Abstract: 
This article argues that the marketing claims on food labels 
are a governance space worthy of critical examination. We use a case 
study of superfood açaí berry products to illustrate how marketing 
claims on food labels encapsulate dominant neoliberal constructions 
of global food systems. These marketing claims implicitly promise 
that by making careful choices consumers can resist and redress the 
ravages of unbridled global capitalism. Food labels suggest that 
consumers can use market signals to simultaneously govern our own 
selves and the market to ensure sustainable, fair, and healthy 
consumption. In response, this article develops, justifies and applies 
a socio-legal approach to researching food chain governance which 
uses the food label as its unit of analysis and traces from the micro 
level of what the everyday consumer is exposed to on a food label to 
the broader governance processes that the food label both symbolizes 
and effects. We demonstrate our approach through a “label and chain 
governance analysis” of açaí berry marketing claims to deconstruct 
both the regulatory governance of the chain behind the food choices 
available to the consumer evident from the label and the way in 
which labels seek to govern consumer choices. Our analysis unpacks 
the nutritionist, primitivist undertones to the health claims made on 
these products, the neo-colonial and racist dimensions in their claims 
regarding fair trade and rural socio-economic development, and, the 
use of green-washing claims about biodiversity conservation and 
ecological sustainability. Through our application of this approach to 
the case study of açaí berry product labels, we show how food labels 
can legitimize the market-based governance of globalized food 
chains and misleadingly suggest that capitalist production can be 
adequately restrained by self-regulation, market-based governance 
and reflexive consumer choices alone. We conclude by suggesting 
the need for both greater deconstruction of the governance 
assumptions behind food labels and to possibilities for collective, 
 
*Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne. 
** School of Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology and the 
Institute for Future Environments.  
***PhD candidate, Law Faculty, Monash University. 
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public interest oriented regulatory governance of both labelling and 
the food system.   
Acknowledgements: 
The research in this article was partially supported by 
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140100484 A Sociological Analysis of the Anti-Ageing Treatment 
Market: The Dynamics of Expectations. The authors are grateful for 
the input and support of colleagues on that project, Professor Alan 
Petersen and Dr. Casimir Macgregor; and to Rowena Maguire who 
co-authored a separate paper with us in this area. We are also grateful 
to the useful comments of audiences to whom earlier versions were 
presented at Food Markets and Cultures of Consumption: Are We 
Being Served? Monash Prato Roundtable, 2-3 July 2015, Monash 
Prato Centre; Law School, QUT, 3 November 2015; Annual Meeting 
of the Law and Society Association, New Orleans, 3 June 2016 and 
Workshop on Food Labelling and Democratic Engagement in the 
Food System, Melbourne Law School and School of Agriculture and 
Food, The University of Melbourne, 28-29 September 2017. Thanks 
also to Laura Boehm who helped us prepare this paper for submission 
for publication. 
I.  Introduction 
To read the marketing claims on the label of an exotic 
superfood sold in Western countries like the United States and 
Australia, such as the Amazonian açaí berry, is to be promised a 
“healthier you,”1 a more sustainable food system and a kinder, 
gentler capitalism. One brand of açaí berry product, for example, tells 
us that, “for countless centuries, the people of the Amazon have 
revered this unique fruit for its nutritional content and prized it as a 
source of health and vitality.”2 Another promises that “now you can 
unlock the energy of the Amazon and better health everyday.”3 A 
third assures us that, despite its healthfulness and exoticness, açaí 
 
1 This emphasis on individual health, and personal control over bodily health, is 
consistent with neoliberal approaches to regulating health. See, e.g., Casimir 
MacGregor, Alan Petersen & Christine Parker, Hyping the market for ‘anti-ageing’ 
in the news: From medical failure to success in self-transformation, 13 
BIOSOCIETIES 64 (2018). 
2 HOPE JOHNSON, ET AL.., Consumer Choice as a Pathway to Food Diversity: A Case 
Study of Açaí Berry Product Labeling, in FOOD DIVERSITY BETWEEN RIGHTS, DUTIES 
AND AUTONOMIES: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES FOR A SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL 
DEBATE ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND AGROECOLOGY 307, 315 (Alessandro Isoni, et 
al eds., 2018). 
3 Id. at 316. 
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berries taste delicious and familiar like “a fruit sorbet with hints of 
dark chocolate and red wine.”4  
These claims encapsulate dominant neoliberal constructions 
of global food systems as capable of providing ethical, healthy 
products through supply chains significantly governed and arranged 
by market signals. These marketing claims implicitly task consumers 
with sending the “right” market signals to shape food supply chains 
and reinforce the positioning of consumers as regulators of our own 
consumption and the ultimate determiners of our own bodily health. 
Açaí berry marketing suggests that if we consumers govern our 
choices “correctly” by eating these “utopian edibles,”5 we can protect 
ourselves from cancer, aging and heart disease.6 Moreover, we can 
simultaneously alleviate poverty and related inequalities experienced 
by the indigenous inhabitants of the Amazon while preserving 
biodiverse ecologies. In short, we are told that by making careful 
choices based on the marketing and information on food labels we 
can resist and redress the ravages of unbridled global capitalism, 
while simultaneously governing our own selves and the market to 
ensure sustainable, fair, and healthy consumption.  
The second part of this article argues that the food label is 
itself a governance space worthy of critical examination. We define 
the food “label” broadly, in line with legal definitions, as including 
all the tags, brands, marks, statements, representations, designs and 
descriptions on food and its packaging and made or displayed to 
consumers when it is sold.7 Collectively, we consider these aspects 
 
4 Daniela Dunde-Brown, Kiss the Berry Creek Street, CONCRETE PLAYGROUND (June 
7, 2016), https://concreteplayground.com/brisbane/restaurants/kiss-the-berry-creek-
street.  
5 Jessica Loyer, What Makes a Superfoods “Super”? The Discursive Construction 
of Utopian Edibles, 21ST SYMPOSIUM OF AUSTRALIAN GASTRONOMY: UTOPIAN 
APPETITES (2017).  
6 Jen Miller, 15 Health Benefits of Açaí Berries, According to Science (7 Delicious 
Recipes), JENS REVIEWS, https://www.jenreviews.com/açaí-berries/ (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2019). 
7 This wording is based on the definition of “label” in Standard 1.1.2 of Australia 
New Zealand Food Standards Code. Broad definitions of food labels are common 
across jurisdictions consistent with the definition provided by the Codex 
Alimentarius which is the source for international food standards. Codex 
Alimentarius, CODEX STAN 1-1985[2] (Rev. 1-1991) defines a label as “any tag, 
brand, mark, pictorial or other descriptive matter, written, printed, stenciled, marked, 
embossed or impressed on, or attached to, a container of food.” The US, for instance, 
defines “label” as “a display, written, printed or graphic matter upon the immediate 
container of any article.” Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C § 321(k) 
(2012); while labelling means “all labels and other written, printed or graphic matter 
(1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such 
an article.” Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C § 321(m) (2012). 
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of the food label to visibly manifest a series of (contestable) 
governance processes that influence both the choices presented to us 
as consumers, and also how we understand what we do when we 
choose one or another food.  
Our approach draws on Dorothy Smith’s “sociology for 
people” to unpack the complex social and institutional arrangements 
within which everyday experience is embedded.8 We also draw on 
the insights of regulatory studies scholarship for our understanding 
of food labels as governance spaces. This scholarship understands 
regulation as emerging from the interactions, stories and power 
contests between government, industry and civil society 
organizations and individuals in any particular domain.9 Food 
labelling is a governance space, we posit, because the information, 
stories and images provided (and what they leave out, simplify or 
exaggerate)10 reflect the outcomes of those contests. Practices and 
decisions concerning the sourcing, processing and transporting of 
produce, and the contractual, legislative and voluntary certification 
conditions under which these activities occur, illuminates where 
regulatory power lies in food chains and for what purposes it is being 
exercised.   
Food labelling is also a governance space in the sense that it 
is a forward attempt to influence the choices of individual consumers. 
People make choices about what to consume based on their self-
identity, and construct consumption as a form of self-expression and 
status signaling.11 Consumer choices are, therefore, performative. 
They shape and reinforce our agency, identity, subjectivities, and 
intentions, including our conceptions of the responsibilities 
 
8 See DOROTHY E. SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE 
29 (2005). 
9 See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (1998); see also Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational 
business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis, 8 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2014); see also LEIGH HANCHER & MICHAEL MORAN, 
ORGANIZING REGULATORY SPACE (1998); see also Colin Scott, Analysing 
Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, PUB. L. 283 
(2001).  
10 See CAROL BACCHI, WOMEN, POLICY AND POLITICS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
POLICY PROBLEMS (1999). 
11 See Pierre Bourdieu, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF 
TASTE (1984); see also C. Fischler, Food, Self and Identity, 27 Sᴏᴄ. SCI. INFO. 275 
(1988); see also Margaret K. Hogg & Paul C. N. Michell, Identity, self and 
consumption: A conceptual framework, 12 J. MKTG. MGMT. 629 (1996); see also 
Janet Borgerson, Materiality, Agency, and the Constitution of Consuming Subjects: 
Insights For Consumer Research, NA-32 ACR N. AM. ADVANCES (2005), 
http://acrwebsite.org/volumes/9116/volumes/v32/NA-32 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2019); see also RUSSELL KEAT, THE AUTHORITY OF THE CONSUMER (1994). 
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consumers have to govern themselves and the market.12 Neoliberal 
governance thus enlists the consumer as a governance agent of 
themselves and of broader social change.13 We, therefore, suggest 
the need for a “label and chain governance analysis” for 
deconstructing both (a) the regulatory governance of the chain 
behind the food choices available to the consumer evident from the 
label and, relatedly, (b) the way in which labels seek to govern 
consumer choices.14  
The third part of the article introduces our case study of açaí 
berry “superfood” product labelling in Australia. The remainder of 
the article uses this case study to illustrate how our approach to 
deconstructing food labels as governance spaces can draw out the 
multiple, varied and complex politics of the global food system 
starting from the standpoint of the everyday consumer and 
uncovering the institutions and governance arrangements that 
support the supply chain as a whole. 
We show that misleading claims on labels go beyond simply 
attracting customers via meaningless puffery. Rather, these claims 
reinforce the neoliberal ideology, and related governance trajectory, 
that consumer power and markets are the optimal regulatory 
instrument for food systems. Through a close inspection, we unpack 
the nutritionist, primitivist undertones to the health claims (Part IV), 
the neo-colonial and racist dimensions in the description of the 
traditional groups behind açaí production connected to claims 
regarding fair trade and rural socio-economic development (Part V), 
and, finally, the use of green-washing claims about biodiversity 
conservation and ecological sustainability (Part VI). By depicting 
açaí as a product that can address a multitude of food system issues 
 
12 See Josee Johnston, Michelle Szabo & Alexandra Rodney, Good food, good 
people: Understanding the cultural repertoire of ethical eating, 11 J. CONSUMER 
CULTURE 293 (2011); see also Dr Mara Miele & Adrian Evans, When foods become 
animals: Ruminations on Ethics and Responsibility in Care-full practices of 
consumption, 13 ETHICS, PLACE & ENV’T 171 (2010). 
13 See Jane Dixon & Cathy Banwell, Re-embedding trust: unravelling the 
construction of modern diets, 14 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 117 (2004). 
14 This article furthers the socio-legal analysis of food label first developed by 
Parker: see Christine Parker, The Food Label as Governance Space: Free-Range 
Eggs and the Fallacy of Consumer Choice, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID, 101 
(2014); see also Christine Parker & Josephine De Costa, Misleading the Ethical 
Consumer: The Regulation of Free-Range Egg Labelling, 39 MELB. U. L. REV. 895 
(2015); see also Christine Parker et al., Can the Hidden Hand of the Market be an 
Effective and Legitimate Regulator? The Case of Animal Welfare Under a Labeling 
for Consumer Choice Policy Approach, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 368 (2017); see 
also Christine Parker, Rachel Carey & Gyorgy Scrinis, The Meat in the Sandwich: 
Welfare Labelling and the Governance of Meat-Chicken Production in Australia, 45 
J. L. & SOC’Y 341 (2018). See also further discussion infra at Part II C. 
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while still being a globally traded commodity, the need for collective, 
public-interested responses to global and local issues are obscured 
such as public health, social justice, rural development, conservation 
and ecological limits. Moreover, claims on food labels can 
contribute, as will be seen in the case of açaí, to recreating the types 
of food chains the claims purport the product to transform.   
The final part of this article (Part VII) turns to the 
implications the analysis has for the (de)construction of the chains 
binding consumer governance choices. We suggest an urgent need 
for scholars and activists to tease out the implications of analyses like 
these in terms of what choices consumers do and do not have, and 
what possibilities there are for friction and contestation in the 
governance chain for an emancipatory politics of the label. Critically 
examining the label as a (market) governance space points to the 
places where holistic food policy interventions at the national and 
international level are urgently needed to both empower citizens and 
create healthier, fairer and environmentally regenerative food 
systems.  
II.  Background and Methodological Approach  
 
A.  Consumer choice governance and global food chains 
 
As food supply chains expand globally, and food-processing 
technologies develop, consumers have more available options than 
ever before. Historically, colonial empires organized and controlled 
global food supply chains, and later food supply chains were 
organized around nation-states.15 Today, global food supply chains 
are arranged largely through networks of actors that operate 
somewhere “between arm’s length markets, on the one hand, and 
large vertically integrated corporations, on the other.”16 The actors 
within food supply chains develop, monitor or comply with varying 
regulatory instruments, such as corporate or international 
institutional codes of practices, guidelines, and standards, domestic 
and international laws, and contractual agreements. Meanwhile, state 
interventions in global supply chains are limited and shaped by, 
among other constraints, international trade and investment 
treaties.17   
 
15 Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State System: The 
rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present, 29 SOCIOLOGIA 
RURALIS 93, 96 (1989). 
16 Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey & Timothy Sturgeon, The governance of global 
value chains, 12 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 79 (2005). 
17 See, e.g., Anne Marie Thow et al., Will the next generation of preferential trade 
and investment agreements undermine prevention of noncommunicable diseases? A 
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With reduced state intervention, and notably high levels of 
corporate concentration, global food chains represent a neoliberal 
approach to governance in which private regulation and consumer 
choice are key organizing principles for food systems.18 
Underpinning these principles is the rationale that consumer choices 
send market signals through supply chains to the actors that influence 
where and how the supply chain functions, and under what 
conditions. When consumer choices are understood as holding the 
power to transform food value chains, then it falls heavily on each 
individual to make choices that contribute to food systems consistent 
with commonly shared values such as fairness and environmental 
stewardship. Given this positioning, consumer choice and individual 
responsibility can be understood as “a regulatory regime based on 
voluntarism, market solutions and the state acting at a distance.”19  
In this context, food labelling takes on a broader and deeper 
significance than solely a written descriptor of contents. Rather, food 
labels play a central role in framing the implications of food choices 
for the individual in terms of their identity, health status and social 
relationships, and with regard to signaling that consumer choices 
influence decisions made in supply chains.20  
Three separate bodies of work question the framing of 
consumer choice as a solution to health, environmental and justice 
issues in food systems. The first body of work centers on critically 
reviewing the dominant construction of individuals as responsible for 
their food choices and diet-related health outcomes.21 Scholars 
 
prospective policy analysis of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, 119 
HEALTH POL’Y 88, 89 (2015). 
18 David Burch & Geoffrey Lawrence, Towards a third food regime: behind the 
transformation, 26 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 267, 268 (2009); Kiah Smith, Geoffrey 
Lawrence & Carol Richards, Supermarkets’ Governance of the Agri-food Supply 
Chain: Is the “Corporate-Environmental” Food Regime Evident in Australia, 17 
INT’L J. SOC. AGRIC. & FOOD 140, 141 (2010). 
19 Unni Kjærnes, Ethics and Action: A Relational Perspective on Consumer Choice 
in the European Politics of Food, 25 J. AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 145, 147 (2012). 
20 BOURDIEU, supra note 11; SIDNEY WILFRED MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING 
FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS INTO EATING, CULTURE, AND THE PAST (1997); Carole A. 
Bisogni et al., Who We Are and How We Eat: A Qualitative Study of Identities in 
Food Choice, 34 J. OF NUTRITION EDUC. AND BEHAV. 128–139 (2002). 
21 See generally, Steven Shapin, Expertise, Common Sense, and the Atkins Diet, in 
EXPERTISE, COMMON SENSE, AND THE ATKINS DIET 174 (J Porter & PWB Phillips 
eds., 2007), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3425897 (finding that people are 
inclined to follow government food pyramids or privately researched diet plans); 
Robert Crawford, Health as a Meaningful Social Practice, 10 HEALTH 401, 402 
(2006) (stating that “personal responsibility for health is widely considered the sine 
qua non of individual autonomy and good citizenship.”); see also, JONATHAN M. 
METZL & ANNA KIRKLAND, AGAINST HEALTH: HOW HEALTH BECAME THE NEW 
MORALITY 9 (2010) (claiming that “individuals striving for health, are in some 
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acknowledge that individuals are, to an extent, personally 
responsible for their food choices and related health outcomes. 
Critically, though, environmental factors are significant determinants 
for the overconsumption of unhealthy foods. As Roberto et al. 
explains: 
A series of environmental factors are exploiting 
biological, psychological, social, and economic 
vulnerabilities of people in ways that undermine 
their ability to act in their long-term self-interest. 
The high profits that come from the successful 
exploitation of vulnerabilities are often the driving 
force behind environmental changes that promote 
overconsumption of food.22  
 
Researchers have examined the various strategies used to 
exploit these vulnerabilities. For instance, Scrinis23 and Nestle24 
show how the reductive emphasis on individual nutrients suits the 
commercial interests of food manufacturers. Similarly, Dixon and 
Banwell25 and Penders and Nellis26 critically investigate how 
interactions between food corporations, diet-disease researchers and 
other groupings of professionals (e.g. dietitians, chefs, personal 
trainers) construct credibility for food marketing claims, which in 
turn influences the scientific evidence on which regulators base their 
responses to product claims.  
The second body of work has focused on public regulation 
and private accreditation of particular ethical and political claims on 
food labels such as fair trade, organic, higher animal welfare and 
various quality and terroir claims.27 This line of research illuminates 
 
instances, rendered more difficult by the ways in which health are culturally 
configured and socially sustained.”) see also, Janne Huovila & Sampsa Saikkonen, 
Establishing credibility, constructing understanding: The epistemic struggle over 
healthy eating in the Finnish dietetic blogosphere, 20 HEALTH 383–400 (2016). 
22 Christina A. Roberto, et al., Patchy Progress on Obesity Prevention: Emerging 
Examples, Entrenched Barriers, and New Thinking, 385 LANCET 2400, 2404 (2015). 
23 GYORGY SCRINIS, NUTRITIONISM: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF DIETARY ADVICE 
49 (2013). 
24 MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES 
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 41 (2007). 
25 Dixon and Banwell, supra note 13, at 1. 
26 Pat Benders & Annemiek P. Nelis, Credibility Engineering in the Food Industry: 
Linking Science, Regulation, and Marketing in a Corporate Context, 24 SCIENCE IN 
CONTEXT 487, 487 (2011). 
27 See generally, Julie Guthman, The Polanyian Way? Voluntary Food Labels as 
Neoliberal Governance, 39 ANTIPODE 456, 456 (2007) (stating “[w]e expand upon 
the notion of the ‘credibility cycle’ through a study of credibility engineering by the 
food industry.”); see also, Brian Ilbery et al., Product, Process and Place: An 
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how consumer anxieties about, and distrust of, industrially produced, 
processed and distributed foods have created demand for niche 
markets and related schemes for verifying ethical claims. Consumer 
choices are constructed as performances of moral and political acts 
such as ethical or sustainable consumption,28 political 
consumerism29 and developmental consumption.30 Evan and Miele  
observe, “ethical food labels reflect a socio-political environment in 
which consumption is deemed to be an appropriate, if not a 
preeminent, field through which to exert influence over the ethics of 
the entire food system.”31 Yet much of this work shows that 
voluntary food label schemes create, at best, incremental and 
contingent change, and generally fail to create the space for deeper 
transformations of industrial food systems. Indeed, these ethical and 
political claims tend to legitimize, green-wash and reinforce 
confidence in the ability of market mechanisms to address food 
system issues.32  
The final key body of work connects the normative claims 
made through advertisements with cultures and societal structures 
that not only encourage but also depend on the over-consumption of 
 
Examination of Food Marketing and Labelling Schemes in Europe and North 
America, 12 EUR. URBAN & REGIONAL STUD. 116, 117 (2005) (discussing the 
importance of proper food labelling); HENRY BULLER & EMMA ROE, FOOD AND 
ANIMAL WELFARE (2018) (stating “[t]he central argument of this original book… is 
that the concern for the welfare of farm animals… constitutes a significant and vital 
linkage between the processes and the acts of consumption and production.”); TIM 
BARTLEY ET AL., LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE 
CONSCIENTIOUS CONSUMER (2015) (exploring the link between consumption and 
production processes in global industries).  
28 CLIVE BARNETT ET AL., GLOBALIZING RESPONSIBILITY: THE POLITICAL 
RATIONALITIES OF ETHICAL CONSUMPTION 15 (2010). 
29 MICHELLE MICHELETTI, POLITICAL VIRTUE AND SHOPPING INDIVIDUALS, 
CONSUMERISM, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (2003). 
30 Michael K. Goodman, The Mirror of Consumption: Celebritization, 
Developmental Consumption and the Shifting Cultural Politics of Fair Trade, 41 
GEOFORUM 104, 105 (2010). 
31 Adrian Evans & Mara Miele, Food Labelling as a Response to Political 
Consumption, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON CONSUMPTION 191 (Margit Keller et al. 
eds., 2017). 
32 Julie Guthman, Neoliberalism and the making of food politics in California, 39 
GEOFORUM 1171, 1173 (2008); Angela Tregear, Progressing knowledge in 
alternative and local food networks: Critical reflections and a research agenda, 27 
J. RURAL STUD. 419 (2011); Alison Hope Alkon & Teresa Marie Mares, Food 
sovereignty in US food movements: radical visions and neoliberal constraints, 29 
AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN VALUES 347, 347 (2012); Vaughan Higgins, Jacqui 
Dibden & Chris Cocklin, Neoliberalism and natural resource management: Agri-
environmental standards and the governing of farming practices, 39 GEOFORUM 
1776, 1777 (2008); cf. Edmund Harris, Neoliberal subjectivities or a politics of the 
possible? Reading for difference in alternative food networks, 41 AREA 55, 55 
(2009). 
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food.  The term “consumptogenic” environments refer to the varied 
factors that encourage individuals to excessively consume unhealthy 
products such as a societal emphasis on economic growth, marketing 
that fosters personal insecurity, and a culture that values fulfilling 
wants.33 The extreme emphasis on individualism within capitalist 
societies, inter alia, encourages individuals to construct their self-
identity and communicate their status to others through their 
consumption choices.34 In the case of food, the global trend away 
from consuming traditional foods based on distinct food cultures and 
ecosystems towards “Westernised” diets has diluted previously clear 
social rules around consumption.35 Consumers now depend heavily 
on food marketing including food labels (broadly defined) to 
construct their own value system for making food choices, which in 
turn informs their views of self.36 In our analysis of açaí berry labels 
below, we draw particularly on Warde’s argument that four sets of 
contradictory advice were commonly used to structure food choice 
in advertisements in British women’s magazines.37 These are (1) 
novelty and tradition; (2) health and indulgence; (3) convenience and 
care; and (4) economy and extravagance.38 Consistent with 
Bourdieu’s conceptualizations of the feedback loops between 
consumer choices, social position, and lifestyle, Warde argues that 
these “antinomies of taste” are far more than mere marketing 
devices.39 Rather, he suggests they are aimed at allaying consumer 
anxieties in relation to “real, contradictory appeals, representing 
social pressures that operate on food choice.”40 Similarly, Schneider 
and Davis’ content analysis of several decades of the Australian 
Women’s Weekly (Australia’s most popular magazine) shows how 
food advertisements purposely exploit these “antinomies of taste” to 
 
33 Jane Dixon & Cathy Banwell, Choice Editing for the Environment: Managing 
Corporate Risks, in RISK AND SOCIAL THEORY IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
180 (Thomas Measham & Stewart Lockie eds., 2012) (arguing that, “consumption 
moved from simply fulfilling the basic needs of shelter, food, clothing and mobility 
and acquired nationalistic, social and moral overtones.”); JOHN COVENEY, FOOD 49–
50 (2014).  
34 See SÉBASTIEN CHARLES, PARADOXICAL INDIVIDUALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GILLES LIPOVETSKY, HYPERMODERN TIMES 1, 15 (ANDREW BROWN TRANS., 2005). 
35 This trend is termed the “nutrition transition” and is associated with the “double 
burden of malnutrition” which refers to the converging malnutrition-related issues 
within societies and populations, that is, the prominence of diet-related NCDs 
associated with obesity and the continuation of undernutrition (i.e. hunger). See 
Barry M. Popkin, et al, NOW AND THEN: The Global Nutrition Transition: The 
Pandemic of Obesity in Developing Countries, 70 NUTR. REV. 3, 6–7 (2012). 
36 Fischler, supra note 11, at 277, 290–291. 
37 ALAN WARDE, CONSUMPTION, FOOD AND TASTE 49 (1997). 
38 Id. at 3. 
39 Id. at 55–56. 
40 Id. at 49. 
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create or trigger consumer feelings of risk and anxiety, which can 
then be immediately resolved by choosing the branded product.41  
Drawing on these three bodies of work, we connect and 
extend these analyses to show how a range of claims and 
representations (including implicit appeals to the four antinomies) on 
food labels reinforce the value of consumption and systematically 
undermine institutional resources and capacity to consider other 
ways food systems could function. 
B.  The Food Label as a Governance Space   
At the nexus of the various dimensions explored in the 
previous section lies our argument that the food label is a governance 
space. Recalling the broad definition of food labels outlined in the 
introduction, we consider the term “food labels” to encompass all the 
packaging, stories, and visual images made or displayed to 
consumers when food is sold.42 Besides their materiality, we 
consider food labels to be, firstly, representations of the decisions 
made in the value chain that influence its operation. The food label 
encapsulates “a particular socio-economic ordering of the food 
system.” Indeed, the distance between producers and consumers 
requires a narrative about the item’s qualities and value chain that 
fosters trust and attracts consumers.43 The label communicates that 
narrative.  
Secondly, we consider food labels to be performative or, as 
Evans and Miele put it, “devices.”44 Food labels hold potential to 
bring about material consequences by influencing supply chains and 
by contouring societal understandings of food system issues and 
solutions, thus channeling “our ethics and politics along certain pre-
set paths.”45 The food label is, therefore, a very small piece of 
“valuable real estate”46 on which larger contests over ecologies, 
markets and consumer bodies are all played out. 
 
41 Tanja Schneider & Teresa Davis, Advertising food in Australia: Between 
antinomies and gastro‐anomy, 13 CONSUMPTION MARKETS & CULTURE 31, 39 
(2010). 
42 As mentioned in the introduction we define the food “label” broadly, in line with 
legal definitions, as including all the tags, brands, marks, statements, 
representations, designs and descriptions made on a food and its packaging and 
made or displayed to consumers when it is sold. See note 10. 
43Evans and Miele, supra note 31, at 191.  
44Id. at 192. 
45Id. at 191. 
46 Paula O’Brien, Marginalising Health Information: Implications of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement for Alcohol Labelling, 41 MELB. U. L. REV. 341, 341 
(2017). 
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Corresponding with this understanding of food labels, our 
analysis specifically focuses on how food labels implicitly and 
explicitly represent and act on the governance systems that support 
and construct food chains. As mentioned in the introduction, we draw 
here on the insight of regulatory studies where scholars show that 
regulation is not a top-down state-centric imposition of rules. Rather, 
regulation emerges from ongoing interactions (e.g. conflicts, 
alliances, modelling and mimicking) among multiple actors 
(including government, industry and civil society), with each actor 
seeking to exercise power legitimately and effectively at specific or 
multiple levels from local and national to regional and global.47  
The significance of these interactions goes beyond setting 
rules and monitoring compliance. These interactions determine what 
products are available, who produces them, how they are produced, 
and under what conditions. They determine the methods and 
materials used in processing, packaging and trading and, crucially for 
this analysis, how a product is available for sale and marketed. 
Finally, these interactions determine the contractual, legislative and 
certification conditions that shape how actors carry out supply chain 
activities and communicate to consumers.  
C.  Methodology for Deconstructing Food Labels as  
Governance Spaces  
The growth of processed and packaged food, supermarket 
concentration, and quality claims on food makes human interaction 
with food labelling an everyday experience. We suggest, inspired by 
Dorothy Smith’s “sociology for people,”48 that it is possible and 
important to start a socio-legal analysis of food labels as governance 
spaces from the standpoint of a person going about their daily life. 
From this standpoint, Smith suggests that scholars can use 
“institutional ethnography” to unpack the complex social and 
institutional arrangements within which everyday experience is 
embedded. Smith shows how this approach can “enlarge the scope 
of what becomes visible from that site, mapping the relations that 
connect one local site to others” (emphasis added).49 
Smith describes the purpose of this “institutional ethnography” as 
twofold:  
One is to produce for people what might be called 
‘maps’ of the ruling relations and specifically the 
 
47 EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 9, at 17; Colin Scott, Analysing regulatory space: 
fragmented resources and institutional design, PUBLIC LAW 329, 330 (2001). 
48 SMITH, supra note 8. 
49 Id. at 29. 
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institutional complexes in which they participate in 
whatever fashion. People’s knowledge of their 
everyday world is thereby expanded beyond the 
scope of what can be learned in the ordinary ways 
they go about their everyday activities . . . The 
second aim is to build knowledge and methods of 
discovering the institutions and, more generally, the 
ruling relations of contemporary Western society.50  
 
In this case, we use what the consumer sees on food labels 
as our starting point from which to illuminate the broader regulatory 
and institutional complexes that frame consumers’ food choices. 
Following Smith, we start with what a consumer sees when they 
wander down food aisles of supermarkets, scroll through online food 
stores, or peruse a café menu. We then map and evaluate the 
relations, institutions and governance processes, mediated through 
food labelling, that influence individual consumers and how food 
systems function. Besides Smith, our focus is inspired by the 
emphasis that new materialism in food studies places on the 
importance of geographies, objects and non-human living beings in 
understanding the food system.51  
This approach to deconstructing food labels was previously 
suggested and applied by Parker.52 While Parker preliminarily 
termed the method “backwards mapping,” in this article we develop 
the methodology further and refer to the approach as a “label and 
chain governance analysis” for “deconstructing food labels as a 
governance space.” We prefer this terminology because it better 
encapsulates our understanding of the food label as both 
representative and performative in the relationship between the 
consumer and the food chain.53 That is, we suggest the need for 
deconstructing both (a) the regulatory governance of the chain 
behind the food choices available to the consumer evident from the 
 
50 Id. at 51. 
51 Ilbery et al., supra note 27; Julian Agyeman et al., Trends and Directions in 
Environmental Justice: From Inequity to Everyday Life, Community, and Just 
Sustainabilities, 41 ANNUAL REV. ENV’T & RES. 321, 330-331 (2016); David 
Goodman, Ontology Matters: The Relational Materiality of Nature and Agro-Food 
Studies, 41 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 182, 183 (2001). 
52 See, e.g., Christine Parker, The food label as a governance space: free-range eggs 
and the fallacy of consumer choice, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 101, 101 (2014) 
(“Investigating how the choices presented to consumers on [their] labels have been 
constructed.”). 
53 Evans and Miele adopted a similar framing of the food label as both an icon 
(symbolic) and a device (capable of bringing about material change). See, Evans & 
Miele, supra note 31. 
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label and, relatedly, (b) the way in which labels govern consumer 
choices. 
The methodology for deconstructing food labels is based on 
visual sociology. It derives from the notion that “valid scientific 
insight in society can be acquired by observing, analyzing and 
theorizing its visual manifestations: behavior of people and material 
products of culture.”54 In the context of complex, globalized supply 
chains, the methodology of visual sociology offers opportunities to 
“bridge some of the disconnections in the contemporary food web.”55 
The food label can be, literally, seen as a visual embodiment of 
supply chain actors interacting with the consumer. In practice, 
deconstructing food labels requires the researcher to consider the 
food label as an everyday “found” object and engage with the 
combined effect of a label’s visuals and text on the claims and stories 
it provides.56 
Deconstructing food labels combines visual sociology and 
regulatory network analyses with supply chain mapping, 
ethnographic and geographic research. Chain mapping entails 
mapping the product and information flows as well as relationships 
between the actors along the supply chain. This entails identification 
of key chain actors, a mapping of the functions of the actors, 
consideration of the various actors’ goals, and identification of where 
the most value is added to the product.57 The chain mapping aspect 
to the methodology allows the researcher to understand the material 
arrangements that connect consumers at the end of the value chain to 
the producers and ecologies at the start of the chain without lapsing 
into sentimentalism or sensationalism. Additionally, deconstructing 
food labels also requires an examination of the regimes developed to 
regulate the value chain, the interactions among these regimes (or 
lack thereof), and their interactions with state-based regulation.58 
Throughout the analysis, geographic and anthropological research 
provides context for the value chain and its drivers and impacts, as 
well as relevant empirical evidence for the label’s claims. In sum, the 
aim is for a sober assessment of socio-economic governance 
 
54 LUC PAUWELS, REFRAMING VISUAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: TOWARDS A MORE VISUAL 
SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (2015). 
55 Gilbert W. Gillespie, Visual Sociology and Food, 6 J. FOR THE STUDY OF FOOD 
AND SOC’Y 7, 7 (2003). 
56 Carol Richards, Geoffrey Lawrence & David Burch, Supermarkets and Agro-
industrial Foods, 14 FOOD, CULTURE & SOC’Y 29, 38–39 (2011). 
57 See, e.g., Simon Bolwig et al., A Methodology for Integrating Developmental 
Concerns into Value Chain Analysis and Interventions, in MARKETS AND RURAL 
POVERTY: UPGRADING IN VALUE CHAINS 21, 23 (Jonathan Mitchell & Christopher 
Coles eds., 2011). 
58 Eberlein et al., supra note 9, at 3. 
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arrangements that create particular value chains to inform 
understandings of what these processes mean for the potential to 
change the food chain specifically and food systems more generally. 
D.  Label and Chain Governance Analysis 
Following initial observations, the researcher begins 
systematically collecting data on each product available for sale. The 
core of this stage involves a segment by segment observation and 
documentation of the label’s textual content and tone, certification 
marks, trademarks and other visuals, as well as a collective look and 
feel of the label including branding, color and font choices. At the 
end of this stage, the researcher should be able to make quantitative 
conclusions about the main messages communicated to the consumer 
via the product label and have an idea of the governance practices 
and governmentality emerging. 
For the second stage, the researcher maps out the value chain 
that brings the products to market with an emphasis on the various 
formal and informal governance arrangements influencing supply 
chain activities. This entails identification of the key stages a product 
moves through from production to consumption and of the main 
actors involved in the supply chain in terms of their role, information 
and resources.  
Proceeding to the third step, the researcher delves deeper into 
the analysis by critically examining the actors, their interests and 
values, interactions between actors, and the form or nature of these 
interactions.59 Here, the researcher uses a variety of data collection 
methods to more deeply delineate the governance relations 
implicated by the label. This includes empirical research methods 
(e.g. interviews, fieldwork, desktop review) and an examination of 
secondary scholarly and activist research.  
Finally, the researcher returns to what the consumer sees to 
make visible the meaning and significance of the inferred governance 
relations. At this stage, the researcher interrogates what the label 
includes and excludes from its communication with the consumer, 
and considers the interests and values served by providing or not 
providing information or by portraying an aspect of the value chain 
in a particular way. Questions relevant to this aspect include: How 
have those who have sought to unsettle and change dominant food 
chains used regulation to do so? How have the dominant players used 
regulation in their responses? What values and interest (that is, what 
rationalities of governance) do the regulatory options chosen 
 
59 Id. 
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represent? What alternative regulatory options and associated values 
and interests have been sidelined or occluded? Which are still 
available or might be available in the future? To what extent have 
choices already made constricted or co-opted the potential for further 
critique and contestation, or to what extent have they opened up 
possibilities for further dialogue and change? What supply chain 
actors are mentioned on the label, which actors are not, and how are 
they depicted? What activities in the supply chain are communicated 
and which activities are not?  
III.  Case Study: Açai Berries   
A.  Origins, Practices and Popularity  
Açaí berries originate from two types of palms that grow 
along the Amazon river from Bolivia to Brazil.60 Originally 
consumed largely by rural, floodplain groups called Amazonian 
ribeirinhos, açaí became popular throughout Brazil by the early 
1990s due to internal migration of these people to provincial cities.61 
Western tourists exported the berry to Los Angeles in the later 
1990s.62 The two most common açaí products on the market are 
frozen smoothie packs and açaí powders, which are both used in 
various beverages or, for the powders, in baking.  
When first imported into the US, açaí was a niche product 
described as “[a] cult phenomenon, popular mostly among young, 
male extreme-sport enthusiasts… skaters, surfers, snowboarders.”63 
It became widely popular after Dr. Nicholas Perricone, a New York 
dermatologist and “anti-ageing expert,” presented açaí as a 
“superfood” for its “anti-ageing properties” in his book that was 
featured on the Oprah Winfrey Show in 2003 and 2004.64 By 2013, 
“açaí-laced products grossed nearly $200 million in the United 
States.”65 Açaí followed a highly similar trajectory in Australia when 
 
60 Jie Kang, et al., Bioactivities of açaí (Euterpe precatoria Mart.) fruit pulp, 
superior antioxidant and anti-inflammatory properties to Euterpe oleraca 
Mart, 133 FOOD CHEMISTRY 671, 671 (2012).  
61 John Colapinto, Strange Fruit: The rise and fall of açaí, NEW YORKER (May 30, 
2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/30/strange-fruit-john-colapi 
nto. 
62 Michael Heinrich, Tasleem Dhanji & Ivan Casselman, Açai (Euterpe oleracea 
Mart.)—A phytochemical and pharmacological assessment of the species’ health 
claims, 4 PHYTOCHEMISTRY LETTERS 10–21 (2011). 
63 Colapinto, supra note 61. 
64 Susan Donaldson James, “Superfood” Açaí May Not Be Worth Price, ABC NEWS 
(DEC. 12, 2018), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Diet/story?id=6434350&page=1. 
65 Tom Philpott, Are Quinoa, Chia Seeds, and Other “Superfoods” a Scam?, 
MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/06/are-superfoods 
-quinoa-chia-goji-good-for-you/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
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it was first imported in the early 2000s. Similar to açaí’s original 
market in LA, açaí began being distributed in Australia through stalls 
and cafes in beachside health conscious areas such as the Gold Coast 
and Bondi beach.66 Freeze-dried açaí powder, capsules and tonics 
began to be sold in retail and health stores in the mid to late 2000s.67 
Because açaí berries begin to spoil within 24 hours of being 
harvested, export of the berries to a broader consumer base was only 
made possible by advances in food processing, preservation and 
transportation technologies. They are 1 to 2 cm in diameter and 
contain a large seed that makes up about 80 to 90% of the fruit in 
both size and weight.68 The seeds are covered in a thin, oily coat, 
which is the edible pulp layer, and tough, fibrous outer layers.69 
Generally, the manufacturing of açaí juice entails the açaí berries 
being soaked in (often, hot and/or chlorinated followed by potable) 
water, added to a rotation device that separates the seeds, pulped and 
sieved in a machine, mixed with citric acid, pasteurized and then 
frozen for and throughout transportation.70 The juice produced is 
then subject to further processing to make either smoothie or powder 
packs. Both products require costly and complex machinery to create 
the right kind of environment, texture and color.71 
The changing role of açaí from mainly traditional diets in the 
place of production to a high value Western “superfood” spruiked by 
 
66 Jacquie Hayes, Berried treasure, AUSTRALIAN (Aug 19, 2011), http://www.the 
australian.com.au/business/the-deal-magazine/berried-treasure/news-story/6c03ef1 
7df23992527a633b07a3f4f4e; Cornelia Voigt et al., Health tourism in Australia: 
supply, demand and opportunities (2011), http://search.ror.unisa.edu.au/record/UN 
ISA_ALMA51138625960001831). 
67 Emily Crane, Meet the University Dropout who Started Importing Açaí Berries 
for a Juice Bar at 22 and Now Makes One Million Dollars a Month, DAILY MAIL 
AUSTRL. (May 1, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3063723/Univer 
sity-dropout-started-importing-açaí-berries-business-makes-one-million-dollars-
month-sleeps-tepee.html. 
68 Lisbeth A. Pacheco-Palencia, Christopher E. Duncan & Stephen T. Talcott, 
Phytochemical composition and thermal stability of two commercial açai species, 
Euterpe oleracea and Euterpe precatoria, 115 FOOD CHEMISTRY 1199, 1199 (2009). 
69 Id. 
70 Rosanna Iris Ayala, Fermentation and Supercritical Extraction Studies of Açaí 
Berry 9–10 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished M.S.C.H. thesis, University of South Florida), 
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5157&context=etd. 
71 Karin Nordström Dyvelkov & Jakob Sloth, Chapter 6 - New Advances in Spray-
Drying Processes, in MICROENCAPSULATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 57, 57 (2014), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124045682000066 (last 
visited Feb 27, 2018); Mariana A. Pavan, Shelly J. Schmidt & Hao Feng, Water 
sorption behavior and thermal analysis of freeze-dried, Refractance Window-dried 
and hot-air dried açaí (Euterpe oleracea Martius) juice, 48 LWT - FOOD SCIENCE 
& TECH. 75, 75 (2012). 
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Oprah and sold as far away as Bondi Beach is a good example of the 
creation of global food chains and the way they are represented to 
consumers. In Australia, like the US, açaí products are sold in a 
variety of forms and retail locations (as shown below) and have 
become an established niche in the market – thus allowing for 
observation of a variety of marketing claims on the labels. Yet, it is 
a small enough niche to enable data collection that covers the whole 
market thus allowing us to take a snapshot of the whole market for a 
relatively new product and the way it tries to establish itself to 
consumers.  
B.  Data  
Following the approach described above to critically 
examine the food label as governance space, we identified 49 açaí 
berry products on sale in Australia as of September 2017, which were 
sold through 41 Australian businesses. Most of these products are 
either: a) frozen açaí berry pulp and açaí berry powders and capsules 
for individual consumption or b) frozen açaí berry pulp sold in cafés 
(in ready to eat bowls and smoothies) and health store retailers. These 
products were identified through multiple searches over various 
public and private databases for companies, trademarks or products 
that used the word “açaí.”72 Following the initial database searches, 
the researchers conducted online or physical site visits. 
Upon identifying an açaí product advertised for sale in 
Australia, all information regarding each product visible to the 
consumer was recorded, compiled, and thematically coded. Relevant 
sources of information included written online product descriptions, 
pictures, signs or symbols in the product description or on the 
packaging, other information on labels (e.g. slogans), and pamphlets 
at point-of-sale. Five common themes, or product claims, were 
identified:73 
1. Açaí berries are uniquely nutritious;  
2. Açaí berry consumption is rooted in traditional knowledges 
and practices;  
 
72 In order of search: all trademarks registered in Australia with the terms ‘açaí’ or 
‘amazon’ on IP Australia; all business names with the term ‘açaí’ on ASIC business 
and company names database; products with the keyword ‘açaí’ in a product name 
search in the Australian Certified Organics (ACO) database; products of Australian 
sellers on ebay.com.au. Specialist açaí cafes were only included if they do not source 
through a wholesaler or if they do not appear to source through a wholesaler and 
were marketed as specialist açaí cafes. A full list of the brands included in our 
sample is available from the first author upon request. 
73 A table showing the products and types of claim made on each product is available 
from the first author upon request.  
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3. Purchasing açaí berries contributes to poverty reduction and 
facilitates sustainable livelihoods;  
4. Açaí berries are organic; and 
5. Açaí berry production preserves the Amazon.  
 
These claims are often on the same label and, as we will 
show, reinforce each other. Accordingly, we have further grouped 
them into three meta-claims: those claims focused on the health 
benefits of consumption of the açaí berry (claims 1 and 2), those 
claims relating to how purchasing açaí berries contributes to poverty 
reduction and facilitates sustainable livelihoods (claim 3), and finally 
those claims that açaí berries are produced in an environmentally 
sustainable manner (claims 4 and 5). The remainder of the paper 
analyzes the results for each of these meta-claims in turn. 
IV.  Health: Nutritionism and Primitivism  
A.  Nutritionism  
Of the 49 açaí products identified in the Australian market 
place, all labels referred to the large concentration of ‘antioxidants’ 
and other chemical compounds in the açaí berry. About a third of the 
products claimed that açaí berries could help with serious diseases 
like cancer or heart disease, and a third claimed that açaí berry 
products have anti-ageing properties. This is frequently explained in 
highly scientific terminology. For example, “Kiss the Berry” cafes in 
Brisbane claim that açaí:  
…contains high levels of essential fatty acids 
(omega 3’s in particular) known for their cardio and 
neuro-protective and anti-inflammatory effect. It is 
super rich in antioxidants to reduce cholesterol, 
contains 19 different amino acids to optimize brain 
signaling pathways, and is rich in minerals and 
vitamins (especially calcium and vitamin E) for 
healthy hair, skin and nails.  
 
At the same time, however, “Kiss the Berry” goes on to 
neatly juxtapose the health benefits of açaí with pleasure:  
So now you’re probably thinking ‘Surely something 
that good for me, can’t possibly taste good.’ Well, 
eating your own words has never been so delicious. 
When the berries are blended, we describe it as a 
fruit sorbet with hints of dark chocolate and red 
wine. What’s not to like? 
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This common juxtaposition speaks to consumer anxiety 
regarding the need to continuously choose between hedonism and 
health or, in Warde’s terms,74 the antinomie of health and 
indulgence. The antinomie is resolved in a gendered way. In her 
critical discourse analysis of superfood marketing, Sikka75 notes that 
the great majority of superfood advertisements are targeted at women 
and marketed as “a solution to the highly confusing message women 
are given with respect to the need to maintain a thin body at the same 
time as giving in to junk food.” We found that attention is 
increasingly being given to youthful, muscular male gendered bodies 
in açaí advertising consistent with idealized images of male bodies, 
and exemplified by, for instance, a newer brand (“Açaí Brothers”) 
focused on health and fitness.  
The previous work of Curll et al76 comprehensively 
examined the research findings behind these health claims. Curll et 
al found no evidence to support the unique health and anti-ageing 
claims made for açaí berry products over many other nutrient-dense 
foods. Rather, the labelling of these products conflates the well-
accepted health benefits of antioxidants and other nutrients found in 
a variety of “normal” fresh, unbranded fruits and vegetables with 
claims exaggerating the unproven benefits of particular 
phytochemicals apparently found in higher concentrations in açaí 
berries.77 This is a form of “nutritionism”, a reductionist emphasis on 
micro-nutrients.78 
B.  Primitivism 
Açaí is heavily promoted to western consumers as a 
“traditional food.”  All 49 of the products in our survey directly made 
claims regarding the traditional role of açaí in the diets of those on 
the Amazonian floodplains. For example, one line of products point 
 
74 Warde, supra note 37, at 70.  
75 Sikka focused on how the marketing for many sweeter superfoods like açaí centres 
on the sweetness and decadence of the food, which is consistent with the traditional 
connection drawn in Western societies between the consumption of sweets by 
women as related to pleasure, sex, desire and lust, and the cultural expectation that 
these wants should be policed. See Contemporary Superfood Cults: Nutritionism, 
Neoliberalism and Gender, in FOOD CULTS: HOW FADS, DOGMA, AND DOCTRINE 
INFLUENCE DIET 87, 93, 95 (Kima Cargill ed., 2017).  
76 Curll et al., Unlocking the Energy of the Amazon: The Need for a Food Fraud 
Policy Approach to the Regulation of Anti-Ageing Health Claims on Superfood 
Labelling, 44 FED. L. REV. 419, 448 (2016). This study was based on an earlier 
version of the same product survey as the research in the current article – but focused 
only on the health claims on the products. 
77 Id. at 435.  
78 Dana Sturtevant & Hilary Kinavey, Nutritionism, BE NOURISHED (OCT. 10, 2016), 
https://benourished.org/nutritionism/. 
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out that açaí was a “staple of Amazon natives for hundreds of 
years.”79 Another assures the consumer that açaí, and the other 
superfoods in the range, “have been fueling indigenous people 
around the world for thousands of years.”80  
These exotic superfoods are thus marketed at the intersection 
of scientific nutritionism and nutritional primitivism.81 They tell the 
consumer that the product is verified by both Western science and 
indigenous tradition.  This is appealing because it transcends the 
antinomie between novelty and traditional foods.82 Nutritional 
primitivism “privileges ancient or indigenous knowledge and 
‘natural’ production practices in a nostalgic search for authenticity in 
the diet and its related health outcomes, in contrast to those food and 
health cultures and regimes seen as ‘tainted’ by complex modern 
technologies.”83 The marketing of açaí berries invokes novel 
nutritionist discourse while still appealing to those who might 
eschew non-traditional foods based on novel technologies (such as 
fortification and genetic manipulation) that produce functional foods 
with higher nutrients.84 
Nevertheless, the way açaí is processed and consumed today 
is far removed from traditional practices. Indigenous Amazonians 
domesticated the palm for use in construction over 8000 years ago.85 
They did consume, but did not rely on, açaí berries before 
colonization. During European colonization (roughly 1494 to 1815) 
açaí became a staple for Amazonian peasants in riverine areas (i.e. 
Amazonian ribeirinhos).86 Since this time, açaí has been consumed 
after being soaked in water, pulped, strained and then drunk, added 
to grains or served with fish or meats. Brazil’s dietary guidelines 
 
79 JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 2, at 316. 
80 About Us, Lᴀ Kᴜʟᴛ, https://www.la-kult.com.au/pages/about-us (last visited Mar. 
13, 2019). 
81 Loyer, supra note 5, at 1, 4. 
82 WARDE, supra note 37 at 55. 
83 Loyer, supra note 5, at 3. 
84 See Jessica Loyer, Communicating Superfoods: A Case Study of Maca Packaging, 
in FOOD AND COMMUNICATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE OXFORD SYMPOSIUM ON FOOD 
AND COOKERY 236, 241 (Mark McWilliams ed. 2015).  
85 The Myth of the Pristine Amazon Rainforest, MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT 
(March 08, 2017),https://www.mpg.de/11147178/amazon-rainforest-pre-columbian 
(last visited Feb 15, 2019). 
86 Eduardo S. Brondizio, Agriculture Intensification, Economic Identity, and Shared 
Invisibility in Amazonian Peasantry: Caboclos and Colonists in Comparative 
Perspective, 26 CULTURE & AGRIC. 1, 6 (2004). 
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continue to recommend eating açaí with cassava flour or grits and 
fish.87 
By contrast, Western consumers eat frozen açaí as a dessert, 
smoothie or breakfast item, combined with fruits. Contrary to some 
products’ claims to be “teaching Australians how to eat and prepare 
Açaí as the locals do in the streets of Brazil,”88 Fajan observed that 
the Western way of eating açaí is commonly viewed within the key 
açaí production region as disrespectful and inappropriate.89 
According to traditional beliefs, açaí has a reputation for being “a 
heavy food that weighs you down and makes you lethargic.”90 
Traditional beliefs in Brazil also associate the inter-mixing of açaí 
with other vegetables and fruits with indigestion.91 Yet, western 
marketing claims that açaí is a “natural energy boost,” an “energizing 
superfood,” a “sustained energy boost.” This representation is what 
MacCannell92 refers to as “staged authenticity,” that is, a product is 
presented as authentic, but the representation of the product for 
western consumers displaces the cultural meaning of the product for 
those who traditionally produce and consume it.  
This cultural displacement in the western market place 
reflects a more literal displacement of açaí in diets in the Amazon. 
For Amazon ribeirinhos today, while açaí is still an accompaniment 
to the staple foods of fish and manioc, there have recently been 
significant declines in açaí consumption. Açaí is increasingly 
replaced by the global commodities of soy oil, meat93 and sugar.94 
This is the neocolonial flip side of the globalization of the food 
supply that has brought açaí to western consumers. While western 
consumers are sold açaí as a disease-preventing solution to unhealthy 
western lifestyles,95 the Amazonian ribeirinhos are joining the global 
nutrition transition and the associated rise in the prevalence of diet-
 
87 Dietary Guidelines for the Brazilian Population, MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF BRAZIL, 
1, 71 (2014), http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/publicacoes/dietary_guidelines_brazil 
ian_population.pdf. 
88 About Amazon Power, Aᴍᴀᴢᴏɴ Pᴏᴡᴇʀ, https://www.amazonpower.com.au/about-
us.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).  
89 JANE FAJANS, BRAZILIAN FOOD: RACE, CLASS AND IDENTITY IN REGIONAL 
CUISINES 64 (2013). 
90 Id. at 65. 
91 Id. at 64. 
92 Dean MacCannell, Staged Authenticity: Arrangements of Social Space in Tourist 
Settings, 79 AMERICAN J. SOCIOLOGY 589, 602 (1973). 
93 Rui Sérgio Sereni Murrieta et al., Food consumption and ecology of riparian 
populations in two Amazonian ecosystems: a comparative study, 21 REVISTA DE 
NUTRIÇÃO 123, 128 (2008). 
94 Id. 
95 Curll et al., supra note 76, at 420; MacGregor, Petersen, and Parker, supra note 
1. 
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related non-communicable diseases. We return to the neocolonial 
implications of açaí marketing in Part V. 
C.  Market-based Governance of Health Claims  
As Frohlich has shown in the US context, health claims and 
nutritional labelling were largely prohibited on food items 
throughout the western world prior to the 1970s on the basis that such 
information would confuse consumers by conflating the properties 
of pharmaceuticals and foods.96 Nutrition labelling emerged in the 
1970s as a form of consumer empowerment and now reflects the 
“belief that it is better to manage markets indirectly through 
information than directly through product bans and standards.”97 
This approach reinforces the market by suggesting that consumers 
can govern the market via businesses’ self-regulatory responses to 
consumer choices.  
The regulation of health claims on food in Australia is 
broadly similar to the US and likewise tends to reinforce this 
neoliberal approach. Food Standards Australia and New Zealand 
(FSANZ) take an equivalent role to that of the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Both FSANZ and the FDA set standards for 
food labelling,98 and prohibit health claims that cannot be 
substantiated by evidence.99 In the US, the FDA is guided by the 
principle of “significant scientific agreement”100 among qualified 
experts when deciding whether to allow a proposed health claim on 
a food product. The FDA applies this standard as part of a systematic 
review of evidence regarding the causal link between a food and a 
health effect. FSANZ also requires “systematic scientific reviews of 
the evidence to establish causal links between a food and health 
 
96 Xaq Frohlich, The Informational Turn in Food Politics: The US FDA’s Nutrition 
Label as Information Infrastructure, 47 Sᴏᴄ. STUD. SCI. 145, (2017).  
97 Id. at 147.  
98 Australia New Zealand Food Standards Regulations 1994 (FSANZ Code); see 
Standards 1.2.1 and 1.2.7. (reflecting internationally agreed principles for food 
regulation set out in Codex Alimentarius 1991: principle 1.2, Codex General 
Guidelines on Claims); see Curll et al., supra note 76, at 445 (“In the US, ‘health 
claims’ on food that expressly, or by implication, characterise a relationship between 
any substance and a disease, or health related-condition, must be approved by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before market”).  
99 Nutrition Labelling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 101 Stat. 
2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301). 
100 Guidance for Industry: Evidence-Based Review System for the Scientific 
Evaluation of Health Claims—Final, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda 
.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Labeli
ngNutrition/ucm073332.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2019). 
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effect before a health claim can be made” on food.101 Neither the 
FDA nor FSANZ requires particular kinds of scientific evidence, and 
both institutions can authorize the full version of a health claim or a 
qualified version of the health claim.102  
Many general level health claims, such as those health claims 
on açaí product labels that do not mention a specific disease or claim 
a specific health effect, can be made in the US, Australia and New 
Zealand without pre-market approval. Rather, Australia and New 
Zealand use a self-substantiated procedure that allows the food 
business to determine whether a general health claim is supported by 
manufacturer evidence.103 Similarly, the US adopts a lower threshold 
for general health claims that requires only notification from the food 
manufacturer with an authoritative statement of support from a list 
of legislatively approved scientific bodies.104 In practice, then, the 
monitoring and compliance of health claims in Australia and New 
Zealand, similar to the US, is left largely to business self-regulation. 
Even where the regulator has to pre-approve claims, it generally 
relies largely on evidence provided by the food business. There is 
little or no proactive monitoring of what claims are actually made on 
products, whether they have been pre-approved or self-substantiated, 
or what overall message is being provided in the market place.105  
This means that exaggerated health claims flourish, as do 
representations that reinforce highly gendered understandings of 
desirable body types and attitudes as well as inaccurate claims about 
traditional uses of the food. The EU, in contrast to the US, Australia 
and New Zealand, demands a higher level of scientific evidence 
(randomized control trials) and requires regulatory pre-approval of 
all health claims.106 This means that superfood health claims such as 
 
101 Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426; see Food Standards Australia New Zealand, 
Food Standards Code Standard 1.2.7, s 18(3)(b) (prescribing the elements of a 
systematic review). 
102 See Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426; Richard Nowak, DSHEA’S Failure: Why 
a Proactive Approach to Dietary Supplement Regulation Is Needed to Effectively 
Protect Consumers, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1056–57 (2010). 
103 Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426. 
104 Food & Drug Admin. Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 105 Stat. 
1677 (1997) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 379). 
105 Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426–27 (discussing the general lack of oversight 
and pre-approval requirements under the regulatory system). 
106 Only European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)-approved food-health 
relationships and their authorized health and nutrition claims determined by the 
European Commission (EC) are permitted for use in the sale of food.  Regulation 
(EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 
2006 on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods [2006] OJ L 404/9, art 1(3) 
(‘Health Claims Regulation (EC) 1924/2006’). The EU register on nutrition and 
health claims permitted for use in the sale of foods can be 
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those found on açaí products in Australia and the US are absent from 
the European marketplace.107  
In Australia, the monitoring and enforcement of misleading 
health and other marketing claims are left to the consumer regulator, 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
The ACCC, like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US, 
enforces the general legal prohibition on false, misleading or 
deceptive conduct in trade and commerce. US law also grants 
specific powers to the FDA to take enforcement action in relation to 
deceptive food labels and labelling (broadly defined). This creates 
some overlap between the powers of the FDA and the FTC but the 
FTC tends to hold the primary enforcement role.108 In relation to açaí 
berry non-food products, the FTC has taken enforcement action by 
seeking and receiving injunctions over the websites of particular açaí 
berry products marketed as dietary supplements.109 Yet, as scholars 
observed the “deceptive practices on the part of companies not party 
to the FTC action have continued.”110 
Enforcement often relies on the ability of consumers and 
food system advocates to successfully notice misleading claims, 
bring them to the attention of the appropriate regulator, and persuade 
the regulator that the issue is significant enough for the regulator to 
take enforcement action out of the other thousands of potential 
actions available to it. However, misleading representations of açaí 
on açaí food labels, as identified later in this article, have not so far 
prompted action in either jurisdiction. After all, Western consumers 
are unlikely to know and complain about details about Amazonian 
 
accessed: <http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/?event=register.home>. 
107 The EFSA Scientific NDA Panel has rejected the vast majority of food business 
health claim substantiation dossiers submitted to it. See European Food Safety 
Authority Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies, General Guidance 
for Stakeholders on the Evaluation of Article 13.1, 13.5 and 14 Health Claims, 9 
EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY J. 2135 (2011). Based on the submitted, assessed 
evidence, EFSA has since 2010 rejected all 149 attempts to substantiate food health 
relationships involving the word ‘antioxidant’, and accepted only one out of 19 
industry submissions regarding ‘polyphenols’. See Aalt Bast et al., Scientism, 
Legalism and Precaution—Contending with Regulating Nutrition and Health 
Claims in Europe, 6 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 401 (2013) (reviewing the European 
approach to health claims on food); see also Curll et al., supra note 76, at 443–44 
(providing a more detailed discussion of the European approach in comparison with 
the Australian and US approach). 
108 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 378(a), (b) (1938). 
109 See, e.g., Complaint at 23, Fed. Trade Comm’n v Cent Coast Neutrecules Inc., 
10 Cv. 04931 (E.D. Ill. 2012). 
110 A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: The 
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling Enforcement 
Recent Developments, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 155 (2011). 
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ribeirinhos’ traditional consumption of açaí’. Nor have Amazonian 
ribeirinhos complained nor pushed for rules that require tradition and 
culture be accurately portrayed at the other end of the value chain. 
We argue in the next section that these inaccurate claims are not just 
trivial marketing puff. They help reinforce a food system in which 
those in the Amazon where the açaí was grown and eaten can be 
exploited. 
V.  Fair Trade: Racism and Neo-colonialism  
A.  Rural Socio-economic Development Claims   
After health claims, the next most common claims on açaí 
products concerned the benefits of açaí production and sale in 
reducing poverty and facilitating sustainable livelihoods for the rural 
communities of the Amazon. Twenty of the açaí products made 
claims regarding how the purchases of açaí benefit Amazon 
communities through increased incomes. Three products even went 
as far as to proclaim that “[t]he manual harvesting of the berries also 
provides hundreds of jobs for the indigenous tribes around Brazil and 
helps minimize the human trafficking and deforestation that these 
tribes would otherwise partake in to make ends meet.”111  
Açaí’s international popularity has created economic 
opportunities for those Amazonian ribeirinhos involved in 
cultivating the palms, harvesting the berries and/or operating the 
boats to transport the berries to processing facilities as well as for 
those employed in the associated industries for açaí processing and 
export.112 Indeed, Brondizio, a leading anthropologist on rural 
populations in the Amazon, claimed that “[t]here may be no better 
example of an economic prospect for overcoming underdevelopment 
in rural Amazonia than the case of açaí palm fruit production 
system.”113 
 
111 AMAZON POWER PTY LTD., https://www.amazonpower.com.au/what-is-açaí.asp 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (marketing the “Amazon Power Açaí Smoothie Packs”, 
“Amazon Power Pure Açaí Pulp” and “Organic 
Açaí Capsules” products). 
112 Leonora Genya Pepper & Livia De Freitas Navegantes Alves, Small-Scale Açaí 
in the Global Market: Adding Value to Ensure Sustained Income for Forrest 
Farmers in the Amazon Estuary, in INTEGRATING LANDSCAPES: AGROFORESTRY FOR 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 211, 211–20 (Florencia 
Montagnini ed., 12th ed. 2017). 
113 Eduardo S. Brondizio, From Stape to Fashion Food: Shifting Cycles and Shifting 
Opportunities in the Development of the Açaí Palm Fruit Economy in the Amazon 
Estuary, in WORKING FORESTS IN THE NEOTROPICS: CONSERVATION THROUGH 
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT 399, 339 (Daniel J. Zarin et al. eds., 2004). 
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Empirical research shows, to an extent, that the economic 
opportunities Brondizio refers to have been leveraged. Pegler 
conducted in-depth interviews with over twenty açaí-producing 
households and found that since gaining popularity açaí has become 
an important source of income.114  These households collected 
around 150 sacks of açaí per year, and earn R$40 per sack, which is 
roughly US$11.69 (or AU$15) and equals a monthly income of 
between R$4800 and R$6000. Similarly, another study reported that 
a ribeirinhos family will make an average of 2300 euros, or 
US$2640, during each month of the harvesting season for açaí.115 
These figures are significantly higher than the average monthly 
income in Brazil over the last two years, which at its highest was 
R$2186.116 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that Amazonian 
ribeirinhos have received a fair proportion of the profits generated 
from açaí production. Similar dynamics that exist in cocoa and coffee 
value chains are evident in açaí supply chains.117Amazonian 
ribeirinhos cultivate the palms and provide the berries, but 
significant market value is added through the processing, export and 
retail of açaí. Additionally, the reliance of Amazonian ribeirinhos on 
a single raw commodity for the majority of their income leaves them 
especially vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices.118 The 
existence of a market opportunity due to the popularity of açaí with 
some western consumers does not necessarily equate to a sustainable 
fair-trade opportunity. Moreover, the racist and neo-colonial 
representation of Amazonian people in açaí marketing raises 
suspicion that their contribution to global supply chains will be 
undervalued.  
 
114 Lee Pegler, Peasant inclusion in global value chains: economic upgrading but 
social downgrading in labour processes?, 42 J. PEASANT STUDIES 929, 945 (2015). 
115 Luciana Batista Pereira, From the Amazon Forest to the World: Gender Divisions 
of Labour in an emerging 
Value Chain 28 (unpublished M.A. Thesis, International Institute of Social Studies, 
The Hague). 
116 Brazil Real Average Monthly Income 2012-2018, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/wages (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
117 See, e.g., Peter Leigh Taylor, Douglas L. Murray & Laura T. Raynolds, Keeping 
Trade Fair: Governance Challenges in the Fair Trade Coffee Initiative, 13 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 199, 200–01 (2005) (considering global commodity chain 
governance in relation to coffee trade). 
118 Monique Barenboim Salles Vanni, Brazilian Açaí Berry and Non-Timber Forest 
Product Value Chains as Determinants of Development from a Global Perspective 
118 (Aug. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The London School of 
Economics) (on file with the Department of Social Policy of the London School of 
Economics). 
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B.  Racist and Neocolonial Representations  
Generally, Amazonian ribeirinhos (also referred to as 
caboclo)119 have mixed ancestry (Latin American, European and 
African descent) and live a semi-subsistent life based on fishing, 
small-scale farming and agroforestry,120 and tend to govern their 
communities with relative autonomy.121 Lima-Ayres explains that: 
Forced cultural transformation and intense 
miscegenation with whites resulted in the dilution of 
specific tribal identities, and led to the formation of 
the caboclo population who considered themselves 
as part of the national society.122   
This history has led to native, non-Indigenous populations, 
like the Amazonian ribeirinhos, as often being described as a 
relatively invisible group in both the Amazon and in the broader 
world.123 Nowadays, ribeirinhos live either in cities or along the river 
of the Amazon, but mostly they move periodically between both.124   
A food label cannot convey the history or current 
marginalization of Amazonian ribeirinhos nor would such accounts 
be an appealing marketing strategy. Yet, the widespread popularity 
of açaí presented an opportunity to raise the profile of the significant 
disadvantages experienced by and contributions made from 
Amazonian ribeirinhos. Given their “invisibility,” it would be 
 
119 Richard Pace, The Amazon Caboclo: What’s in a Name?, 34 LUSO-BRAZILIAN 
REV. 81, 84 (1997) (explaining how the term caboclos is colloquially used to 
describe Amazonian ribeirinhos and other rural populations in the Amazon. 
However, this term is contested, and for some this term carries prejudicial 
connotations about the groups mixed ancestry and class). 
120 James A. Fraser, Caboclo Horticulture and Amazonian Dark Earths along the 
Middle Madeira River, Brazil, 38 HUMAN ECOLOGY 651, 653 (2010). 
121 HEATHER F. ROLLER, AMAZONIAN ROUTES: INDIGENOUS MOBILITY AND 
COLONIAL COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN BRAZIL 210 (2014); Barbara A. Piperata, 
Nutritional status of Ribeirinhos in Brazil and the nutrition transition, 133 AM. J. 
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 868, 869–70 (2007). 
122 Deborah de Magalhaes Lima-Ayres, The Social Category Caboclo: History, 
Social Organization, Identity and 
Outsider’s Social Classification of the Rural Population of an Amazonian Region 
(The Middle Solimoes) 90 (Jan. 
1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, King’s College Cambridge) (on file with the 
Department of Social 
Anthropology, King’s College Cambridge). 
123 Jacqueline M. Vadjunec & Marianne Schmink, New Amazonian Geographies: 
Emerging Identities and Landscapes, 28 J. Cultural Geography 1, 2–6 (2014). 
124 CRISTINA ADAMS ET AL., AMAZON PEASANT SOCIETIES IN A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT: POLITICAL ECOLOGY, INVISIBILITY AND MODERNITY IN THE 
RAINFOREST 14 (Cristina Adams et al. eds., 1st ed. 2006). 
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socially beneficial for this group to receive recognition as a distinct 
and diverse cultural entity.  
Yet, none of the labels examined referred to Amazonian 
ribeirinhos. Instead, several labels describe Amazon ribeirinhos as 
either indigenous, traditional or native. Such references have the 
potential to be true, untrue or half-true given the heterogeneity of 
Amazonian ribeirinhos.125 What is of significance is the decision to 
omit referring to Amazonian ribeirinhos as a distinct group with their 
own history and culture. Referring to Amazonian ribeirinhos broadly 
as indigenous or native sanitizes difficult aspects of history. For 
instance, it removes the effects of colonization by making it seem as 
if this social category of people were undisturbed by its processes.126 
Consistent with the “nutritional primitivism” of the health claims on 
açaí products mentioned above, the food label acts as a constructed 
window into the history and identity of Amazonian ribeirinhos.  
Like other “superfoods,” açaí labels commonly use warrior 
imagery and references to warriors to depict Amazon ribeirinhos. 
Warrior imagery is often a component of the “noble savage” 
stereotype, which stems from colonial ideology and theology. This 
long-standing stereotype casts non-white ethnic groups as pure, wise 
stewards of the land that are removed from capitalist processes and 
urban societies.127 Likewise, on some online açaí sites, consumers 
are invited to “join the tribe,” i.e. sign up to their mailing list or 
loyalty program.128 Other labels feature what appears to be a man 
with a dramatically protruding bottom lip, a slanted forehead, and 
tribal jewelry as a logo (Amazon Power Açaí Smoothie Packs, 
Amazon Power Pure Açaí Pulp and Organic Açaí Capsules, Amazon 
Power Pty Ltd.) Protruding lips are a facial feature focused upon in 
racist pseudo-science to assign inferiority to certain races.129 As 
 
125 Lima-Ayres, supra note 122, at 119; Pace, supra note 119, at 84; ROLLER, supra 
note 121, at 205. 
126 M. J. Rowland, Return of the “Noble Savage”: Misrepresenting the Past, Present 
and Future, AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL STUDIES 2, 6–9 (2004). 
127 TER ELLINGSON, THE MYTH OF THE NOBLE SAVAGE 211–12 (2001). 
128 See, e.g., CLEAN Tᴇᴀ, https://cleantea.com.au/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (asking 
website visitors to “JOIN THE CLEAN TEA TRIBE” by subscribing to their email 
list); Lᴀ KULT, https://www.la-kult.com.au/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (asking 
website visitors to “Be Part Of Our Tribe – Become the Best Version of Yourself”); 
OHANA AÇAÍ, http://ohanaaçaí.com.au/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (asking website 
visitors to “Join the tribe” by downloading the “Ohana App”); Sᴀᴍʙᴀᴢᴏɴ, 
https://www.sambazon.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (asking website visitors to 
“Join our TRIBE NEWSLETTER!”). 
129 Alexander Edmonds, Triumphant Miscegenation: Reflections on Beauty and 
Race in Brazil, 28 J. Intercultural Stud. 83, 85 (2007). 
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O’Toole observed, “in the language of racism, thick lips speak 
volumes.”130  
This “noble savage” caricature is at best culturally 
insensitive. It can also incidentally serve a racist agenda.131 
Stearman132 has shown how an ecological version of the noble 
savage stereotype in the Amazonia has undermined efforts for land 
tenure security. She argues that policies that grant land entitlements 
on the condition that a native group exhibits conservationist qualities 
distracts from the fact that rights to remain on traditional lands is 
supported by human rights law.133 The subsuming of the 
contemporary Amazonian ribeirinhos into the identity of primitive 
“Amazon natives” ‘casts remote producers as “Others” who exist in 
a timeless, imaginary geography, when in reality they are real people 
in real places faced with a range of “contemporary challenges.”’134   
Açaí products claim that açaí berry “naturally grows” and is 
“wild-harvested” to ensure that “the delicate environment of the 
Amazon is protected and the ancient traditions of indigenous people 
from this region are respected and preserved.”135 These claims 
overlook the role of Amazonian ribeirinhos as stewards of the açaí 
palm. Amazonian ribeirinhos employ skill and labor to manage the 
palm, “including through thinning, weeding, pruning, inter-cropping 
techniques and the development of seedlings.136 Arguably then, the 
land and crop management by Amazonian peasants may fit some 
definitions of ‘agroforestry,’ and is certainly an example of small-
scale production systems which tend to use less intensive harvesting 
methods.”137 By not mentioning their role as forest managers, açaí 
 
130 Fintan O’Toole, Racism rears its ugly head, IRISH TIMES (May 6, 2003), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/racism-rears-its-ugly-head-1.358021. 
131 ELLINGSON, supra note 127, at 297. 
132 Allyn MacLean Stearman, Revisiting the Myth of the Ecologically Noble Savage 
in Amazonia: Implications for Indigenous Land Rights, 14 CULTURE & 
AGRICULTURE 2 (1994). 
133 Id. 
134  Jessica Loyer, Superfoods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL 
ETHICS 1, 2 (David M. Kaplan ed. 2016).  
135 Hope Johnson, Christine Parker & Rowena Maguire, Consumer Choice as a 
Pathway to Food Diversity: A Case Study of Açaí Berry Product Labelling, in FOOD 
DIVERSITY BETWEEN RIGHTS, DUTIES AND AUTONOMIES 307, 314 (Alessandro Isoni 
et al. eds., 2018). 
136 Id. at 313–14 (citing Eduardo S. Brondízio & A.D Siqueira, From Extractivists 
to Forest Farmers: Changing Concepts of Caboclo Agroforestry in the Amazon 
Estuary, 18 Res. in Econ. Anthropology 233, 258 (1997)). 
137 Id. (citing Clark L. Erickson, Amazonia: The Historical Ecology of a 
Domesticated Landscape, in The Social Lives of Forests: Past, Present, and Future 
of Woodland Resurgence (Susanna B. Hecht, Kathleen D. Morrison, & Christine 
Padoch eds., 2014)). 
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berry claims have perpetuated on a global scale the prejudicial views 
in Brazil about Amazonian peasants as “low-skill” and “lazy,” due 
to their subsistence, rural lifestyle.138 Yet Amazonian ribeirinhos, in 
the initial period of açaí boom, did manage to increase the production 
of açaí without leading to deforestation or monoculture farming. 
Brondizio and Siqueria explain:  
Agroforestry systems that mimic native forests are 
‘invisible’ in the analysis of most researchers who 
employ conventional measures of [agricultural] 
intensification. The result is agroforestry’s 
characterization as extensive, partially extractivist 
and non-dependent on labor and energy input other 
than for ‘gathering.’ [In other words,] conventional 
ideas of what farming involves, [which stem from 
colonial processes,] combined with the 
marginalization of Amazonian ribeirinhos have fed 
into the claims that açaí is passively ‘gathered’ and 
undervalue the contribution of Amazonian people to 
the production and sustainable management of 
acai.139  
The agricultural activities of other colonized peoples around 
the world, including Australian Aboriginal groups, have also been 
constructed in this way, which has provided a narrative that has 
assisted in justifying the taking of their (supposedly unmanaged and 
uncared for, yet potentially agriculturally productive) land for 
industrial, export-oriented agriculture.140  
 
C.  Voluntary Fair-trade Certification and Other Schemes 
for a Just Distribution of Benefits and Burdens 
  
The dominant governance method for addressing the 
equitable inclusion of poor producers in developing countries into 
global supply chains that serve markets of developed countries141 is 
 
138 See id. at 313 (citing Mark Harris, Nature Makes them Lazy: Contested 
Perceptions of Place and Knowledge in the Lower Amazon Floodplain of Brazil, 3 
Conservation and Society 461 (2005)). 
139 Id. at 313. 
140CHRISTOPHER MAYES, UNSETTLING FOOD POLITICS: AGRICULTURE, 
DISPOSSESSION AND SOVEREIGNTY IN AUSTRALIA 19–48 (2018); see generally 
BRUCE PASCOE, DARK EMU: BLACK SEEDS: AGRICULTURE OR ACCIDENT? (2014) 
(discussing how the colonizing Europeans mistakenly believed that Australian 
Aboriginals did not use agriculture to develop the land). 
141 See Laura T. Raynolds, Fair Trade: Social regulation in global food markets, 28 
J. RURAL STUD. 276, 279 (2012) (“Fair Trade operates at the intersection of market 
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the fair trade movement. Fair trade aims to create supply chains 
based on adequate working and trading conditions to alleviate 
poverty and enable sustainable development.142 From the 1960s 
onwards, fair trade spawned various formalized non-governmental 
bodies who create and administer, inter alia, third-party certification 
schemes.143  
Third-party fair trade certification entails independent non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or private companies auditing 
aspects of a supply chain against specified criteria including, for 
instance, that cooperatives in the chain are democratic, that farm 
workers are, at least, being paid the minimum wage for their work, 
and that small-scale farmers are receiving at least a fair trade floor 
price (i.e. profits cover the costs of production, savings and the living 
costs for an average family).144 The results of such audits may be sent 
back to a parent company or head NGO for review. If the audit 
reveals that fair trade requirements are being met, then the 
manufacturer, in the case of açaí, is licensed a certification mark to 
feature on the product’s label. The mark alerts consumers that a third-
party has verified the product’s claims of being from a “fair,” 
equitable supply chain, differentiates the product and attracts price 
premiums.145  
Only two açaí products in our survey (both from Sambazon, 
a US-based wholesaler) displayed a third-party fair trade 
certification. The remaining 18 açaí products that made claims 
regarding the fairness of the supply chain had not been subject to any 
third-party oversight.146 For instance, one product explained: “[t]he 
Açaí berries used in this product have been harvested by local 
families, which also means rural community and grower 
 
critique and reregulation, challenging dominant ‘unfair’ trade practices and 
promoting alternative ‘fair’ trade norms in global arenas.”). 
142 ANNA HUTCHENS, CHANGING BIG BUSINESS: THE GLOBALISATION OF THE FAIR 
TRADE MOVEMENT 58 (2009). 
143 Matthew Anderson, NGOs and Fair Trade: The Social Movement Behind the 
Label, in NGOS IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 222–41 (Nock Crowson et al., 2009). 
144 See, e.g., WORLD FAIR TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTFO FAIR TRADE STANDARD 17 
(2017), https://wfto.com/standard-and-guarantee-system/fair-trade-standard (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2019) (explaining compliance criteria used by the World Fair Trade 
Organization). 
145 See Marie-Christine Renard, Quality Certification, Regulation and Power in Fair 
Trade, 21 J. RURAL STUD. 419, 423–24 (2005).  
146 Because fair trade is a broader concept than third-part certification schemes, 
supply chain actors can also assess their own value chains against set social and 
environmental standards and make product claims regarding how the supply chain 
follows fair trade principles in a broad sense. 
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cooperatives are empowered through fair trade pricing.”147 Another 
uncertified claim was that “[e]very step of our supply chain is closely 
monitored to ensure sustainable and fair trade practices are 
followed.”148 These claims are difficult, if not impossible, for a 
consumer, regulator or another third party to verify.  
Even where fair trade certification was obtained, it was the 
company, Sambazon, that manufactured the product that was 
certified, as opposed to the açaí product themselves or, at the time of 
writing, the cooperatives that bought açaí from Amazonian 
ribeirinhos.149 The certifying body was “ECOCERT” a private 
company based in France. The certification would have involved a 
review of mainly documentary evidence including Sambazon’s 
corporate social responsibility policy, the clauses in contracts 
between Sambazon and cooperatives and the cooperatives to the 
individual producers (e.g. prices paid to producer must be at least 
10% higher than standard price determined annually), the fair trade 
policies of the cooperatives Sambazon works with, and other 
documentary evidence such as delivery notes and invoices. The 
auditor would also have carried out a specified number of interviews 
between the auditor and individual producers, cooperatives and 
Sambazon staff and management to verify the documentary 
evidence.  
However, the working conditions for açaí harvesting seem 
inconsistent with the ECOCERT audit criteria regarding working 
conditions. Açaí harvesting involves climbing near the top of a tall 
palm while carrying a machete to cut down palm fronds that grow 
the berries. Once on the ground, people hand-strip the berries from 
their stalks. Raffles describes it as: 
[R]ough, dangerous work, hard on hands and feet, 
made worse by the relentless insects… The 
emphasis is on speed and volume. On a good day –
if it does not rain, if no one gets injured, if there are 
big bunches and short trees– two people might 
 
147 Açaí berry blend powder, NUTRA ORGANICS, https://nutraorganics.com.au/produ 
cts/açaí-berry-blend (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
148 RioLife 100% Organic Free-dried Açaí Powder, RIOLIFE, http://www.riolife.co 
m.au/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).  
149 Amazonian ribeirinhos engaged in forest farming of açaí do not apply for third-
party fair trade certification. The fees and administrative work involved can be 
considerable. Further, processing companies will obtain fair trade certification that 
requires them to work with farming cooperatives that in turn meet fair trade 
standards such as minimum price requirements. For exported açaí, Amazonian 
ribeirinhos tend to engage with cooperatives that on-sell the berries to a processor.  
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collect four sacks, each holding fruit from seven or 
eight bunches. But to do that, collectors have to cut 
corners…150 
Yet ECOCERT criterion 3.4.4.2 requires that the 
cooperatives Sambazon engages with do not allow the use of 
equipment that presents a danger to users and that adequate 
protective equipment is provided at the producer level. To safely use 
a machete, equipment required includes appropriate gloves, 
protective eyewear and a lanyard around the machete to prevent 
against slippage.151 Images of Amazonian ribeirinhos provided by 
Sambazon do not appear to be wearing safety equipment, and no 
mention is made of the measures Sambazon takes as part of ensuring 
the safety of people harvesting açaí.  
The evidence is lacking regarding whether açaí producers 
involved in fair trade certified supply chains are better placed than 
those producers who are not. Generally, case studies investigating 
the impact of cooperatives meeting fair trade standards have found 
modest benefits accrue to small-scale farmers that are members of 
the cooperative.152 Nevertheless, a range of contextual and 
geographical factors significantly determine whether small-scale 
farmers and/or farm workers benefit from participation in fair trade 
certification schemes, and so it is difficult to make sweeping claims 
about the benefits of fair trade beyond particular contexts.153 Beyond 
the household level, a large body of work critiquing fair trade 
suggests that the scheme itself is neither novel154 nor a challenge to 
 
150 HUGH RAFFLES IN AMAZONIA: A NATURAL HISTORY 202 (2002). 
151 See, e.g., R.A. Munoz et al., Sugar Cane Cultivation and Processing, in 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 64.36 (Jeanne Mager 
Stellman ed., 1998) (discussing recommended safety precautions to be taken when 
using a machete). 
152 See Christopher Bacon, Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, 
and Specialty Coffees Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern 
Nicaragua?, 33 WORLD DEV. 497, 506 (2005); V. Ernesto Méndez et al., Effects of 
Fair Trade and organic certifications on small-scale coffee farmer households in 
Central America and Mexico, 25 RENEWABLE AGR. & FOOD SYSTEMS 236, 239 
(2010); Erin Smith & William M. Loker, “We Know Our Worth”: Lessons from a 
Fair Trade Coffee Cooperative in Honduras, 71 HUMAN ORG. 87, 94 (2012); Eric J 
Arnould et al., Does Fair Trade Deliver on Its Core Value Proposition? Effects on 
Income, Educational Attainment, and Health in Three Countries, 28 J. PUB. POL. & 
MARKETING 186, 198–99 (2009); Ruerd Ruben & Ricardo Fort, The Impact of Fair 
Trade Certification for Coffee Farmers in Peru, 40 WORLD DEV. 570 (2012). 
153 See, e.g., Joni Valkila & Anja Nygren, Impacts of Fair Trade certification on 
coffee farmers, cooperatives, and laborers in Nicaragua, 27 AGR. & HUMAN 
VALUES 321, 322 (2010). 
154 See, e.g., Frank Trentmann, Before “fair trade”: empire, free Trade, and the 
moral economies of food in the modern world, 25 ENV’T & PLANNING SOC. & SPACE 
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neocolonial trade relations typified by human and natural resources 
being significantly exploited in less wealthy areas while the benefits 
and outputs from this exploitation flow to wealthier countries and 
groups.155  
Consistent with the critiques of fair trade as unsuited to 
bringing about systematic change, açaí is increasingly being grown 
on plantations, i.e. large, privately held, largely corporate-managed 
farms that employ economies of scale and specialize in cash crops.156 
The intensified scale of açaí production is, arguably, a natural 
trajectory of relatively unregulated market dynamics that seek ever-
increasing levels of production and consumption enabled via existing 
wealth inequalities which provide a cheap labor pool for plantation 
agriculture. This trend is not evident on açaí product labels 
examined, which are either silent as to its specific production 
methods or claim to originate from wild-harvesting. Nevertheless, 
the shift to plantations in the case of açaí is threatening the small-
scale production of açaí in the estuary, which model of production 
has been and generally is the most suited to addressing social and 
economic inequalities in rural communities.157  
The move towards plantations reflects an inherent 
contradiction within the popularity of açaí; that is, its popularity is 
facilitated by claims that purchasing açaí benefits the Amazonian 
communities, while its increasing popularity beyond a niche 
undermines its potential to benefit such communities in the long-
term. Fair trade schemes rather than challenging such capitalist 
dynamics in the context of açaí reinforces them by allowing 
plantations to be incorporated into fair trade certified supply 
 
1079, 1090–92 (2007) (analyzing the changing moral geography of trade and 
consumption over time). 
155 See generally Suzanne Freidberg, Cleaning Up Down South: Supermarkets, 
Ethical Trade and African Horticulture, 4 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 27, 
34–35 (2003); Anandi Ramamurthy, Absences and Silences: The Representation of 
the Tea Picker in Colonial and Fair Trade Advertising, 13 VISUAL CULTURE IN 
BRITAIN 367, 391–92 (2012); Daniel Jaffee & Philip H. Howard, Corporate 
cooptation of organic and fair trade standards, 27 AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN 
VALUES 387–399 (2010); Ian Hussey & Joe Curnow, Fair Trade, neocolonial 
developmentalism, and racialized power relations, 5 INTERFACE 40–68 (2013); 
Trentmann, supra note 155; LAURA T. RAYNOLDS & ELIZABETH A. BENNETT, 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON FAIR TRADE (2015). 
156 Nathalie Cialdella & Livia Navegantes Alves, La ruée vers l’« açaí » (Euterpe 
oleracea Mart.): trajectoires d’un fruit emblématique d’Amazonie [The rush to the 
“açaí” (Euterpe oleracea Mart.): Trajectories of an emblematic fruit of the 
Amazonia], 4 REVUE TIERS MONDE (THIRD WORLD REVIEW) 119 (2014). 
157 Olivier De Schutter, How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of large-
scale investments in farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 258–59 (2011). 
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chains.158 Moreover, açaí product labels, through their 
misrepresentation of Amazonian ribeirinhos, are counter to efforts 
like fair trade to re-embed social relations in supply chains. Of the 
49 products examined, none pictured açaí plantations, instead 
preferring romanticized and mystified representations of the 
Amazonian river. No labels depicted the reality of the difficult 
working environments that Amazonian ribeirinhos operate in to 
secure their livelihoods.  
A related issue is the role of Amazon ribeirinhos in 
cultivating the palms on which açaí grows over the centuries (as well 
as Indigenous groups). Generally, two schemes are relevant where a 
group in a particular area has been the stewards for a particular plant 
variety. The first is geographical indicators, but no geographical 
indicators were provided for on the açaí products examined.159 
Perhaps this is because the palms on which açaí grows are across 
country borders.  
The second schemes are those international agreements, 
namely the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya 
Protocol, that establish bilateral access and benefit sharing schemes 
 
158 ECOCERT, TECHNICAL STANDARDS DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO 
PRODUCTS ORIGINATING FROM FAIR TRADE 4 (2010) (arguing just like the other 
predominant fair trade schemes, make plantations eligible for fair trade 
certification). Although, ECOCERT explains that products from plantations will 
only be fair trade certified under exceptional circumstances, but it is unclear what 
those exceptional circumstances may be. ECOCERT does state that, when 
considering the eligibility of a plantation, the context of plantation (e.g. size of land, 
type of production), as well as the corporate structuring of the plantation (e.g. 
shareholding structure) are relevant considerations. Note also the incorporation of 
plantations into fair trade is not necessarily counter to progressing social justice, but 
much will depend on the political context and state willingness to regulate fair trade 
practices on plantations. See, e.g., Sarah Besky, Can a Plantation be Fair? 
Paradoxes and Possibilities in Fair Trade Darjeeling Tea Certification, 29 
ANTHROPOLOGY WORK REV. 1 (2008) (stating the context-specific factors that 
influence whether fair trade certification makes the conditions on plantations just 
and favorable to workers.) In the context of açaí, plantations are only now emerging 
and competing with small-scale operations and wild-harvesting. Combined with the 
current political climate in Brazil following the country’s 2018 presidential election, 
it is questionable whether the context is conducive to supporting fair work conditions 
on plantations. See PETER FLEMING AND MARC T. JONES, THE END OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CRISIS AND CRITIQUE 91, 91 (2013) (commenting on 
Nestle’s ability to appropriate the work of fair trade social movements for corporate 
branding). 
159 Cf. Rosemary J. Coombe & S. Ali Malik, Transforming the Work of 
Geographical Indications to Decolonize Racialized Labor and Support 
Agroecology, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 363 (2018) (arguing that geographical 
indicators combined with fair trade and analogous certification schemes have the 
potential to transform unequal relations within and between countries that perpetuate 
harms). 
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regarding genetic materials and related traditional knowledge. 
Access and benefit sharing schemes incentivize biodiversity 
conservation and recognize the role of traditional communities as 
stewards of particular genetic resources.160 State signatories to these 
international instruments then implement these schemes through 
domestic legal regimes. However, access and benefits schemes 
generally do not apply in the context of açaí production and export. 
The schemes are relevant where a company wishes to patent genetic 
material from the palms on which açaí grows or the fruit themselves. 
In the context of a traditional food item dramatically increasing in 
value like açaí, access and benefit sharing schemes are irrelevant, as 
a third-party is not taking the açaí plant genetics and related 
knowledge to develop, for instance, a new plant variety or 
pharmaceutical drug. Thus, no direct avenues exist to reward those 
communities that have acted as stewards to the açaí palms that now 
provide significant economic benefits to a range of supply chain 
actors.  
VI.  Biodiversity and Ecological Sustainability: Green-
Washing  
A.  Biodiversity Conservation 
Nineteen of the 49 products examined made claims about 
how the wild harvesting of açaí preserves the biodiversity of the 
Amazon rainforest. For instance, one product claimed that:  
This Açai is wild harvested from deep in the 
Amazon forests. This means the fruit grows in its 
native bio-diverse ecosystem maintaining its natural 
nutrient profile. Wild harvesting ensures that the 
delicate environment of the Amazon is protected” 
(Raw Organic Açaí Powder, Loving Earth Pty Ltd). 
Another claimed: 
Harvested sustainably from a wild and vigorous 25-
foot Brazilian tropical palm that naturally grows 
prolifically across 2.5 million acres of Amazon 
River floodplains -- supporting the Açai Berry 
industry makes these trees more valuable vertical 
than logging them – and how good is that? (Açaí 
Powder, Power Super Foods Pty Ltd) 
 
160 See, e.g., MANUEL RUIZ & RONNIE VERNOOY, THE CUSTODIANS OF BIODIVERSITY: 
SHARING ACCESS TO AND BENEFITS OF GENETIC RESOURCES 4–5 (2012). 
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These claims imply that food can be produced and 
consumed on a large and globalized scale while having only a 
minimal, or even positive, impact on the natural environment. The 
consumer is told that it is possible to use and consume aspects of 
Amazonian ecosystems while simultaneously conserving the same 
ecosystems.161  
Conventional food production in relation to fruits tends to 
be monoculture, mechanized and input intensive. To cast açaí 
berries production and consumption as a counter to conventional 
food systems, açaí berry labels do not draw attention to the long, 
energy-intensive supply chains that employ highly technical food 
processing methods.162 Instead, the food labels place emphasis on 
the harvesting process, with descriptors including “wild-
harvested,” “wild-gathered,” “hand-picked” and “manually 
harvested.” These phrases convey the message that açaí berries are 
grown in the wild as opposed to on farms and that açaí berries are 
harvested by hands and not machinery. As mentioned above, it 
also devalues and invisibilizes the Amazonian ribeirinhos’ role as 
stewards of the Euterpe oleracea palm on which açaí grows. 
As global demand for açaí has continued to increase, market 
pressures have incentivized the development of more intensive açaí 
farms. Furthermore, Brazilian politicians have sought to attract 
private investment into açai plantations and increase the use of 
synthetic fertilizers in açaí management.163 This outcome is 
predicated on the theory of comparative advantage, which provides 
the rationale for international trade and investment law.164 
Comparative advantage holds that each country should specialize in 
the commodities that they produce best, rather than directing 
resources towards commodity production that is more difficult for 
them to perform due to, for instance, environmental, geographic and 
social conditions. As Brazil, and other Latin American countries, are 
particularly well-suited for growing açaí, the theory provides that 
they should specialize and intensify the production of açaí berries.  
 
161 C.f. Robin Canniford & Avi Shankar, Purifying Practices: How Consumers 
Assemble Romantic Experiences of Nature, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 1051, 1051 (2013). 
162 The supply chain is energy intensive owing to the need for refrigeration for frozen 
açaí pulp or juice. The powders do not require the same refrigeration, but the 
processing methods used to formulate the powders have the potential to be energy 
intensive depending on the context and methods employed.  
163 Jennifer A. Lewis, The power of knowledge: information transfer and açaí 
intensification in the peri-urban interface of Belém, Brazil, 74 AGROFORESTRY SYS. 
293, 297–98 (2008). 
164 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical 
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 65 (2006). 
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[In the last few years,] production of açaí has 
intensified in the floodplains leading to large areas 
of diverse forest being converted into açaí 
agroforests and [to açai berries] being grown on 
monoculture plantations. A recent study by Freitas 
et al. examined the impact of the demand for açai on 
the biological diversity of Amazonian floodplain 
forests. They found a loss of 50% of tree species 
diversity and a 63% reduction in pioneer species 
(hardy varieties that are the basis for forest 
ecosystems). These findings align with empirical 
studies that illustrate a negative correlation between 
increase[s in intensive agricultural production for 
export to meet global demand] and declines in 
[dietary diversity] and on- and off-farm 
biodiversity.165 
 Similarly, Barlow et al.166 compared the biodiversity loss 
from human disturbances within forests in the Amazonian flood 
plains (including from açaí agroforestry) to the expected biodiversity 
loss from deforestation. They commented that:  
At its most stringent, Brazil’s centrepiece 
environmental legislation, the Forest Code, 
mandates Amazonian landowners to maintain 80% 
of their primary forest cover. Our results show that 
even where this level of compliance is achieved, the 
primary forests of these landscapes may only retain 
46%-61% of their potential conservation value and 
are likely to have lost many species of high 
conservation and functional importance.167 
In the catchments studied then, more biodiversity was lost 
due to human disturbances than would be expected by deforestation 
to the extent allowed under Brazilian laws. Barlow et al.168 framed 
their research as evidence for urgent regulatory interventions that go 
beyond preventing deforestation and center on preserving the 
diversity of these ecosystems. While market dynamics stemming 
from the popularity of açaí may prevent land use change in the 
 
165 Johnson, Parker & Maguire, supra note 136, at 314. 
166 Jos Barlow et al., Anthropogenic disturbance in tropical forests can double 
biodiversity loss from deforestation, 535 NATURE 144, 144 (2016). 
167 Id. at 147. 
168 Id. at 144. 
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Amazonian floodplains, the market as it currently functions does not 
conserve biodiversity and instead facilitates simplified agroforests.  
Despite the common marketing claims regarding “wild-
harvested” açaí berries, the rapid development of açaí plantations in 
upland areas of the Amazon river delta suggests that açaí is 
increasingly sourced from plantations.169 Alternatively, it may 
indicate that domestic markets are now relying on plantation-grown 
açaí, while wealthier Western markets have maintained access to açaí 
that is wild-harvested and organic. 
More broadly, trends in the intensification of açaí production 
for export show how the successful marketing of açaí products, with 
its emphasis on the multiple benefits of açaí consumption for health 
and the environment and rural development, contribute to 
undermining these very claims. The popularity of açaí, partly fueled 
by such claims, creates market incentives to intensively produce açaí 
berries on monoculture farms, which in turn undermines the claims 
about how the consumer choice to buy açaí contributes to the 
preservation of pristine Amazonian environments.    
B.  Organic  
The main way in which environmental claims are regulated 
in global supply chains is through voluntary organic certification.170 
Organic claims are common on açaí products with 29 of the 
identified labels describing the açaí contents as organic.171 Of these, 
17 claims were supported by third-party certification marks, and 12 
claims were unsupported by a certification scheme.  
 
169 Alistair John Campbell et al., Anthropogenic disturbance of tropical forests 
threatens pollination services to açaí palm in the Amazon river delta, 55 J. APPL. 
ECOL. 1, 1 (2018). 
170 See Hui-Shung Chang & Lydia Zepeda, Consumer perceptions and demand for 
organic food in Australia: Focus group discussions, 20 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD 
SYS. 155, 159 (2004) (containing empirical research that finds that Australian 
consumers generally interpret organic claims as communicating that a product is 
“free of chemicals, pesticides and residues,” “healthiness,” and “wholesomeness”); 
see generally STEWART LOCKIE, Capturing the Sustainability Agenda: Organic 
Foods and Media Discourses on Food Scares, Environment, Genetic Engineering, 
and Health, 23 Agric. & Human Values 313 (2006) (discussing, amongst other 
topics, the viewpoints surrounding organic foods); Lydia Zepeda & Jinghan Li, 
Characteristics of Organic Food Shoppers, 39 J. AGRIC. & APP. ECON. 17 (2007) 
(investigating the characteristics of organic food shoppers compared to nonorganic 
food shoppers). 
171 Generally, organic agriculture refers to a set of ecologically-based land use 
practices that do not use synthetic in-puts (fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, 
genetically modified seeds, etc.). Underlying the concept of organic agriculture is, 
inter alia, resistance to industrial agriculture, characterised by intensive practices, 
low biodiversity and a high dependence on external in-puts.  
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For highly processed foods like açaí berries, these organic 
claims give the message that the consumer can purchase a product 
that is simultaneously clean, green, and super convenient. Warde172 
suggests that processed foods are often marketed, especially towards 
working people with caring responsibilities, as quick and easy yet 
also showing care to the family – overcoming the antinomie of 
convenience and care. Acaí superfood products also emphasize their 
convenience (e.g. ready to blend smoothie packets or freeze-dried 
powers) that synchronously allow the consumer to care for the 
environment and their own body:  
The açaí in our [product name] is natural and organic 
and is harvested from the Brazilian rainforest. For 
your convenience, our product range includes 
RioLife 100% certified organic and wild harvested 
freeze-dried açaí powder….. The only açaí in 
Australia with absolutely nothing added to it! . . . 
since RioLife Açaí berries are wild harvested and 
organic, there are no pesticides involved.173 
 
Yet the claim that these products care for the environment is 
not easy to verify and may be greenwashing. No legally binding 
standards exist in Australia in relation to “organic” claims nor does 
any required pre-market verification process exist. Thus, the 
manufacturer of the açaí product broadly determines: firstly, whether 
they will make an organic claim, and secondly, whether they will 
seek certification of their claim by a NGO or make the claim without 
third-party certification.  
The only way in which an Australian government regulator 
would examine the substantiation of an organic claim on a product 
for domestic consumption would be if a consumer, NGO or 
competing business made a complaint to one of the state consumer 
protection regulators or the ACCC (discussed above). Under s18 of 
the Australian Consumer Law,174 the complaint would have to allege 
that a product’s claim is ‘misleading and deceptive.’ When 
investigating whether an organic claim is misleading or deceptive, 
the ACCC refers to the Australian Standard for Organic and 
biodynamic product (AS 6000-2015) as a guideline.175 Sellers 
 
172 Warde, supra note 37, at 152. 
173 RioLife, supra note 149. 
174 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.) (being a model law that 
applies at both Commonwealth and State levels). 
175 See Organic Claims, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N. 
https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/groceries/organic-claims (last visited Mar. 13, 
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wishing to comply with consumer and imported food law in Australia 
would, therefore, follow the minimum standards set out in AS 6000-
2015 to mitigate their potential liability.176 This approach, thus, 
informally enrolls the manufacturer to self-regulate their use of 
organic claims (which they may do by obtaining organic certification 
in accord with the standard), and enrolls the consumer, and other 
market actors, in information-gathering to trigger an ACCC 
investigation.177 However, it would be difficult for a consumer to 
detect whether an organic claim was actually misleading since açaí 
is harvested in lands not subject to secure land tenure rules, and 
moves through globalized supply chains.178 For example in relation 
to wild-harvested plants, an açaí product would be consistent with 
2.9.2 of the AS 6000-2015, if the açaí berries it contains were sourced 
from a clearly defined collection area and the collection area was not 
subject to synthetic farming inputs in the last three years.179 
Additionally, the operator must carry out collections in a way that 
does not “disturb the stability of the natural habitat or the 
 
2019) (stating that “there is a voluntary Australian standard for growers and 
manufacturers wishing to label their products ‘organic’ and ‘biodynamic’ (AS 6000-
2009)” and that “this standard is a useful reference point when determining whether 
a product is organic”); see generally Memorandum, Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Standards Australia International 
Limited 2003 (Austl.) (Standards Australia, which is analogous to the American 
National Standards Institute, is a long-established NGO and not-for-profit in 
Australia. This organization develops standards in a range of sectors, participates in 
the creation of international standards and accredits other organizations to develop 
standards. It works closely with the Australian Government pursuant to the 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commonwealth of Australia and 
Standards Australia Limited.). 
176 See generally Imported Food Control Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.) Because açaí is an 
imported product, it is also regulated under the Imported Food Control Act 1992 
(Cth), which contains a “labelling offence” in s 8A. The offence is made out where 
a person does not meet “applicable standards” relating to information on food 
packaging labels and carries a penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. The burden of 
proof falls on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a labeling offence, 
which places the onus on the party with the most information about a food package’s 
contents. “Applicable standards” is defined as ‘the national standard in force in 
relation to that food or matter’, and so would likely encompass the AS 6000-2015. 
177 See generally Curll et al., supra note 76, at 425 (discussing further the pathway 
of enforcement) The ACCC usually only takes action where there is a complaint and 
the issue is of significance; see also Julia Black, Enrolling actors in regulatory 
systems: examples from UK financial services regulation, 2003 PUB. L. 63 (2003) 
(discussing the concept of enrollment). 
178 See Fábio de Castro, Local politics of floodplain tenure in the Amazon, 10 INT’L. 
J. COMMONS 1 (2016) (finding that forests are community-based management 
systems, which are not subject to land tenure rules). 
179 Organic and Biodynamic Products 2015 (Austl.) Farming inputs must meet the 
requirements in Appendix B of the AS 6000-2015 if the product is to be labelled as 
“organic” in a manner complying with the standard. Generally, farming inputs 
should be naturally occurring materials (e.g. compost).   
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maintenance of species in the collection area” (art 2.9.2(b)). Thus, 
consumers would generally need to rely on third-party organic 
certification, consistent with AS 6000-2015.  
Even though certification is not a precondition to marketers 
making organic claims in Australia, organic claims on açaí products 
certified by a third-party were more common than uncertified claims. 
Third-party certification involves non-state actors setting 
management standards which meet, and perhaps go beyond, AS 
6000-2015. No requirements, on-going monitoring or approval 
processes exist in relation to certification bodies. Thus, their ability 
to create and implement standards generally occurs without any 
regulatory intervention from governments.  
Meanwhile, certification trademarks are available for an 
entity setting itself up as a certification body, provided their 
trademark application includes the standards that the goods must 
meet before the certification trademark can be employed.180 The 
rights to use and license the certification trademark are limited to the 
rules governing the use of the mark, as submitted in the trademark 
application. In sum, certification bodies are not regulated by a 
government body in terms of their activities or standards; but they 
are able to obtain private property rights in their certification mark, 
which incidentally provides a small level of regulatory oversight 
through the requirement that a trademark application includes the 
scheme’s rules.  
The Australian and New Zealand approach to regulating 
organic claims significantly differs to the US where the term 
“organic” can only be used on a food label if the product has been 
produced according to the Organic Food Production Act and the US 
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) organic regulations.181 The US 
approach enables significantly more public oversight and critique of 
organic standards. However, the USDA’s Organic Standards are 
routinely critiqued for representing the interests of large-scale, 
industrial organic operations owned by corporations rather than 
requiring genuinely sustainable farming practices.182 
 
180 TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 (Cth) pt 16 (Austl.).  
181 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501–6524 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 115–281)). 
182 See Jaffee and Howard, supra note 156; Alessandra Arcuri, The Transformation 
of Organic Regulation: The Ambiguous Effects of Publicization, 9 REG. & GOV. 144 
(2014); Leslie King & Julianne Busa, When Corporate Actors Take Over the Game: 
The Corporatization of Organic, Recycling and Breast Cancer Activism, 16 SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT STUD. 549 (2017); MICHAEL A. HAEDICKE, ORGANIZING ORGANIC: 
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Of the 17 açaí products that claimed to be certified, over half 
were accredited through the not-for-profit entity Australian Certified 
Organic (ACO). This is consistent with the ACO being the most 
common certification mark applied to organic products sold in 
Australia.183ACO’s Standard 7.5 relates to “wild harvesting.” Given 
that most açaí does not grow on farms subject to private property 
rights, standard 7.5 is likely to be the standard used by açaí product 
manufacturers to obtain certification.184 The USDA’s Organic 
Regulation “5022: Wild Crop Harvesting” is highly similar to 
Standard 7.5, which indicates that analogous standards and 
evidentiary requirements apply to açaí certified as organic and 
imported into the US.185  
To be certified organic under standard 7.5, açai product 
manufacturers must periodically verify that the açaí harvesting is not 
“degenerating to the natural systems” of the Amazonian estuary or 
other natural habitats in which the palm grows.186 Essentially, the 
açaí manufacturer must check on, and verify that, the harvested areas 
regenerate post-harvest, and that the harvesting of açaí does not 
involve felling of the palms or impacts to other flora to the extent that 
harvesting has compromised surrounding ecosystems.187 The 
standard states that the harvesting area should “encourage co-
mingling of species of wild-harvest products and native species so as 
to mimic as much as is feasibly possible the natural ecosystems 
within which these species have evolved.”188 In other words, the wild 
harvesting of açaí should be conducted in smaller-scale ways that 
make use of an abundant species without resulting in the loss of 
ecosystems functions or the biodiversity that supports ecosystems.  
The açaí manufacturer must identify on a map a clear area 
for the harvesting of açaí that are “a satisfactory distance” from 
conventional farming or related contamination risks.189 The açaí 
manufacturer must keep a record of all “collectors” and any local 
 
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN AN EMERGING MARKET (2016); JULIE GUTHMAN, 
AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN CALIFORNIA (2004).  
183 Organic Certification, ORGANIC FOOD AU, http://www.organicfood.com.au/con 
tent_common/pg-organic-certification.seo (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
184 AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC STANDARD PTY. LTD., AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED 
ORGANIC STANDARD § 7.5, at 54 (2017). 
185 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV. NOP 5022, WILD CROP HARVESTING 
(2011), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/5022.pdf. (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2019); see also 7 CFR § 205.207. 
186 AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC STANDARD PTY. LTD., AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED 
ORGANIC STANDARD § 7.5.1, at 54 (2017). 
187 Id. at § 7.5.1–7.5.2, at 54.  
188 Id. at § 7.5.3, at 54. 
189 Id. at § 7.5.5–7.5.6, at 54. 
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agents, as well as the respective quantities of açaí berries they 
provided.190 Açaí manufactures must further provide instructions to 
collectors or other local agents that defines the area of collection and 
informs them about the standard.191 To evidence that these 
instructions were provided, the collectors or relevant agents must 
“sign statements to say that they have followed the instructions,” 
which are kept on file by the açaí manufacturer.192  
Documents formulated and provided by the açaí processor 
provide the evidentiary base for certification in the context of açaí. 
This evidence is provided by the açaí processor to a Brazilian 
certification body that is recognized by the ACO. The ACO assesses 
the evidence gathered by the approved Brazilian certification body, 
along with import documentation and documented proof that the 
product was not fumigated or irradiated at the Australian border. The 
ACO may then confer its certification mark to the açaí processor or 
importer as a wholesaler. The on-going use of the mark is subject to 
annual review by the ACO, and the ACO performs random checks 
on imported products to test for contaminants.  
Overall, an açaí processing company does not know for 
certain whether the instructions were followed nor is it required to 
perform periodic checks. Financial and time pressures may lower 
incentives to examine whether their instructions to forest farmers 
have been followed. It is also conceivable that these standards are not 
practical, given that they were not developed with the bottom-up 
involvement of Amazonian ribeirinhos and apply broadly to all wild-
harvested products. In the case of açaí products, the organic 
certification does not represent, as consumers would assume, a 
product that is free from synthetic chemicals. Rather, it represents 
that açaí processors and forest farmers have self-substantiated their 
efforts to avoid harvesting too close to, for instance, conventional 
farms. No objective scientific evidence, or evidence verified first-
hand by the ACO itself, is used in the process of certification.  
Moreover, the biodiversity loss in the Amazonian 
floodplains suggests that the organic certification requirements, 
especially those regarding the preservation of ecosystems during 
harvest, are not being followed or that not enough actors have 
voluntarily agreed to such standards. In the context of açaí then, 
organic certification is not confirmation that the product is 
sustainably harvested. Consumers think they are buying a product 
that is “clean and green” even though the veracity of these claims 
 
190 Id. at § 7.5.13–7.5.14, at 55. 
191 Id. at § 7.5.12, at 54.  
192 Id. 
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requires much more evidence and oversight than the supply chains 
of a globally-traded, durable commodity allows. Moreover, 
consumers cannot know what proportion of land is being preserved 
as organic or biodiverse due to açaí production, but it is not likely to 
be large as long as it remains a market niche. At the same time, the 
more popular the product becomes, the more likely it is to create 
pressure for unsustainable production practices.   
VII.  Conclusion  
Through our preliminary development of a label chain 
governance analysis, we demonstrate how to connect, and the value 
of connecting, the micro world of the consumer and their everyday 
choices with the macro world of cultural, social, political and 
governance institutions.193 In Part II we suggested that this approach 
can help scholars, activists and engaged consumers to not only 
critically evaluate particular products but also identify patterns in 
markets and supply chains that should be addressed by collective 
action and governance strategies beyond consumer choice. We 
operationalized our approach through a case study of the marketing 
for açaí berry products, introduced in Part III. These marketing 
claims suggest that choosing these products enable consumers to 
govern their own health while also contributing to market signals, as 
a form of regulation, which supports a fairer more sustainable food 
system. 
Our analysis of health claims in Part IV shows the factors 
that have influenced the generally lax regulatory standards around 
health claims and suggests the need to reconsider whether certain 
health and nutritional claims should be legally allowed to be made 
on foods at all. In the European Union, for example, many claims 
about diseases and disease markers that can be allowed in the US and 
Australia are legally prohibited. The result is that many of the 
misleading and overreaching claims seen on US and Australian 
superfood products are not seen in the market in the EU. Addressing 
the claims themselves will be important. Stricter regulation of the 
claims and more active monitoring and enforcement of the 
requirements to back up claims in the US and Australia would help 
prevent misleading claims and quieten the noisy landscape of self-
interested commercial health messages provided to consumers.194  
 
193 See Schneider & Davis, supra note 41, at 32 (discussing the intersection between 
food production, industry, regulation, and consumer choice). 
194 See Curll et al., supra note 76, at 443–45 (discussing the failure of Australian and 
American regulatory measures in preventing fraudulent food label health claims). 
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Public messaging and guidance regarding food choices 
should adopt a more holistic understanding of the connections 
between human bodily health and food. One example of this 
approach is the development of sustainable dietary guidelines by 
various nations. Brazil’s dietary advice, for instance, tells citizens 
that “[d]iet is more than the intake of nutrients.”195 Such guidance 
needs to be combined with restrictions on food advertising itself and 
in particular on commercially conflicted health messaging.196 This 
would help create space for public health professionals to provide 
fairer and more precise messages about healthy diets and healthy 
lives and may go some of the way to mitigating the cultural factors 
that promote over-consumption. Finally, public regulatory 
interventions, such as fiscal measures, could be taken that make 
ultra-processed, unhealthy food products less economically and 
physically accessible, while improving the availability and 
accessibility of a diverse range of unprocessed, unbranded plant 
food.197   
Our analysis of fair trade representations in Part V showed 
how product labels leave out the limitations inherent in market-based 
responses to social inequalities and highlight a simple understanding 
of social issues and social change. They tend to provide some 
technically true information (e.g. demand for açaí has created more 
employment opportunities) that are undermined by the omission of 
other aspects (e.g. the working conditions, the lack of land tenure 
security, the problems with dependence on raw agricultural 
commodities for livelihoods). Rather, açaí product labels tended to 
reinforce social inequalities by omitting the distinct culture and 
position of Amazonian ribeirinhos, including in particular, the 
significance of their agroforestry skills and knowledge in enabling 
the mass supplies of açaí while preserving biodiversity.  
Part VI exposed how food labels can depict technically true 
environmental claims but avoid contextualizing these temporary 
benefits within the broader dynamics of capitalist, globalizing food 
supply chains that necessarily incentivize monoculture, intensive 
 
195See Christine Parker & Hope Johnson, Sustainable Healthy Food Choices: The 
Promise of ‘Holistic’ Dietary Guidelines as a National and International 
Springboard, 18 QUT L. Rᴇᴠ. 1, 32–34 (2018) (citing Carlos Augusto Monteiro et 
al., Dietary Guidelines to Nourish Humanity and the Planet in the Twenty-First 
Century: A Blueprint from Brazil, 18 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2311 (2015)). 
196 See id. at 38–40 (summarizing relevant regulatory policy measures and 
supporting literature); see also Walter Willett et al., Food in the Anthropocene: The 
EAT-Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Food Systems, 393 
LANCET 447, 478–84 (2019) (summarizing regulatory policy measures necessary for 
healthy sustainable diets). 
197 See Willett et al, supra note 199, at 484. 
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farming. Moreover, this part illustrated how the depiction of third-
party certification marks is designed, and empirical evidence showed 
how it has created, consumer trust in environmental claims. Going 
beyond the marks to critically examine the evidence and standards 
being imposed undermines the trust created when it comes to wild-
harvested, imported products. The difficulties of verifying claims in 
this context stem from the distances over which global food chains 
operate and the way in which these claims rely largely on 
documentary evidence provided by parties with an interest in being 
certified.  
As Dorothy Smith observed the “work of inquiry” as to how 
local sites of people’s experience “are connected into the extended 
social relations of ruling and economy” must be “technical,” yet “its 
product should be ordinarily accessible and usable, just as a well-
made map is, to those on whose terrain it maps.”198 Similarly, our 
deconstruction of the label as governance space is technical and 
scholarly in part. Yet, we also propose it as an emancipatory study 
that can be communicated for reflexive consumers199 who wish to 
identify and exercise agency in relation to social systems and 
structures. We do not mean to imply that every individual consumer 
must be aware of everything in the supply chain and its governance 
behind every product. Democratic control and accountability of the 
market and the food system, however, requires that there be enough 
individuals and groups, consumers, activists, policy-makers, 
business people, artists, and so on, who look behind the label and 
identify governance practices that recreate injustice and inequality 
and act to change them. Therefore, we see our study as a resource to 
further critical examinations of the food label as a governance space 
while positioning such analyses as a starting off point from which to 
think through, detail and advocate for new possibilities for the 
regulatory governance of food systems.  
 
 
198 DOROTHY SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE 29 
(2005). 
199 See generally Antony Beckett & Ajit Nayak, The Reflexive Consumer, 8 
MARKETING THEORY, 299 (2008) (introducing the concept of the “reflexive 




The Clash of Agricultural Exceptionalism and the First 




I.  Introduction 
 
A.  Overview  
 
Since the Nation’s founding, agricultural production has 
been treated differently than other industries.  This concept, known 
as “agricultural exceptionalism,” has manifested in many different 
ways throughout U.S. history.1  Since the 1990s, one manifestation 
of agricultural exceptionalism has been the enactment of “Ag-gag 
laws,” state laws that limit information gathering activities at 
animal production facilities.2  Ag-gag laws are frequently criticized 
by animal welfare advocates and legal scholars for seeking to shield 
 
* Author received her J.D. from the University of Colorado Law School in 2018 
and received her LL.M in Agriculture and Food Law from the University of 
Arkansas School of Law in May 2019. She is grateful for Professor Susan 
Schneider's assistance editing this article. 
1 For example, the agriculture industry is exempted from federal labor laws, 
environmental regulations, and antitrust restrictions.  See Susan Schneider, A 
reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and 
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010) 
(discussing the history of agriculture law in the U.S. and arguing for a new 
paradigm for the special treatment afforded agriculture under the law).  
2 It should be noted that Ag-gag laws generally apply to “processing activities” and 
“farming activities.”  Traditionally, agricultural exceptionalism applies to the 
latter, but not the former, and the distinction is not trivial.  For example, the 
exemptions afforded to agriculture under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a form of 
agricultural exceptionalism, and the exemptions do not extend to workers in 
processing. The Supreme Court has held that chicken catchers are not agricultural 
workers and therefore not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime pay 
provisions.  See Herman v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 82 F. Supp. 2d 631 (2000). By 
contrast, Ag-gag statutes attempt to expand the umbrella of agricultural 
exceptionalism to also include processing activities.  
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animal production facilities3 from public scrutiny, a state-
sanctioned protection not afforded to other industries.4    
 
Early Ag-gag laws were enacted to protect agriculture 
facilities from trespass and property damage, known as “agriculture 
interference laws.”5  After 2011, a second wave of Ag-gag laws 
were enacted, focusing solely on information gathering activities.6  
Six states currently have Ag-gag laws which have not been 
challenged in court; one state (Kansas) currently has Ag-gag 
litigation pending; and in four states, Ag-gag laws have been ruled 
unconstitutional.78 
 
3 By “animal production facility” I refer to feedlots, slaughterhouses, and livestock 
processing facilities, although the term might also include animal research 
facilities.  For example, the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act defines “animal facility” as including “any vehicle, 
building, structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, handled, 
housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”  KY. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).  
In this paper, I use the terms “animal production facility,” “animal facility,” and 
“agriculture facility” to mean the same thing. 
4 See generally Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal 
Abuse: Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J. L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 337 (2015) (discussing the arguments made against Ag-gag laws, 
particularly the most recent generation of Ag-gag laws requiring rapid reporting to 
local authorities and the damaging effects these laws have for promotion of animal 
welfare).  
5 Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, MICH.  ST. U. ANIMAL 
LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-ag-
gag-laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
6 Id.  
7 The states with Ag-gag laws in the books include Montana, North Dakota, 
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama and North Carolina.  Ag-gag laws in Idaho, 
Utah, Wyoming, and Iowa have been ruled unconstitutional.  What is Ag-Gag 
Legislation?, AM. SOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, 
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-
legislation#Ag-Gag%20by%20State (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).  
8 This paper does not discuss the Wyoming Ag-gag law because it does not solely 
target speech activities pertaining to animal facilities. WYO. STAT. ANN. . § 6-3-414 
(2016) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40- 27-101 (2016) were nearly identical statutes 
which imposed civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for entering private land 
for the purpose of collecting resource data or crossing private land to collect 
resource data. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
6-3-414 (2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-
SWS, 2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101 
(2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-SWS, 
2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018). In Western Watershed Project v. 
Michael, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that the 
statutes were content-based restrictions on speech because they only penalized data 
“relating to land or land use.” W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-
SWS, 2018 WL 5318261, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018) (finding that the laws 
failed to meet strict scrutiny, the court deemed the laws unconstitutional). 
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As recent litigation demonstrates, a state’s desire to protect 
animal facilities from public scrutiny through Ag-gag legislation 
frequently clashes with the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Despite the prominence of agricultural 
exceptionalism in federal and state laws and in U.S. history, where 
agricultural exceptionalism clashes with the U.S. Constitution, the 
former must yield.  
 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the constitutionality 
of the Kansas Ag-gag law, “The Farm Animal and Field Crop and 
Research Facilities Protection Act,” focusing on the First 
Amendment.  It explores the law in light of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and three recent Ag-gag cases, Animal Legal Defense 
Fund v. Herbert, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, and 
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds.  The courts in each 
respective case held the states’ Ag-gag laws unconstitutional in part 
or in whole.9   
 
A consideration of the Kansas Ag-gag law’s 
constitutionality is timely because on December 4, 2018, a coalition 
of public interest groups filed suit against the state, arguing the 
Kansas Ag-gag law violates the First Amendment.  This article 
argues that the public interest groups should succeed in its lawsuit 
in part and adds additional perspective on the Kansas Ag-gag law 
by addressing additional First Amendment issues with the law not 
raised by the public interest group’s complaint.    
 
Section One of this paper looks at the Kansas statute and 
the complaint filed by the public interest groups.  Section Two 
discusses the holdings in ALDF v. Herbert, ALDF v. Wasden, and 
ALDF v. Reynolds.  Section Three discusses the First Amendment 
problems with the Kansas law.  As this article discusses below, the 
Kansas law is different from the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa.  
Nevertheless, the two sections of the law which implicate speech 
are unconstitutional and should be struck by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Kansas.10  
 
 
9 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(upholding and striking aspects of Idaho’s Ag-gag law); Animal Legal Def. Fund 
v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1198 (D. Utah 2017) (striking Utah’s Ag-gag 
law in its entirety); and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 
417CV00362JEGHCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 9, 2019)(striking Iowa 
Ag-gag on summary judgement). 
10 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1825(a) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) 
(2018).  
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B.  Undercover Activities at Animal Facilities: Why They 
Matter  
 
The term “Ag-gag” was coined by food writer Mark 
Bittman in 2011, though the history of animal activism and 
undercover activity goes farther back.11  The first animal cruelty 
indictment occurred in 1999 after People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA) released footage from a three-month 
investigation of animal abuse at Belcross Farm in North Carolina.12  
Today, a YouTube search of “animal production undercover 
investigation” yields countless undercover videos revealing horrific 
animal abuse at farms, slaughterhouses, and processing facilities for 
all types of animals. 
 
These investigations matter foremost because no animal 
should endure abuse. Moreover, a consumer has a right to know 
how her meat arrived on her plate, and undercover investigations 
can help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing 
food.  Also, given the expanding disconnect between consumers 
and food production in our society, and the tight security at animal 
facilities, these investigations may be the only source of 
information disseminated to the public.   
 
 These investigations can also have serious consequences 
for exposed facilities.  For example, footage of graphic chicken 
abuse at an egg production facility, Sparboe Farms, released by 
Mercy for Animals in 2013 led McDonald’s and Target to drop the 
egg supplier.13  In a dramatic example, in 2007, the Humane 
Society released footage of workers torturing cattle at Hallmark 
Meat Packing Co., which raised concerns about mad cow disease 





11 Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011) 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0.   
12 Ted Genoways, Gagged by Big Ag: How Exposing Abuse Became a Crime, 
EARTH FIRST! NEWSWIRE (June 17, 2013), http://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/201 
3/06/17/gagged-by-big-ag-how-exposing-abuse-became-a-crime/. 
13 Dana Ford, McDonald’s, Target drops egg supplier after animal cruelty report, 
CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/business/sparbo 
e-farms-animal-cruelty/index.html. 
14 Wayne Pacelle, Torture on Tape, HUMANE SOC. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 3, 2008) 
https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/01/calif-cow-abuse.html?credit=blog_post_0 
92509_id5103. 
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C.  State’s Fight Back: From Property Destruction to Free 
Speech  
 
As discussed above, the focus of Ag-gag laws has shifted 
over time.  Laws adopted in the 1990s—such as the Kansas law—
were enacted in response to groups like the Animal Liberation 
Front, which engage in illegal tactics, such as fence cutting, animal 
theft, and arson, to liberate animals.15  The second wave of Ag-gag 
laws, which includes the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa, were 
enacted in response to undercover investigations and do not 
implicate physical conduct.16 
 
This article argues that the term “Ag-gag” applies to any 
law that implicates speech activities at agriculture facilities, 
including laws that mainly target trespass and physical damage.17 A 
full discussion of the evolution of these laws and the semantics of 
what constitutes “Ag-gag” is beyond the scope of this article, but 
merits attention in its own right.18  
 
 
15 See Marshall Tuttle, Finally A Solution? How Animal Legal Defense Fund v. 
Otter Could Affect the Constitutionality of Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, 21 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 237, 244 (2016) (discussing the history of Ag-gag legislation in the 
United States).  
16 Prygoski, supra note 5. 
17 See Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm 
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent Confront 
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 35–38 (2015) (“The first 
generation of ‘ag-gag’ laws . . . generally concerned trespass and harm to property 
at animal facilities and properties with field crops. Additionally, however, they 
criminalized unauthorized photographing or recording at the 
agriculture facility…. The second wave of ag-gag enactments emphasized new 
ways to chill whistleblowing and 
undercover reporting.”). 
18 For example, whether Ag-gag encompasses “eco-terrorism” laws is open to 
discussion.  See  
Will Potter, Sentinel Species: the Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as 
“Terrorists,” and What It Means For Civil Liberties in Trump’s America, 95 
DENV. L. REV. 887, 882–83 (2018) (discussing the history of eco-terrorism laws 
and arguing that the term ‘eco-terrorism’ was created by corporate interest groups 
to shift public perception regarding animal activists).  See also Kevin Adam, 
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” 
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1129, 1166–67 
(2012) (“The AETA has been the subject of extreme criticism, primarily because 
of its disproportionately harsh penalties for conduct that falls outside of what most 
would consider ‘terrorism.’ For example, six animal-rights activists—known 
collectively as the ‘SHAC 7’—were convicted of conspiring to violate the AETA 
and sentenced to four to six years in federal prison for operating a website that was 
used to organize undercover animal-rights investigations.”). 
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II.  Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act  
 
A.  The Nation’s First Ag-Gag Law: Constitutionally 
Suspect Sections  
 
There are many ways for a state to draft Ag-gag legislation.  
As this paper demonstrates, there are major differences in the 
Idaho, Utah, Iowa, and Kansas laws, to varying degrees of 
constitutionality.     
 
The Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act, enacted in 1990, was the nation’s first Ag-
gag law.19  “Animal facility” is defined as “any vehicle, building, 
structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, 
handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”20 
 
The Act broadly criminalizes four types of conduct: (1) 
damaging or destroying an animal facility; (2) exercising control 
over an animal facility; (3) entering an animal facility to take 
pictures or recordings of the facility; and (4) remaining at an animal 
facility against the owner’s wishes.21  Each prohibited act requires 
that the actor have “the intent to damage or destroy” the enterprise 
or the enterprise’s property.22  Violation of the Act varies from 
misdemeanor to felony depending on the amount of damage caused 
to the facility.23   
 
Not all sections of the Kansas law are constitutionally 
suspect.  The sections of the law which this article argues violate 
the First Amendment are the focus of this paper.  First, Section (a) 
“Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” is void for vagueness and 
chills protected speech because it is overbroad. Section (a) states: 
“No person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and 
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal 
facility, damage or destroy an animal facility or any animal or 
property in or on an animal facility.”24  However, the terms “intent 
to damage” and “damage” are not defined in the statute.   
 
 
19 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825–47-1828 (2018).  
20 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018). 
21 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1827(a)–(d) (2018) (providing a more detailed 
description of the prohibited conduct).  
22 Id. 
23 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g) (2018).  
24 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(a) (2018). 
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Second, Section (c) “Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” of 
the statute states: “No person shall, without the effective consent of 
the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at 
the facility: . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by 
photograph, video camera or by any other means.”25  As this article 
discusses in detail below, this section violates the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.  Before addressing these sections 
and comparing them with the constitutional issues addressed by the 
Ninth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, and 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Iowa, this article discusses 
the recent complaint filed against the State of Kansas.      
 
B.  Animal Legal Defense Fund Files Suit  
 
i.  The Complaint  
 
On December 5, 2018, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Center 
for Food Safety, Shy 38 Inc., and Hope Sanctuary filed suit against 
the Kansas Governor and State Attorney General, alleging that the 
Kansas Farm and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act 
violates the First Amendment.26  The complaint alleges (1) that the 
law is an impermissible content and viewpoint-based restriction on 
protected speech;27 and (2) that the law is overbroad.28   
 
First, Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleges that the 
Act violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based 
on the speaker’s message, which is a content-based restriction on 
protected speech.29  When the Farm Animal and Field Crop and 
Research Facilities Protection Act was enacted, the state already 
had content-neutral statutes prohibiting fraud, trespass, adulteration 
of food products, theft, theft of trade secrets, and destruction of 
property.30 Because the state has created a separate law to prosecute 
 
25 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2018). 
26 Complaint at 1, 6, ALDF v. Colyer, No. 2:18-cv-02657-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. 
Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KS-
Ag-Gag.pdf. 
27 Id. at 28–30. 
28 Id. at 30–31. 
29 See id. at 28–29 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 
(1972), holding that “laws which 
target certain messages or speech because of their ‘ideas, subject matter, or 
content’” violate the First Amendment, 
and arguing that this designation of content-based restrictions applies to the Kansas 
Ag-Gag law). 
30 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (2018) (creating and describing the state crime 
of criminal trespass); KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-664 (2018) (describing the conditions 
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certain conduct and speech at animal production facilities, ALDF 
argues the law distinguishes favored speech from disfavored speech 
on the basis of ideas or viewpoints.31  The complaint alleges that 
“the law applies only to speech that involves the subject matter of 
the animal industry and its practices and is therefore content-based 
on its face.”32 
 
As the complaint notes, content-based restrictions regarding 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.33 ALDF argues the law is 
neither justified by a compelling interest, nor narrowly tailored to 
protecting privacy, trespass, and biosecurity because the state can 
do so through less restrictive means.34     
 
ALDF’s second cause of action is that the law’s 
overbreadth amounts to a restriction on protected speech.35  ALDF 
also argues that the law has a chilling effect on speech because the 
text is vague, and violations carry a heavy criminal penalty.36  
Specifically, because the law does not define the meaning of “intent 
to damage,” it is unclear what type of conduct is prohibited.37  
Moreover, the “almost limitless” definition of animal facility38 and 
research facility39 chills speech because the statute covers an 
expansive number of forums: the complaint notes, “these broad 
definitions would include not just factory farms . . . but also . . . 
 
under which a food will be deemed adulterated); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-5801 (2018 
(describing the crime of theft)); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3320 (2018); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. 21-5813 (2018) (describing the crime of criminal damage to property). 
31 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (explaining that 
regulations which differentiate speech on the basis of content are subject to 
exacting scrutiny, while regulations unrelated to the content of speech are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny).  
32 Complaint, supra note 26, at 28–29. 
33 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (holding content-based restrictions 
are subject to strict scrutiny).  
34 Complaint, supra note 26, at 29. 
35 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (holding that a law 
prohibiting substantially more speech than necessary is unconstitutional even 
though some of the conduct targeted by the law does not offend the First 
Amendment).   
36 Complaint, supra note 26, at 17–19. 
37 Complaint, supra note 26, at 13–14. 
38 Defined as “any vehicle, building, structure, research facility or premises where 
an animal is kept, handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.  KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2012). 
39 Defined as “any place, laboratory, institution, medical care facility, elementary 
school, secondary school, college or university, at which any scientific test, 
experiment or investigation involving the use of any living animal or field crop 
product is carried out, conducted or attempted.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47‒1826(i) 
(2012). 
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restaurants with lobster or fish tanks, pet stores, circuses, petting 
zoos, and elementary school classrooms with an ant farm . . . ”40  
 
The chilling effect of the law’s vagueness and broad sweep 
is compounded by the potential for criminal prosecution at the 
felony level.  ALDF indicates that “the criminal penalties are the 
same for a person who intends to take a picture in an animal facility 
without the consent of the owner as for a person who knowingly 
kills or injures an animal.”41    
 
ii.  Assessment of Complaint  
 
This article agrees with ALDF’s claims for relief—that the 
law violates the First Amendment as a content and viewpoint-based 
discrimination, and second, that the law’s overbreadth violates the 
First Amendment—while diverging from the argument that the 
entire statute is unconstitutional. 
 
As a content and view-point based discrimination, this 
article relies heavily on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, discussed in detail 
below.42  While ALDF’s complaint does not cite Reed, reference to 
this important case regarding facially content-neutral laws would 
strengthen its case.  
 
Regarding the statute’s overbreadth, ALDF focuses on the 
wide range of conduct prohibited by the law, alleging that the entire 
law is unconstitutional because “the law as a whole restricts 
substantially more speech than the First Amendment permits.”43  
This article diverges from ALDF in this allegation, because certain 
prohibited activities in the statute do not implicate speech.   
 
For example, K.S.A. § 47-1827(b) prohibits “acquir[ing] or 
otherwise exercis[ing] control over an animal facility . . .” and 
K.S.A. §§ 47-1827(e) and (f) prohibit “dama[ing] or [destroy]ing . . 
. field crops” at a private research facility or a government agency.  
 
The conduct prohibited in these sections does not implicate 
the First Amendment, and, despite the statute’s overbreadth and 
vagueness, there is a significant difference between causing 
 
40 Complaint, supra note 26, at 20. 
41 Id. at 18 (comparing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g)(3) (2006) with KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21- 6412(b)(2)(A) (2017)). 
42 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2227 (2015). 
43 Complaint, supra note 26, at 30–31 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 473 (2010)). 
58                 JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY               [Vol.15 
 
physical damage to a facility versus making an undercover 
recording.  While the statute amounts to an unreasonable restraint 
on protected speech, damaging or destroying another’s property is 
not protected speech.  Thus, the Kansas District Court could find 
the sections of the statute which implicate speech unconstitutional 
while upholding the sections of the statute targeting conduct.44 
 
iii.  Comparison to Idaho, Utah, and Iowa Ag-Gag Laws  
 
This section discusses the opinions in the Idaho, Utah, and 
Iowa cases.  Notably, these three Ag-gag statutes all targeted some 
form of false speech used to obtain entry, access, or employment at 
an agriculture facility.  By contrast, the Kansas statute does not 
address false speech.  Thus, while the courts in these respective 
cases all apply the Supreme Court’s test for laws regulating false 
speech, this inquiry is not relevant in the Kansas case.45  
 
The Idaho statute was deemed unconstitutional in part, 
while the Utah and Iowa statutes were deemed unconstitutional 
entirely.  While the Kansas statute does not address false speech, it 
is still at least in-part unconstitutional.  
 
C.  ALDF v. Wasden: Idaho Ag-Gag Held Partially 
Unconstitutional  
 
The Idaho Interference with Agricultural Production law 
was passed in 2014 after an undercover video of abuse at an Idaho 
dairy was released.46  Shortly after the law was enacted, ALDF 
filed suit.  The case was eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
and a decision was released in January 2018.   
 
 
44 A discussion of conduct under the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this 
paper, though it should be noted that damaging or destroying an animal facility 
would be not considered expressive conduct.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing the limits and considerations involved when 
considering restrictions on symbolic speech).  
45 See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that false speech which 
neither causes a legally cognizable harm nor inures a material gain to the speaker 
is a form of protected speech). 
46 Arin Greenwood, Court Says No to Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal 
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/id 
aho-ag-gag-law_us_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543; Mercy for Animals, Burger 
King Cruelty—Video Exposes Horrific Animal Abuse at a Burger King Dairy 
Supplier, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNYcWOu 
Vqk& oref=https% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww.youtube.com% 2Fwatch% 3Fv% 3DlN 
YcWOuVqk& has verified1.   
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In ALDF v. Wasden, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held two sections of Idaho’s Interference with Agricultural 
Production law unconstitutional.  First, Section (1)(a), the 
“Misrepresentation Clause,” stated: “a person commits the crime of 
interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly: 
(a) is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters 
an agricultural facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or 
trespass.”47   
 
Second, Section (1)(d), the “Recording Clause,” prohibited 
“enter[ing] an agricultural production facility that is not open to the 
public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . . 
mak[ing] an audio or video recording of the conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operation.”48  The remainder of 
Section A focuses on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 
 
i.  Misrepresentation Clause  
 
1.  Gaining Entry Through Misrepresentation is Protected 
Speech 
 
Assessing the constitutionality of the Misrepresentation 
Clause, the Ninth Circuit looked to U.S. v. Alvarez, in which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, which 
criminalized false claims that the speaker had received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.49  In Alvarez, the Court held that 
false speech is neither categorically protected nor unprotected; false 
speech made for the purpose of material gain, material advantage, 
or that inflicts a legally cognizable harm can be criminalized.50  
Other forms of false speech, which do not fall into any of the 
unprotected categories, receive constitutional protection.51  
 
The Ninth Circuit held that criminalizing entering an 
agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated 
 
47 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(c) (2018). 
48 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(d) (2018). 
49 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. 
50 Id. at 712.  
51 Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1195 (2018). It 
should be noted that Alvarez was a plurality decision, and there has been 
discussion in lower courts as to whether the plurality’s opinion applies, or the 
concurrence’s (Breyer, J. concurring, applying a form of intermediate scrutiny to 
protected false speech).  While considering the narrow grounds of the Alvarez 
majority, the Ninth Circuit and the District Courts for Utah and Iowa all applied 
strict scrutiny.     
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Alvarez.  The court reasoned that “lying to gain entry merely allows 
the speaker to cross the threshold of another’s property, including 
public property.”52  Lying for this purpose does not necessarily 
result in material gain or advantage for the speaker, nor does it 
inflict a legally cognizable harm on the property owner.53   
 
Because lying to gain entry is protected speech under 
Alvarez, the court assessed Section(1)(a) under strict scrutiny.  The 
court held that the state might have a compelling interest in 
regulating property rights and protecting its farm industry, but 
“criminalizing access to property by misrepresentation is not 
actually necessary to protect those rights . . . If . . . [the state’s] real 
concern is trespass, then Idaho already has a prohibition against 
trespass that does not implicate speech in any way.”54 
 
2.  Obtaining Records Through Misrepresentation is 
Unprotected Speech 
 
Conversely, Section (1)(b), which prohibits “obtain[ing] 
records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat, 
misrepresentation or trespass”55 and Section (1)(c), which prohibits 
“obtain[ing] employment with an agricultural facility by force, 
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or 
other injury to the facility’s operations, livestock, crops, owners, 
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises, business interests or 
customers”56 were upheld.   
 
The court held that making false statements to obtain 
records inflicts a property harm upon the owner and could result in 
material gain to the speaker and is thus unprotected speech under 
Alvarez.57  For example, a property owner suffers a legally 
cognizable harm from records obtained through false speech and 
 
52 Id. at 1195.  
53 See id. at 1194–95 (exemplifying this point, the court makes the following 
analogy: “Take, for example, a teenager who wants to impress his friends by 
obtaining a highly sought-after reservation at an exclusive pop-up restaurant that is 
open to the public.  If he were to call the restaurant and finagle a reservation in the 
name of his mother, a well-known journalist, that would be a misrepresentation.  If 
the restaurant offers up a reservation on the basis of the mother’s notoriety, 
granting a “license” to enter the premises…the teenager would be subject to 
punishment of up to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed $5,000 or both.”). 
54 Id. at 1196. 
55 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(b) (2018).   
56 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).  
57 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1199. 
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the speaker may learn trade secrets.  Because such speech is 
unprotected, it is only subject to rational review.   
 
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit 
did acknowledge that the law was partially motivated by animus 
towards animal welfare groups.58  However, because animal 
welfare groups are not a traditionally suspect class, a court may 
only strike the statute “if [it] serves no legitimate government 
purpose and if impermissible animus towards an unpopular group 
prompted the statute’s enactment.”59  The court acknowledged that 
animus towards reporters and activists was a factor in passing the 
statute, but that it also serves the legitimate purpose of protecting 
agricultural production facilities from interference.60 
 
3.  Obtaining Employment Through Misrepresentation is 
Unprotected Speech 
 
The Ninth Circuit also held that Section (1)(c), which 
prohibits obtaining employment through misrepresentation with the 
intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility, does not 
offend Alvarez.  In Alvarez, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here 
false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or valuable 
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that 
the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First 
Amendment.”61  Moreover, this section is limited to those seeking 
employment with intent to cause economic or other injury to the 
facility, which further narrows its scope.  
 
While this speech is unprotected, in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, the Supreme Court held that the government may offend the 
First Amendment if it makes a viewpoint distinction in regulating 
unprotected speech.62  ALDF argued that the statute’s Restitution 
Clause, which permits victims to recover twice the amount of the 
damage resulting from the statute’s violation, violated R.A.V. 
 
58 See id. at 1200–01 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 448 (1985), holding “a bare…desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
[or] negative attitude[s] or fears about that group [do not constitute] a legitimate 
government interest for the purpose of this review.”). 
59 Id. at 1200 (citing Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 
919 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
60 Id. at 1201. 
61 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723. 
62 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (distinguishing which 
types of features of speech can be prohibited without violating the First 
Amendment). 
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because it was enacted solely to punish whistleblowers and 
journalists, and thus suppress a specific viewpoint.63  The Ninth 
Circuit held that because the Restitution Clause is limited to 
economic loss, rather than “less tangible damage” such as 
emotional distress, the statute does not punish animal activists any 
more so than other regulations in the Idaho Penal code.64  
 
ii.  Recording Clause  
 
The Recording Clause created the crime of interference 
with agricultural production if a person knowingly “[e]nters an 
agricultural production facility that is not open to the public and, 
without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial 
process or statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings 
of the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operation.”65 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Recording Clause violated 
the First Amendment.  As a preliminary matter, the court indicated 
that making an audio or video recording is speech protected by the 
First Amendment.66  The court then determined the Recording 
Clause was a content-based restriction because law enforcement 
would be required to view the content of the recording to determine 
before bringing charges.  Because the Recording Clause was 
deemed to be a content-based restriction, the court assessed it under 
strict scrutiny.  The court held that the clause was not narrowly 
tailored to protect agriculture production facilities because it was 
both over and under-inclusive.  The clause was held to be under-
inclusive because it did not regulate photographs and over-inclusive 
because it suppressed more speech than necessary to protect 
property and privacy.67 
 
D.  ALDF v. Herbert: Utah Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional  
 
In 2012, the State of Utah enacted the Agricultural 
Operation Interference law, which created the crime of agricultural 
interference for certain recording activities; seeking access to an 
agriculture operation under false pretenses; and seeking 
 
63 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304 (2018); 
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202. 
64 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202 
65 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1), (2) (2018).  
66 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (stating “[N]either the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth 
Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of 
pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the 
essay or artwork) in terms of First Amendment protection afforded…” 1203.  
67 Id. at 1204. 
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employment with the intent to record activities at an agriculture 
production facility.  The United States District Court for the District 
of Utah held the entire statute unconstitutional, and the State of 
Utah did not file an appeal.   
 
i.  Lying Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on 
Protected Speech  
 
Section (2)(b) created the crime of agricultural operation 
interference if a person “obtains access to an agricultural operation 
under false pretenses.”68  The court assessed this section under the 
Alvarez standard discussed above.  The Utah District Court, like the 
Ninth Circuit in Wasden, held that Section (2)(b) infringed on 
protected speech, noting “[l]ying to gain entry, without more, does 
not itself constitute trespass.”69  Thus, because obtaining access 
through false pretenses does not necessarily result in a legally 
cognizable harm, it does not fall into a category of unprotected false 
speech under Alvarez.  The court cited numerous examples of 
speech which could be criminalized under this provision, such as a 
restaurant critic who hides her identity, a dinner guest who lies to 
his host, and a job applicant who fabricates his hobbies.70 
 
Because Section (2)(b) infringed on protected speech, it 
was assessed under strict scrutiny. The state cited four interests 
before the court: 1) protecting animals from injury resulting from 
unqualified workers; 2) protecting animals from disease brought 
into the facility by workers; 3) protecting workers from exposure to 
disease; and 4) protecting workers from injury resulting from 
unqualified workers.71 
 
The court held that even if these were compelling interests, 
the statute was not narrowly tailored to address these problems.  
The lying provision was over-inclusive in that it criminalized 
conduct unrelated to protecting these interests, and under-inclusive 
in that it did nothing to target harmful conduct resulting from 





68 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–6–112. 
69 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1203 (D. Utah 2017). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1211. 
72 Id. at 1213. 
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ii.  Recording Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on 
Protected Speech  
 
Section (2)(a), (c), and (d) created the crime of agricultural 
operation interference for various recording activities at an 
agricultural production facility.73  As a preliminary matter, the court 
held that recordings were a form of speech for First Amendment 
purposes.74  The state argued that because the Act only applied to 
speech on private property, First Amendment protections did not 
apply.  The court rejected this argument, stating “a landowner’s 
ability to exclude from her property someone who wishes to speak, 
and the government’s ability to jail the person for that speech” are 
two different concepts which the state incorrectly conflated.75 
 
The court then determined that the recording provisions 
were a content restriction because they required viewing the content 
of the recordings to determine if they were recordings of an 
agriculture operation.  Had the statute supplanted the term “of” with 
“at” the court indicated it might have assessed the provisions as 
content-neutral restrictions.”76 
 
As a content-based restriction, the court assessed the 
recording provision under strict scrutiny.  The court held that the 
state offered no clear evidence of how its interests in enacting the 
statute, discussed above, were furthered by recording restrictions.  
The recording provisions, like the lying provisions, were deemed 
unconstitutional.  
 
E.  ALDF v. Reynolds: Iowa Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional  
 
Most recently, in January 2019, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Iowa held the state’s “Agricultural production 
facility fraud” statute unconstitutional in a summary judgement 
motion.77  The Iowa law, enacted in 2012, created the crime of 
agricultural production facility fraud for “(a). obtain[ing] access to 
an agricultural production facility by false pretenses” and “(b). 
 
73 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 76–6–112(2)(a), (c), (d). 
74 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208 (stating that, “[b]ecause recordings themselves are 
protected by the First Amendment, so too must the making of those recordings be 
protected.  This is not to say that the State cannot regulate the act of recording; it is 
merely to say that if it wishes to do so, the State must justify and narrowly tailor 
the restriction, as with any other constraint on speech.”).  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1211.  
77 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 2019 WL 
140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019). 
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mak[ing] a false statement or representation as part of an 
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural 
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false, 
and mak[ing] the statement with the intent to commit an act not 
authorized by the owner . . . ”78  For a first conviction, the crime 
constituted a serious misdemeanor and for a subsequent conviction, 
the crime constituted an aggravated misdemeanor.79 
 
i.  False Speech and Employment: A Different Outcome   
Than Wasden 
 
As a preliminary matter, the Iowa District Court determined 
that the false speech at issue—both making false statements to 
access an agriculture facility and making false statements to seek 
employment at an agriculture facility—are protected forms of 
speech under Alvarez because neither instance causes a legally 
cognizable harm nor provides a material gain to the speaker.80  
Interestingly, the Iowa District Court came to a different conclusion 
regarding false speech and employment than the Ninth Circuit, 
which upheld Idaho’s restriction on obtaining employment at an 
agriculture facility through false speech.  
 
Unlike the Idaho statute, which prohibited obtaining 
“employment . . . by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the 
intent to cause economic or other injury,”81 the Iowa statute 
prohibits obtaining employment by false speech “with the intent to 
commit an act not authorized by the owner.”82  In a previous 
decision addressing the state’s motion to dismiss, the Iowa court 
held that the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding Idaho’s employment 
clause was inapplicable because the court “placed great emphasis 
on the intent prong of the Idaho statute.”83   
 
The Iowa court reasoned that “[t]his intent provision 
cabined the application of the Idaho statute so that it only 
criminalized the sort of false statements that the plurality in 
[Alvarez] recognized the government may target . . . : those likely 
to cause material harm to others.”84  Conversely, the Iowa code 
 
78 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(a),(b) (2012). 
79 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(2)(a),(b) (2012). 
80 Reynolds, 2019 WL at 10.  
81 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018). 
82 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(b) (2012). 
83 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 924 (S.D. Iowa 
2018). 
84 Id. 
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prohibits all false speech in a job application if the speaker intends 
to commit an unauthorized act—a much broader prohibition that 
the Idaho code.  Determining section § 717A.3A(b) to be broader 
than the type of false speech the Court deemed unprotected in 
Alvarez, the Iowa court assessed section (b) under strict scrutiny.  
 
ii.  Iowa Statute Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny  
 
In the court’s summary judgment opinion, it deemed § 
717A.3A unconstitutional.  First, the court determined the entire 
statute was a content-based restriction because the content of the 
speech—whether it was true or false—would need to be assessed to 
find an individual guilty of agriculture production facility fraud.85 
 
As a content-based restriction, the court applied strict 
scrutiny in assessing the law.86  Though dubious of the state’s 
justifications for the law (property interests and biosecurity) it still 
held that these interests were important, but not compelling.87  The 
law was also deemed unnecessary to protect these interests because 
the state made no argument explaining how false speech used to 
access or gain employment at an agriculture facility would 
compromise biosecurity.88  Finally, the court determined that 
because Iowa already has other content-neutral statutes regarding 
trespass and biosecurity, the state’s interests could be achieved by 
means which do not affront protected speech.89  As of February 14, 
2019, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office is set to file an appeal 
brief by March 20, 2019.90 
 
III.  Kansas Ag-Gag: ‘Better’ Drafted, But Partially 
Unconstitutional  
 
As the nation’s first Ag-gag law, perhaps there is a reason 
the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities 
 
85 Reynolds, 2019 WL at 11 (citing See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 
468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (holding law that prohibits broadcasting stations which 
receive federal funds from editorializing is content-based.)). 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 Id. at 7. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 8. 
90 Rox Laird, Federal Judge Strikes Down Iowa ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, https://www.court 
housenews.com/federal-judge-strikes-down-iowa-ag-gag-law/, (last visited Jan. 21, 
2019); see also Challenging Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, Animal Legal Defense Fund 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://aldf.org/case/challenging-iowas-ag-gag-law/ (last visited 
March 4, 2019). 
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Protection Act was not challenged until 2018; it is ‘better’ drafted 
than the Idaho and Utah laws.91 
 
Notably, there is no section in the Kansas statute which 
criminalizes false speech used to enter or seek employment at an 
animal facility, so Alvarez is not relevant.  However, like the Idaho 
and Utah statutes, the Kansas statute does criminalize conduct 
involving recording and photography.   
 
 Despite its tactful drafting, certain sections are still 
constitutionally suspect.92  This section assesses these problematic 
sections of the law in light of the holdings in Reynolds, Wasden, 
and Herbert.  
 
A.  Unconstitutional Aspects of Kansas Law 
 
i.  Because Key Terms are Not Defined, the Statute is 
Overbroad and Vague 
 
1.  The Meddling Student Example93  
 
The word ‘damage’ and the clause ‘intent to damage’ are 
not defined in the statute’s definition section.  However, each 
prohibited act under § 47-1827 requires the actor have the ‘intent to 
damage’ the enterprise.94  Because the term ‘damage’ and the 
clause ‘intent to damage’ are not defined in statute’s definitions 
section, the statute chills speech and restricts more speech than 
necessary to serve its purpose.  If the term ‘damage’ were defined 
to only include activities resulting in physical damage, the 
remainder of the statute (excluding § 47-1827(c)(4)) might be 
constitutional. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated, “a law may be invalidated 
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are 
 
91 It should also be noted that no one has ever been prosecuted under this law.  
92 See Complaint, supra note 26, at 31 (alleging that the entire statute is 
unconstitutional on its face or, in the alternative, that Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(c)(4), 
(c)(1), (c)(3), Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(a), (b), (c)(2), and (d)(1) are unconstitutional as 
applied to Plaintiff.) For purposes of this paper, I only argue that Sections Kan. 
Stat. § 47-1827(a) and (c)(4) are unconstitutional.  
93This example was inspired by the Ninth Circuit’s factious teenager who lies 
about his identity in order to secure a reservation at an exclusive restaurant, thus 
implicating Idaho Code § 18–7042(1)(a).  See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195.  
94 § 47-1827(b) is the only prohibited act with a different standard, requiring the 
actor have the “intent to deprive the owner of such facility.”  
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unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”95  Even if aspects of the law are constitutional, 
under the overbreadth doctrine, the court considers that “the threat 
of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people from 
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.”96 
 
In this instance, the word ‘damage’ and the term ‘intent to 
damage’ could mean many things and runs the risk of criminalizing 
perfectly legitimate forms of speech.  For example, does the statute 
criminalize economic, emotional, or physical damage, or all three?   
 
There is also a timing issue: must the speaker have the 
intent to damage the enterprise before she engages in her speech 
activity, or can she be charged if her intent changes from the time 
she made a recording or photograph to the time of disseminating 
the information?  
 
To exemplify the statute’s overbreadth, consider the 
following hypothetical activity which could be criminalized under 
the statute.  A school group offers a tour to a local animal 
production facility as part of a field trip for a science class.  Though 
the students are told in advance not to take any photos inside, a 
student nonetheless hides his phone in his pocket before the field 
trip because he plans to take a photo, just for fun.  The student has 
signed up for the field trip because his friends dared him to take a 
photo inside.   
 
  Once inside, he takes a particularly gruesome photo of an 
animal carcass being processed.  The student entered the facility an 
omnivore, but, when he returns home and views the photo, he 
realizes he is disgusted by the facility and becomes a vegetarian.  
Wanting to share his news and hoping to persuade others in his 
network to stop eating meat, he posts the photo to his Facebook 
page, and in the caption, he names the animal production facility 
and tells his friends that they should stop eating meat because of the 
atrocities he witnessed at the facility.  A few of his friends view the 
photo, are also disgusted by it, and decide to stop eating meat.   
 
Under Section (c)(4), the student could be criminally 
prosecuted.  By captioning the facility’s name in his photo and 
hoping to convert his friends to vegetarianism, the student had the 
 
95 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
449  n.6 (2008) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615). 
96 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2018). 
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“intent to damage the enterprise.”  Because he planned to take the 
photo in advance of entering the facility, he entered “to take 
pictures.”  For his actions, the student could be fined and charged 
with a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the extent of his 
damage.  Whether the facility owner might have recourse in a 
private tort action (which is beyond the scope of this paper), the 
State cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct without infringing 
on First Amendment rights.97  
 
2.  Kansas Attorney General Opinion Letter Does Not 
Ameliorate Statute’s Issues  
 
Following the statute’s enactment, the Kansas Attorney 
General released Opinion Letter No. 90-72 on the issue of the 
meaning of “intent to damage.”98  The letter does little to clarify 
any confusion surrounding the statue’s vagueness and overbreadth, 
and moreover, the letter is not binding law.99   
 
  The letter states that the specific intent to damage the 
enterprise conducted at the facility is a required element of the 
crime, and such intent is determined by a judge or jury based on the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the event.   
 
Responding to the question of what “damages” means, the 
Opinion Letter essentially ‘punts’ on the issue.  The most definitive 
statement in the letter says, “[u]pon conviction, restitution may be 
ordered in an amount sufficient to compensate the victim for the 
loss suffered.  In a civil action compensatory damages may include 
out-of-pocket loss as well as consequential damages.”100  So, if 
damages constitute any form of quantifiable harm, perhaps any 
intent is sufficient to implicate charges so long as the victim’s 
losses are quantifiable.  This logic is purely speculative and does 
little to clarify the meaning of ‘intent to damage.’ 
 
97 Note that the State of Utah argued that the First Amendment was inapplicable to 
its Ag-gag statute because the law only regulated speech on private property.  The 
Utah District Court was quick to reject this argument, noting that the state had 
conflated the difference between “a landowner’s ability to exclude from her 
property someone who wishes to speak, and the government’s ability to jail the 
person for that speech.”  The former does not affront the First Amendment, while 
the latter does. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208. 
98 See Livestock and Domestic Animals -- Farm Animal and Research Facilities 
Protection Act -- 1990 Senate Bill No. 776 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 90-72 (1990), 
http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1990/1990-072.pdf (last visited Ma. 10, 
2019).  
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 10.  
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i.  The Pictures Clause Fails First Amendment Scrutiny as 
Either Content-Based or Content-Neutral Restriction 
 
Section (c) of Prohibited acts; criminal penalties states: 
“[n]o person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and 
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal 
facility . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by 
photograph, video camera or by other means.”101  This section 
infringes on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment 
as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech.102  
 
 The first step in assessing this section under the First 
Amendment is to determine if it infringes on protected speech.  The 
Supreme Court has held movies to be protected by the First 
Amendment.103  And in United States v. Stevens, the Court stated 
“visual [and] auditory depiction[s], such as photographs, videos, or 
sound recordings” are subject to the First Amendment.104  It 
logically follows that the act of creating a film, photo, or recording 
must receive some level of protection as well, and neither the Ninth 
Circuit, the Utah District Court, nor the Iowa District Court 
considered otherwise.  Thus, protected speech is at issue.    
 
1.  Assessed as Content-Neutral Restriction  
 
Section (c)(4) prohibits entering an animal facility “to take 
pictures by photograph, video camera, or by other means.”105  This 
section is notably different from both the Idaho and Utah statutes in 
that it does not prohibit taking pictures or recordings of an 
agriculture production facility, but rather at an animal production 
facility.106   
 
Because this section limits where a photo or recording can 
be made, rather than regulating the photo or videos content, it might 
be deemed a content-neutral regulation.  In Herbert, responding to 
the state’s argument that the recording provision was a content-
neutral restriction, the Utah District Court stated, “[t]hat might be 
 
101 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018). 
102 There is also a timing issue here, as discussed above in the meddling student 
example. Must the actor have the intent to damage the enterprise before she enters?  
This uncertainty contributes to the statute’s overbreadth and vagueness.  
103 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).   
104 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
105 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018). 
106 Id.  
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so if the Act criminalized recording an imagine at an agricultural 
operation.  But the Act criminalizes recording an image of an 
agricultural operation.  The distinction is not trivial . . . the use of 
“of” rather than “at” means the Act does not bar all filming at an 
agricultural operation, so it is not location based.”107   
 
Following the rationale of the Utah District Court, the 
Kansas recording provision should be assessed as a content-neutral 
restriction.  Though there are different variations of the content-
neutral test, the Supreme Court commonly asks if the law “is 
designed to serve a substantial government interest and [does] not 
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”108 
 
Even assuming the Kansas legislature has a substantial 
interest in protecting its farmers and ranchers, it is dubious that the 
law does not ‘unreasonably limit alternative avenues of 
communication.’   
 
Individuals and groups who wish to disseminate 
information and exposés of animal production facilities essentially 
have no other avenue of communication under this law.  The 
hypothetical “alternative avenues of communication” do not 
measure up to the prohibited conduct. For example, an individual 
could seek the owner’s consent to film or photograph, but clearly 
what the individual would see while undercover at a facility would 
be different than what the individual would see during a planned 
visit.  
 
 And given the tight security at animal production facilities, 
there is essentially no way to take photos or recordings from the 
outside.  Alternatively, an entity or individual wishing to expose 
abuses at an animal production facility could interview a willing 
employee, but the differences between reading an interview versus 
viewing images or audio recordings is significant.  A business can 
prohibit individuals from recording or taking photos on its property, 
but the state cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct. Because the 
 
107 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1211. 
108 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). See also 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); United 
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-
48 (1981) (illustrating that the Court commonly asks whether a law regarding 
speech is designed to serve a substantial government interest and does not limit 
alternate avenues of communication). 
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law limits the only legitimate avenue for this speech to occur, it 
infringes on protected speech if it is deemed content-neutral.  
 
2.  Assessed as Content-Based Restriction  
 
Despite the text of Section (c)(4), and the distinction drawn 
by the Utah District Court between the term “at” and “of,” it is not 
clear if the Kansas recording provision is actually content-neutral.  
Arguably, Section (c)(4) is content-based. 
 
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court stated, “our 
precedents have . . . recognized a separate and additional category 
of laws that, though facially content-neutral, will be considered 
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be justified 
without reference to the content of the regulation of speech or that 
were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the 
message [the speech] conveys.  Those laws, like those that are 
content-based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.”109 
 
The Kansas statute is content-based under the Gilbert logic.  
First, the law cannot be justified without reference to its content.  
For example, although the law prohibits recordings and taking 
photos at an animal production facility, it only singles out those 
made with the intent to damage the enterprise.  Viewing the 
contents of the photo or recording is important, if not necessary, to 
determine the actor’s intent.  For example, a photograph of a sunset 
taken at an animal production facility is probably not taken with the 
intent to damage the enterprise.  But a photograph of animal abuse 
is likely taken to expose the conduct and cause the enterprise 
economic damage.  Thus, Section (c)(4) cannot be justified without 
viewing the content of the photo or recording.   
 
Second, the law regulates the content of speech because the 
government disagrees with the speaker. In Gilbert, the Court further 
stated, “government regulation of speech is content-based if a law 
applies to a particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 
idea or message expressed.” In this instance, the state already has 
other laws on its books which protect privacy, trespass, and 
biosecurity.110  Why the state should need an additional law 
singling out speech at an agriculture production facility is unclear 
 
109 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  
110 Complaint, supra note 26, at 29. 
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and is only justified by a desire to suppress speech on the topic of 
animal welfare.111 
 
Because Section (c)(4) is content-based under the 
“additional category” of laws recognized in Gilbert, it will only be 
upheld if it meets strict scrutiny, a standard most laws infringing on 
protected speech are unable to meet.  
 
 Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.  While the state may have a 
compelling interest in protecting its agriculture production 
facilities, the law is not narrowly tailored to this interest because, as 
mentioned above, other laws are already on the books in Kansas 
that protect these interests and do not infringe on speech.  Under 
strict scrutiny, this section fails.  
 
IV.  Conclusion  
 
The outcome of four prior cases striking Ag-gag legislation 
indicates an ominous fate for the Kansas Farm Animal and Field 
Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act.  While the statute’s 
Picture’s Clause uses different language from the Pictures Clauses 
in Idaho and Utah respectively, it too fails to meet the demands of 
strict scrutiny for the reasons discussed above.  Moreover, the 
vague meaning of ‘damage’ and ‘intent to damage’ creates an issue 
of overbreadth.  
 
While the entire Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act might not violate the First Amendment, 
whether these laws are good public policy is an entirely separate 
question. The State of Kansas and the remaining six states with Ag-
gag laws might rationalize these laws with trespass or property 
damage concerns, but there is no rational justification to suppress 
speech in the process.  Ag-gag laws are yet another example of 
legislation which affords agriculture special status.  While 
agricultural exceptionalism’s pervasiveness in U.S. history and law 
is unlikely to shift in the immediate future, it must always yield to 
the First Amendment.  
 
111 Even if the state has a compelling interest in protecting the property of animal 
facilities from physical damage—and it is not even clear this was the state’s real 
interest in enacting the law—prohibiting recording and photography is not 
necessary to further this interest.  
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Walter G. Johnson, M.S.T.P.* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Foodborne illness remains an ongoing public health 
challenge in both the developing and industrialized worlds.1 In the 
United States, almost 50 million reported cases of infectious disease 
occur every year from a food product, resulting in substantial 
morbidity and mortality with economic burdens to health care and 
productivity.2 Despite recognition as a leader in food safety, the U.S. 
experiences longstanding and novel issues in food safety.3 Advances 
in whole genome sequencing (WGS) promise to bolster food safety 
regulators’ capabilities to identify pathogens and determine their 
source.4 However, inefficiencies in tracing food products through the 
supply chain remain.5  
 
Simultaneously, practical applications are beginning to 
emerge for new distributed ledger technologies, including 
blockchain.6 First popularized by the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, 
blockchain has been hailed as a transformative technology for any 
industry engaged in recordkeeping.7 Blockchain has attracted 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; Master of Science 
and Technology Policy, 2017, Arizona State University. With many thanks to Gary 
Marchant and David McCarville for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Diane G. Newell et al., Food-Borne Diseases — The Challenges of 20 Years Ago 
Still Persist While New Ones Continue to Emerge, 139 INT’L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 
S3, S4 (2010). 
2 Robert L. Scharff, Economic burden from health losses due to foodborne illness in 
the United States, 75 J. FOOD PROT. 123, 123 (2012). 
3 RENÉE JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FDA FOOD SAFETY 
MODERNIZATION ACT (P.L. 111-353) 1 (Feb. 18, 2011). 
4 Jennifer L. Gardy & Nicholas J. Loman, Towards A Genomics-Informed, Real-
Time, Global Pathogen Surveillance System, 19 NATURE REV. GENETICS 9 (2018).  
5 Thea King et al., Food Safety for Food Security: Relationship Between Global 
Megatrends and Developments in Food Safety, 68 TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 160, 
170 (2017). 
6 DYLAN YAGA ET AL., U.S. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8202, 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/i 
r/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf [hereinafter NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ]. 
7 Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, Jan.–Feb. 2017 
HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017), https://enterprisersproject.com/sites/default/files/th 
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massive investments for its broad applications in finance.8 
Meanwhile, academic and industry research on blockchain has 
exploded since 2012.9 Though blockchain applications have only 
begun to surface, other sectors including healthcare, energy, and 
government services stand to benefit from this technological 
revolution.10  
 
New pilot projects suggest blockchain may also serve a 
public health function as applied to food safety,11 potentially 
overlapping with WGS advances. Blockchain in the food industry 
promises increased traceability of food products through the supply 
chain, as well as reduced fraud and counterfeiting of food products.12 
In 2017, Walmart and IBM began a collaboration to pilot blockchain 
in the food supply chain to hasten responses and reduce waste during 
an outbreak of foodborne illness.13 Federal regulators in the U.S. 
have gained interest in exploring this application of blockchain 
technologies in the wake of two lettuce E. coli outbreaks during 2018 
which suffered from traceability issues.14 Given their complementary 
 
8 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Demystifying the Blockchain, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/blockchain-technology.ht 
ml. 
9 Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—
A Systematic Review, 11 PLOS ONE 10.1371,  9–10 (2016).  
10 U.K. GOV’T OFFICE SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK 
CHAIN 64–71 (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technolog 
y.pdf; Katharine Gammon, Experimenting with Blockchain: Can One Technology 
Boost Both Data Integrity and Patients’ Pocketbooks?, 24 NATURE MED. 378, 381 
(2018); Mike Orcutt, How Blockchain Could Give Us a Smarter Energy Grid, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609077/how-
blockchain-could-give-us-a-smarter-energy-grid/. 
11 See generally Frank Yiannas, A New Era of Food Transparency Powered by 
Blockchain, 12 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 46 (2018). 
12 Sylvian Charlebois, How Blockchain Technology Could Transform the Food 
Industry, CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-
blockchain-technology-could-transform-the-food-industry-89348. 
13 See IBM Announces Major Blockchain Collaboration with Dole, Driscoll’s, 
Golden State Foods, Kroger, McCormick and Company, McLane Company, Nestlé, 
Tyson Foods, Unilever and Walmart to Address Food Safety Worldwide, IBM (Aug. 
22, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/53013.wss (detailing 
IBM’s announcement in 2017 that it would begin a major blockchain collaboration 
with various companies, including Walmart as well as blockchain’s suitability to 
combat food waste problems) [hereinafter IBM Press Release]. 
14 Maggie Fox, The FDA Thinks Walmart May Have One Solution to Romaine 
Lettuce Recalls, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/heal 
th-news/fda-thinks-walmart-may-have-one-solution-romaine-lettuce-recalls-
n940826.  
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nature, industry-driven blockchain projects could soon converge 
with government-based WGS infrastructure to provide a more 
comprehensive approach to responding to foodborne illness. 
Accomplishing this goal will require addressing regulatory and 
technical hurdles.  
 
This article illustrates opportunities and obstacles arising 
from combining blockchain and WGS in food safety. Part I reviews 
food safety regulatory infrastructure in the U.S. and recent advances 
in WGS. Part II describes the rise of blockchain and its application 
in the food supply chain. Part III presents the promise of successfully 
combining blockchain and WGS tools alongside governance 
challenges and opportunities, pointing to soft law approaches 
including voluntary regulatory programs and technical standards as 
a potential path forward.  
 
II.  Food Safety Oversight and Whole Genome 
Sequencing 
  
Ensuring food safety and preventing foodborne illness 
represent common, pervasive public health challenges for every 
nation and state.15 Nearly 50 million individuals in the U.S. become 
ill after exposure to contaminated food products in a single year.16 
Food poisoning may produce more mild symptoms of gastric distress 
but can also yield potentially fatal liver, kidney, and neurological 
complications.17 In turn, foodborne illnesses in the U.S. result in 
128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 mortalities annually.18 Globally, 
food poisoning strikes 600 million individuals, resulting in 420,000 
 
15 See INST. MED., ADDRESSING FOODBORNE THREATS TO HEALTH: POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND GLOBAL COORDINATION 3 (2006) (“Ensuring the safety of food is a 
long-standing and critical objective of public health. The estimate that millions of 
Americans—whose food is among the safest on earth—are sickened by tainted food 
each year attests to the need to further safeguard our food supply, while the mounting 
threat of terrorism lends this mission a particular urgency.”). 
16 See L. Hannah Gould et al., Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks --- 
United States, 2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1197, 1197 (2011) 
(“Foodborne agents cause an estimated 48 million illnesses annually in the United 
States.”). 
17 See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States., 5 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 607, 607 (1999) (“[S]ymptoms of foodborne illness 
range from mild gastroenteritis.”). 
18 Foodborne Illness and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.  
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fatalities.19 Foodborne illness may have disparate impacts on 
vulnerable groups, including minorities and people of lower 
socioeconomic status,20 suggesting health justice as a needed lens for 
this public health hazard.21 Consumers consistently rate food 
poisoning among top food-related concerns, ahead of pesticides, 
antibiotics, or allergens.22 The economic burden of foodborne illness 
from common pathogens on the American healthcare system may 
approach $78 billion per year.23 
 
 The expansive scope of pathogens and food products 
contributing to foodborne illness complicates oversight for 
prevention and response.24 Myriad species of microorganisms and 
toxic metabolites lead to illness every year. Prominent pathogens are 
 
19 Food Safety: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety. 
20 See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne 
Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 681, 686 (1998) (“Foodborne illness is particularly dangerous for those 
without access to health care, including the homeless, migrant workers, and others 
of low socioeconomic status.”); Jennifer J. Quinlan, Foodborne Illness Incidence 
Rates and Food Safety Risks for Populations of Low Socioeconomic Status and 
Minority Race/Ethnicity: A Review of the Literature, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. 
HEALTH 3634, 3645–46 (2013) (discussing the impact of “greater access to small, 
independently operated food markets and fast-food/take-out restaurants” on 
minorities’ increased food poisoning rates). Cf. K. L. Newman et al., The Impact of 
Socioeconomic Status on Foodborne Illness in High-Income Countries: A 
Systematic Review, 143 EPIDEMIOL. & INFECT. 2473, 2473 (2015) (finding that the 
effect of socio-economic status, or SES, varies depending on the pathogen, but “the 
majority of identified studies for Campylobacter, salmonellosis, and E. coli infection 
showed an association between high SES and illness.”). 
21 See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. LAW 
& PUB. POL’Y 47 (2014) (arguing that health law should be used as a tool for social 
justice). 
22 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2018 FOOD 
& HEALTH SURVEY 49 (2018) (finding “[f]oodborne illness from bacteria” was 
ranked as the most important food safety issue in 2018 more often than any other 
choice); INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD & 
HEALTH SURVEY 75 (2014). 
23  See Scharff, supra note 2, at 123 (finding that the aggregated annual cost of 
foodborne illness was $77.7 billion under its enhanced model). Cf. Sandra Hoffmann 
et al., Annual Cost of Illness and Quality-Adjusted Life Year Losses in the United 
States Due to 14 Foodborne Pathogens, 75 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1292, 1292 (2012) 
(reporting an average of $14 billion annually as a result of only common pathogens). 
24 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAD BUG BOOK: HANDBOOK OF 
FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL TOXINS (2d ed. 2012) 
(providing information about major food pathogens and discussing the related 
oversight challenges) [hereinafter BAD BUG BOOK]. 
78                   JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY          [Vol.15 
bacterial or viral, including salmonella, E. coli, and norovirus.25 
Parasites, protozoa, prions, and chemical toxins can also contaminate 
food and cause illness.26 Every year, multiple outbreaks in meat, 
produce, and other types of consumables are investigated by federal 
regulators.27 Illness arising from all food types can give rise to 
infection, hospitalization, and mortality.28 Moreover, contamination 
vulnerabilities exist at all stages of the food supply chain, “from farm 
to table.”29 Identifying the pathogen responsible and the origin of 
contamination is a critical part of the response to an outbreak and 
preventing future outbreaks, and thus promoting food safety more 
broadly.30 Difficulties in characterizing pathogens can arise from 
food contaminated by multiple microorganisms.31 Unfortunately, 
determining the origin of an outbreak with current tools can require 
a substantial amount of time, potentially enabling the outbreak to 
propagate.32 
 
 Federal law divides regulatory authority over food safety 
between multiple agencies.33 Recently boosted by the Food Safety 
Modernization Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
primary responsibility for preventing and responding to food 
 
25 Foodborne Illnesses and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html. 
26 See BAD BUG BOOK, supra note 24 (discussing the impact of each of these 
categories of contaminants on food safety). 
27 List of Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/multistate-
outbreaks/outbreaks-list.html. 
28 John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and 
Deaths to Food Commodities by using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998–2008, 
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 407, 410–13 (2013). 
29 FED. FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/fswg_report_final.pdf. 
30 Steps in a Foodborne Outbreak Investigation, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (June 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigat 
ing-outbreaks/investigations/detection.html. See also Sébastien Pouliot & Daniel A. 
Sumner, Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality, 90 AM. 
J. AGRIC. ECON. 15, 24–25 (2008). 
31 Marion Koopmans, Food-Borne Viruses from a Global Perspective, in INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 225, 225 (2012).  
32 Il-Hoon Cho & Seockmo Ku, Current Technical Approaches for the Early 
Detection of Foodborne Pathogens: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 INT’L J. 
MOLECULAR SCI. 2078, 2079 (2017); IBM Food Trust: Trust and Transparency in 
Our Food, IBM (2018), https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/solutions/food-trust (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
33 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY IS 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 6–7 (2017).  
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contamination.34 FDA wields various tools for ensuring food safety 
including inspection, recalls, sampling, and voluntary destruction.35 
Complementing FDA jurisdiction, the Department of Agriculture’s 
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has similar authority over 
meat, poultry, and processed eggs.36 The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) conducts food safety surveillance, 
investigates multistate outbreaks, and coordinates state and local 
public health actions.37 These three federal agencies established the 
Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) in 2011 
to promote coordination and cooperation in identifying culpable 
pathogens and contaminated food products.38  
 
Despite its multi-agency scheme, gaps in U.S. food safety 
oversight remain. For example, of the nearly 50 million cases of 
foodborne illness in the U.S. each year, the responsible pathogen has 
historically only been identified in one fifth of the cases.39 In 2011, 
the FDA launched the “Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) 
Program” to enhance its food safety operations.40 WGS methods 
comprehensively decode the full genome of an organism, identifying 
 
34 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) 
(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i 
(2018)); see Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 353, 
354–55 (2011) (analyzing the new duties as well as the enhanced scope of FDA’s 
authority created by FSMA). 
35 See Deliganis, supra note 20, at 702–05 (considering the many tools available in 
FDA’s arsenal); Food: Compliance & Enforcement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Food/ComplianceEnforcement/default.htm 
(discussing FDA’s authority to take action against “adulterated” or “misbranded” 
foods); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 393(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
36 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–26 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–56 
(2019). 
37 21 U.S.C. § 2224; CDC and Food Safety, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/cdc-and-food-safety.html. See 
generally U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR 
FOODBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAKS, UNITED STATES: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016). 
38 INTERAGENCY FOOD SAFETY ANALYTICS COLLABORATION, STRATEGIC PLAN: 
CALENDAR YEAR 2017-2021 2–3 (2017). 
39 See Elaine Scallan et al., Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Major 
Pathogens, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 7, 7 (2001) (finding 9.4 million cases of 
foodborne illness caused by known, common pathogens); see also Elaine Scallan et 
al, Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Unspecified Agents, 17 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 16, 16 (2011) (finding 38.4 million cases of foodborne 
illness caused by unknown pathogens). 
40 Eric L. Stevens et al., The Public Health Impact of a Publicly Available, 
Environmental Database of Microbial Genomes, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 
(2017).  
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the organism by comparing the data produced through sequencing to 
reference genomic datasets.41 With the costs of WGS technology 
falling,42 the FDA program calls on laboratories to characterize the 
full genome of microbes obtained from food, environmental, and 
clinical samples in their local areas.43 The GenomeTrakr platform 
serves as a key tool in the FDA Whole Genome Sequencing Project 
by providing an international reference database of pathogen 
genomes.44 GenomeTrakr enables public health officials to infer the 
origin of contamination in food products by comparing the genomes 
of new outbreak pathogens, obtained from WGS, to references in the 
database from various geographical locations.45 In 2013, CDC 
announced its existing PulseNet network of genomic food safety 
laboratories would begin collecting WGS data.46 PulseNet aims to 
recognize outbreaks earlier by finding common strains of specific 
pathogens in different clinical cases and whole genome data should 
augment these efforts.47 FSIS contributes to both CDC’s PulseNet 
and FDA’s GenomeTrakr, and, in 2017, indicated interest in 
conducting its own analyses of pathogen genomic data.48 An 
overview of the efforts of IFSAC agencies to implement WGS 









41 Jenny C. Taylor et al., Factors Influencing Success of Clinical Genome 
Sequencing Across a Broad Spectrum of Disorders, 47 NATURE GENETICS 717, 717 
(2015). 
42 Xavier Didelot et al., Transforming Clinical Microbiology with Bacterial Genome 
Sequencing, 13 NATURE REV. GENETICS 601, 610 (2012). 
43 Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 
15, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/wholegenomesequencing 
programwgs/. 




46 PulseNet: Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pathogens/wgs.html.  
47 Id.; Fast Facts About PulseNet, U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/fast-facts.html. 
48 Use of Whole Genome Sequence Analysis to Improve Food Safety and Public 
Health, 82 Fed. Reg. 44378 (Sept. 22, 2017).  
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Figure 1. IFSAC Agencies and WGS Initiatives 
 
 
Early evidence suggests these WGS methods for pathogen 
characterization may improve the response capacity of food safety 
regulators.49 FDA reports cases showing WGS affords the ability to 
identify and distinguish between problematic pathogens in the food 
system, even in products with ingredients from diverse geographic 
locations.50 In 2013, CDC launched a pilot project to detect food 
contaminated with listeria using WGS techniques.51 Initial results 
demonstrate that WGS methods enabled public health officials to 
identify as many as 50% more related cases of foodborne listeria in 
a year and reduced the average number of cases reported per outbreak 
by up to 50%.52 The listeria project points to significant possible 
public health and economic savings by reducing the burden of 
foodborne illness.53 The expanding international adoption of 
PulseNet and GenomeTrakr should allow for further improved 
results.54 Moreover, WGS systems may offer a platform for public 
health officials to monitor the food supply chain and intervene earlier 
 
49 See E. Kurt Lienau et al., Identification of a Salmonellosis Outbreak by Means of 
Molecular Sequencing, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 981 (2011) (discussing how 
genome sequencing methods were used in identifying a salmonella outbreak in 
2009-2010). 
50 Examples of How FDA Has Used Whole Genome Sequencing of Foodborne 
Pathogens for Regulatory Purposes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm422075.htm. 
51 Brendan R. Jackson et al., Implementation of Nationwide Real-time Whole-
genome Sequencing to Enhance Listeriosis Outbreak Detection and Investigation, 
63 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DIS. 380, 380–81 (2016). 
52 Id. at 382 (comparing data from the year prior to WGS implementation to year 2 
of WGS use). 
53 Robert L. Scharff et al., An Economic Evaluation of PulseNet: A Network for 
Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S66, S66 (2016). 
54 See Marc W. Allard et al., Practical Value of Food Pathogen Traceability through 
Building a Whole-Genome Sequencing Network and Database, 54 J. CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY 1975, 1975 (2016); Celine Nadon et al., PulseNet International: 
Vision for the Implementation of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Global 
Food-Borne Disease Surveillance, 22 EUR. SURVEILLANCE 1. 
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than otherwise possible to mitigate the spread of detected 
pathogens.55 
 
Despite advances in WGS food regulation, gaps exist in 
industry and regulatory entities’ abilities to trace food through the 
supply chain.56 Paper documentation in the food supply chain 
continues to be used despite inefficiency.57 No comprehensive digital 
system exists to track food products through the supply chain, 
slowing down regulatory responses to outbreaks of foodborne 
illnesses.58 The summer 2018 regulatory investigation of an E. coli 
outbreak in lettuce from Arizona lasted for weeks,59 illustrating long 
response times despite access to CDC and FDA genomic databases. 
Challenges in traceability can lead to significant waste as well. For 
example, after struggling to identify the source of an E. coli outbreak 
in November 2018, CDC and FDA warned consumers and 
distributors to discard all romaine lettuce from all producers.60 This 
extensive response to the uncertain source of contamination further 
raised objections from farmers feeling they were unfairly forced to 
 
55 Proactive Approaches of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/W 
holeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm. 
56 See King et al., supra note 5 at 160, 170. 
57 Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain: Safety 
and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD CONTROL 172, 181 (2014). 
58 Sylvain Charlebois et al., Comparison of Global Food Traceability Regulations 
and Requirements, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1104, 1108 
(2014).  
59 Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Developments in the 
Romaine Outbreak Investigation U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm612187.ht
m. 
60 CDC Food Safety Alert: E. coli Outbreak Linked to Romaine Lettuce, U.S. CTR. 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/rele 
ases/2018/s1120-ecoli-romain-lettuce.html; Statement from FDA Commissioner 
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., On the Current Romaine Lettuce E. coli Outbreak 
Investigation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Ne 
wsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm626716.htm [hereinafter FDA 
Update]. CDC even recommended consumers discard lettuce when unsure if lettuce 
was romaine. Id. FDA Commissioner Gottlieb expressed frustration that the 
contaminated food could not be well identified or traced to specific producers. See 
Susan Scutti, Don’t Eat Romaine Lettuce, CDC Urges Amid E. coli Concerns, CNN 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/health/romaine-lettuce-e-coli-
cdc/index.html. Some commentators were wry in their description of the regulatory 
inefficiency. See, e.g., Tom McKay, CDC: Do Not Eat Any Romaine Lettuce Until 
We Can Figure Out What the Hell Is Going On, GIZMODO (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://gizmodo.com/cdc-do-not-eat-any-romaine-lettuce-until-we-can-figure-1830 
580265. 
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carry the costs of traceability issues.61 New approaches for digitally 
managing food safety data and tracing food products will be needed 
to complement other advances in preventing and responding to 
foodborne illness.  
 
III.  Blockchain and Applications in the Food Supply 
Chain 
  
Improving traceability in the food supply chain may require 
novel tools. Opportunities to optimize and streamline the food safety 
infrastructure and to trace contaminated foods identified by WGS 
through the supply chain may arise with new technological 
approaches offered by blockchain.62 These approaches offer 
platforms for a host of participants to collectively build a record of 
data while ensuring that only one, authoritative version exists at any 
time.63 
 
Blockchain represents a large category of upcoming 
technologies anchored in the larger umbrella of distributed ledger 
technologies.64 Blockchain systems have gained substantial attention 
by stakeholders from myriad industries due to several key elements 
 
61 See Martin Finucane & Katie Camero, Farmer Worries CDC Has Gone Too Far 
With Its Lettuce Warning, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.bostonglob 
e.com/metro/2018/11/23/has-cdc-gone-too-far-with-its-lettuce-warning/F6WaKxS 
WQ81AsZtg8lLjuO/story.html. Some groups began labeling lettuce by its location 
and date of harvesting in response. Jesse Newman, Lettuce Producers Prepare 
Labeling Changes in Response to New E. coli Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lettuce-producersprepare-labeling-changes-in-
response-to-newe-coli-outbreak-1543255194?mod=hp_lead_pos10. 
62 See generally Massimo Di Pierro, What Is the Blockchain?, 19 COMPUTING SCI. 
& ENGINEERING 92 (2017); Explainer: What Is a blockchain?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 
23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610833/explainer-what-is-a-block 
chain/. 
63 See, e.g., Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain: A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives 
Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk Notes, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 257, 262 (2017) (discussing the efficiency of blockchains compared to a 
centralized system); see Sorkin, supra note 8 (comparing blockchains to the use of 
Google Docs).  
64 WORLD BANK GROUP, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND 
BLOCKCHAIN 1 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1779115137140 
62215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Blockchain-
Fintech-Notes.pdf; R3, BLOCKCHAIN BYTE: WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A 
BLOCKCHAIN AND A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER? 2–3 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites 
/default/files/2017_BC_Byte.pdf. 
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of the technology.65 First, blockchain acts as a ledger or recording 
system for data or transactions.66 Data are loaded onto the ledger in 
discrete “blocks” and coupled to the prior block, forming a “chain” 
with a timeline.67 Second, blocks are placed on the ledger 
chronologically and users can view all blocks dating back to the 
original.68 Third, that ledger is distributed across all nodes in the 
system, signifying that all users have a copy of the record.69 Finally, 
verified blocks become immunized from changes by individual 
users, because altering an old block requires a majority of nodes to 
agree on the change.70  
 
Classifying blockchains can occur in multiple manners, 
though a useful lens comes from viewing systems as permissioned or 
permissionless, public or private (as in Figure 2).71 Permissionless 
blockchains enable any party to add a block to the chain, where 
permissioned systems require users to first obtain prior authorization 
from an administrator.72 The public-private dimension instead 
distinguishes whether anyone can access and review data stored on 
the ledger, or if only authorized entities can access the information.73 
While Bitcoin functions as a public, permissionless system without 
a central authority, businesses looking for more top-down 
 
65 The National Academies describes blockchain as “a technology meant to achieve 
and unalterable, decentralized, public, append-only log of transactions, without any 
single authority in a position to change the log.” NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., 
SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 103 (2018).  
66 See NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–1717 (explaining the ways blockchain can 
track data); Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and 
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2293 (2016).  
67 NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–17; Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 66, 
at 2293; see also Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin & Paul Haynes, Governance 
in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134, 136 (2016). 
68 X. Xu et al., A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design, 
in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE (ICSA) 
243, 244 (2017). 
69 WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 64, at 5–6; see also R3, supra note 64, at 2 
(noting that while blockchains are distributed, they can be built as both centralized 
or decentralized systems). 
70 Nir Kshetri, Blockchain’s Roles in Strengthening Cybersecurity and Protecting 
Privacy, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1027, 1027–28 (2017); see Yli-Huumo et al., supra 
note 9, at 3 (discussing the process of forming blockchain). 
71 Weizhi Meng et al., When Intrusion Detection Meets Blockchain Technology: A 
Review, 6 IEEE ACCESS 10179, 10183 (2018). 
72 See NIST REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
73 See Meng et al., supra note 71, at 10183. 
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approaches generally select private and permissioned schemes.74 
These characteristics may change the method of verifying blocks 
before being added to the immutable chain, called consensus 
models.75 Proof of work consensus models have become 
commonplace in permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin, which 
competitively reward the first participating node to verify blocks by 
solving algorithmic “puzzles.”76 However, consensus protocols 
better suited for permissioned systems may provide useful 
alternatives to proof of work models and their high fiscal and energy 
costs.77 For greater flexibility, data recorded on the distributed ledger 
and associated applications can be stored on- or off-chain.78  
 
Figure 2. Basic Blockchain Structural Classifications79 
 
 
74 Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain, 
IBM BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-
difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/. 
75 For a comprehensive review of consensus mechanisms, see NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra 
note 6, at 18–24. 
76 Id. at 19–20. 
77 See id. at 21–24; CATHERINE MULLIGAN ET. AL. BLOCKCHAIN BEYOND THE HYPE 
5, WORLD ECON. F. (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/48423_Whether_Block 
chain_WP.pdf. 
78 See Jose Luis Bellod Cisneros et al., Public Health Surveillance using 
Decentralized Technologies, 1 BLOCKCHAIN HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 7 (2018). 
79 Adapted from information in NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6; Meng et al., 
supra note 71, at 10183. 
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 Blockchain has gained a reputation as a financial technology, 
with its popularization through Bitcoin and the oscillating market 
value of cryptocurrencies since then.80 However, blockchain 
applications also offer substantial promise in the health care and 
public health sectors.81 Perhaps best documented is the anticipated 
application of blockchain to power electronic health records to 
enhance privacy and portability.82 But various other opportunities to 
advance public health through blockchain exist, including tracing 
medical products through the supply chain.83 Converging with the 
interest in blockchain for logistics,84 blockchain has been proposed 
as a system to track prescription opioids through the drug supply 
chain.85  
 
 The intersection of blockchain, supply chain logistics, and 
public health has recently sparked attention for its applications in 
food safety. In August 2017, IBM and food industry giants including 
Walmart announced a partnership to pilot a blockchain-based food 
surveillance system.86 The permissioned IBM platform aims to 
record data throughout the supply chain for individual food batches 
including location of origin, identification numbers, expiration dates, 
shipping records, and other processing information.87 Notably, the 
Walmart-IBM collaboration promises to identify the source of an 
 
80 See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS, 
MERCATUS CTR. 1–2, 6 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/gmu_bitcoin 
_042516_webv3_0.pdf. 
81 Ron Ribitzky et al., Pragmatic, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Blockchain and 
Distributed Ledger Technology: Paving the Future for Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN 
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 5–9 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.p 
hp/journal/article/view/24/21. 
82 See Gammon, supra note 10, at 378–79. 
83 Liam Bell et al., Applications of Blockchain Within Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN 
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 2 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.php 
/journal/article/view/8/29. 
84 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRADE TECH – A NEW AGE FOR TRADE AND SUPPLY 
CHAIN FINANCE 11 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Trade_Te 
ch_report_2018.pdf.  
85 Susan Galer, Betting on Blockchain as a Miracle Cure for the $78 Billion Opioid 
Crisis, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/09/12/bett 
ing-on-blockchain-as-a-miracle-cure-for-the-78b-opioid-crisis/. 
86 IBM Press Release, supra note 13. 
87 Brigid McDermott, Improving Confidence in Food Safety with IBM Blockchain, 
IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2 
017/09/improving-confidence-in-food-safety-with-ibm-blockchain/. (In general, 
relevant supply chain data loaded on the blockchain may include “time, location, 
price, parties involved, and other relevant information when an item changes 
ownership.”); See Kshetri, supra note 70, at 1034. 
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outbreak “in seconds rather than days or weeks.”88 The blockchain 
application could give retailers the confidence to only discard food 
products from the affected farms, rather than wasting considerably 
more food.89 By September 2018, Walmart announced it would 
retain the program permanently to trace lettuce products.90 Walmart 
will require direct suppliers and over 100 upstream farms to comply 
over the course of 2019.91 
 
 Though no public data on the project have been released, the 
Walmart-IBM pilot offers a valuable case study in leveraging 
distributed ledger technology to promote public health.92 The 
preliminary reports of success for blockchain in the food supply 
chain will likely draw further interest from industry competitors and 
regulators alike for uses beyond leafy greens.93 In November 2018, 
the French distributor Auchan SA announced its own blockchain 
 
88 See IBM Press Release, supra note 13. 
89 IBM Food Trust Expands Blockchain Network to Foster a Safer, More 
Transparent and Efficient Global Food System, IBM (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2018-10-08-IBM-Food-Trust-Expands-Blockchain-
Network-to-Foster-a-Safer-More-Transparent-and-Efficient-Global-Food-System; 
see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
90 Matt Smith, In Wake of Romaine E. coli Scare, Walmart Deploys Blockchain to 
Track Leafy Greens, WALMART , https://news.walmart.com/_news_/2018/09/24/in-
wake-of-romaine-e-coli-scare-walmart-deploys-blockchain-to-track-leafy-greens 
(last accessed Apr. 8, 2019). 
91 Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks 
Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/bu 
siness/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html; Kim S. Nash, Walmart Requires Lettuce, 
Spinach Suppliers to Join Blockchain, WSJ BLOG (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/09/24/walmart-requires-lettuce-spinach-suppliers-
to-join-blockchain/. 
92 The late 2018 expansion of the pilot to include European food distributor 
Carrefour may open more opportunities for evaluation. See Food Traceability: 
Carrefour, a Blockchain Pioneer in Europe, Has Joined the IBM Food Trust 
Platform to Take Action on a Global Scale (Oct. 8, 2018), 
http://www.carrefour.com/current-news/food-traceability-carrefour-a-blockchain-
pioneer-in-europe-has-joined-the-ibm-food. However, should the pilot fail and these 
industry leaders abandon a blockchain approach, this may ripple into the food supply 
chain industry. See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, When Early Adopters 
Don’t Adopt, 357 SCIENCE 135, 135–36 (2017). 
93 See From Shore to Plate: Tracking Tuna on the Blockchain, PROVENANCE (July 
15, 2016), https://www.provenance.org/tracking-tuna-on-the-blockchain. 
Contamination in other common food products also cause public health burdens, as 
the 2018 FSIS recalls on raw beef indicate. See News Release, U.S. Food Safety & 
Inspection Serv., JBS Tolleson, Inc. Recalls Raw Beef Products Due to Possible 
Salmonella Newport Contamination (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps 
/portal/fsis/topics/recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recall-case-
archive/archive/2018/recall-085-2018-EXP-release. 
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pilot to trace meat and vegetables through the supply chain.94 The 
World Wildlife Fund has launched a blockchain project to trace tuna 
through the supply chain in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji.95 
Insurers may support the drive towards blockchain, given the 
potential for lowering fiscal risk in the food supply chain.96 
Publicized foodborne illness outbreaks may add pressure to adopt 
blockchain, with some coverage casting blockchain as a potential 
solution to traceability issues arising from the November 2018 E. coli 
outbreak.97 CDC and FDA already collaborate with IBM on 
blockchain applications in public health,98 and may take new steps to 
infuse their food safety operations with blockchain.99 While vital to 
acknowledge that blockchain technology cannot solve all 
problems,100 its potential to reduce foodborne illness will likely drive 
further experimentation and implementation. 
 
IV.  Governance Considerations for Combining 
Blockchain and Genomics 
  
Two rising trends in food safety may soon converge. On one 
side, food regulators have begun to implement WGS methods and 
databases to enhance responses to foodborne illness, aiming also to 
 
94 Globalized blockchain: Auchan implements food traceability technology on 
international scale, FOODINGREDIENTSFIRST (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.foodingr 
edientsfirst.com/news/globalized-blockchain-auchan-implements-food-
traceability-technology-on-international-scale.html 
95 New Blockchain Project Has Potential to Revolutionize Seafood Industry, WORLD 
WILDLIFE FUND (Jan 8, 2018), https://www.wwf.org.nz/what_we_do/marine/blockc 
hain_tuna_project/. 
96 See David Hundeyin, Australian Insurer Announces Blockchain Trial for Beef 
Export Supply Chain, CCN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/australian-
insurer-announces-blockchain-trial-for-beef-export-supply-chain/. 
97 See Bruce Y. Lee, What Blockchain Has to Do with Turkey, Romaine Lettuce, and 
Food Safety, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2018/ 
11/28/what-does-blockchain-have-to-do-with-turkey-lettuce-and-food-safety/#41fb 
5c7b7399. 
98 Steven Melendez, How IBM and the CDC Are Testing Blockchain to Track Health 
Issues Like the Opioid Crisis, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fastcom 
pany.com/90231255/how-ibm-and-the-cdc-are-testing-blockchain-to-track-health-
issues-like-the-opioid-crisis; IBM Watson Health Announces Collaboration to Study 
the Use of Blockchain Technology for Secure Exchange of Healthcare Data, IBM 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51394.wss. 
99 See Fox, supra note 14. 
100 R. Jᴇꜱꜱᴇ MᴄWᴀᴛᴇʀꜱ, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financ 
ial_infrastructure.pdf. 
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augment prevention efforts.101 On the other, private industry is 
developing blockchain capabilities for data recording to streamline 
regulatory compliance and minimize discarded products during an 
outbreak. Blockchain offers strengths to cover the weaknesses of 
WGS, enabling officials to trace contaminated food products through 
the supply chain and potentially increasing data liquidity.102 In turn, 
whole genomic sequencing methods should enable determining the 
exact type of pathogen and its geographical origin, when blockchain 
is limited to tracing backwards rather than starting at the beginning. 
If combined effectively, the nexus of blockchain and WGS could 
enhance the capacity of public health actors to respond to and prevent 
foodborne illness mortality and morbidity.  
 
More specifically, benefits might accrue from fusing the 
power of WGS methods and government reference databases with 
the advantages of blockchain containing an authoritative, 
timestamped, readily searchable record (as depicted in Figure 3). 
Since blockchain systems likely cannot store the amount of data 
constituting a full genomic sequence,103 useful information about 
each sequenced organism including species and location could 
instead be recorded directly on the chain.104 The full DNA sequence 
of pathogens could instead be stored “off the chain,”105 with a central 
authority providing permission to access the full sequence data on 
request by public health officials. In one possible scheme, during an 
outbreak of foodborne illness, pathogen information from clinical 
samples could be compared to reference databases and on-chain data 
to narrow the search for a matching organism. Permissioned access 
to off-chain genomic sequences could then be used to infer where the 






101 See Proactive Applications of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceRes 
earch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm. 
102 Halil Ibrahim Ozercan et al., Realizing the Potential of Blockchain Technologies 
in Genomics, 28 GENOME RES. 1255, 1262 (2018). 
103 See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 4–5. 
104 See Bellod Cisneros et al., supra note 78, at 5. 
105 William J. Gordon & Christian Catalini, Blockchain Technology for Healthcare: 
Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability, 16 COMPUTATIONAL 
& STRUCTURAL BIOTECH. J. 224, 228 (2018). 
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Figure 3. Potential Food Safety Benefits in Integrating 
Blockchain and WGS  
 
 
Beyond public health benefits, incentives exist to encourage 
private actors to pursue the integration of blockchain and WGS in 
food safety operations. Despite upfront costs in developing or leasing 
the blockchain platform, the Walmart case study suggests substantial 
potential savings for food distribution corporations by increasing 
response time to contamination in food products.106 The heightened 
agility and specificity offered by combining WGS and blockchain 
should therefore promote greater internal savings and less waste for 
industry actors. More targeted responses to contamination should 
also protect farming entities from the economic impact of distributors 
discarding even uncontaminated food products when faced with 
uncertainty about the source and path of an outbreak.107 The potential 
for blockchain and WGS combination systems to streamline and 
speed compliance should reduce or mitigate regulatory penalties 
resulting from contamination.108  
 
Though offering great promise, excitement for a pragmatic 
new public health tool should be tempered by a realistic 
understanding of remaining technical, corporate, and governance 
challenges.109 Whether developers can adequately scale up the 
blockchain supply chain pilot projects remains an open question, and 
 
106 See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.  
107 See, e.g., Finucane & Camero, supra note 61. 
108 See generally, EMILY M. LANZA, CONG. RES. SERV., R43927, FOOD SAFETY 
ISSUES: FDA JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43927.pdf. 
109 See CHRIS JAIKARAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R45116, BLOCKCHAIN: BACKGROUND 
AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45116.pdf. 
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may require years to accomplish.110 Scaling up may also come with 
added risks of cybersecurity vulnerability.111 Further increasing 
adoption of and participation in FDA and CDC pathogen sequencing 
programs will take time and appropriate standardization of the 
technology.112 Deploying blockchain and WGS sequencing 
technologies at all nodes in a food supply chain will demand 
substantial time, resources, and, likely, political capital. Notably, 
while implementing blockchain would allow for improved supply 
chain management and mitigate the extent and duration of foodborne 
illness outbreaks, it would not directly resolve existing food safety 
issues leading to contamination.113 
 
 Moreover, technical decisions about the most appropriate 
architecture for a blockchain will be required and have regulatory 
implications. Blockchain-powered food supply chain systems 
promise to reduce fraud by holding all users accountable for the data 
they enter.114 However, this benefit is only possible from within a 
permissioned blockchain system, as all users creating blocks must be 
identifiable to gain permissioned access.115 Permissionless systems 
could create insurmountable challenges in data integrity and 
compliance by enabling any party to add blocks to the ledger.116 
 
110 Evelyn Cheng, For All the Hype, Blockchain Applications Are Still Years, Even 
Decades Away, CNBC (June 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/for-all-
the-hype-blockchain-applications-are-still-years-even-decades-away.html; Melissa 
Gilmour, Blockchain for Supply Chains—More Hype Than Reality?, SWEETBRIDGE 
(June 11, 2018), https://blog.sweetbridge.com/blockchain-for-supply-chains-more-
hype-than-reality-150f9962b80c. 
111 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 84, at 11. See also, Aleksey K. Fedorov et. 
al., Quantum Computers Put Blockchain Security at Risk, 563 NATURE 465, 465–67 
(2018); Quantum Computers Pose an Imminent Threat to Bitcoin Security, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609408/quantum-
computers-pose-imminent-threat-to-bitcoin-security/. 
112 Jacob Moran-Gilad, Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Food-Borne 
Pathogen Surveillance and Control – Taking the Pulse, 22 EUROSURVEILLANCE 
30547, 30547 (2017). 
113 Jenny Splitter, Walmart’s Blockchain Offers Tech Fix, But There’s More to Leafy 
Greens Than Data, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysp 
litter/2018/09/28/walmarts-blockchain-offers-tech-fix-but-theres-more-to-leafy-
greens-than-data/. 
114 Nir Kshetri, Blockchain Systems Are Tracking Food Safety and Origins, THE 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2018 6:49 AM), https://theconversation.com/blockchain-
systems-are-tracking-food-safety-and-origins-106491. 
115 See NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
116 Les Wilkinson et. al., Blockchain Meets Healthcare: Understanding the Business 
Model and Implementing Initiatives, 2017 ACC DOCKET 57, 59, https://www.nelso 
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Permissioned systems could also avoid proof of work consensus 
mechanisms, avoiding substantial energy consumption and 
environmental impacts upon scaling up.117  
 
If permissioned platforms advance, questions may arise 
about whether industry or government entities will hold centralized 
control of the blockchain to grant permission to participate and add 
blocks.118 The potential public health utility and existing government 
stewardship over WGS databases may support placing public actors 
in control of permissioned blockchains. Federal regulators 
administering the permissioned systems may maximize 
accountability for industry and the effectiveness of enforcement 
actions.119 The possibility of deliberate food contamination in acts of 
agroterrorism120 may provide further rationale for federal 
government control. Yet, the technology and supply chain industries 
will likely lead the efforts to build blockchain infrastructure in the 
food supply chain.121 Despite incentivizes to minimize fiscal harm 
from contamination, blockchain development will require private 
firms to expend notable resources in a competitive market. 
Accordingly, economic factors will likely disincentivize industry 
members who have invested the most in creating and maintaining 
platforms to cede control of their permissioned systems to federal 
food safety regulators.122  
 
nmullins.com/storage/4db2ba62b5531942d89ab659e2921280.pdf (“Depending on 
the industry, knowing who is on the network may not only be desired but legally 
required.”). 
117 See Camilo Mora et al., Bitcoin Emissions Alone Could Push Global Warming 
Above 2°C, 2018 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1.   
118 Australia recently announced a pilot project for a national blockchain to act as a 
platform for blockchain based commerce in Australia, highlighting the possibility of 
a state-run blockchain for commercial and potentially regulatory functions. See 
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.australiannationalblockchain.co 
m/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).   
119 Direct federal control would facilitate more traditional command and control 
regulation, often perceived as more accountable, transparent, and directly 
enforceable. See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, ‘Governing’ 
Nanotechnology Without Government?, 35 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477 (2008). 
120 U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-310, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 28–29 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf. 
121 Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and Logistics 
Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018 
/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#1f 
be6eb45fec (highlighting use cases all arising from private industry). 
122 REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE 18, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2000), https://www.oecd.org/ 




Further governance challenges could arise in the decision for 
public or private blockchain architecture. A public blockchain could 
enable public health officials globally to monitor food safety in the 
supply chain without procedural constraints on gaining access to the 
blockchain, likely leading to improved foodborne illness responses. 
The open-access model of a public ledger may also offer the most 
pragmatic interface between blockchain and the growing 
international adoption of GenomeTrakr and the PulseNet 
International network of WGS public health laboratories.123 
However, a public design would also enable any other party to view 
data on the chain, including competitors, yielding corporate 
confidentiality dilemmas.124 Accordingly, businesses generally seek 
to utilize private blockchains.125 Off-chain storage of confidential 
data could ease such concerns, but off-chain storage can carry 
independent security vulnerabilities.126 Though a public blockchain 
could maximize transparency in supply chain governance,127 
business incentives may resist regulatory moves granting 
competitors access to confidential supply chain and compliance data.  
 
The presence of competition in crafting blockchain 
platforms for the food supply chain also highlights the potential for 
interoperability challenges.128 Given the competitive pressures to 
protect confidential data, each supply chain manager will likely 
 
gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (illustrating how corporate “[c]ompliance rates 
are lower when regulation does not fit well with existing market practices or is not 
supported by cultural norms and civic institutions.”). 
123 See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 10. 
124 See Charlebois, supra note 12. Developing new tools for blockchain platforms, 
including zero knowledge proofs, may mitigate the disclosure of confidential data 
by enabling parties to reveal no more data than is required for a given transaction. 
See Vinayaka Pandit & Pankaj Dayama, Privacy in Blockchain Collaboration with 
Zero Knowledge Proofs, IBM BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/bl 
ockchain/2019/01/privacy-in-blockchain-collaboration-with-zero-knowledge-proof 
s/. 
125 See Jayachandran, supra note 74. 
126 Ana Reyna et al., On Blockchain and Its Integration with IoT. Challenges and 
Opportunities, 88 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEMS 173, 177 (2018).  
127 Benjamin Herzberg, Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product 
Supply Chains, PROVENANCE (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.provenance.org/whitepa 
per. 
128 As in health care, blockchain is not an inherent solution to interoperability and 
issues will likely develop when blockchain platforms are implemented. Raj Sharma, 
Don’t Look to Blockchain to Solve Healthcare’s Interoperability Woes, FORBES 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/18/dont-
look-to-blockchain-to-solve-healthcares-interoperability-woes/#7a19bd5e6eab. 
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obtain and operate their own blockchain with limited incentives to 
ensure it could interface with others.129 Moreover, firms will lack 
incentives to switch to a new, more centralized blockchain platform 
once committed to one, as logged data will remain on the original 
blockchain and protocols to transfer data to a new blockchain remain 
limited.130 Food blockchains lacking interoperability may complicate 
efforts by public health officials to effectively track foodborne illness 
outbreaks and apply WGS data, particularly when outbreaks span 
facilities and regions involving multiple supply chains.131 Food 
products packaged with multiple types of ingredients,132 potentially 
tracked through different blockchains, may exacerbate 
interoperability challenges.133 Government pressure or mandates to 
create interoperable platforms could be opposed by industry, citing 
potential anticompetitive effects.134 
 
 No simple solution exists to these governance challenges, 
given the conflicting public health and business interests in designing 
and deploying a blockchain to integrate with existing WGS 
operations. Overly aggressive actions or requirements by regulators, 
even made in the interest of public health, may disincentivize 
industry from ever developing the blockchain platforms.135 
Command and control regulatory approaches administered by a 
central government may suffer from perceived or real inefficiency, 
 
129 Absent standardization or other pressures, blockchain developers will have 
significant latitude to build unique platforms to the specifications of individual 
clients, likely resulting in interoperability issues. See DAVID SCHATSKY, ET. AL., 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE FIVE VECTORS OF PROGRESS 4, DELOITTE, (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4600_Blockchain-five-
vectors/DI_Blockchain-five-vectors.pdf. 
130 See JAIKARAN, supra note 109, at 8. 
131 See Aung & Chang, supra note 57, at 178. 
132 John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and 
Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008, 
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 408–09 (2013) (describing these products 
as “complex foods”). 
133 See BLOCKCHAIN USE CASES FOR FOOD TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL 23, KAIROS 
FUTURE (2017), https://www.sklkommentus.se/globalassets/kommentus/bilder/publ 
ication-eng-blockchain-for-food-traceability-and-control-2017.pdf.  
134 See IOANNIS LIANOS, BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION: GAINING COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 73 (2018), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/c 
les/files/cles_8-2018.pdf. 
135 See Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/cr 
ypto-industry-regulation.html. 
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overly burdensome costs to industry, and restricting flexibility to 
innovate with emerging blockchain systems.136  
 
Instead, handling the synthesis of WGS methods and 
blockchain in the food supply chain may benefit from “softer” 
regulatory approaches. As opposed to command and control 
schemes, softer approaches offer a spectrum of regulatory 
mechanisms lacking traditional legal enforceability.137 So called 
“soft law” enables more voluntary, innovative, and adaptable 
regulatory possibilities by expanding definitions of oversight to 
include regulation by private or public-private entities.138 Limitations 
of these softer approaches should guide their implementation and 
combination, including the potential for reduced legitimacy, 
inconsistent enforcement, and regulatory capture, as well as 
coordination issues in public-private settings.139  
 
Softer oversight should offer useful tools for advancing the 
effective combination of blockchain and WGS technologies while 
responding to governance challenges. Public-private or voluntary 
oversight programs140 may ease tensions between government or 
industry control over permissioned blockchains through leaving 
control with industry while creating infrastructure for collaboration. 
Such arrangements could promote the flow of blockchain and WGS 
data across the public-private border during an outbreak while also 
enabling government information gathering to measure the 
effectiveness of blockchain implementation.141 Federal regulators 
already facilitate food industry action on traceability without 
 
136 Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False 
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 530 (1997). 
137 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401–
02 (2000). 
138 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 103, 105–
12 (2001); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 
BUS. & SOC. 68, 69–70 (2010). 
139 See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 119, at 477. 
140 See Kenneth W. Abbott, et. al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for 
Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS 279, 298–300 (2017) (describing voluntary and 
partnership programs in nanotechnology). 
141 See GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING 5, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM (2016) (describing the utility of information sharing in collaboratively 
addressing cybercrime); Gary E. Marchant, et. al., Risk Management Principles for 
Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 43, 53–54 (2008) (describing information gathering 
as a preliminary governance tool for emerging technologies). 
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wielding formal regulatory power. Following the November 2018 
lettuce contamination, FDA coordinated stakeholders in forming a 
task force to generate recommendations for improving traceability 
with labeling.142 These existing relationships could provide the 
groundwork for close collaboration on governing blockchain and 
WGS tools. 
 
Technical standards, another soft regulatory tool, could 
promote interoperability and facilitate common blockchain 
architecture for WGS compatibility.143 Third party standards can 
provide technical guideposts to direct and stimulate innovation in 
nascent technologies with various forms.144 Civilian standard setting 
bodies with high credibility including ISO and IEEE could build on 
their existing projects on blockchain145 to craft standards for 
interoperability in food safety applications and WGS compatibility. 
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology could 
provide a similar function as a public entity with expertise on 
blockchain,146 crafting voluntary standards with stakeholder input to 
encourage data fluidity across blockchains and intersections with 
public genomic databases.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
  
Blockchain and WGS represent powerful emerging 
technologies capable of bolstering regulatory and corporate response 
to foodborne illnesses. The technologies carry complementary 
strengths, combining increased traceability and accountability in the 
food supply chain with enhanced identification of pathogens and 
location of origin. With the clear potential to advance public health, 
the convergence of blockchain and WGS appears inevitable. 
 
142 See FDA Update, supra note 60. 
143 For a review of blockchain technical features amenable to standardization, see 
Advait Deshpande et al., Understanding the Landscape of Distributed Ledger 
Technologies/Blockchain, RAND (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_rep 
orts/RR2223.html. 
144 Knut Blind, et. al., The Impacts of Standards and Regulation on Innovation in 
Uncertain Markets, 46 RES. POL’Y 249, 258 (2017). 
145 ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology, ISO, 
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604/x/catalogue/p/0/u/1/w/0/d/0 (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2019); P2418.3 – Standard for the Framework of Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT) Use in Agriculture, IEEE, https://standards.ieee.org/project/2418 
_3.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
146 See NIST Report, supra note 6, at ii. 
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However, synthesis and implementation will require addressing 
technical and governance challenges.  
 
Government-based WGS operations must effectively 
intersect with industry-driven blockchain developments to realize the 
promise of both technologies. Questions arise over whether public or 
private entities should retain control of permissioned platforms, 
whether to use public or private blockchain architectures, and how to 
address interoperability. Soft regulatory approaches offer a path to 
balancing public and private interests in resolving these governance 
challenges, though selecting exact oversight instruments should be 
reevaluated as both technologies mature independently and together. 
Successfully navigating governance and technical challenges to 
bring blockchain and WGS together, though complex, should 
promote public health and reduce foodborne illness burdens. 
Federal Regulation of Pesticide Residues: A Brief History 
and Analysis 
Kate Z. Graham, Esq.* 
I.  Introduction 
 In the United States today, there are over 900 pesticides in 
use1 and over 400 are approved for use in food production,2 whether 
used as part of the growing process or in post-harvest handling.  
Although the history of pesticide use in food crops goes back 
centuries, the post-war period has seen an enormous growth in the 
varieties and amounts of pesticides used in our food system.  As our 
reliance on pesticides has grown, pesticides have become a divisive 
issue.  Pesticide advocates view them as essential to a secure and 
reliable food supply needed to feed a growing world population.  
Detractors, however, point out the public health risks—both known 
and not yet fully understood—that widespread pesticide use may 
entail.  Meanwhile, consumer demand for products grown without 
the use of pesticides is increasing, while at the very same moment 
farmers are applying more and different pesticides to combat 
pesticide-resistant “superweeds.”  These tensions are playing out 
both globally and locally in a variety of arenas, from debates over 
pesticide bans within international organizations and national 
governments, to the litigation of personal injury claims in American 
courts. 
 
 As policy-makers and the public rethink the current 
regulatory framework, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of 
what that framework is.  This paper seeks to explain the process by 
which the U.S. government approves the use of pesticides for food 
production, manages potential public health risks associated with 
pesticides in our diets, and enforces these policies throughout the 
food system.  First, I will begin with a discussion of what pesticides 
are and the relationship of pesticides to the history of agriculture in 
the U.S., tying together both this history with the history of our laws 
addressing pesticide use in food.  Second, I will describe the features 
 
* Kate Z. Graham, J.D., LL.M., is an associate attorney at the law firm of Fafinski 
Mark & Johnson, PA in New Ulm, Minnesota;  B.A., Carleton College; J.D., 
William Mitchell College of Law; LL.M., Agriculture & Food Law, University of 
Arkansas School of Law. 
1John E. Casida, The Greening of Pesticide-Environment Interactions: Some 
Personal Observations, 120 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 487, 487 (2012). 
2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-38, FOOD SAFETY: FDA AND USDA 
SHOULD STRENGTHEN PESTICIDE RESIDUE MONITORING PROGRAMS AND FURTHER 
DISCLOSE MONITORING LIMITATIONS 25 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/66 
6408.pdf [hereinafter GAO Fᴏᴏᴅ SAFETY Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ]. 
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and complexities of our current pesticide-residue regulatory system.  
Finally, I will discuss criticisms of our current regulatory system and 
opportunities for improvement. 
 
 But first, what are pesticides?  Simply put, pesticides are any 
substance used to kill or mitigate the harmful effects of organisms 
viewed as “pests.”  “Pests,” broadly defined, are any organisms that 
are unwelcome from a human perspective.3  In the context of food 
and agriculture, pests of concern include weeds and insects that 
compete with crops or predate upon them, as well as fungi and 
rodents that attack food plants in the field and after harvest. 
 
The U.S. government has defined “pesticides” as “(1) any 
substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, 
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, [and] (2) any substance 
or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, 
defoliant, or desiccant.”4  “Pests” are defined in the law as “(1) any 
insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or (2) any other form of 
terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other 
micro-organism (except viruses, bacteria, or other micro-organisms 
on or in living man or other living animals) which the Administrator 
declares to be a pest under section 136w(c)(1) of [Title 7].”5  
Basically, any chemical applied to a food crop or to the medium in 
which a food crop is grown is most likely regulated in the U.S. as a 
pesticide. 
II.  A Brief History of Pesticide Use and Regulations 
  
Pesticides are nearly as old as agriculture itself.  Pre-Roman 
civilizations used sulfur as a fumigant and insect repellent, a practice 
recorded by Homer in the Odyssey in 1000 BC.6  Until the 19th 
century, however, most pesticides were derived from botanical 
preparations, sulfur, oil soaps, kerosene emulsions, lime, and sodium 
chloride (i.e. salt).7  In 1867, a grape-grower in Europe discovered 
that the paint known as Paris Green, a substance that contained 
 
3 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE FUTURE ROLE OF PESTICIDES IN US 
AGRICULTURE 18 (2000). 
4 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012) (including “nitrogen stabilizers,” defined under 
subsection (hh).  The definition expressly excludes substances that are considered 
“new animal drugs” under 21 U.S.C. § 321(w) and liquid chemical sterilants for use 
on devices defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321). 
5 Id. at § 136(t). 
6 FREDERICK M. FISHEL, U. FLA./INST. FOOD & AG. SCI. EXTENSION, PEST 
MANAGEMENT AND PESTICIDES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016), 
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PI/PI21900.pdf.  
7 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23. 
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arsenic and copper, not only deterred would-be grape thieves, but 
also kept insects away.8  This led to the widespread use of arsenicals 
as both insecticides and herbicides.9  Not only were arsenicals highly 
effective on a broad array of insects, they were cheap, allowing 
farmers to boost yields and profits.10  Other heavy-metals were also 
employed as pesticides, such as the mixture of hydrated lime and 
copper sulfate known as Bordeaux mixture, a fungicide still in use 
today to control downy mildew,11 and lead arsenate, used to halt the 
spread of the gypsy moth.12   
 
 During the first three decades of the 20th century, use of 
arsenicals as insecticides increased significantly.13  Aside from the 
fact that these chemicals were inexpensive and effective against 
pests, other changes in agriculture drove farmers to embrace 
pesticides in a way they had not previously.  Advances in agricultural 
technology, including the adoption of mechanized plows, cultivators, 
and harvesters and the application of crop rotation and fertilizers 
allowed farmers to grow more crops in large monocultures with a 
much smaller labor force.14  But these monoculture fields presented 
a veritable buffet for would-be pests, a problem compounded by the 
loss of natural habitat for pest predators and alternative sources of 
pest foods.15  Thus, between 1919 and 1929, total insecticide use 
quadrupled from 14.5 million pounds to 58 million pounds.16 
 
 As the number of pesticide chemicals on the market 
increased, so too did the number of fraudulent products.  Farmers had 
no way of knowing that the products they purchased actually worked.  
Thus, the first law regulating pesticides was intended to ensure their 
efficacy rather than their safety.  Passed in California, the Insecticide 
Law of 1901 standardized arsenic content in arsenical pesticides.17  
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Congress passed the first federal law 
 
8 Id.; see also ERIC L. TAYLOR, ET AL., SOUTHERN REGIONAL EXTENSION FORESTRY, 
PESTICIDE DEVELOPMENT: A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HISTORY 3 (2007), 
https://sref.info/resources/publications/pesticide-development---a-brief-look-at-the 
-history/at_download/file (noting that “Paris green . . . was used extensively to 
control the potato beetle and protect grapes from insect damage.”) 
9 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23. 
10 FREDERICK ROWE DAVIS, BANNED: A HISTORY OF PESTICIDES AND THE SCIENCE OF 
TOXICOLOGY 4 (2014). 
11 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23; see also Eric L. Taylor, et 
al., supra note 8, at 3. 
12 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 4. 
13 Id. at 10. 
14 Id. at 3. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 11. 
17 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 24. 
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aimed at regulating pesticides.  The Insecticide Act of 1910 
prohibited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of adulterated or 
misbranded pesticides.18  The law also standardized the content of 
the two most popular pesticides of the time: Paris green and lead 
arsenate.19  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), whose 
mission was to support and promote U.S. agriculture, was tasked 
with enforcement of the new pesticide law.20   
 
 Arsenical pesticides were the mainstay of pest control until 
the introduction of synthetic organic compounds following World 
War II.  Dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane (DDT) was first 
synthesized in 1874 but was not used as an insecticide until 1939 
when a researcher discovered it was extremely toxic to a wide variety 
of insects.21  During the war, DDT was used effectively to reduce 
casualties of malaria and other insect-borne diseases for troops in the 
Pacific theater, and likely saved the lives of many troops.22  DDT 
was the first in a long line of these second-generation pesticides 
developed during WWII, including organophosphates like parathion 
(originally developed by the Germans as a nerve gas) and the 
herbicide 2,4-D, still widely used today.23  Insecticide use in this 
period increased significantly as farmers were advised to apply 
chemicals at rates intended to totally eradicate pests and “sterilize” 
farm fields.24  This sterilization approach eliminated crop pests but 
also eliminated beneficial insects, and as was later discovered, it had 
a disastrous effect on bird populations.25   
 
Meanwhile, a revolution in food safety was taking place.  A 
grassroots movement known as the Pure Food movement led to the 
creation of the first federal law governing food safety in 1906.26  
Passage of the law was finally made possible following public outcry 
over the publication of Upton Sinclair’s novel, The Jungle, a book 
intended to spotlight dangerous labor practices in the meatpacking 
industry but caused a greater stir over its revelations about what was 
 
18 JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS, PESTICIDE USE IN 
U.S. AGRICULTURE: 21 SELECTED CROPS, 1960-2008 3 (2014), https://www.ers.usd 
a.gov/webdocs/publications/43854/46734_eib124.pdf.  
19 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 5. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 24. 
22 Id. 
23 TAYLOR, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 8, at 4. 
24 Id. at 5. 
25 Id. 
26 Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA CONSUMER 
MAG. 1, 2 (1981), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/history/forgshistory/e 
volvingpowers/ucm593437.pdf.  
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in the meat that people were consuming.27  The 1906 Food and Drugs 
Act prohibited the interstate transport of unlawful food and drugs.28  
The law focused on the accuracy of food and drug labeling and 
prohibited certain food adulterants, including ingredients intended to 
substitute for the food, conceal, damage, harm human health, or 
constitute a filthy or decomposed substance.29 
 
 Despite the benefits of the 1906 law, by the 1930s it became 
clear that the law was insufficient to protect consumers.  For 
example, the law had no judicial enforcement mechanism to halt the 
sale of adulterated food products.30  Because the law did not punish 
noncompliance, adulterated products continued to proliferate in the 
marketplace.  Further, the economic climate of the 1930s exacerbated 
the impacts of the law’s shortcomings and spurred renewed interest 
among the public in better food safety regulation.31  These concerns 
led to the passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA), which ushered in our modern regulatory framework for 
food labeling.  Among other things, the new law beefed up 
enforcement by authorizing courts to issue injunctions to halt the sale 
of adulterated products and allowed the federal government to 
establish food standards to promote honesty and fair dealing.32   
 
But it was not until the 1950s that the two most important 
sections of the FFDCA relating to pesticide use were passed.  In 
1952, a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives released a 
report that investigated the “nature, extent and effect of the use of 
chemicals” in food and food production.33  The committee, led by 
Congressman John Delaney, concluded that many chemicals used in 
food production may be linked to cancer and that additional 
regulation of chemical residues in food was necessary.34  As a result, 
Congress passed the Miller Amendment in 1954, which added 
Section 408 to the FFDCA.35  Section 408 directed the federal 
government to establish limits, known as “tolerances,” on the amount 
 
27 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 1. 
28 History of FDA’s Internal Organization – Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act 
and Its Enforcement, FDA (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History 
/FOrgsHistory/EvolvingPowers/ucm054819.htm.  
29 Id. 
30 Janssen, supra note 26, at 8. 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 Id. at 7. 
33 Bruce S. Wilson, A Legislative History of the Pesticide Residues Amendment of 
1954 and the Delaney Clause of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, in 
REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX, 161, 163 (1987). 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 165. 
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of chemical residues permitted in food.36  In order to establish 
appropriate tolerances, the government was directed to balance the 
interest of food safety against the interest in providing an adequate 
food supply.  This risk-benefit balancing standard appealed broadly 
to industry groups because it meant the government could only 
curtail pesticide use to the extent that it did not interfere with 
agricultural production.37  Prior to the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, pesticide residue 
tolerances were set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).38 
 
 Four years later, Congress passed Section 409 of the 
FFDCA, which required that all food additives be found “safe” 
before being allowed on the market.39  Pesticide residues were 
included in the definition of food additives and regulated under 
Section 409 if they became concentrated in the food product through 
processing such that it exceeded the tolerance in the raw product, or 
where the residue had not been sufficiently reduced through good 
manufacturing practices.40  In addition, the law included what 
became known as the Delaney Clause (named for Congressman 
Delaney), which prohibited any food additive known to induce 
cancer in humans or animals.41  Although technically the Delaney 
Clause only applied to processed foods, because pesticides are 
generally applied to the raw product prior to processing it was 
impossible to omit such residues without also banning them from use 
on the raw product.  Thus, the Delaney Clause had the practical effect 
of banning virtually all pesticides linked to cancer from use in the 
food system. 
 
 By the 1950s, over 300 million pounds of pesticides were 
being manufactured each year, a huge increase from the 100 million 
pounds produced in 1945.42  This growth in production mirrored a 
steady increase in the number of different products available on the 
market.  It soon became clear that the 1910 Insecticide Act was 
stretched to the limits.  In 1947, Congress passed the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an attempt 
 
36 Id. at 25. 
37 Id. at 165. 
38 David M. Bearden et al, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes 
Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 114 
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30798.pdf.  
39 James Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens Were In the Right Places: The Passage 
of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 273, 279 (1998). 
40 Id. at 280. 
41 Id. at 279. 
42 Pamela A. Finegan, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the Pesticide 
Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 615, 619 (1989). 
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to update the law, and in doing so established the basic framework 
for pesticide regulation that is still in effect today.43  Although it 
enhanced enforcement mechanisms, the law remained essentially a 
labeling law that prohibited the manufacture and sale of any pesticide 
that was adulterated or mislabeled.  Once again, the emphasis was on 
protecting pesticide purchasers from fraud rather than protecting 
applicators and the public at large from pesticide exposures.44  In 
1959, FIFRA was amended to require the registration of all new 
pesticides prior to sale to the public.45  The USDA continued to be 
the agency responsible for enforcement of pesticide regulations 
under FIFRA. 
 
 By the 1960s, public outcry over the widespread use of 
pesticides was again piqued by the publication in 1962 of Silent 
Spring by Rachel Carson, a scientist and former employee of the 
federal Bureau of Fisheries (a predecessor to the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service).46  In her book, which sold 162,000 copies in 
hardback and several million in paperback, Carson described serious 
harms to the environment and human health from pesticide 
exposures.47  Such harms included massive die-offs of fish and birds, 
cow’s milk containing pesticide residues, and pesticide-induced 
diseases in humans.48  Carson’s work galvanized the emerging 
environmental movement, led to an all-out ban on DDT, and 
 
43 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 
163 (1947). 
44 See Finegan, supra note 42, at 623 (noting that the “[Federal Insecticide Act] 
prevented the manufacture, sale, or shipment of certain adulterated insecticides in 
order ‘to protect farmers and consumers against fraudulent products.’”). 
45 Barbara Kennedy Kahn, New Developments in Pesticide Regulation, 13 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 309, 310-11 (1994). 
46 See JoAnne L. Dunec, On a Farther Shore: The Life and Legacy of Rachel Carson, 
27-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 62, 62 (2013) (noting how Rachel Carson (a 
scientist and former employee of the federal Bureau of Fisheries, a predecessor to 
the US Fish and Wildlife Service) published her book Silent Spring in 1962, creating 
a “national debate” over the “’growing concern among scientists as to the possibility 
of dangerous long-range side effects from the widespread use of DDT and other 
pesticides’”). 
47 Edwin McDowell, Silent Spring,’ 20 Years a Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
1982, at C16, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1982/09/27/178690 
.html?action=click&contentCollection=Archives&module=LedeAsset&region=Ar
chiveBody&pgtype=article. 
48 See Finegan, supra note 42, at 619–20 (“In the 1960s, public enthusiasm for 
pesticide use dwindled following publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring which 
focused public awareness on the environmental and public health problems posed 
by pesticides. Carson presented a frightening picture of massive fish kills, residue-
saturated milk from cows grazing on treated pastures, a poisoned wildlife 
population, and a human population plagued by a host of new pesticide-induced 
diseases.”). 
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contributed in no small part to the creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970.49 
 
 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA), which contained a 
number of amendments to FIFRA.50  First, the law shifted regulatory 
enforcement from USDA to the new EPA.51  Second, the law 
amended the criteria for pesticide registration to include 
consideration of a pesticide’s adverse impacts on the environment 
and human health.52  Third, the law required the EPA to reregister all 
previously registered pesticides in light of this new standard.53  The 
law kept in place the risk-benefit balancing test, however.  Following 
these changes, FIFRA emerged not only as a consumer protection 
law but as an environmental protection law as well.  
 
Despite these changes, however, the law had little effect on 
the amount of pesticides making their way into the environment.  In 
fact, pesticide use in the US hit a peak in 1979.54  For the next twenty 
years, there were no major changes in the pesticide regulatory 
system, but the use and variety of pesticides continued to grow and 
change.  By 1981, farmers in the U.S. were applying 632 million 
pounds of pesticides annually.55  The increased use of pesticides 
resulted from the increase in the total number of acres planted as well 
as a decline in herbicide costs.56  Additionally, whereas  most 
pesticides applied in the 1950s and 1960s were insecticides, by the 
1980s and 1990s the vast majority of pesticides applied to crops were 
herbicides.57  With the rising popularity of organophosphates, like 
atrazine and 2,4-D, farmers shifted their dependence from the more 
acutely toxic and persistent heavy metals to compounds that were 
 
49 See Mcdowell, supra note 47 (“[Silent Spring] led to a spate of state and local 
laws regulating the use of pesticides, it helped to make ecology one of the great 
popular causes of the 1960’s, and eventually it helped lead to the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.”). 
50 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 
973 (1972). 
51 Finegan, supra note 42, at 624, 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 GAO FOOD SAFETY REPORT, supra note 2, at 5–6.  
55 FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., supra note 18, at 11. 
56 See id. at 13–15 (describing how increasing herbicide use due to relatively falling 
prices combined with increasing crop acreage contributed to increased pesticide use 
from the early 1960s to early 1980s). 
57 See id. at 11 (“Pesticide use more than tripled between 1960 and 1981. Herbicide 
use increased more than tenfold (from 35 to 478 million pounds) as more U.S. 
farmers began to treat their fields with these chemicals. By contrast, insecticide use 
declined from 114 million pounds in 1960 to 97 million pounds in 1981.”).  
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less persistent in the environment but entailed different health and 
environmental risks.58  Further, the overall increase in the use of 
pesticides led to an increase in the potential human exposures to these 
chemicals. 
 
In 1993, the National Research Council issued a 
groundbreaking study examining pesticide exposures in infants and 
children.59  Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children revealed 
that the EPA was failing to adequately consider the different 
physiologies of young children when calculating pesticide residue 
tolerances.60  Compared to adults, children consume more food per 
pound of body weight, which means that they also consume more 
pesticides relative to their body weight when pesticide residues are 
present in their food.61  In addition, infants and children tend to 
consume a lesser variety of foods compared to adults, which can lead 
to a greater concentration of certain pesticides in their diets.62  The 
report raised concerns about the heavy reliance on organophosphates 
in particular, which have been shown to cause neurological problems 
and developmental delays in children.63  The report urged the EPA 
to take infants and children into account when determining tolerance 
levels, to move away from the risk-benefit balancing test, and to 
consider exposures from a variety of dietary and nondietary 
exposures.64 
 
In reaction to the study and public outcry, Congress passed 
the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which revised 
Section 408 of the FFDCA.  The new law replaced the risk-benefit 
balancing test for establishing tolerances with a new test focused 
entirely on safety.  In establishing tolerances, the EPA was required 
to determine “to a reasonable certainty” that “no harm would result” 
from “aggregate exposures” to pesticide residues.65  In addition, the 
 
58 See id. at 16 (“In 1968, atrazine and 2,4-D were among the top five pesticides 
used, but the other three were insecticides: toxaphene, DDT, and methyl parathion 
(fig. 9). In 2008, each of the top five herbicides (glyphosate, atrazine, acetochlor, 
metolachlor, and 2,4-D) were more heavily used than the top insecticide.”). 
59 COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN i (1993). 
60 See id. at 344–45 (discussing how traditional toxicity tests do not make allowances 
for the unique feature of infants and children). 
61  See id. at 4 (noting how children are at more risk to pesticide exposure because 
they eat more food per unit of body weight than adults do). 
62  See id. (discussing how children are at more risk to pesticide exposure because 
they consume fewer types of foods than adults do). 
63  Id. at 63. 
64  Id. at 8–9. 
65 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(A)(ii), 110 
Stat. 1489, 1516. 
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EPA had to take into account the particular susceptibilities of infants 
and children, including incorporating an additional tenfold safety 
factor when setting tolerances.66  This new standard required not only 
that the EPA solely consider health risks when setting tolerances in 
most cases, but also that the EPA had to obtain and incorporate data 
on American diets to determine what an average person’s aggregate 
exposure to pesticides might be.67  In addition, the new law removed 
the Delaney Clause which had barred pesticides linked to cancer; 
now, all pesticides would be subjected to the same scrutiny, whether 
they were linked to cancer or to other health problems.68  Finally, the 
law required the EPA to re-evaluate all existing tolerances using the 
new “no harm” standard within the following ten years.69 
 
In the years that followed, the EPA canceled some 
registrations for certain highly toxic organophosphates for use on 
some crops and farmers began to shift away from a reliance on more 
acutely toxic organophosphates to new products believed to be safer 
and less persistent in the environment.70  The introduction in the 
1990s of herbicide-resistant seed varieties developed with the use of 
genetic engineering and generated a significant increase in the use of 
the herbicide glyphosate.  Glyphosate, originally released under the 
tradename RoundUp by Monsanto (now Bayer), was believed to be 
both safe for humans and wildlife and able to break down quickly in 
the environment.  Even though glyphosate is a type of 
organophosphate, which is known to cause neurological and 
development issues, initial studies indicated there were few health 
risks.  Combined with glyphosate-resistant crop varieties, farmers 
could apply significant amounts of glyphosate to control weeds 
throughout the growing season without damaging their crop.  By the 
2000s, glyphosate was the number one most applied pesticide in the 
U.S., amounting to 38% of all pesticides used in 2008, trailed by 
atrazine at only 13%.71  By 2008, farmers were applying 
approximately 516 million pounds of pesticides.72  About 80% of 
 
66 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(C)(ii)(II), 
110 Stat. 1489, 1517. 
67 See id. (discussing what the EPA is required to determine by law). 
68 See Andrew J. Miller, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Science and Law 
at a Crossroads, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 393, 396 (1997) (discussing how the 
new law steps away from the Delaney act). 
69 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(C)(ii)(II), 
110 Stat. 1489, 1517. 
70 FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., supra note 18, at 40. 
71 Id. at 20. 
72 Id. at 5.  
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pesticides are applied to five major crops: corn, soybeans, potatoes, 
cotton, and wheat.73 
III.  Pesticide Regulation Today: A Patchwork of 
Agencies and Laws 
  
Our current system of pesticide regulation reflects the 
complex history and evolution of our laws governing the various 
disciplines that touch on pesticide use, including agricultural law, 
environmental law, and human health law.  The laws that make up 
this regulatory framework include FIFRA, enforced by the EPA, and 
the FFDCA, enforced by the FDA and the USDA.  In brief, the 
following agencies have the following responsibilities in regulating 
pesticide residues in food: 
 
● EPA registers pesticides and establishes tolerances; 
● FDA enforces pesticide residue limits on most foods; 
● USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) enforces 
pesticide residue limits in meat and poultry; and 
● USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) researches 
and issues reports on the levels of pesticide residues found 
in foods. 
A.  Pesticide Registration: FIFRA 
  
All pesticides must be registered with the EPA in accordance 
with FIFRA.74  Recall that FIFRA is essentially a labeling law, which 
means that the applicant must provide the EPA with information 
about the product along with a proposed label to qualify for 
registration.75  FIFRA allows the EPA to approve a pesticide for sale 
on the market so long as the manufacturer’s claims about the product 
are warranted, the product is properly labeled, and when used “with 
widespread and commonly recognized practice” it will not “cause 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”76  In certain 
circumstances, the EPA may classify a pesticide as “restricted-use,” 
meaning that the pesticide may only be applied by or under the 
supervision of a trained and certified applicator.77  The EPA may also 
issue “conditional use” registrations, which means that a pesticide 
 
73 Id. at 27. 
74 About Pesticide Registration, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/a 
bout-pesticide-registration (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
75 40 C.F.R. § 152.50(d) (2018). 
76 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012). 
77 40 C.F.R. § 152.170(a) (2018). 
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may be available for purchase and use even before the agency has 
received all data regarding the safety and efficacy of the product.78  
A pesticide may be conditionally registered in situations where a 
similar product is already on the market or where the manufacturer 
can show that no harm will come about as a result of the conditional 
use registration.79  If a product receives a conditional use registration, 
however, the manufacturer is still required to provide the necessary 
information at some future date.80  The applicant must also specify 
the intended use for the product.  If a new use is proposed for a 
product that is already registered, the applicant must still go through 
the registration application process, although it may qualify for 
conditional registration.81 
 
 After a pesticide registration application is received, whether 
for a new active ingredient or a new use, the EPA issues a notice of 
receipt in the Federal Register describing the new active ingredient 
or proposed new use and soliciting public comment.82  Once the EPA 
reviews the application and issues a decision to conditionally or 
unconditionally register the product for the proposed use, it publishes 
a notice of issuance in the Federal Register.  The notice of issuance 
describes the new chemical or new use, summarizes the EPA’s 
conclusions, lists any missing data and the conditions for their 
submission, and responds to comments received from the initial 
notice of application.83 
B.  Tolerance Setting: FFDCA 
  
In addition to the registration requirement under FIFRA, a 
pesticide intended for use on food must also receive a tolerance 
pursuant to the FFDCA.  A tolerance is the maximum residue level 
of a pesticide that may legally be present in food, measured in parts 
per million (ppm).84  According to the FFDCA, a food is considered 
adulterated if it contains a pesticide residue for which no tolerance is 
established (and no exemption from the tolerance requirement was 
 
78 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7) (2012). 
79 40 C.F.R. § 152.113–14 (2018). 
80 Id. at § 152.115. 
81 See id. at § 152.102. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Pesticide Registration Manual: Chapter 11 - Tolerance Petitions, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter-
11-tolerance-petitions#main-content (last visited Apr. 22, 2018); see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 346 (2012) (regulating the “tolerances for poisonous or deleterious substances in 
food”). 
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established) or where the amount of the residue is in excess of the 
established tolerance.85  A tolerance may be established for pesticide 
residues in a raw agricultural commodity or in a processed 
commodity under the same procedures.86  But where pesticide 
residues are not in greater concentration after processing, the 
tolerance in effect for the raw agricultural product is applicable and 
a separate processed tolerance is not necessary.87   
 
Prior registration of the pesticide is not necessary to obtain a 
tolerance from EPA.  In fact, there are certain situations in which 
obtaining a registration for a product for which a tolerance is required 
is not possible, such as where the product is approved for use in a 
foreign country but is not in use in the U.S.88  To register a product 
under FIFRA, the applicant must either state that a tolerance or 
exemption from tolerance was previously obtained or that the 
applicant is requesting that a tolerance be obtained pursuant to EPA 
regulations.89  A tolerance or an exemption from tolerance must be 
established for all active and inert ingredients in a pesticide.90   
 
 In order to obtain a tolerance determination from the EPA, 
the applicant must provide, among other things, a description of the 
chemical, data regarding how the chemical is used and how much of 
its residue remains on food, a summary of studies regarding the 
safety of the chemical, proposed tolerances, methods for removing 
residues in excess of the proposed tolerance, whether processing 
increases the concentration of residues, practical methods for 
detecting and measuring the chemical’s residues in foods, and a 
description of any effects on infants and children or to the human 
reproductive or endocrine systems.91  The applicant must also 
provide a summary of the application, which the EPA will publish in 
the Federal Register along with a notice of filing of a petition for 
tolerance.92  After the application is submitted and published, the 
EPA must decide whether to issue an order establishing, modifying, 
or revoking a tolerance regulation, or whether to publish a proposed 
regulation and request public comment, or whether to deny the 
petition.93   
 
 
85 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
86 40 C.F.R. § 180.7(10) (2018). 
87 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2) (2012). 
88 Pesticide Registration Manual, supra note 84. 
89 40 C.F.R. § 152.50(i) (2018). 
90 Pesticide Registration Manual, supra note 84. 
91 40 C.F.R. § 180.7 (2018). 
92 Id. at § 180.7(d), (f). 
93 Id. at § 180.7(h). 
2019]     FEDERAL REGULATION OF PESTICIDE RESIDUES     111 
 The standard by which EPA must establish a tolerance is 
whether the tolerance is “safe.”94  “Safe” means the EPA has 
determined “there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result 
from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including 
all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which 
there is reliable information.”95  EPA applies this standard differently 
depending on whether a chemical is deemed to have a no observed 
adverse effect level (NOAEL), which is also known as a threshold 
effect, or, whether no threshold can be identified.96  Residues below 
a NOAEL are considered to have no known or anticipated adverse 
effects, whereas residues for nonthreshold chemicals have no dose 
below which there is any certainty that no harm will occur.97  For 
threshold chemicals, EPA applies a 100-fold safety factor to account 
for potential differences between human and animal physiologies 
since safety studies are generally conducted on animals and not 
humans.98  In addition, EPA is directed to apply an additional 10-fold 
safety factor to account for the unique susceptibilities of infants and 
children.99  But EPA is permitted to use a different (i.e. lower) safety 
factor if “on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe for 
infants and children.”100 
 
 For nonthreshold chemicals, the “safe” test is satisfied if the 
increased lifetime adverse risk is “negligible,” which is defined as no 
greater than a one-in-a-million lifetime risk.101  Cancer risks 
generally fall into the nonthreshold category.102  Recall that, prior to 
passage of the FQPA, the Delaney Clause effectively established a 
zero-tolerance policy for chemicals associated with cancer risks; 
post-FQPA, cancer-causing chemicals may receive a tolerance so 
long as the established tolerance does not exceed this “negligible” 
risk limit.103  In addition, for certain nonthreshold chemicals that 
entail up to a ten-in-a-million annual risk or a two-in-a-million 
lifetime risk of adverse health effects, the EPA is permitted to 
 
94 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
95 Id. at § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
96 See id. at § 346a(b)(2)(B) (stating that a pesticide chemical residue that has a 
nonthreshold effect is assessed by quantitative risk analysis while a pesticide 
chemical residue that has a threshold effect is assessed by determining the level of 
aggregate exposure that is safe); see also LYNN L. BERGESON, FIFRA: FEDERAL 
INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT 31 (2000). 
97 BERGESON, supra note 96, at 31. 
98 Id. 
99 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). 
100 Id.  
101 BERGESON, supra note 96, at 31. 
102 Id. 
103 Wilson, supra note 33, at 161; CONG. RES. SERV., 96-759 ENR, PESTICIDE 
LEGISLATION: FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT OF 1996 (P.L. 104-170) 11 (1998).  
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consider the pesticide’s offsetting benefits when establishing a 
tolerance.104  EPA may consider benefits to human health and to 
avoid a “significant disruption in domestic production of an 
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply.”105   
 
 In general, if a pesticide residue is found on a food for which 
there is no tolerance or exemption from tolerance, the food is 
considered adulterated.  However, if the residue is unavoidable 
through good agricultural and manufacturing practices, the food may 
still be marketable.  For instance, many pesticides that are no longer 
authorized for use on food are persistent and remain in the soil, 
finding their way into the food supply even though they are no longer 
registered and approved for use.106   In this case, the FDA may issue 
an “action level.”107  An “action level” is a recommended level above 
which an environmental contaminant in food should not exceed.108  
The action level is not legally binding, and FDA may take 
enforcement action, or not, at its sole discretion.109  In addition, while 
the EPA sets tolerances for most pesticides used on crops, the FDA 
establishes tolerances for animal drug residues found in food-
producing animals.110 
C.  Diet Surveys: FDA & USDA 
  
As previously discussed, FFDCA requires the federal 
government to establish tolerances by taking into account all dietary 
exposures to pesticide residues.  As a practical matter, this 
requirement also mandates that the government monitor American 
diets for the presence of pesticide residues in the foods most 
commonly consumed.  USDA and FDA each have a program that 
monitors the amount of pesticide residues consumed in the average 
American diet.111  While these programs sometimes find tolerance 
 
104 21 U.S.C. § 346a (Westlaw through P.L. 116-5). 
105 21 U.S.C. § 346a (Westlaw through P.L. 116-5). 
106 Pesticide residues in food, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 19, 2018). 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/pesticide-residues-in-food.  
107 Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Question and Answers, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/foodborneillnesscontaminants/pesticides/ 
ucm583711.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING THE 
HUMAN FOOD SAFETY OF NEW ANIMAL DRUGS USED IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Ani 
malVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm05218
0.pdf.  
111 Pesticide Data Program, U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. https://www.ams.usda.gov/datasets 
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violations, they are not designed for enforcement purposes; rather, 
they are intended to simply gather data to inform EPA’s tolerance-
setting process and other government food safety and nutrition 
programs and policies.112 
i.  FDA Total Diet Study 
  
The FDA’s Total Diet Study (TDS) is an annual report of the 
levels of various contaminants and nutrients in commonly consumed 
foods in the U.S.113  The TDS has been conducted continuously by 
FDA since the early 1960s.114  To conduct the study, the FDA buys, 
prepares, and tests about 280 different foods and beverages for the 
presence of about 800 different contaminants and nutrients.115  The 
study adopts a “market basket” methodology: Researchers purchase 
the same foods from retailers around the country four times a year 
and at least once in each of four regions per year (West, North 
Central, South, and North East).116  The list of foods purchased is 
based upon food consumption surveys performed by USDA.117  To 
select which foods will be added to the list of products to be tested, 
FDA groups similar foods together, choosing the one specific food 
that is most commonly consumed in that group to represent an entire 
group of foods.118  About every ten years, FDA revises its list of 
tested foods to account for changes in eating patterns.119  In 
performing the tests, the researchers attempt to closely mimic how 
the average consumer would likely consume the food by purchasing 
it from a retail outlet and preparing it as it would normally be 
prepared (i.e., peeling, cooking, etc.).120  The testing methods used 
 
/pdp (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Reports 
and Data, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/foodborneillness 
contaminants/pesticides/ucm2006797.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).  
112 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., PESTICIDE DATA PROGRAM ANNUAL 
SUMMARY, CALENDAR YEAR 2016 ii (2018), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/defau 
lt/files/media/2016PDPAnnualSummary.pdf.pdf.   
113 Total Diet Study, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.fda 
.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/totaldietstudy/default.htm. 
114 Katie Egan, FDA’s Total Diet Study: Monitoring U.S. Food Supply Safety, FOOD 
SAFETY MAG. (June/July 2002), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/maga 
zine-archive1/junejuly-2002/fdas-total-diet-study-monitoring-us-food-supply-safet 
y/.  
115 Total Diet Study, supra note 113. 





120 Id.; see Lauran Neergaard, Monitoring the Chemicals We Eat, MONT. STANDARD 
(Aug. 7, 2003), https://mtstandard.com/special-section/news/monitorin 
g-the-chemicals-we-eat/article_2ad357d5-4e7f-5f23-afda-de5c09ab12d5.html.  
114                    JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY     [Vol.15 
to detect contaminants are extremely sensitive, able to detect 
chemicals in concentrations as low as 100 parts-per-billion (ppb), 
which is significantly more sensitive than the tests used for 
regulatory enforcement.121 
 
 While the TDS results are not generally used for 
enforcement, they have in some cases led to further investigation and 
regulatory action.  For example, test results from the 1970s revealed 
unusually high levels of iodine in dairy products that was traced back 
to the use of iodine-based cleaners in the dairy industry, the use of 
which was subsequently reduced.122  And in 1971, higher 
concentrations of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were identified 
in boxed cereals; it was subsequently discovered that cereal boxes 
made with PCB-contaminated recycled paper were leaching PCBs 
into the breakfast cereals.  The federal government issued regulations 
limiting PCB content of packaging and industry began bagging foods 
inside paper boxes to prevent chemical contamination.123 
ii.  AMS Pesticide Data Program 
  
The Pesticide Data Program (PDP) is a national pesticide 
residue monitoring program conducted by the Monitoring Programs 
Division of the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
since 1991.124  PDP data are primarily used by EPA to assess dietary 
exposure to pesticide residues to assist with the establishment of 
tolerance levels.125  PDP data are also used by FDA in planning its 
enforcement and regulatory programs, such as the TDS (discussed 
above).126  The PDP is similar to the TDS in that it samples foods 
determined to be representative of the foods most commonly eaten 
in the U.S., with a special emphasis on the diets of infants and 
children.127  In addition, the samples are collected from a variety of 
sampling sites in ten states representing each of the four census 
regions of the U.S.128  However, rather than purchase samples from 
retail outlets, PDP researchers acquire samples from “terminal 
 
121 Egan, supra note 114.  
122 Id. 
123 See id. 
124 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., THE PESTICIDE DATA PROGRAM HELPING 
MONITOR THE SAFETY OF AMERICA’S FOOD SUPPLY 2 (2015), 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/PDP%20factsheet.pdf. 
125 U.S. Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ Aɢʀɪᴄ., Aɢʀɪᴄ. Mᴋᴛɢ. Sᴇʀᴠ., supra note 112, at 1. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. at ii. 
128 Id. at 3 (currently, the ten states involved in the PDP are Washington, California, 
Colorado, Texas, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Florida).   
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markets,” which are generally wholesale distributors that voluntarily 
participate in the program.129  AMS coordinates with state 
governments to select the samples and ship them to the appropriate 
laboratories for testing.130  In addition, instead of a “market basket” 
approach to testing, the PDP does not test the same foods each year.  
Rather, it cycles commodities through the testing program about 
once every five years for “high-consumption items,” and less 
frequently for other items.131  In any given year, the majority of 
products tested are fruits and vegetables, whereas grains and dairy 
are only rarely tested.132  In 2012, AMS decided to stop testing beef, 
pork, and poultry products with the expectation that USDA FSIS 
would provide this data to the EPA.133  PDP tests are performed after 
the food is prepared in a manner that emulates consumer practices.134 
 
 Like the TDS, the PDP tests for a variety of pesticides at the 
lowest detectable levels.  In 2016, about 77% of samples tested 
positive for the presence of pesticide residues, but over 99% of 
samples had residues below the tolerance established by the EPA.135  
15.7% of samples tested positive for 1 pesticide and 61.6% tested 
positive for more than one pesticide.136  In addition to testing for 
pesticide residues, the PDP tests for environmental contaminants, 
which include pesticides that are no longer authorized for use in the 
U.S. but persist in the environment, and pesticides found on imported 
goods;137 for example, a metabolite of DDT was found in 39.2% of 
spinach samples.138  About 2.6% of samples tested in 2016 contained 
residues with no established tolerance and .46% contained pesticide 
residues in excess of tolerance.139 These tolerance violations were 
reported to the FDA for enforcement, but by the time the PDP study 






129 Id. at 3.  
130 Id. at 5. 
131 Id. at 4.   
132See id. at ix (90.3% of samples collected and analyzed in 2016 were fruits and 
vegetables).   
133 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 14.  
134 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., supra note 112, at 1. 
135 Id. at ix–x. 
136 Id. at 20. 
137 Id. at 18.   
138 Id. at 20.   
139 Id. at 22. 
140 See id. at 21.  
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D.  Enforcement Programs: FDA & USDA 
  
The USDA and the FDA are charged with enforcing EPA 
tolerances in the foods that each agency is required to regulate.  Due 
to the unique histories of these two organizations, USDA is charged 
with regulating meat, poultry, egg products (not shell eggs), and 
catfish, whereas FDA is charged with regulating nearly everything 
else, including fruits, vegetables, dairy, seafood, and spices.141  Both 
agencies also regulate imports as well as domestically produced 
goods in the categories of food for which each agency has 
jurisdiction.  Each agency also takes a different approach to its 
regulatory enforcement procedures.  Because USDA regulates a 
comparatively much smaller segment of the food system, it has 
greater enforcement resources available to it relative to the number 
of products it oversees, which enables it to take a more rigorous 
approach to testing and enforcement.142  The FDA, by contrast, is 
saddled with regulating around 75% of the food system, requiring it 
to divert limited resources to known problem areas. 
 
i.  FSIS National Residue Program 
 
The National Residue Program (NRP) is designed to identify 
and control chemical and pesticide residues, including veterinary 
drug residues, found in the products that the USDA regulates.143  The 
Food Safety and Inspection Service, a division of USDA, administers 
the program under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA),144 the 
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA),145 and the Egg Products 
Inspection Act (EPIA).146  In carrying out the program, FSIS 
conducts random sampling of carcasses at the slaughter 
establishments it regulates,147 testing for over 80 veterinary drugs 
and over 100 pesticides as well as certain metals.148  Meat carcasses 
 
141 Daniela Galarza, USDA vs. FDA: What’s the Difference?, EATER (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.eater.com/2017/3/24/15041686/fda-usda-difference-regulation. 
142 See USDA and FDA One Step Closer to Securing More Government Funding for 
FY 2019, FOOD SAFETY MAG. (May 24, 2018), https://www.foodsafetymagazin 
e.com/news/usda-and-fda-one-step-closer-to-securing-more-government-funding-
for-fy-2019/.  
143 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., UNITED STATES NATIONAL 
RESIDUE PROGRAM FOR MEAT, POULTRY, AND EGG PRODUCTS: 2019 RESIDUE 
SAMPLING PLANS 2 (2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/3 
94f0bd4-2c5d-47bc-ba4f-f65992972e43/2019-blue-book.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  
144 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5). 
145 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–472 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-5). 
146 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–1056 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-5); U.S. DEPT. 
AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 1.  
147 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 4.  
148 Id. at 3. 
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are required to be held pending the testing results, whereas poultry 
and catfish are not required to be held but FSIS regulations 
recommend that establishments hold these items pending the testing 
results.149  Not all livestock are included in the sampling program, 
however; each year FSIS generates a sampling plan to identify which 
classes of livestock will be tested.150  A Surveillance Advisory Team 
(SAT), consisting of representatives from FSIS, FDA, EPA, USDA’s 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), USDA’s AMS, and HHS’s 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, assist FSIS in 
identifying its sampling targets each year.151  For 2019, FSIS’s 
sampling plan will sample production classes covering about 95% of 
domestic meat and poultry consumption.152  In addition, FSIS 
conducts random sampling of imported meat and poultry.153 
 
In addition to gathering data on the presence of residues in 
the food system, the NRP plays an important role in enforcement.  A 
violation occurs when an FSIS laboratory detects a chemical 
compound in excess of an established tolerance or FDA action level 
or if the detected chemical has no established tolerance.154  FSIS 
enters violation data into the Residue Violator Tracking (RVT) 
system, which is an FDA/FSIS interagency database.155  FSIS 
notifies the slaughter establishment and the producer of the violation, 
and recommends that the establishment also notify the producer of 
the violation.156  FSIS also shares the violation data with the EPA 
and the FDA, giving the FDA the opportunity to further investigate 
the producer in cooperation with state agencies, and to take further 
enforcement action if necessary.157  Information about repeat 
violators is posted publicly on FSIS’s website each week on the 
Residue Repeat Violators List to warn processors and deter 
violations.158  In addition, FSIS requires all slaughter establishments 
to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
inspection systems that identify and mitigate all food safety hazards 
posed by chemical residues.159  In general, data from the NRP show 
that tolerance violations in FSIS-regulated products are extremely 
rare.  For example, FSIS found a total of 30 pesticide residue 
 
149 Id. at 4. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1.   
152 Id. at 4.  
153 Id. at 6–7.   
154 Id. at 2. 
155 Id. 
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violations out of nearly 55,000 random samples of domestic and 
imported products between 2000 and 2011.160  The most frequently 
found violations were for products that are now banned but have 
persisted in the environment, such as hexachlorobenzene, DDT, and 
chlordane.161 
 
ii.  FDA Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program 
  
Whereas the USDA regulates meat, poultry, egg products 
(except shell eggs), and catfish, the FDA regulates all other food 
products, amounting to 75% of the U.S. food supply.162  The amount 
and variety of food products that fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction 
is staggering, amounting to $417 billion worth of domestic food and 
$49 billion worth of imported food.163  In addition, the number of 
imports within the FDA’s jurisdiction has increased dramatically, 
doubling in the ten years between 1999 and 2009 and reaching 9.7 
million individual “entry lines” in 2012.164  The FDA also tests and 
regulates animal food products, focusing on feed for animals 
intended for human consumption.165  The sheer magnitude of 
products that fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction underscores the 
important role the FDA plays in ensuring the safety of the U.S. food 
supply, but also evidences the growing strain on the FDA’s limited 
enforcement resources. 
 
 In contrast to the USDA, the FDA does not take a statistical 
approach to its sampling program to test for pesticide residue 
violations.  The agency acknowledges that such an approach would 
be impossible given the limited resources allocated to it for 
enforcement and the magnitude of its regulatory jurisdiction.166  
Instead, the FDA focuses its limited resources on sampling targeted 
commodities based on a number of different factors, including the 
frequency of consumption, the history of prior violations, findings 
from other studies (including the TDS and PDP), and toxicity of 
 
160 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 38.  
161 Id. at 39. 
162 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA AT A GLANCE 1 (2017), https://www.fda.gov 
/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/UCM553532.pdf.  
163 CFSAN – What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/WhatWe
Do/default.htm.  
164 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 38. 
165 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PESTICIDE RESIDUE MONITORING PROGRAM FISCAL 
YEAR 2016 PESTICIDE REPORT 12 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/Fo 
odborneIllnessContaminants/Pesticides/UCM618373.pdf. 
166 See id. at 10–11.  
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particular pesticide residues.167  The FDA also partners with state and 
local regulators to coordinate sampling and testing of targeted 
commodities.168  When a tolerance violation is identified in a 
product, the FDA may issue a Warning Letter to the producer, or it 
may seize the product or issue an injunction to correct the cause of 
the violation.169  The FDA may also request that a company recall its 
products, or in very serious cases the FDA has the authority to require 
a recall if the FDA believes the product would cause serious health 
consequences or death in humans.170  For imported products, the 
shipment may be refused entry into U.S. commerce, or the FDA may 
place an import alert for all future shipments of the product, allowing 
future shipments to be detained without physical examination.171  
The import alert also shifts the burden to the producer or shipper to 
prove their products are not in violation of tolerance levels before the 
product will be permitted to enter U.S. commerce.172 
 
 As part of its sampling program, the FDA uses a multi-
residue method (MRM) capable of detecting a majority (but not all) 
of the approximately 400 pesticides with EPA tolerances, plus 
several others that lack tolerances.173  Occasionally, the FDA also 
uses selective residue methods to test for the presence of specific 
residues that are not picked up by the MRM.174  No one test is capable 
of detecting all pesticide residues.175  Results of the FDA’s 
enforcement sampling generally show very low levels of tolerance 
violations; however, the FDA’s sample size is small relative to the 
total number of products available for human or animal consumption.  
For 2016, FDA tested just 7,413 samples, of which 6,946 were 
human foods and 467 were animal foods (mostly foods for 
livestock).176  Of all the samples, 2,670 were from domestically-
produced foods and 4,276 (60% of samples) were imported, 
reflecting FDA’s targeted enforcement of imports based on historical 
data indicating more frequent violations in imported goods.177  
Violative residues were detected in 0.9% of domestic samples and 
9.8% of import samples.178  Of domestic samples, 46.2% contained 
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some pesticide residues below tolerance (non-violative), whereas 
39.5% of imports contained some pesticide residues below 
tolerance.179 
IV.  Criticism of Pesticide Residue Regulatory 
Framework 
 
Since the passage of the FQPA in 1996, many of the most 
toxic pesticides have been taken off the market or their usage has 
been significantly decreased.180  By one measure, overall dietary risk 
from pesticide residues declined 81% between 1996 and 2013.181  
Even so, USDA residue data indicate that residues from highly toxic 
pesticides are still a significant risk factor, particularly for certain 
organophosphate pesticides still in use and for fungicides applied 
post-harvest.182  In addition, the use of lower-toxicity pesticides, such 
as glyphosate and neonicotinoids, raises questions about their safety 
relative to their dosage as such chemicals are being applied in larger 
and larger quantities on more and more crops.183  The reliance on 
genetically engineered (GE) herbicide resistant crops has led to 
overapplications of herbicides and the development of herbicide-
resistant weeds, leading to even greater increases in the use of 
herbicides to eliminate these “superweeds.”184  During the first 15 
years of commercial use, genetically engineered crops caused an 
increase of 527 million pounds of herbicides used.185  Recently, with 
the introduction of GE crops resistant to 2,4-D, the USDA estimates 
that the use of 2,4-D will increase from 77.8 million pounds per year 
to 176 million pounds per year.186 
 
In the following sections, I discuss some of the criticisms 
leveled at the current pesticide regulatory system.  These criticisms 
primarily described the following shortcomings: inadequate 
protection of children and infants, insufficient protection from 
nonthreshold effects, and tolerance setting that fails to consider 
sufficient nonbiased data.  
 
179 Id. 
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A.  Protection of Children 
 
The protection of infants, children, and pregnant women 
were the focus of the reforms brought about by the FQPA, and with 
good reason—immature humans suffer a greater detrimental impact 
from exposure to pesticide residues than adults.  Children consume 
more food relative to their body weight and are less able to detoxify 
their bodies due to differences in their metabolism and the 
immaturity of their immune systems and neurological 
development.187  Empirical studies have shown that children exposed 
to pesticide residues disproportionately suffer from neurological 
disorders.  For example, several studies of children living on or near 
farms have shown that such children suffer from increased rates of 
neurological problems, including autism and developmental 
delays.188   
 
In particular, a class of pesticides known as 
organophosphates are especially neurotoxic to humans, with serious 
implications for infants and children.189  The National Institutes of 
Health has concluded that exposure to organophosphate pesticides at 
even very low, infrequent doses can permanently affect developing 
brains, leading to changes in brain chemistry and behavior, including 
hyperactivity.190  A Harvard School of Public Health study showed 
that children with higher detectable levels of organophosphate 
pesticide metabolites in their urine were more likely to be diagnosed 
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).191  While the 
use of organophosphate pesticides declined 70% between 2000 and 
2012, their use still represented 33% of all insecticides applied in 
2012.192  For example, residues of malathion, a highly toxic 
organophosphate, were detected in 6.2% of samples of strawberries 
tested by the USDA in 2016.193 
 
The FQPA requires the EPA to impose an additional ten-fold 
safety factor to account for the particular susceptibilities of children, 
unless the EPA finds that “on the basis of reliable data, such [other] 
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margin [of safety] will be safe for infants and children.”194 Despite 
this requirement, a 2001 report showed that in more than two-thirds 
of cases, the EPA was not applying the ten-fold safety factor in 
organophosphate pesticides.195  Overall, the EPA has applied the ten-
fold safety factor in only 16% of tolerances.196  The EPA’s evident 
reluctance to apply the mandated additional safety factor to pesticide 
tolerances along with its sanction of organophosphate pesticides for 
use on fruits that are commonly consumed by children raises 
questions about whether the EPA is sufficiently protecting the health 
of U.S. children. 
 
B.  Protection from Nonthreshold Effects 
 
In establishing tolerances for pesticide residues in food, the 
EPA categorizes chemical compounds into two classes based upon 
empirical data: (1) those chemicals with no discernable harms below 
a certain dosage, and (2) those chemicals without an identifiable 
“threshold” dosage below which no adverse effects are detected.  The 
latter category is referred to as “nonthreshold” chemicals.  This 
distinction is significant because the EPA is permitted to use a 
different regulatory approach for nonthreshold chemicals.  Even 
though there is no known dosage of a nonthreshold chemical that 
entails no health risk from exposure, the EPA is permitted to consider 
the chemical’s offsetting benefits to society when determining the 
appropriate tolerance.197  Thus, even though exposure to a pesticide 
may entail an increased risk of cancer, such risk may be balanced 
against the benefit that use of the pesticide would provide in 
increased access to a low-cost and stable food supply.   
 
Many critics have expressed concern that the EPA’s 
approach to regulating nonthreshold chemicals does not go far 
enough to protect human health from risks of cancer and other health 
problems.  Many chemicals in common use in agriculture have been 
linked to the development of various cancers.  For example, the 
commonly-used herbicide 2,4-D and related chlorophenoxy 
herbicides are listed by the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (IARC), a division of the World Health Organization of the 
United Nations, as “possibly carcinogenic to humans.” At least one 
study has found a correlation between cancer mortality and proximity 
to farm fields treated with 2,4-D.198  Glyphosate, the leading 
 
194 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (Current through P.L. 116-5). 
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pesticide in agriculture today, was identified as a “probable” 
carcinogen by the IARC in 2015.199  In all, around 40 different EPA-
registered pesticides are classified as carcinogens, probable 
carcinogens, or possible carcinogens by the IARC.200  
 
In addition, emerging research has shown that even low-dose 
exposure to pesticide residues can cause adverse health effects, and 
may be linked to neurological disorders, obesity, heart disease, and 
diabetes. 201  The concern stems in large part from the fact that many 
pesticides are “endocrine disrupting chemicals” (EDCs), meaning 
they interfere with the body’s natural hormone-driven processes, 
including metabolism, reproduction, and the development of some 
cancers.202  While much of the concern is focused on the 
organophosphate pesticides, some of which (like DDT) are no longer 
in use, even newer generation pesticides may pose serious risks, 
although the research is less settled.  For example, neonicotinoid 
pesticides have generally been considered a safer alternative to 
organophosphate pesticides.203  But at least one study has shown that 
these chemicals’ effects mimic the effects of nicotine in developing 
mammal brains, indicating they may disrupt brain development.204  
Although food is not the only pesticide-exposure pathway, it is one 
of the most significant ones. 205   
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The possibility that even low-dose exposure to pesticide 
residues entails serious health risks is particularly concerning given 
the extent to which most people are now exposed to pesticides 
through their diets.   According to data from the 2016 PDP, a mere 
22.7% of the fruits, vegetables, and milk sampled that year contained 
no pesticide residues; 15.7% contained residues of 1 pesticide, and 
the majority of samples (61.6%) contained residues from at least two 
or more pesticides.206  And, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has found that the bodies of most Americans 
contain the metabolites of 29 different pesticides.207 
C.  Insufficient Data 
  
The FFDCA requires the government to establish residue 
tolerances at safe levels, considering aggregate exposures from all 
possible exposure sources.208  However, the government no longer 
has a program that tracks the aggregate amount of pesticides applied 
each year.209  The last year for which we have such data is 2007, and 
in that year an estimated 684 million pounds of pesticides were 
applied, which was an increase from the prior year, but less than the 
peak of 843 million pounds in 1979.210  In addition, there is no 
reliable data on the breakdown of which types of active ingredients 
are in use, which is significant because one type of pesticide may be 
significantly more toxic to human health than another, meaning that 
a total increase or decrease in the use of all pesticides does not mean 
the risk to human health has proportionately changed.211  In short, we 
simply do not know the quantity and types of pesticide chemicals in 
use, making it difficult to predict the quantity and types of residues 
that will end up in American diets. 
 
206 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., supra note 112, at 20. However, 
results vary greatly year to year since the PDP tests a different mix of commodities 
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In addition, the EPA generally relies on animal studies when 
establishing tolerances.  But whether and to what extent the animal 
subjects of studies respond in the same way human subjects would is 
a question that is not well understood.  In fact, animal studies may 
not accurately represent the reproductive and endocrine-disrupting 
harms caused by pesticide exposure in humans.212  The EPA attempts 
to compensate for this information gap by applying a 100-fold safety 
factor, and in some cases, the EPA applies an additional 10-fold 
safety factor to account for the susceptibilities of children and 
infants.  But it is not known whether a 100-fold or 1,000-fold safety 
factor accurately accounts for the differences between humans and 
the animals subjected to study.  Further, these safety factors can only 
be applied where the chemical demonstrates a threshold effect; for 
non-threshold effects where there is no level below which there is no 
risk of harm, the safety factor is inapplicable. 
 
Finally, the tolerance-setting system depends upon data 
supplied by the chemical makers, which creates a conflict of interest 
that invites bias into the system.  Industry-sponsored studies have 
been shown to be more likely to provide results favorable to the 
pesticide manufacturer.213  And in most cases, the EPA makes its 
findings based primarily on data supplied by industry rather than 
independent researchers, in part due to the way the study criteria are 
determined.  The EPA develops the research methodologies and 
study design with industry representatives, a process that results in 
stringent and prohibitively expensive study criteria that effectively 
excludes independent researchers from the process.214 While some of 
these additional criteria are necessary to exclude inherently flawed 
studies, some industry-proposed criteria eliminate from 
consideration so-called “qualitative studies” that may provide useful 
data on cause and effect relationships.215  In some cases, the EPA 
applies rigid study criteria retroactively to existing independent 
laboratory studies; unsurprisingly, few or no independent studies 
meet the qualifications for consideration by the EPA.216  In addition, 
the EPA may disregard studies that do not show a uniform response 
at the species or population level or that were done in situ instead of 
in the laboratory.  Studies have shown, however, that, there is 
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significant natural variation among organism response at individual, 
population, and species levels, and further that laboratory research is 
not inherently better than experiments conducted in the field.217  By 
excluding data from independent researchers and relying primarily 
on industry-supplied data, the EPA may not be seeing the whole 
picture when it engages in tolerance setting. 
 
D.  Lack of Enforcement 
i.  FDA 
 
The FDA is tasked with enforcing pesticide residue 
tolerances for the vast majority of foods produced in and imported to 
the United States.  The FDA enforces tolerances by taking samples 
of domestic and imported foods and testing those samples for the 
presence of chemical residues.218  But the FDA’s sampling procedure 
does not use statistical methods; instead the FDA aims its limited 
resources at targeting products that the FDA believes are more likely 
to be out of tolerance.  This means that its sampling results and the 
number of tolerance violations is not representative of the entire 
portion of the food system that falls within the FDA’s jurisdiction.219  
Further, when the FDA does sample a commodity, it takes very few 
samples, which further dilutes the representational quality of its 
testing.220  Thus, the fact that the FDA’s targeted enforcement 
program shows very low rates of tolerance violations is not 
generalizable to the food system as a whole.  For example, compare 
the results of the FDA’s sampling of lettuce with AMS’s sampling 
of lettuce in the same year.  In 2005, the FDA took 26 samples of 
head lettuce and 44 samples of leaf lettuce.  Of those samples, none 
of the head lettuce was violative, and 2.3% of the leaf lettuce was 
violative, with one sample presenting with a residue that was out of 
tolerance.221  By contrast, data from AMS in 2005 found presumptive 
residue violations in 17.77% of lettuce samples.222  As previously 
discussed, AMS uses a statistically valid sampling method and tests 
a greater number of samples of the small number of products it tests. 
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In addition, the FDA has decreased the amount of samples it 
takes from a high of over 12,000 domestic and imported food 
samples in 1993 to a low of about 5,000 total samples in 2008.223  In 
2016, FDA tested just 7,413 samples.224  In addition, roughly 60% of 
these samples were from imports, even though the majority of the 
U.S. food supply is domestic in origin.225  Even looking solely at 
imports, however, FDA tests less than 1/10th of 1% of imports.226  
The FDA’s methodology for targeting certain samples of the food 
supply often misses the mark.  For example, its PREDICT system 
designed to recommend which imported foods to test based on prior 
history and other data has failed to accurately estimate which foods 
will have the highest violation rates.227  The FDA relies on data from 
its Total Diet Study and AMS’s Pesticide Data Program to 
supplement its enforcement data.  But while these programs use 
statistical sampling methods, the sample sizes used in these studies 
are too small to be representative.  For example, the PDP tests only 
about 20 to 30 foods each year.228  
 
When the FDA tests a food sample, it does not test for all 
known pesticide residues because doing so would be prohibitively 
expensive.  Instead, the FDA uses a multi-residue method test 
(MRM) that detects many different pesticides, but not all.  The 
FDA’s MRM cannot detect six of the most commonly used 
pesticides.229  And the FDA only rarely uses selective residue 
methods (SRMs) due to their cost.230  The following pesticides are 
listed in the top 25 most used pesticides, but the FDA rarely if ever 
tests for their presence in the food supply: glyphosate, 2,4-D, MCPA, 
mancozeb, paraquat, and methyl bromide.231  Further, the FDA does 
not disclose in its reports that its testing methods cannot detect these 
pesticides.232 
 
In a 2014 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
made the following observation:  
 
If, for example, the agency wanted to know 
incidence and level of pesticide residues across all 
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domestic and imported foods, it would need to 
design statistically valid random samples of those 
two broad categories of foods. If, on the other hand, 
FDA wanted to know about residue levels within 
particular commodities, it would need to design a 
survey of random samples of those commodities that 
meets statistical standards. FDA is not currently 
taking either of these approaches in its regulatory 
monitoring program.  Finally, FDA’s ability to 
evaluate the effectiveness of its targeted monitoring 
program (i.e., enforce pesticide residue tolerances in 
foods established by EPA) is limited because it has 
not determined the incidence and level of pesticide 
residues in the foods it regulates against which it can 
compare the results of its targeted compliance and 
enforcement monitoring.233 
 
ii.  USDA 
 
Compared to the FDA, the USDA is tasked with regulating 
a much smaller proportion of the U.S. food system.  Its jurisdiction 
is limited to meat, poultry, some (but not all) egg products, and 
catfish.234  Like the FDA, the USDA uses a multi-residue method to 
test for veterinary drugs and pesticide residues as part of its 
enforcement program.  Its methods test for over 80 veterinary drug 
analytes and over 100 pesticide analytes.235  However, as of 2014, 
there were 191 pesticides with established tolerances for direct or 
indirect use in animals.236  In addition, of the pesticides for which the 
USDA tests, it does not perform all tests on all categories of animal 
products.237 For instance, the USDA only recently began using the 
multi-residue pesticide method on egg products.238  The USDA does 
not disclose in its reports which pesticides its tests do not detect or 
the potential bias caused by its selection of production classes for 
testing.239  Although the USDA tests samples from the production 
classes that represent that vast majority of the animal products 
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consumed it the U.S., it routinely does not test whole production 
classes that are less frequently consumed, like ducks and rabbits.240   
 
Although the USDA reduced the number of scheduled 
samples it took from over 8,000 per year in 2000 to less than 1,900 
per year in 2009, it has since increased the number of scheduled 
samples.241  In Fiscal Year 2017, the USDA took over 7,000 
scheduled domestic samples and over 2,700 import samples.242  In 
addition, for that same year, FSIS took over 177,000 inspector-
generated (i.e. non-random) samples.243 
 
The USDA is also responsible for the Pesticide Data 
Program (PDP), conducted by AMS.  Although the PDP uses 
statistically valid sampling methods, the number of food types 
sampled each year is very small.  The AMS reports do not 
demonstrate to what extent the foods chosen for testing differ from 
or are similar to other foods in the overall food system or to what 
extent the distribution centers chosen for study differ from or are 
representative of all distribution centers in the food system.244  The 
PDP is limited by not having a complete record of all food 
distribution centers and data regarding how food obtained from non-
participating centers may differ from the food obtained from those 
that voluntarily participate.245   
V.  Conclusion 
 On August 10, 2018, a California jury ordered Monsanto 
(now a division of Bayer) to pay $289 million to Dewayne Johnson, 
a former pest control manager for a public-school system who 
contracted non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.246  Johnson’s doctors stated 
that his cancer is aggressive, and it is unlikely that Johnson will live 
past 2020.247  Johnson’s lawyers persuaded the jury that Monsanto, 
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the maker of the glyphosate-based herbicide RoundUp, was 
responsible for Johnson’s cancer.  The verdict was the first of its 
kind, but possibly not the last—Monsanto faces more than 5,000 
similar lawsuits across the U.S.248  
 
 Glyphosate is one of many pesticides previously assumed to 
be safe, but new research is casting doubt on this assumption and 
raising questions about the efficacy of our current regulatory system. 
This system, originally devised to guarantee the effectiveness of 
pesticides, has since been tasked with guaranteeing their safety and 
limiting the public’s exposure to them.  But limited resources and 
industry influence may be hampering the ability of federal regulators 
to carry out this task. And due to the unique history of the regulatory 
system, enforcement authority is fragmented among several different 
federal agencies. These shortcomings are now giving rise to a wave 
of litigation over pesticide safety and an increase in the demand for 
products made without pesticides such as foods that are certified 
organic.  Maintaining and restoring public confidence in the safety 
of the U.S. food system may depend on the ability of policy makers 
to reform our current regulatory system to better guarantee the 
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For more than forty years, the United States Department of 
Agriculture Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; 
formerly Food Stamps) has offered nutrition assistance to nearly 
forty million eligible individuals and families each month.  This 
article first provides a brief overview of the evolution of the United 
States’ largest domestic food security and nutrition safety net 
program.  Then, the article reviews Congressional actions taken 
regarding SNAP during the 2018 Farm Bill deliberations, 
appropriations for fiscal years 2017 through 2020, and oversight 
(in)activities.  The article focuses on Congressional activities 
regarding block grants; participant eligibility; benefit adequacy, 
issuance, and redemption; and strengthening SNAP’s nutritional 
impacts.  Next, the article discusses a variety of executive orders, 
administrative actions, initiatives, nominations, budget proposals, 
and tweets with SNAP implications put forth thus far by President 
Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States.  These actions 
include the America’s Harvest Box, natural disaster responses, the 
public charge rule, tariffs on Chinese imports, and various agency 
relocations and reorganizations.  The article reflects on how each of 
these legislative and executive developments might impact SNAP's 
organization, operations at the federal, tribal, state and retailer levels, 
and, ultimately, eating patterns and health of participating and 
eligible children and families, persons with disabilities, and elders. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
While the United States (US) has not explicitly enshrined the 
right to food in our Constitution or adopted national legislation 
specifically recognizing the fundamental right to freedom from 
hunger1, the national government has an extensive history of using 
 
* Sheila Fleischhacker is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University where she teaches a first-of-its-kind nutrition law and policy course in its 
fifth offering. She is developing a course book that synthesizes key law and policy 
approaches from historical and contemporary perspectives across the globe for 
improving healthy eating and reducing nutrition-related non-communicable diseases 
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policy and programmatic approaches to ensure individuals and 
families in most need have access to nutritious and safe foods and 
beverages.2  Helping secure access to nutritious and safe foods and 
beverages has been associated with a variety of positive impacts 
including but not limited to economic growth and job creation, 
increased global security and stability, improved health, poverty 
reduction, reduced healthcare burden, and trade opportunities.3  The 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) leads the national efforts to 
tackle hunger and promote food security through the administration 
of fifteen federal food and nutrition assistance programs, including 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; formerly 
Food Stamps). 4  In the 2008 Farm Bill, the Food Stamps Program 
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*** Sara N. Bleich is a Professor of Public Health Policy at the Harvard Chan School 
of Public Health in the Department of Health Policy and Management. She is also 
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1 Food: A Fundamental Human Right, FAO OF THE UN, http://www.fao.org/FOCU 
S/E/rightfood/right7.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). 
2 A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fn 
s.usda.gov/snap/newa-short-history-snap (last visited Aug. 20, 2018); see also FNS 
Strategic Priorities, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda 
.gov/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2018) (laying out the following strategic priorities: 
Provide Americans with access to nutritious food; utilize data-driven strategies to 
improve program integrity; maintain a high-performing workforce by improving 
performance and increasing accountability; deliver FNS programs in a manner that 
maximizes customer service and ensures equal access and opportunity; and ensure 
FNS programs pave a pathway to self-sufficiency). 
3 Global Food Security, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT’L INST. FOOD AGRIC., https://nifa.us 
da.gov/topic/global-food-security (last visited Aug. 20, 2019). 
4 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-snap (last visited Aug. 20, 2019); see also Policy Basics: The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 
13, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-the-supplemental-nutrition 
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was renamed to SNAP to include a greater emphasis on nutrition.5  
For more than forty years, SNAP has been the nation’s largest 
program in the domestic food security and nutrition safety net and 
accounted for sixty-eight percent of all federal food and nutrition 
assistance in fiscal year 2018.6   
 
Each month, SNAP offers nutrition assistance to nearly forty 
million eligible individuals and families, persons with disabilities, 
and elders.7  In fiscal year 2018, twelve percent of the population 
participated in SNAP; this marked the fifth consecutive year that 
participation decreased after increasing in twelve of the previous 
thirteen years.8  The monthly benefits are delivered to electronic 
benefits transfer accounts, allowing beneficiaries to purchase eligible 
foods and beverages from 247,861 authorized retailers.9  The per 
person SNAP benefits for fiscal year 2018 averaged $125.25 per 
month.10  SNAP also lifts individuals and families out of poverty; in 
2014, this included more than four million people.11  And, SNAP is 
known as an “automatic economic stabilizer” that dampens the 
depths of recession and protects the larger national economy; 
because, as an entitlement program, SNAP automatically expands 
 
-assistance-program-snap (explains how SNAP works, who is eligible, how do 
people apply for SNAP, how much do households receive in benefits, how much 
does SNAP cost, current trends in SNAP participation, and other special features of 
SNAP). 
5 About FNS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/a 
bout-fns (last updated June 1, 2019); see Dottie Rosenbaum, Food Stamp Provisions 
of the Final 2008 Farm Bill, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 1, 2008), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-stamp-provisions-of-the-final-2008-farm-bill 
(provides a brief summary of each of the food stamp provisions in the 2008 Farm 
Bill).  
6 VICTOR OLIVEIRA, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., THE FOOD ASSISTANCE 
LANDSCAPE: FY 2018 ANNUAL REPORT iv, (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdo 
cs/publications/92896/eib-207.pdf?v=8949.8. 
7 RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42505, SUPPLEMENTAL 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): A PRIMER ON ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 
1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42505.pdf. 
8 OLIVEIRA, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
9 Facts About SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usd 
a.gov/snap/facts-about-snap (last updated Aug. 14, 2019); Dottie Rosenbaum, 
USDA to Fund SNAP for February 2019, But Millions Face Cuts if Shutdown 
Continues, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/millions-face-cut-in-sna 
p-food-assistance-if-government-shutdown-continues (last updated Jan. 10, 2019); 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., Where Can I Use SNAP EBT?, 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/retailer-locator (last updated Oct. 22, 2013). 
10 OLIVEIRA, supra note 6, at 4. 
11 Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Kept 4.7 Million Americans Out of Poverty Last 
Year, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.cbpp.o 
rg/blog/snap-kept-47-million-americans-out-of-poverty-last-year. 
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when individuals and families qualify for the program without direct 
legislative or executive actions at the federal or state levels.12 
 
SNAP was initially developed to prevent hunger and enable 
workers to work and children to grow up and thrive, even if their 
families or our nation fell on tough times.13  Hunger is a potential but 
not necessarily physiological consequence of food insecurity.14  A 
1990 Life Sciences Research Office of the Federation of American 
Societies for Experimental Biology report explained, “food 
insecurity exists whenever the availability of nutritionally adequate 
and safe foods or the ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially 
acceptable ways is limited or uncertain.”15  According to the World 
Food Summit of 1996, food security “exists when all people at all 
times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.”16  This definition encompasses food 
availability, food access (physical and financial), utilization 
(sufficiently nutritious and safe foods and beverages that are 
equitably distributed within the household), and stability of these 
three dimensions over time.17  Since 1995, the USDA Economic 
Research Service (ERS) has monitored national and state-level food 
insecurity through the Current Population Survey Food Security 
Supplement (CPS-FSS), administered monthly by the Census Bureau 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics.18  The CPS-FSS uses the eighteen-
item US Household Food Security Survey Module, which 
categorizes households as having very low food security (reports of 
multiple indications of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food 
intake), low food security (reports of reduced quality, variety, or 
 
12 Rachel West & Rebecca Vallas, Trump’s Effort to Cup SNAP by Fiat Would Kill 
178,000 Jobs Over the Next Decade, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2019/03/14/466700/trumps
-effort-cut-snap-fiat-kill-178000-jobs-next-decade/.  
13 JEFFREY M. BERRY, FEEDING HUNGRY PEOPLE: RULEMAKING IN THE FOOD STAMP 
PROGRAM 21 (1984). 
14 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FOOD INSECURITY AND HUNGER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE 44 (Gooloo S. Wunderlich & Janet L. Norwood eds. 
2006). 
15 FED’N OF AM. SOC’Y FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY, CORE INDICATORS OF 
NUTRITIONAL STATE FOR DIFFICULT-TO-SAMPLE POPULATIONS vi (Sue Ann 
Anderson ed. 1990), https://www.faseb.org/Portals/2/PDFs/LSRO_Legacy_Reports 
/1990_Core%20Indicators%20of%20Nutritional%20State%20for%20Difficult-to-
sample%20Populations.pdf. 
16 Food Security 1, FAO (June 2006), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoi 
taly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf. 
17 Id.  
18 Current Population Survey-Food Security Supplement, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/data-source/current-population-survey-food-
security-supplement (last visited Aug. 20, 2019). 
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desirability of diet; little or no indication of reduced food intake), 
marginal food security (one or two reported indications—typically 
of anxiety over food sufficiency or shortage of food in the house; 
little or no indication of changes in diets or food intake), or high food 
security (no reported indications of food-access problems or 
limitations).19  
 
In 2017, “an estimated 11.8 percent of US households were 
food insecure, down from 2016 and continuing a decline from a high 
of 14.9 percent in 2011, while still above the pre-recession (2007) 
level of 11.1 percent.”20  Among households with children, an 
estimated 7.7 percent were food insecure, slightly down from 8.0 
percent in 2016.21  Evidence suggests undocumented immigrants 
face “unique vulnerabilities for food insecurity related to unfamiliar 
food environments, remittances and separation, employment, and 
community and government resources” that are likely not accurately 
captured in national estimates of household food insecurity.22  
Besides households, growing concerns have emerged on college 
campuses.23  A 2017 systematic review of grey and peer-reviewed 
literature reported average rates of food insecurity on postsecondary 
education campuses of 35% and 42%, respectively.24  Similarly, a 
2018 Government Accountability Office report noted there are no 
national estimates for food insecurity among college students and 
recommended areas for improvement for communicating to eligible 
students the options for federal food and nutrition assistance, such as 
 
19 Definitions of Food Security, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/ 
definitions-of-food-security.aspx (last updated Sept. 5, 2018); Survey Tools, U.S. 
DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-
assistance/food-security-in-the-us/survey-tools/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2019). 
20 ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., 
HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2017 v (2018),  https://www.e 
rs.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/90023/err-256.pdf?v=0. 
21 Id. at ii. 
22 Ashley Munger et al., More than Just Not Enough. Experiences of Food Insecurity 
for Latino Immigrants, 17 J. IMMIGR. & MINORITY HEALTH, 1548, 1548 (2015). 
23 Erika Dunyak, The End of the Ramen Diet: Higher Education Students and SNAP 
Benefits, 14 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 154, 154 (2018). 
24 See Meg Bruening et al., The Struggle is Real: A Systematic Review of Food 
Insecurity on Postsecondary Education Campuses, 117 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & 
DIETETICS 1767, 1767 (2017) (reviews the peer-reviewed and gray literature to 
assess the prevalence of food insecurity on postsecondary education institutions, as 
well as factors related to food insecurity among students and suggested/practiced 
solutions and included seventeen peer-reviewed studies and forty one sources of 
gray literature in the analysis and found food insecurity was high among students 
and more studies are needed to assess the long-term influence of food insecurity 
among this vulnerable population). 
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SNAP.25  Food insecurity among older adults “remains a persistent 
problem, particularly in minority and rural populations.”26 
 
Across the life course, food insecurity—even marginal food 
security—has direct and indirect consequences with short and long 
term impacts including inadequate dietary intake, suboptimal 
development and function, increased hospitalizations, disrupted or 
under use of prescribed medications, poorer management of chronic 
diseases, elevated and prolonged periods of stress, reduced academic 
achievement, decreased interpersonal skills, and fetal epigenetic 
changes.27  A 2014 systematic review of the associations between 
 
25 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-95, FOOD INSECURITY: BETTER 
INFORMATION COULD HELP ELIGIBLE COLLEGE STUDENTS ACCESS FEDERAL FOOD 
ASSISTANCE BENEFITS (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-95. 
26 Wilson O’Dare, Community Food Environments and Healthy Food Access Among 
Older Adults: A Review of the Evidence for the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition 
Program (SFMNP), 56 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 193227-243 (2017). 
27 See Ellen Barnidge et al., Clinic-to-Community Models to Address Food Security, 
JAMA PEDIATRICS, 507-508 (2017) (discusses how food insecurity is a social and 
economic condition with direct and indirect consequences, including poor dietary 
intake, poor physical and mental health, hospitalizations, stress, reduced academic 
achievement, and fetal epigenetic changes); John T. Cook et al., Are Food 
Insecurity’s Health Impacts Underestimated in the U.S. Population? Marginal Food 
Security also Predicts Adverse Health Outcomes in Young U.S. Children and 
Mothers, 4 ADV. NUTRITION 51, 51–52 (2013) (reviews the literature regarding 
households with marginal food security and found these households should not be 
classified as food secure, as is current practice, and should be reported in a separate 
discrete category); John T. Cook & Deborah A. Frank, Food Security, Poverty, and 
Human Development in the United States, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 196–202 
(2008) (summarizes the data on household and children’s food insecurity and its 
relationship with children’s health and development and with mothers’ depressive 
symptoms); Robert .C. Whitaker et al., Food Insecurity and the Risks of Depression 
and Anxiety in Mothers and Behavior Problems in their Preschool-Aged Children, 
118 PEDIATRICS e859, e866 (2006) (conducted a cross-sectional survey and found 
mental health problems in mothers and children are more common when mothers 
are food insecure); Diana F. Jyoti et al., Food Insecurity Affects School Children’s 
Academic Performance, Weight Gain, and Social Skills, 135 J. NUTRITION 2831, 
2835–2836 (2005) (used longitudinal data and found food insecurity was a positive 
predictor of poor developmental trajectories in children); Craig Gunderson & James 
P. Ziliak, Food Insecurity and Health Outcomes, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1830, 1832–1835 
(2015) (reviews the literature and discusses how food insecurity is consistently 
associated with poor health); Seth A. Berkowitz et al., Treat or Eat: Food Insecurity, 
Cost-Related Medication Underuse, and Unmet Needs, 127 AM. J. MED. 303, 308 
(2014) (conducted a cross-sectional study with chronically ill adult patients and 
found about 1 in 3 were unable to afford food, medications, or both); Jung Sun Lee 
et al., Food Insecurity and Health Across the Lifespan, 3 ADVANCES NUTRITION 744, 
745 (2012) (summarizes a symposium that aimed to learn about the prevalence and 
severity of food insecurity in the US across the lifespan, understand the growing 
body of research that documents the impact of varying degrees of food insecurity on 
physical and mental health across the lifespan, examine how food insecurity is 
related to chronic disease, and explore research methodology to determine the 
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food insecurity and dietary quality reported that food insecure adults 
consumed fewer vegetables, fruit, and dairy products in comparison 
to food secure adults and had lower intakes of vitamin A and B6, 
calcium, magnesium, and zinc.28  Food insecure children only 
 
impact of food insecurity on healthcare costs and utilization); Hillary K. Seligman 
& Dean Schillinger, Hunger and Socioeconomic Disparities in Chronic Disease, 
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 6–8 (2010) (discusses the relationship between hunger, 
socioeconomic disparities, and chronic disease); Seth A. Berkowitz et al., Material 
Need Insecurities, Control of Diabetes Mellitus, and Use of Health Care Resources: 
Results of the Measuring Economic Insecurity in Diabetes Study, 175 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 257, 258 (2015) (conducted cross-sectional analyses and reported 
material need insecurities were common among patients with diabetes mellitus and 
had varying but generally adverse associations with diabetes control and the use of 
health care resources); Yiyun Chen & Seth C. Kalichman, Synergistic Effects of 
Food Insecurity and Drug Use on Medication Adherence Among People Living with 
HIV Infection, 38 J. BEHAV. MED. 397, 403 (2015) (conducted a cross-sectional 
survey and found maternal needs were common among patients with diabetes 
mellitus and had varying but generally adverse associations with diabetes control 
and use of health care resources); Deidra C. Crews et al., Effect of Food Insecurity 
on Chronic Kidney Disease in Lower-Income Americans, 39 AM. J. NEPHROLOGY 
27, 32 (2014) (conducted cross-sectional analyses and found food insecurity was 
associated with a trend towards greater odds of chronic kidney disease); Francesca 
Gany et al., Do Our Patients Have Enough to Eat?: Food Insecurity Among Urban 
Low-Income Cancer Patients, J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1153, 
1164 (2014) (found underserved cancer patients had higher rates of food 
insecurity—nearly five times those of the state average); Shalon M. Irving et al., 
Food Insecurity and Self-Reported Hypertension Among Hispanic, Black, and White 
Adults in 12 States, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2009, 11 
PREVENTATIVE CHRONIC DISEASE E161, E162 (2014) (conducted cross-sectional 
study and found a positive relationship between food insecurity and hypertension); 
Amanda W. Singer et al., Does Food Insecurity Undermine Adherence to 
Antiretroviral Therapy? A Systematic Review, 19 AIDS BEHAV. 1510-1526 (2015) 
(summarized the literature and found antiretroviral therapy adherence was 
negatively associated with food insecurity); Savannah Hobbs & Christian King, The 
Unequal Impact of Food Insecurity on Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes Among 
5-year-old Urban Children, 50 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 687, 689, 692 (2018) 
(conducted cross-sectional study and found negative associations between food 
insecurity and child behavior problems); Sara E. Grineski et al., Transitional 
Dynamics of Household Food Insecurity Impact Children’s Developmental 
Outcomes, 39 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 715 (2018) (found among a nationally 
representative sample of kindergarten and first-grade students that food insecurity 
was determinantal to children’s self-control, math, and working memory scores); 
Emily A. Wang, et al., Food Insecurity and Health: Data from the Veterans Aging 
Cohort Study, 130 PUB. HEALTH REP. 261, 265 (2015) (used cross-sectional data to 
find food insecurity was prevalent among veterans in an aging cohort and was 
associated with worse control of medical conditions who accessed care in the 
Veterans Health Administration). 
28 Karla L. Hanson & Leah M. Conner, Food Insecurity and Dietary Quality in US 
Adults and Children: A Systematic Review, 100 AM J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 684, 687 
(2014) (across all studies, food security or food sufficiency was generally measured 
for the household and indicated by one or more of the following categories: 1) food 
secure or food sufficient, 2) marginal food security (MFS), 3) food sufficient with 
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consumed less fruit than food secure children; however, research 
suggests parents or primary care givers protect their children from 
compromised dietary quality during food shortages and are also the 
ones (mis)reporting their children’s consumption.29  For almost a 
decade and a half, evidence continues to mount demonstrating food 
insecurity often co-occurs with being overweight, particularly among 
women.30   
 
The intersections between inadequate dietary intake, weight 
gain, and increased risk of non-communicable chronic diseases such 
as obesity, cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes mellitus, and 
certain types of cancer may be linked through a developed 
dependence on inexpensive, highly palatable foods and beverages 
that are energy dense, but nutrient poor.31  And, these intersections 
could potentially result from a cyclical pattern of having enough food 
at certain periods followed by food scarcity, especially if these 
episodic food shortages are experienced during critical periods of 
growth and development, particularly, pregnancy and infancy.32  
Research indicates overconsumption when food is available and 
under-consumption when scarce may contribute to metabolic 
disturbances, such as cycles of hyper- and hypoglycemia.33  
Moreover, research regarding the role of body fat in fertility suggests 
that women tend to conserve energy even when food is limited, 
which may explain gender differences in associations between food 
 
limitations (i.e., “enough but not always what we wanted to eat”), 4) low food 
security (LFS), 5) very low food security (VLFS), and 6) food insecure or food 
insufficient, which was equivalent to LFS and VLFS combined). 
29 Id. at 684 (identifying 16 articles that examined the associations between food 
insecurity and dietary quality in US children with 21 results (16%) suggesting an 
adverse association but many studies used only a few measures of dietary quality).  
30 See Nicole I. Larson & Mary T. Story, Food Insecurity and Weight Status Among 
U.S. Children and Families: A Review of the Literature, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE 
MED. 166, 166 (2011); Marilyn S. Townsend et al., Food Insecurity is Positively 
Related to Overweight in Women, 131 J. NUTRITION 1738, 1742 (2001); J.C. 
Eisenmann et al., Is Food Insecurity Related to Overweight and Obesity in Children 
and Adolescents? A Summary of Studies, 1995-2009, 12 OBESITY REV. e73, e73 
(2011); Lauren M. Dinour et al., The Food Insecurity-Obesity Paradox: A Review 
of the Literature and the Role Food Stamps May Play, 107 J. AM. DIETETICS. ASS’N. 
1952, 1953 (2007); LISA M. TROY, EMILY ANN MILLER & STEVE OLSON, 
RAPPORTEURS; INST. MED. NAT’L ACAD., Setting the State for the Coexistence of 
Food Insecurity and Obesity, in HUNGER AND OBESITY: UNDERSTANDING A FOOD 
SECURITY PARADIGM: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 13–14 (2011). 
31 See Barbara A. Laraia, Food Insecurity and Chronic Disease, 4 ADVANCES 
NUTRITION 203, 203–205 (2013) (summarizes the literature on the link between food 
insecurity and the following: 1) diet, 2) weight gain, and 3) chronic disease). 
32 Id. at 203, 210.  
33 Lee M.Scheier, What is the Hunger-Obesity Paradox?, 105 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 
883, 884 (2005). 
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insecurity and weight status.34  Another mechanism is competing 
demands; in other words, tradeoffs between medication for chronic 
disease management or housing/utility payments and food may 
exacerbate food insecurity.35  Chronic stress associated with food 
insecurity and poverty may also increase chronic disease risk by 
possibly increasing allostatic load, reducing healthy behaviors (i.e., 
lack of energy for physical activity), increasing unhealthy coping 
behaviors (e.g., substance abuse), and diminishing cognitive capacity 
to make decisions that support long-term health.36 
 
This article starts with a brief overview of the evolution of 
the largest program in the nation’s domestic food security and 
nutrition safety net.  Then, this article analyzes current legislative 
(One Hundred Fifteenth and initial One Hundred Sixteenth US 
Congress) and executive (first two years of the Trump 
administration) branch developments impacting SNAP's 
organization, operations at the federal, state and retailer levels, and, 
ultimately, eating patterns and health outcomes of the United States’ 
most vulnerable populations.  This article focuses on the legal and 
policy implications and reflects on how each might affect our ability 
to improve nutrition among participating and eligible children and 
families, persons with disabilities, and elders. 
 
II.  From Breadlines to EBT: SNAP History, 
Participation, and Impacts  
 
A.  History 
 
The seeds of SNAP date back to the stock market crash of 
October 1929 when our country began the worst economic downturn 
in our history at that time.37  During this period known as the Great 
Depression, farm prices were at record lows and farmers held huge 
surpluses of leading agricultural products while thousands of 
poverty-stricken Americans stood in bread lines across the nation’s 
cities for free food supported by private charities, individuals 
 
34 Daniel Nettle et al., Food Insecurity as a Driver of Obesity in Humans: The 
Insurance Hypothesis, 40 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 1, 19 (2017). 
35 SENDHILL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR. SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE 
MEANS SO MUCH (2013). 
36 Amanda. C. McClain et al., Food Insecurity and Odds of High Allostatic Load in 
Puerto Rican Adults: The Role of Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) During 5 Years of Follow-up, 80 PSYCHOSOMATIC 
MED.  737 (2018). 
37 JANET POPPENDIECK, BREADLINES KNEE-DEEP IN WHEAT: FOOD ASSISTANCE IN 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION ix–x (U. Cal. Press 2014) (1986). 
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including Al Capone, or government agencies.38  This contrast of 
overproduction and under-consumption became known as the 
“paradox of want amid plenty” or “the paradox of scarcity and 
abundance” and fueled the development of federal food and nutrition 
assistance programs in both the Hoover and Roosevelt 
administrations.39  Table 1 highlights other policy and programmatic 
developments emerging from the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the US Government shaping SNAP.  Today, the USDA 
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) works with state agencies, 
schools, food, nutrition, and health professionals, along with 
neighborhood and faith-based organizations to ensure eligible 
individuals and households can access federal food and nutrition 
assistance benefits.40  FNS also works with state agencies and the 
retail food industry on program administration and integrity.41 
 
 B.  Participant Characteristics 
 
In fiscal year 2017, the majority of SNAP households (eighty 
percent) included a child, an elderly individual, or an individual with 
a disability; these households received eighty-five percent of SNAP 
benefits.42  About half of SNAP participants (forty-three percent) live 
in a household with earnings; some of these working individuals are 
known as able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) or 
technically: a “person between the ages of 18 and 49 who has no 
dependents and is not disabled.”43  ABAWDs, which we will discuss 
further, can only receive SNAP benefits for three months in three 
years if they do not meet certain special work requirements.44  The 
program benefits households in both urban and rural areas and across 
 
38 Id at 25. 
39 Id. at xvi–xvii; see JONATHAN COPPESS, THE FAULT LINES OF FARM POLICY 1 
(2018). 
40 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 4. 
41 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-167, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ACTION NEEDED TO BETTER MEASURE AND ADDRESS 
RETAILER TRAFFICKING (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-167 
(discusses how some authorized SNAP retailers are “selling” cash instead of food, 
anywhere from $960 million to $4.7 billion and recommends the Administrator of 
FNS improve the accuracy of the estimates of retailer tracking, assess the benefits 
and costs of reauthorizing a sample of high-risk stores more frequently than other 
stores, and increase penalties for retailer trafficking, among others). 
42 Kathryn Cronquist & Sarah Lauffer, Characteristics of Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Householders: Fiscal Year 2017 14, Contract N. AG-3198-F-
18-0005, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Feb. 2019), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/Characteristics2017.pdf. 
43 Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs), U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTR. SERV. (July 17, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/able-bodied-adults-
without-dependents-abawds. 
44 Id.  
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all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and, via block grants, the US 
territories.45  Economic conditions and state program policies such 
as income eligibility criteria, application assistance, online 
applications, and the extent of outreach activities influence their 
residents’ SNAP participation.46  Moreover, the length of SNAP 
participation and state approaches to renewal varies; one study 
examining SNAP entrants (between 2008 to 2012) determined 
twenty-six percent of SNAP households participated for a four month 
period, fifty-two percent participated for a year or less, and sixty-
seven percent participated for two years or less.47  Improvement in 
financial circumstances is the most common “exit trigger” for ending 
SNAP participation.48    
 
 C.  Economic and Health Impacts 
 
An integral component of the evolution of SNAP has been 
research and evaluation of demonstration projects that examine the 
impact of SNAP on poverty, food insecurity, dietary intake and 
quality, weight status, healthcare costs, and academic achievement.  
Evidence indicates SNAP benefits help lift individuals out of 
poverty.49  That is, if SNAP benefits are included as income, 10 
percent of SNAP households would move above the federal poverty 
 
45 SNAP – It Ain’t Just for Cities, AM. FARM. BUREAU FED’N. (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.fb.org/market-intel/snap-it-aint-just-for-cities; Tim Marema, Keep It 
Rural: SNAP Enrollment as Percent of County Population, DAILY YONDER (Dec. 




46 Brian Stacy et al., Using a Policy Index to Capture Trends and Differences in 
State Administration of USDA’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 18, 
ERR-No.244, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/87096/err-244.pdf?v=0/; U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-670, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF STATE ELIGIBILITY EXPANSIONS 
NEEDED 39–40 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-670. 
47 Current Perspectives on SNAP Participation: Dynamics of Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program Participation from 2008 to 2012 66, U.S. Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ. 
Aɢʀɪᴄ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Nᴜᴛʀ. Sᴇʀᴠ (Dec. 2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defaul 
t/files/ops/Dynamics2008-2012.pdf. 
48 Id. at 9. 
49 Laura Tiehen et al, The Effect of SNAP on Poverty 20 (U. Ky. Ctr. Poverty Res. 
Discussion Paper Series DP2013-06, 2013), https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewco 
ntent.cgi?article=1014&context=ukcpr_papers; but see, Laura Tiehen et al., 
Alleviating Poverty in the United States: The Critical Role of SNAP Benefits 17, 
ERR-No.132, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Apr. 2012) (claiming that, 
“prevalence of poverty, as measured by the headcount index, was not reduced much 
by SNAP”), https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44965. 
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guidelines.50  Among women, childhood participation in SNAP 
increases economic self-sufficiency, including educational 
attainment, earnings, and income.51  Emerging evidence is 
illustrating connections between SNAP participation and reduced 
health care costs and hospital utilization.52  In terms of academic 
achievements, a 2006 longitudinal study of a nationally 
representative sample found starting Food Stamp program 
participation during the four years from kindergarten to third grade 
was associated with about a three-point greater improvement in 
reading and mathematics scores compared with stopping Food Stamp 
program participation during that period.53   
 
50 Cronquist & Lauffer, supra note 42, at xv. 
51 Hilary Hoynes, Diane W. Schanzenbach, & Douglas Almond, Long-Run Impacts 
of Childhood Access to the Safety Net, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 893-934 (2016). 
52 See Seth Berkowitz, Hilary Seligman, Joseph Rigdon, James Meigs & Sanjay 
Basu, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Participation and Health 
Care Expenditures Among Low-Income Adults, 177 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. INTERN. 
MED. 1642-1649 (2017) (found SNAP participation was associated with reduced 
health care spending among low-income American adults); Steven Carlson & 
Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP is Linked with Improved Nutritional Outcomes and 
Lower Health Care Costs (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/snap-is-linked-with-improved-nutritional-outcomes-and-lower-health-
care (discusses how SNAP may promote better health and lower health care costs); 
Laura J. Samuel, Sarah L. Szanton, Rachel Cahill, Jennifer L. Wolff, Pinchuan Ong, 
Ginger Zielinskie & Charles Betley, Does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program Affect Hospital Utilization Among Older Adults? The Case of Maryland, 
21 POPUL. HEALTH MANAG. 88-95 (2018) (estimated that enrolling the forty-seven 
percent of the 2012 population who were eligible nonparticipants in SNAP could 
have been associated with nineteen million in hospital cost savings); Chinedum O. 
Ojinnaka & Colleen Heflin, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Size and 
Timing and Hypertension-Related Emergency Department Claims Among Medicaid 
Enrollees, 12 J. AM. SOC. HYPERTENSION e27-e34 (2018) (found higher SNAP 
benefit amount was associated with a decreased probability of hypertension-related 
emergency department claims); Rajan A. Sonik, Susan L. Parish & Monika Mitra, 
Inpatient Medicaid Usage and Expenditure Patterns After Changes in Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program Benefit Levels, 15 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. E120 (2018) 
(found changes in SNAP benefit levels were associated with changes in inpatient 
Medicaid usage and cost problems); Irma Arteaga & Colleen Heflin, SNAP Benefits 
and Pregnancy-Related Emergency Room Visits, 37 POP. RES. POLICY REV. 1031-
1052 (2018) (found that women who received SNAP benefits in the second or third 
week of the calendar month were less likely to receive pregnancy-related care 
through the emergency room in the week following benefit receipt).   
53 Edward A. Frongillo, Diana F. Jyoti & Sonya J. Jones, Food Stamp Program 
Participation is Associated with Better Academic Learning Among School Children, 
136 J. NUTR. 1077-1080 (2006). 
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SNAP also helps individuals and households “put food on 
the table”54 and reduces the prevalence of very low food security.55  
For example, an analysis of nearly three thousand households with 
children found SNAP participation for six months was associated 
with improved food security.56  But impacts on dietary intake and 
quality have been mixed.57  Although many studies have linked 
 
54 Steven Carlson et al., SNAP Works for America’s Children 2, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/s 
nap-works-for-americas-children. 
55 Mark Nord & Anne Marie Golla, Does SNAP Decrease Food Insecurity? 
Untangling the Self-Selection Effect i, ERR-No. 85, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. 
SERV. (Oct. 2009), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/46295/10977_ 
err85_1_.pdf?v=0. 
56 James Mabli & Julie Worthington, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
Participation and Child Food Security, 133 PEDIATRICS. 610, 610 (2014). 
57 See Parke E. Wilde, Paul E. McNamara & Christine K. Ranney, The Effect of 
Income and Food Programs on Dietary Quality: A Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Analysis with Error Components, 81 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON 959, 698 (1999) (used a 
maximum likelihood estimator and found Food Stamp participation was associated 
with higher intake of meats, added sugars, and total fats); Steven T. Yen, The Effects 
of SNAP and WIC Programs on Nutrient Intakes of Children, 35 FOOD POL’Y 576, 
579 (2010) (used a system of nutrient equations to examine the effects of SNAP and 
WIC participation among young children and found SNAP had a small and negative 
effect on fiber intake); Cindy W. Leung et al., Dietary Intake and Dietary Quality 
of Low-Income Adults in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 96 AM. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 977, 977 (2012) (finding SNAP participants had lower dietary 
quality scores than did non-participants); Meenakshi M. Fernandes, Effect of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) on Frequency of Beverage 
Consumption Among Youth in the United States, 112 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & 
DIETETICS 1241, 1244  (2012) (reporting SNAP participation did not have a 
predictive effect on soft drink, 100% fruit juice or milk consumption among youth); 
Rebecca L. Franckle et al., Transactions at a Northeastern Supermarket Chain: 
Differences by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Use, 53 AM. J. PREV. 
MED. e131, e131 (2017) (found transactions with SNAP benefit use in comparison 
to transactions without SNAP benefit use included higher spending on less healthful 
food categories including sugar-sweetened beverages, red meat, and convenience 
foods, and lower spending on more healthful food categories such as fruit, 
vegetables, and poultry); Anna H. Grummon & Lindsey S. Tallie, Nutritional Profile 
of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Household Food and Beverage 
Purchases, 105 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1433, 1433 (2017) (determined SNAP 
participants purchased an additional 15 to 20 more calories per person from sugar-
sweetened beverages, and an additional 174 to 195 mg more sodium per person); 
Cindy W. Leung et al, Associations of Food Stamp Participation with Dietary 
Quality and Obesity in Children, 131 PEDIATRICS 463, 463 (2013) (SNAP 
participants were below national recommendations for whole grains, fruits, 
vegetables, fish, and potassium while exceeding recommended limits for processed 
meat, sugar-sweetened beverages, saturated fat, and sodium); Cindy W. Leung et al, 
Few Changes in Food Security and Dietary Intake from Short-term Participation in 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Among Low-Income Massachusetts 
Adults, 46 J. NUTRITION EDUC. BEHAV. 68, 70 (2014) (found SNAP participants 
increased refined grain intake by 1.1 serving/day from baseline to follow-up and no 
other associations were observed with other foods, nutrients, or dietary quality); 
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SNAP participation to obesity, the most rigorous assessments show 
no effect of SNAP on body weight.58  Similarly, differences in 
 
Cindy W. Leung et al, SNAP Participation and Diet-Sensitive Cardiometabolic Risk 
Factors in Adolescents, 52 (2 Suppl. 2) AM. J. PREV. MED. S127, S127 (2017) 
(SNAP participants had lower Healthy Eating Index scores versus income-eligible 
non-participants); Lindsey S. Tallie et al., Nutritional Profile of Purchases by Store 
Type: Disparities by Income and Food Program Participation, 55 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 167, 172 (2018) (reported SNAP households purchased more 
calories from starchy vegetables, processed meat, desserts, sweeteners and toppings, 
total junk food, sugar-sweetened beverages, and milk than income-eligible and 
higher-income SNAP non-participants and SNAP participant purchases were higher 
in sodium density); Hilary W. Hoynes & Diane W. Schanzenbach, Safety Net 
Investments in Children, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/bp 
ea-articles/safety-net-investments-in-children/ (examined a variety of US social 
safety net program investments including SNAP and found access to safety net 
programs during childhood improves outcomes for children in the short and long 
term). 
58 Joseph Rigdon, Seth A. Berkowitz, Hilary K. Seligman & Sanjay Basu, Re-
Evaluating Associations Between the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
Participation and Body Mass Index in the Context of Unmeasured Confounders, 192 
SOC. SCI. MED. 112-124 (2017) (determined SNAP participation was associated with 
increased Body Mass Index); Amy L. Webb, Andrew Schiff, Douglas Currivan & 
Eduardo Villamor, Food Stamp Participation But Not Food Insecurity is Associated 
with Higher Adult BMI in Massachusetts Residents Living in Low-Income 
Neighborhoods, 11 PUBLIC HEALTH NUTR. 1248-1255 (2008) (reported participation 
in the food stamp program twelve months prior to the survey was associated with 
higher Body Mass Index); Diane Gibson, Food Stamp Program Participation is 
Positively Related to Obesity in Low Income Women, 133 J. NUTR. 2225-2231 
(2003) (determined participation in the food stamp program was associated with a 
9.1% increase in the predicted probability of current obesity); Stephanie B. Jilcott, 
Elizabeth D. Wall-Bassett, Sloane C. Burke & Justin B. Moore, Associations 
Between Food Insecurity, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
Benefits, and Body Mass Index Among Adult Females, 111 J. AM. DIETETIC ASSOC. 
1741-1745 (2011) (reported mean Body Mass Index was significantly greater among 
women receiving <$150 in SNAP benefits per household member versus those 
receiving > $150 in benefits per household member); Stephanie B. Jilcott, Haiyong 
Liu, Katrina D. Dubose, Susan Chen & Sibylle Kranz, Food Stamp Participation is 
Associated with Fewer Meals Away From Home, Yet Higher Body Mass Index and 
Waist Circumference in a Nationally Representative Sample, 43 J. NUTR. EDUC. 
BEHAV. 110-115 (2011) (reported food stamp authorization was associated with 
higher Body Mass Index and waist circumference among females and higher food 
stamp benefits received were associated with lower Body Mass Index); Binh T. 
Nguyen, Kerem  Shuval, Farryl Bertmann &Amy L. Yaroch, The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, Food Insecurity, Dietary Quality, and Obesity 
Among US Adults, 105 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1453-1459 (2015) (reported adult 
SNAP participants with marginal food security from the 2003 to 2010 National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey data had lower Body Mass Index and 
lower probability of obesity than SNAP participants with low or very low food 
security); Cindy W. Leung, Susan J. Blumenthal, Elena E. Hoffnalge, Helen H. 
Jensen, Susan B. Foerster, Marion Nestle, Lilian W.Y. Cheung, Dariush 
Mozaffarian & Walter C. Willett, Associations of Food Stamp Participation and 
Diet Quality and Obesity in Children, 131 PEDIATRICS 463-472 (2013) (found SNAP 
participation was not associated with a higher rate of childhood obesity); Cindy W. 
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dietary intake between SNAP participants and non-participants are 
small, and the most recent, well-conducted studies show virtually no 
direct effect of program enrollment on diet quality.59  In short, the 
diet quality of most Americans is bad and this is not a poor person’s 
problem.  Moreover, inconsistent findings are due to the majority of 
published studies not adequately accounting for self-selection into 
SNAP.60  Essentially, small differences between SNAP participants 
and non-participants do not reflect SNAP’s causal effect on obesity 
or diet quality, but rather: 1) a change in circumstances that both 
precipitates SNAP enrollment and effects diet and obesity (for 
example, a pay cut or recent illness), or 2) a greater propensity for 
people with obesity and poorer diets to enroll in SNAP.61   
 
In 2012, FNS published a SNAP profile capturing key 
accomplishments and lessons learned over the program’s four decade 
history including strategies used to serve Americans most in need, 
improve diet quality, promote self-sufficiency, and increase 
administrative efficiencies.62  FNS recognized how nationwide 
standards for eligibility and benefits helped ensure SNAP is available 
to most households with gross income less than 130 percent of the 
 
Leung, June M. Tester, Eric B. Rimm & Walter C. Willett, SNAP Participation and 
Diet-Sensitive Cardiometabolic Risk Factors in Adolescents, 52 (2 Suppl. 2) AM. J. 
PREV. MED. S127-S137 (2017) (reported SNAP participants had higher Body Mass 
Index for age Z scores, waist circumference Z scores, and waist-to-height ratios than 
higher income nonparticipants but SNAP participation was not associated with most 
cardiometabolic risk factors); Marlana J. Kohn, Janice F. Bell, H. Mollie Grow & 
Galant Chan, Food Insecurity, Food Assistance and Weight Status in US Youth: New 
Evidence from NHANES 2007-08, 9 PEDIATR. OBES. 155-166 (2014) (reported food 
assistance program participation including SNAP, WIC, and school meals was 
associated with increased body size in food secure youth but not food insecure 
youth); Mary T. Gorski Findling, Julia A. Wolfson, Eric B. Rimm, Sara N. Bleich, 
Differences in the Neighborhood Retail Food Environment and Obesity Among US 
Children and Adolescents by SNAP Participation, 26 OBESITY (SILVER SPRING) 
1063-1071 (2018) (determined greater neighborhood access to retail food outlets is 
associated with higher obesity prevalence for children overall and for children who 
participate in SNAP). 
59 Tatiana Andreyeva, Amanda S. Tripp & Marlene B. Schwartz, Dietary Quality of 
Americans by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation Status: A 
Systematic Review, 49 AM. J. PREV. MED. 594-604 (2015). 
60 Id.; see also Sara Bleich, et al., Strengthening the Public Health Impacts of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program through Policy, ANN. PUB. HEALTH 
(forthcoming 2019); Hilary K. Seligman & Seth A. Berkowitz, Aligning Programs 
and Policies to Support Food Security and Public Health Goals in the United States, 
11 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 1-19 (2018). 
61 Id. 
62 BUILDING A HEALTHY AMERICA: A PROFILE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Apr. 2012), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf. 
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federal poverty guidelines across the country.63  And then, in 2018, 
ERS provided historical and analytical perspective on major SNAP 
design issues under consideration including block grants, restricting 
SNAP foods and beverages, adequacy and timing of SNAP benefits, 
retailer eligibility standards, program access and outreach, and work 
requirements.64  Rooted in SNAP policy and programmatic history, 
we will draw on these 2018 ERS analyses, among others, to now 
focus on current legislative (One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress 
and initial One Hundred Sixteenth US Congress) and executive (first 
two years of the Trump administration) branch developments 
impacting SNAP's organization, operations at the federal, state, and 
retailer levels, and, ultimately, eating patterns and health outcomes 
of the nation's most vulnerable populations.   
 
III.  115th US Congress on SNAP - The Farm Bill, 
Appropriations and Oversight (In)Activities  
 
The One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress met in 
Washington, District of Columbia (DC) from January 3, 2017 
to January 3, 2019, during the final weeks of Barack Obama’s 
presidency and the first two years of Donald Trump’s 
presidency.65  The House, Senate, as well as the Presidency—
once Trump took office—were all under Republican Party 
control; nonetheless, party unity and legislative 
accomplishments were comparatively modest.66  Consistent 
with efforts to erode the American safety net including efforts 
to roll back provisions of the Affordable Care Act (P.L.111-
148) that expand Medicaid, passing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(P.L. 115-97) that likely makes low- and middle-income 
households worse off, and calls for mandatory Medicaid work 
requirements, the One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress 
 
63 Id. at 2. 
64 VICTOR OLIVEIRA ET AL., DESIGN ISSUES IN THE USDA’S SUPPLEMENTAL 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: LOOKING AHEAD BY LOOKING BACK. i, ERR-
No.243, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Jan. 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov 
/webdocs/publications/86924/err-243.pdf?v=43124. 
65 See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RES. SERV., R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE i (Dec. 20, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44762.pdf 
(presents the profile of the membership of the 115th Congress including data on party 
affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, 
religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service). 
66 Sarah Binder, Dodging the Rules in Trump’s Republican Congress, 80 J. POL. 
1454, 1454 (2018); Frances E. Lee, Parties and Partisanship in the Age of Trump 
Symposium: The 115th Congress and Questions of Party Unity in a Polarized Era, 
80 J. POL. 1464, 1464 (2018). 
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explored a variety of legislative approaches to gut SNAP 
including, but ultimately unsuccessfully, the 2018 Farm Bill 
(See Table 2).67  The Farm Bill is a recurring omnibus bill re-
approved about every five years by Congress.68  The 2018 Farm 
Bill includes twelve titles, ranging from rural development to 
nutrition.69  The nutrition title addresses SNAP.  As Table 1 
illustrates, about six decades ago, a pilot Food Stamp program 
with less than 380,000 participants was integrated into the 
Farm Bill to garner urban Congressional members’ support for 
farming issues.70  Now, SNAP is the largest component of the 
Farm Bill, with about eighty percent of total spending going to 
fund this entitlement program.71   
 
This review will mainly focus on the One Hundred Fifteenth 
and initial One Hundred Sixteenth Congressional actions taken 
regarding SNAP during the 2018 Farm Bill deliberations in addition 
to fiscal year 2017 through 2020 appropriations and oversight 
(in)activities.  The progress made in the 2018 Farm Bill and the 
negative implications of the recent government shutdown on the 
USDA Food Distribution Program for Indian Reservations (FDPIR), 
which continues to lack a shutdown contingency plan, is not within 
the scope of this law review; nonetheless, policy developments 
affecting FDPIR have significant implications for SNAP given 
eligible individuals and families who do not participate in FDPIR 
 
67 William G. Gate, Once the Tax Bill is Paid For, Low- and Middle-Income 
Households will be Worse Off, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.brookings.ed 
u/blog/up-front/2018/01/02/once-the-tax-bill-is-paid-for-low-and-middle-income-
households-will-be-worse-off/; Nathaniel Weixel, GOP Senator Calls for 
Mandatory Medicaid Work Requirements, THE HILL (May 10, 2018), https://thehill. 
com/policy/healthcare/medicaid/387128-gop-senator-calls-for-mandatory-medicai 
d-work-requirements; Dylan Matthews, The War on the Poor: Donald Trump’s Win 
Opens the Door to Paul Ryan’s Vision for America, VOX  (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/22/13641654/paul-ryan-trump-
poverty-safety-net. 
68 Overview and History of the Farm Bill I, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 
https://www.coursera.org/lecture/food-system/overview-and-history-of-the-farm-
bill-i-Hm3Xt (last visited Aug. 21, 2019). 
69 The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334, https://docs.house.gov 
/billsthisweek/20181210/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf. 
70 COPPESS, supra note 39. 
71 The United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018: Highlights and Implications (2019), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/agriculture-improvement-act-of-2018-highlights-and-
implications/. 
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tend to participate in SNAP.72  Moreover, this review does not 
address specific policy developments and needs affecting SNAP 
participation among active-duty service members, although more 
than $21 million SNAP benefits were redeemed at commissaries 
from September 2014 through August 2015.73  Specifically, this 
review focuses on actions, or the lack thereof, on the following areas: 
block grants; participant eligibility; benefit adequacy, issuance, and 
redemption; and strengthening SNAP’s nutritional impacts. 
 
 A.  Block Grants 
 
A block grant is a fixed level of annual funding regardless of 
need.74  A change in this direction would be significant as SNAP is 
currently an entitlement program that is designed to be responsive to 
economic fluctuations which allow enrollment to expand rapidly 
when the economy weakens and shrink when it improves.75  Charged 
in part by a new Federalism to give states more flexibility and control 
costs, initial 2018 Farm Bill discussions leading up to the One 
Hundred Fifteenth US Congress’ legislative agenda re-explored 
combining safety net programs including SNAP into a meta-block 
 
72 Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTR. SERV. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/fdpir/food-distribution-
program-indian-reservations-fdpir; Kayla Gebeck & Philip Baker-Shenk, 2018 
Farm Bill is Historic for Indian Country, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.hklaw.com/NativeAmericanLawBlog/2018-Farm-Bill-is-Historic-for-
Indian-Country-12-20-2018/; Mark Trahant, Congressional Hearing Looks at the 
Impact of Shutdown on Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/congressional-hearing-looks-at-
the-impact-of-shutdown-on-indian-country-XhiLWA1JIkSfrkOdPbE89g/; Nancy 
M. Pindus et al., STUDY OF THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM ON INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS (FDPIR): FINAL REPORT, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. 
(June 2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/StudyofFDPIR.p 
df; Kenneth Finegold et al., Tribal Food Assistance: A Comparison of the Food 
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR) and the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) i, U. INST. (Nov. 2009), https://www.urban.o 
rg/sites/default/files/publication/28396/412034-Tribal-Food-Assistance.PDF. 
73 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-561, DOD NEEDS MORE COMPLETE 
DATA ON ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICEMEMBERS’ USE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 1 
(2016), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-561; SNAP Benefits, MIL. 
BENEFITS, https://militarybenefits.info/snap-benefits/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019). 
74What is a Block Grant?, GRANTS.GOV (June 15, 2016), https://blog.grants.gov/20 
16/06/15/what-is-a-block-grant/; ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RES. 
SERV., 7-5700, BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 1 (July 15, 
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40486.pdf. 
75 David Reich et al., Block-Granting Low-income Programs Leads to Large 
Funding Declines Over time, History Shows, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/block-granting-low-
income-programs-leads-to-large-funding-declines-over-time. 
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grant to states.76  That is, the “Agenda for Renewed Opportunity” 
proposed each state would receive a fixed, annual amount of funding 
for several safety net programs.77  A pilot program was also pitched 
to explore different ways of distributing this federal aid in addition 
to establishing a commission to examine rigorous analysis of the 
proposed safety net programs.78  Known as the Commission on 
Evidence-Based Policy Making, this multi-disciplinary group would 
be tasked with advising Congress on whether or how to create a 
Clearinghouse for Program and Survey Data that would “facilitate 
the merging of data on government programs with other 
administrative data so researchers could link anonymous participants 
across programs” while maintaining privacy rights of program 
participants, incorporate outcome measurements, and institutionalize 
randomized controlled trials into program design, among others 
charges “without adding to the federal budget deficit (such as 
through user fees for participating academic and other research 
institutions).”79  
 
There is precedent for block granting social safety net 
programs in the US.80  In fact, permitted by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Nutrition Assistance Program (NAP) 
operates via block grants in a growing number of US territories 
including Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Marian Islands, although we will discuss later how a 
recently introduced Senate bill aims to allow these US territories to 
finally participate in SNAP.81  Research indicates total funding for 
NAP does not substantially change over time, which results in 
restricting program eligibility and benefits to the most financially 
needy individuals and households.82  Experience from other safety 
 
76 Paul Ryan, Expanding Opportunity in America: A Discussion Draft from the 
House Budget Committee (June 24, 2014), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uplo 
ads/2016/06/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf; Robert Greenstein, Ryan and 
Block-Granting the Safety Net, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 3, 2015),  
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/ryan-and-block-granting-the-safety-net; Lucas Berger, 
Food Stamps and Federalism, ROOSEVELT INST. (Mar. 23, 2014),  https://www.corn 
ellrooseveltinstitute.org/dom/food-stamps-and-federalism; Kenneth Finegold et al., 
Block Grants: Details of the Bush Proposals, THE URBAN INST. 1 (Apr. 2004), 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310990_A-64.pdf. 
77See Ryan, supra note 76, at 14. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 67. 
80 Reich et al., supra note 75, at 1.  
81 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 H.R. 3982, 97th Cong. (1981-
1982), https://www.congress.gov/bill/97th-congress/house-bill/3982/titles. 
82 Elizabeth Wolkomir, How is Food Assistance Different in Puerto Rico Than in 
the Rest of the United States?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/how-is-food-assistance-different-
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net programs similarly illustrates the generally static impact of block 
granting on funding levels.83  For example, the cash assistance 
provided by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children, has 
steadily declined over time.84  One study found the purchasing power 
of TANF was at least twenty percent lower now than when the 
program was created in 1996.85   
 
While innovative approaches to lifting Americans out of 
poverty and promoting food security are needed, the “Agenda for 
Renewed Opportunity” or the “Opportunity Grant” was deemed to 
essentially erode SNAP’s long-standing entitlement status; most 
likely provide weaker and less comprehensive and responsive 
versions of our existing federal aid programs; and result in large 
funding declines over time.86  According to an ERS report, a block 
grant approach to SNAP could potentially result in states restricting 
SNAP eligibility, hinder a state’s ability to respond quickly to 
increased need during an economic downturn, and increase the 
prevalence of food insecurity.87  Another consideration is that a fixed 
block grant challenges most states’ disaster SNAP approaches (e.g., 
hurricanes, tornadoes, or earthquakes), which is problematic given 
 
in-puerto-rico-than-in-the-rest-of-the; ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF 
IMPLEMENTING THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARINA ISLANDS 21, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD 
& NUTRITION SERV. (Aug. 2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ 
ops/SNAPCNMI.pdf. 
83DILGER & BOYD, supra note 74, at 8; Reich et al., supra note 75, at 2. 
84 LIZ SCHOTT ET AL., HOW STATES USE FUNDS UNDER THE TANF BLOCK GRANT 3–
4, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/res 
earch/family-income-support/how-states-use-funds-under-the-tanf-block-grant; R. 
Kent Weaver, The Structure of the TANF Block Grant, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2002), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-structure-of-the-tanf-block-grant/. 
85 ASHLEY BURNSIDE & IFE FLOYD, TANF CASH BENEFITS HAVE FALLEN BY MORE 
THAN 20 PERCENT IN MOST STATES AND CONTINUE TO ERODE 1, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-
support/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-by-more-than-20-percent-in-most-States. 
86 DILGER & BOYD, supra note 74, at 14–15; KENNETH FINEGOLD ET AL., BLOCK 
GRANTS: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED, No.A-63, U. INST. (Apr. 
2014), http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310991_A-63.pdf ; Greenstein, 
supra note 76;  LIZ SCHOTT, LESSONS FROM TANF: BLOCK-GRANTING A SAFETY-
NET PROGRAM HAS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS EFFECTIVENESS 2, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-
support/lessons-from-tanf-block-granting-a-safety-net-program-has; Berger, supra 
note 76;  Reich et al., supra note 75, at 3; DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, BLOCK-GRANTING 
SNAP WOULD ABANDON DECADES-LONG FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO REDUCE 
HUNGER 1, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cbpp 
.org/research/food-assistance/block-granting-snap-would-abandon-decades-long-
federal-commitment-to. 
87 OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at iv. 
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the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters.88  
Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill did not convert SNAP to a block grant 
program.89  Notwithstanding, work remains to identify more 
effective ways to consistently alleviate poverty and food security in 
our country while providing state and local government agencies 
flexibility to meet their residents’ needs and streamline 
administrative safety net program processes.90 
 
B.  Participant Eligibility  
 
Legislative deliberations leading up to the 2018 Farm Bill 
impacting SNAP participant eligibility included intense 
consideration but ultimately unsuccessful legislative attempts to 
eliminate broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) and establish 
stricter work requirements.  Other eligibility related legislative 
actions in the 2018 Farm Bill included simplifying homeless housing 
cost provisions, preserving states’ option to coordinate SNAP 
benefits with low-income energy payments assistance (LIHEAP) 
(i.e., helping households “afford to heat and eat”), rejecting a lifetime 
ban on individuals convicted of certain felonies, and eliminating state 
performance bonuses to recognize best or most-improved in SNAP 
operations that have been historically reinvested in supporting SNAP 
integrity and effectiveness.91  The USDA also recently issued a 
memo to states urging them to strengthen their policy and 
programmatic approaches to restrict individuals from participating 
who have failed to make child support payments.92 
 
88 Tony Abernathy, Responsibilities of the USDA-Food and Nutrition Service in 
Nutrition Assistance Response to Natural Disasters, 61 J. NUTRITION SCI. 
VITAMINOLOGY S14, S14 (2015). 
89 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R.2, 115th Cong. (2017-2018) 
(enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2. 
90 Id. 
91FOOD RESEARCH & ACTION CENTER’S ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL FARM BILL 
CONFERENCE REPORT AGRICULTURE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2018 TITLE IV—
NUTRITION, FOOD RES. & ACTION CTR., http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-
farm-bill-conference-report-analysis.pdf; see also U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD NUTR. 
SERV., FY19 Homeless Shelter Deduction Memo (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.fns.usd 
a.gov/snap/fy19-homeless-shelter-deduction-memo (explaining the self-executing 
simplified homeless housing cost provisions of the 2018 Farm Bill); Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program: Student Eligibility, Convicted Felons, Lottery and 
Gambling, and State Verification Provisions of the Agricultural Act of 2014 – Final 
Rule, 7 C.F.R. Parts 271, 272, and 273 [FNS 2015-0038] (Apr. 15, 2019) (outlining 
how states can determine whether certain felons should be disqualified and 
clarifying restrictions regarding lottery winners). 
92 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., State Flexibilities Related to Custodial 
and Noncustodial Parents’ Cooperation with State Child Support Agencies (May 1, 
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i.  Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility  
 
Since 2000, states have been permitted to use BBCE, which 
allows them to align the SNAP asset test or gross income eligibility 
thresholds with certain other non-cash means-tested programs.93  
That is, BBCE allows states to grant automatic eligibility for families 
that receive TANF assistance and meet State-determined income 
limits.94  According to an ERS report, BBCE simplifies the 
application process for potential SNAP participants and reduces 
administrative costs, without significant increases in eligibility.95  
Recognizing program integrity concerns and escalating program 
costs, the US Government Accountability Office stressed improved 
oversight of state implementation of BBCE is needed.96  A 
preliminary House version of the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R.2), which was 
drafted in an untraditional partisan manner and passed by two votes 
with no support from Democrats, eliminated BBCE and proposed 
changes to countable resources.97  Countable resources include a 
portion of the value of a household’s vehicle(s), which states have 
been able to exclude some or all of, consistent with TANF; however, 
the preliminary H.R.2 proposed to eliminate the state vehicle policy 
option and increase the amount of most vehicles’ value that is 
excluded for countable resources from $4,650 to $12,000.98  On the 
other hand, the preliminary Senate version of the Farm Bill (S.3042) 
did not propose significant changes to participant eligibility.99  A 
2018 analysis of these proposed participant eligibility changes 




93 Daryll E. Ray & Harwood D. Schaffer, Categorical Eligibility for Food Stamps: 
It’s Origin and Adoption by States, AGRIC. POL’Y ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.agpol 
icy.org/weekpdf/641.pdf; AUSSENBERG, supra note 7, at 1; GENE FALK & RANDY 
ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., R42054, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): CATEGORICAL ELIGIBILITY 2, 4 (2019), https://fas.or 
g/sgp/crs/misc/R42054.pdf. 
94 AUSSENBERG, supra note 7, at i. 
95 OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at 52–53. 
96 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 46, at 39. 
97 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 284, CONGRESS.GOV (June 21, 2018), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll284.xml (finding that no democrats supported 
this preliminary version of the bill and that the bill passed by two votes); Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4006, § 4013 (2018),  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2. 
98 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4013 (2018). 
99 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3042, 115th Cong. (2018) (lacking 
a section that proposes changes to SNAP participant eligibility under Title IV–
Nutrition), https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Agriculture%20Imp 
rovement%20Act%20of%202018.pdf. 
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for SNAP benefits or eight percent of those who participated in 
SNAP in fiscal year 2015.100  Others estimate more than three million 
Americans would be impacted and speculate more than 500,000 
children’s access to free USDA school breakfast and lunch would be 
jeopardized since children who live in households that receive SNAP 
benefits would no longer be directly certified or automatically 
eligible to participate in the USDA school meal programs.101  The 
elimination of BBCE will also impact a school’s use of the 
Community Eligibility Provision, which allows a school to offer free 
meals to all students without collecting meal applications based on 
the school area’s SNAP eligibility numbers.102  Still, the USDA 
published a proposed rule on July 23, 2019 in the Federal Register 
that aims to end “this loophole” and “limits SNAP/TANF automatic 
eligibility to households that receive substantial, ongoing TANF-
funded benefits aimed at helping families move towards self-
sufficiency.”103  Days prior to the release of this rule, the House 
Agriculture Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department 
Operations held a hearing regarding the potential implications of 
eliminating BBCE that included discussion of “the Minnesota 
millionaire,” Rob Undersander, who applied for and received SNAP 
benefits while owning one million in assets and then donated the 
funds to his church and other charities.104  The House Committee of 
Education and Labor Chairman Scott also wrote a letter to Secretary 
Perdue raising concerns about the USDA’s estimates regarding the 
 
100 Karen Cunnyngham, Simulating Proposed Changes to the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program: Countable Resources and Categorical Eligibility 2, 
MATHEMATICA POL’Y RES. (2018), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-
publications-and-findings/publications/simulating-proposed-changes-to-the-supple 
mental-nutrition-assistance-program-countable-resources. 
101 Crystal FitzSimons & Ellen Vollinger, FRAC Chat: Broad-Based Categorical 
Eligibility and School Meals (2019), https://www.frac.org/blog/broad-based-
categorical-eligibility-and-school-meals. 
102 Simone Del Rosario, 17,000 Washington Students Could Lose Free Meals Over 
Food Stamp Changes (2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/money/17000-
washington-students-could-lose-free-meals-over-food-stamp-changes/ar-
AAFjAlA. 
103 Revision of Categorical Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), 84 Fed. Reg. 142 (July 24, 2019).) 
104 The United States House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations, The Potential 
Implications of Eliminating Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility for SNAP 
Households, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID= 
109661; see also Julia Limitone, How this Minnesota Millionaire Received 
‘Hundreds of Dollars’ in Food Stamps (2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/perso 
nal-finance/how-this-minnesota-millionaire-receives-hundreds-of-dollars-of-food-
stamps. 
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impact of this proposed rule.105  The public comment period closes 
on September 23, 2019.106  Given that BBCE was not altered in the 
2018 Farm Bill, any final rule could potentially evoke a legislative 
response.107   
 
ii.  Work Requirements 
 
The preliminary House version of the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 
2) also proposed significant changes to the work requirements 
imposed on able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD) 
unable to find work.108  As explained earlier, ABAWD describes a 
person between the ages of 18 and 49 who has no dependents and is 
not disabled that is currently eligible to receive SNAP benefits for 
three months in three years if they do not meet certain special work 
requirements.109  SNAP work requirements are popular with House 
Republicans, State Republican leadership, the Trump administration, 
and the public.110  Various Congressional hearings, reports, and 
mandated pilot projects preceded the proposed SNAP work 
requirements in the preliminary H.R.2, along with similar legislative 
and executive branch efforts targeting other social safety net 
programs, including recent changes to Medicaid.111  However, most 
 
105 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 
Chairman Scott to Secretary Perdue: Release Internal Estimates Showing Impact of 
Proposed SNAP Changes on Free School Meals (July 29, 2019), https://edlabor.hou 
se.gov/media/press-releases/chairman-scott-to-secretary-perdue-release-internal-es 
timates-showing-impact-of-proposed-snap-changes-on-free-school-meals. 
106 Revision of Categorical Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, supra 103. 
107 The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334, https://docs.house.go 
v/billsthisweek/20181210/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf. 
108 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4015 (2018) (as 
introduced in the House, Apr. 12, 2018). 
109 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 43. 
110 Helena Bottemiller Evich, Morning Agriculture: Critics Question Stricter SNAP 
Work Requirements, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.politico.com/newslette 
rs/morning-agriculture/2018/10/16/critics-question-stricter-snap-work-requirement 
s-375598. 
111 The Agricultural Act of 2014 Pub. L. No. 113-79, sec. 4022, 128 Stat. 649, 799 
(2014);  PAUL RYAN, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT 
FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE  310 (2014),  http://budget.house.gov/upload 
edfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf; Public Hearing: To Review the 
Implementation of Section 4022 of the Agricultural Act of 2014: Pilot Projects to 
Reduce Dependency and Increase Work Requirements and Work Effort Under the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 113th 
Cong. (2014), https://archives-agriculture.house.gov/hearing/review-implementatio 
n-section-4022-agricultural-act-2014-pilot-projects-reduce-dependency; How Our 
Welfare System Can Discourage Work: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.govinfo. 
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working-age adults in SNAP who can work do, while often for low 
pay, without benefits, and unstable schedules.112  The current 
ABAWD requirements, as set forth in the Food and Nutrition Act of 
2008, include registering for work, accepting suitable employment, 
not voluntarily quitting a job or reducing hours, and participating in 
workfare (unpaid work through a special state-approved program), 
or employment and training programs.113  While several exemptions 
exist, including permitting states to provide waivers to ABAWD 
during periods of high unemployment, if work requirements are not 
met, inability to participate in SNAP may exaggerate an ABAWD’s 
food insecurity.114  The preliminary H.R.2 proposed stricter work 
 
gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg97912/html/CHRG-114hhrg97912.htm; How Our 
Welfare System Can Discourage Work: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means & the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. (2015) (discussing the work requirement and 
efforts to coordinate programs in regards to this aspect); Hearing: Past, Present, and 
Future of SNAP: The Means to Climbing the Economic Ladder, U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee Repository (June 10, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103569; How 
Our Welfare System Can Discourage Work (2016), Subcommittee on Nutrition – 
Public Hearing RE: Past, Present, and Future of SNAP: Improving Innovation and 
Success in Employment and Training Programs, House Committee on Agriculture 
Republicans (Sept. 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov 
/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=3511; Letter From Department of Health and 
Human Services  to State Medicaid Director (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid. 
gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf (discussing, amongst other 
issues, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ policy  to incentivize work 
engagement). 
112 Brynne Keith-Jennings & Raheem Chaudhy, Most Working-Age SNAP 
Participants Work, But Often in Unstable Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/most-
working-age-snap-participants-work-but-often-in-unstable-jobs; Brynne Keith-
Jennings & Vincent Palacios, SNAP Helps Millions of Low-Wage Workers: Crucial 
Financial Support Assists Workers in Jobs with Low Wages, Volatile Income, and 
Few Benefits, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 10, 2017), https://www.c 
bpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-low-wage-workers; 
LAUREN BAUER ET AL., WORK REQUIREMENTS AND SAFETY NET PROGRAMS 2, 
HAMILTON PROJECT (2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/WorkRequ 
irements_EA_web_1010_2.pdf. 
113 The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 43. 
114 OLIVERIRA ET AL., supra note 64; Kristin F. Butcher et al., Most Workers in Low-
Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, in Volatile Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 24, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-
inequality/most-workers-in-low-wage-labor-market-work-substantial-hours-in 
(stating that proposals for work requirements in SNAP . . . vary in terms of . . . the 
economic conditions under which the requirements may be temporarily waived”); 
Ed Bolen et al., More than 500,000 Adults Will Lose SNAP Benefits in 2016 as 
Waivers Expire, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar 18, 2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-
lose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-expire. 
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requirements called for almost all adult SNAP participants under the 
age of sixty to work or participate in employment and job training 
for at least twenty hours per week and permitted states to target 
limited resources to those who they deem may benefit most from 
employment and training programs.115   
 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated more than one 
million adults would lose SNAP benefits as a result of the 
preliminary H.R.2’s proposed stricter mandatory work 
requirements.116  In addition, the Congressional Budget Office 
determined other impacts on states including: the likely need for 
more than the proposed two years to establish new employment and 
training opportunities that will likely serve relatively few eligible 
SNAP participants in each state; possible increased costs for tracking 
SNAP work status or exemptions from work requirements; and 
potential financial hardships contending with at least seven 
provisions deemed unfunded mandates (i.e., a regulation(s) that 
requires a state to perform certain actions with no funding allocated 
to support its fulfillment).117  Notably, states have had the option to 
implement work requirements in SNAP, but many have stopped or 
opted not to start as the requirements are burdensome on participants 
and state agencies.118  The Heritage Foundation reported, “as of late 
2017, six states and the District of Columbia have statewide 
ABAWD work waivers, 27 states have partial waivers, and roughly 
1,300 counties are ‘labor surplus areas’ as designated by the 
Department of Labor.”119  Recent reports indicate that Illinois’ 
request for a waiver to reinstate a number of cases was denied and 
resulted in what federal investigators determined as an over-issuance 
of SNAP benefits during a four-month period.120  In a similar 
situation but for a longer period of time, the State of New Mexico 
 
115 Ed Bolen et al., House Farm Bill Would Increase Food Insecurity and Hardship, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/house-farm-bill-would-increase-food-insecurity-and-hardship. 
116 CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2 AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION ACT 
OF 2018 12 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-07/hr2_1.pdf. 
117 Id. at 13, 22. 
118 FNS CONTROLS OVER SNAP BENEFITS FOR ABLE-BODIED ADULTS WITHOUT 
DEPENDENTS 4 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (2016), 
https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.  
119 ROBERT RECTOR & VIJAY MENON, ISSUE BRIEF: SNAP REFORM ACT OFFERS 
SOUND BASIS FOR WELFARE POLICY 3, HERITAGE F. (2018), https://www.usda.gov/o 
ig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf. 
120Cole Lauterbach, USDA Says Illinois Over-Issued Food Stamps, May Face 
Significant Fines, ILL. NEWS NETWORK. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.ilnews.org/ne 
ws/state_politics/usda-says-illinois-over-issued-food-stamps-may-face-
significant/article_02f08c50-c422-11e8-a5f3-4b474cacffd6.html. 
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was fined more than $163 million.121  On the other hand, Maine 
announced in 2014 it would no longer grant waivers from the work 
requirements for ABAWDs, resulting in eighty percent ABAWD 
caseload drop in only a few months.122  Likewise, in 2014, Indiana 
reinstated work requirements.123  Between October 2017 and March 
2018, Georgia ended SNAP benefits for an average of 356 
participants for failing to meet work requirements.124  Recently, in 
April 2018, Wisconsin increased work requirements for SNAP 
recipients, among other provisions to limit the state’s welfare 
programs.125 
 
Employment and training programs (SNAP E&T) are 
administered by the USDA, using a formula-based grant program 
that provides about $300 million annually to support states (or state 
partners) offering a package of services including, but not limited to, 
participant assessment, employment and training activities, and 
supportive services.126   SNAP to Skills (S2S) is a USDA project that 
is designed to provide direct and intensive technical assistance, tools 
and resources to ten states to help each of them build more effective 
and job-driven SNAP E&T programs.127  While Congressional 
appropriations to SNAP E&T have grown and USDA has learned a 
lot about how to provide states technical assistance in developing and 
operating these programs, preliminary evaluations generally found 
states only offered basic job search services and have not had 
significant impacts on helping ABAWD transition into the 
workforce.128  A recent Government Accountability Office report 
 
121 Id. 
122 ROBERT RECTOR ET AL., MAINE FOOD STAMP WORK REQUIREMENT CUTS NON-
PARENT CASELOAD BY 80 PERCENT 1, HERITAGE F. (2016), https://www.heritage.org 
/welfare/report/maine-food-stamp-work-requirement-cuts-non-parent-caseload-80-
percent. 
123 Reinstatement of Work Requirements for Able-Bodied SNAP Recipients Without 
Dependents, IND. FAM. & SOC. SERV. ADMIN., https://www.in.gov/fssa/dfr/4929.ht 
m. 
124 Chris Joyner, Ga. Cuts Food Stamps for Thousands with New System Tracking 
Recipients, Aᴛʟ. J. CONSTITUTION (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state-
-regional-govt--politics/cuts-food-stamps-for-thousands-with-new-system-tracking 
-recipients/GUlvrSd5v5CFosItLktYlK/.  
125 Scott Bauer, Walker Signs 9 Bills Limiting Wisconsin Welfare Into Law, U.S. 
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/wisconsin/article 
s/2018-04-10/walker-to-sign-9-welfare-overhaul-bills-into-law. 
126 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., What is SNAP E&T?, https://snaptoski 
lls.fns.usda.gov/about-snap-skills/what-is-snap-et (last visited Aug. 21, 2019). 
127 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., About SNAP to Skills, 
https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/about-snap-skills (last visited Aug. 21, 2019). 
128 DEBORAH KOGAN ET AL., SNAP EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING (E&T) BEST 
PRACTICES STUDY: FINAL REPORT III-23, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &NUTR. SERV. 
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determined SNAP E&T programs have served a small percentage of 
SNAP recipients—less than 1% per month on average in 2016; the 
data regarding these programs and their impacts were limited and of 
poor quality, and several states have not leveraged work force 
development system resources.129  A 2017 report by the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI)—a conservative think tank—discussed 
how SNAP work requirements might hinder a state’s ability to 
respond to local economic conditions and the availability or lack of 
education and training programs.130  The AEI report also found this 
punitive approach fails to provide robust investment in more 
effective pathways to transition ABAWDs into the workforce.131  
The local labor market conditions are an important consideration; to 
illustrate, an ERS report found “a 10 percent increase in local 
employment raises the average [SNAP] recipient’s probability of 
program exit by nearly seven percent.”132  A recent report from the 
White House Council of Economic Advisors found the proposed 
work requirements in the preliminary H.R.2 may facilitate the 
placement of certain ABAWD into the workforce.133  However, 
evidence from TANF, which has work requirements, suggests that 
employment gains were inconsistent and participation in the program 
dropped sharply.134  Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill did not include 
stricter work requirements and included provisions aiming to 




129 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-56, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: MORE COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION NEEDED ON 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GA 
O-19-56.   
130 See DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH, THE FUTURE OF SNAP: CONTINUING TO 
BALANCE PROTECTION AND INCENTIVES 17, AM. ENTER. ISNT. (2017), http://www.aei 
.org/publication/the-future-of-snap-continuing-to-balance-protection-and-incentive 
s/ (discussed how SNAP responds quickly to increased need during times of 
economic downturns and strengthens the macroeconomy but could do more to assist 
participants with finding employment). 
131 Id. 
132 ERIK SCHERPF ET AL., PARTICIPATION IN USDA’S SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): EFFECT OF LOCAL LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS IN 
OREGON. i, ERR-257, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (2018), https://www.ers 
.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/90038/err-257.pdf?v=5890.6. 
133 EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE PROGRAMS 5, EXEC. 
OFF PRESIDENT COUNS. ECON. ADVISORS (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-
Programs.pdf. 
134 Marian Jarlenski & Sara N. Bleich, The New Push for Work Requirements in 
Medicaid and SNAP: Implications for Children and Families, MED. CARE BLOG 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.themedicalcareblog.com/the-new-push-for-work-requ 
irements-in-medicaid-and-snap-implications-for-children-and-families/. 
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funding, expanding the definition of SNAP E&T programs, and 
requiring state agencies to reach out to private employers in 
developing their SNAP E&T plans.135  The 2019 Agricultural 
Appropriations allocated $487,707 to employment and training 
programs.136  On March 6, 2019, as part of its Farm Bill 
Implementation, the USDA issued an information memorandum on 
the self-executing Employment and Training provisions.137   
 
Altogether, the proposed stricter work requirements in the 
preliminary H.R.2 were one of the most contentious differences 
between the preliminary House and Senate versions and ultimately 
was not a part of 2018 Farm Bill approved by both the House (390-
47) and Senate (87-13) and signed by President Trump on December 
20, 2018.  Shortly after the President signed the 2018 Farm Bill, the 
USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), issued a new proposed 
rule aiming to strengthen the criteria for mandatory SNAP work 
requirements and significantly restrict state waiver allowance.138  
The USDA proposed rule indicated the widespread use of ABAWD 
waivers during periods when unemployment rates were low 
necessitated strengthening the criteria for granting waivers.139  The 
proposed rule also aims to end the unlimited carryover of ABAWD 
exemptions, which states have used to extend SNAP eligibility for 
 
135 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334 § 4005 
(discussing employment and training programs for SNAP recipients).  
136 DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2019 30, 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/do 
c/FY%202019%20Explanatory%20Statement%20for%20Division%20A%20(Ag)
%20(1.21.19).pdf. 
137 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t Agric., Food & Nutr. Serv. to the Regional 
Directors of Food & Nutr. Serv. 1 (Mar. 6, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sit 
es/default/files/Section-4005-Agriculture-Act-2018.pdf. 
138 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied 
Adults Without Dependents, 84  Fed. Reg. 980 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); Olivia Paschal, The Farm Bill and the Assault on Poor 
Families: Stringer New Work Requirements for Food-Stamp Recipients Could 
Doom Passage of a New Farm Bill, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theatla 
ntic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/the-farm-bill-and-the-assault-on-poor-
families/568441/.  
139 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied 
Adults Without Dependents, supra note 138, at 981; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): STATUS OF STATE ABLE-
BODIED ADULT WITHOUT DEPENDENTS (ABAWD) TIME LIMIT WAIVERS – FISCAL 
YEAR 2019 – 2ND QUARTER (Mar. 13, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defa 
ult/files/snap/FY19-Quarter2-ABAWD-Waiver-Status.pdf (listing the current 
ABAWD time limit waivers approved for State agencies, which is updated each 
fiscal quarter). 
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ABAWDs.140  The USDA indicated the proposed rule would not 
apply to the disabled, elderly, or women who are pregnant.  Over ten 
years, the proposed rule is projecting an estimated one billion and 
half dollar reduction.  Close to eight thousand public comments were 
submitted during a sixty-day period that was only briefly extended 
for three days due to technical issues with the website;141 even 
though, on February 1, 2019 during the historic shutdown, 
Representative Marcia Fudge requested an extension for the public 
comment period.142   
 
Legislation was introduced during the 115th Congress to 
prevent the USDA from implementing the proposed rule.143  In 
addition, Title 1 of a Rules Committee package (H.Res. 6) directs the 
House of Representatives’ Office of General Counsel to explore legal 
options for responding to the proposed SNAP rule, recognizing, in 
part, Congress had the opportunity to address work requirements in 
the 2018 Farm Bill and did not.144  During a Senate hearing on 
February 28, 2019, Secretary Perdue was asked several contentious 
questions about the proposed rule and then fired back with a press 
release reiterating “the need to restore the original intent of SNAP: 
A second chance, not a way of life.”145  On April 3, 2019, the House 
Agriculture Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight and Department 
Operations held a hearing regarding the proposed rule and most 
members expressed strong opposition, emphasizing Congressional 
intent was expressed during the 2018 Farm Bill to not impose stricter 
work requirements and the USDA should await the results of the 
2018 Farm Bill provisions aiming to strengthen SNAP E&T  
programs.146  The day before the hearing, more than 100 House 
 
140 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied 
Adults Without Dependents, supra note 138, at 980. 
141Id. at Enhanced Content – Public Comments. 
142 Press Release, Rep. Marcia L. Fudge (D-OH-11), Congresswoman Marcia L. 
Fudge Requests Immediate Extension of USDA’s Comment Period on SNAP Rule 
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://fudge.house.gov/press-statements/congresswoman-marcia-l-
fudge-requests-immediate-extension-of-usdas-comment-period-on-snap-rule/.  
143 Protect SNAP Act, H.R. 7372, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018), https://delauro.house.go 
v/sites/delauro.house.gov/files/Protect_SNAP_Act.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent
&eId=9ecb2bc8-24c4-45f2-974b-a80c3bbce3ad. 
144Adopting the Rules of the House of Representatives for the One Hundred 
Sixteenth Congress, and for other purposes, H.R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 103(o) 
(2019).  
145 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Perdue Reiterates Need to Restore Original 
Intent of SNAP: A Second Chance, Not A Way of Life (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/02/28/perdue-reiterates-need-
restore-original-intent-snap-second-chance. 
146 Hearing: Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight and Department Operations – 
RE: “Examining the Proposed ABAWD Rule and its Impact on Hunger and 
Hardship”, REPUBLICAN HOUSE COMM. ON AGRIC. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://republica 
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Democrats sent a letter to Secretary Perdue urging him to withdraw 
the proposed rule and demanding detailed demographic data on 
ABAWDs.147  The USDA only provided a publicly available report 
at this time, which lacked the requested detailed assessment.148  In 
addition, Secretary Perdue acknowledged the definition of ABAWDs 
might need further refining.149  Similarly, close to half of the 
members of the Senate in a bipartisan effort sent a letter to Secretary 
Perdue explaining how the proposed rule is “…contrary to 
Congressional intent, evidenced by the passage of the Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334), which rejected similar 
harmful changes to SNAP and passed Congress by a historic vote of 
87-13 in the Senate and by 369-47 in the House of 
Representatives.”150   
 
The proposed rule will likely affect participation rates and 
participant churn in SNAP, which occurs when a SNAP participant 
exits and then reenters within four months or less.151  Evidence 
suggests the stronger enforcement of mandatory work requirements 
and stricter standards for waivers put forth in this proposed rule could 
potentially affect the food security status of more than one million 






147 Press Release, Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT-3rd), DeLauro, House Dems Urge 
Secretary Perdue to Withdraw Harmful Changes to SNAP Work Requirements (Apr. 
2, 2019), https://delauro.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/delauro-house-dem 
s-urge-secretary-perdue-withdraw-harmful-changes-snap. 
148 Ryan McCrimmon, Dems Turn Up Heat on SNAP data, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/04/04/dems-turn-
up-heat-on-snap-data-570428.  
149 Ryan McCrimmon, Disaster Aid Talks Break Down as New Storm Nears, 
POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agricultur 
e/2019/04/10/disaster-aid-talks-break-down-as-new-storm-nears-577842. 
150 Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Warner, Kaine Urge Trump Admin. 




151 GREGORY MILLS ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE RATES, CAUSES, AND COSTS OF 
CHURNING IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP).: 
Final Report 14, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (2014), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/SNAPChurning.pdf. 
152 Karen Cunnyngham, Proposed Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program: Waivers to Work-Related Time Limits 1, MATHEMATICA POL’Y 
RES. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-
findings/publications/proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-waivers-to-work-related-time. 
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dollars.153  According to a recent Hamilton Project analysis, the 
proposed rule would likely weaken states’ ability to respond to 
deteriorating economic conditions and negatively affect the 
important automatic stabilizer SNAP provides in our fiscal policy 
toolkit.154  Likewise, a recent Urban Institute case study of ABAWD 
in Kentucky found at least 13,122 SNAP participants lost benefits 
because they reached the three-month time limit after work 
requirements were reinstated.155  The study authors expressed 
concern about this “rapid loss of SNAP benefits associated with a 
policy change without clear evidence.”156  In Wisconsin, a New Food 
Economy analysis found the state’s expanded work requirements fell 
short of expectations and was expensive (more than one billion 
annually was paid to the one company awarded the employment 
training program contract).157  On the other hand, The Foundation for 
Government Accountability contends states have used “loopholes 
and gimmicks” to waive work requirements, which were “only 
intended for areas with unemployment rates above ten percent or that 
otherwise lacked job opportunities for ablebodied adults.”158    
 
Future research can further examine how best to utilize a 
program aimed at preventing food insecurity as a means of 
transitioning participants with a range of marketable skills and life 
circumstances into more stable and stronger workforce situations.159  
 
153 Leslie Gersing, City Grocers Could Lose Millions Monthly in Federal Food-
Stamp Proposal, CRAINS N.Y. BUS. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.crainsnewyork.c 
om/politics/city-grocers-could-lose-millions-monthly-federal-food-stamp-proposal. 
154 LAUREN BAUER ET AL., HOW DO WORK REQUIREMENTS WAIVERS HELP SNAP 
RESPOND TO A RECESSION 7, HAMILTON PROJECT (2019), https://www.brookings.ed 
u/research/how-do-work-requirement-waivers-help-snap-respond-to-a-recession/. 
155 ELAINE WAXMAN & NATHAN JOO, URBAN INST., REINSTATING SNAP WORK-
RELATED TIME LIMITS: A CASE STUDY OF ABLE-BODIED ADULTS WITHOUT 
DEPENDENTS IN KENTUCKY 12,  (Mar. 2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/fil 
es/publication/100027/reinstating_snap_time_limits_1.pdf. 
156 Id. at 2. 
157 H. Claire Brown, When the Government Mandates Work Requirements for Food 
Stamps, Who Actually Profits?, THE NEW FOOD ECONOMY (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://newfoodeconomy.org/work-requirements-snap-mandatory-employment-
training-program-profits/. 
158 Sam Adolphsen, et al., Waivers Gone Wild: How States are Still Fostering 
Dependency, FGA (Apr. 16, 2019), https://thefga.org/research/work-requirement-
waivers-gone-wild/. 
159 See JULIE STRAWN, POLICY BRIEF 6: INTEGRATING SNAP E&T INTO CAREER 
PATHWAY SYSTEMS TO BOOST OUTCOMES 5, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. 
(2017), https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2017-05/S2SBrief6_Int 
egratingSNAPandPathways.pdf (discusses how States may find an added benefit to 
integrating SNAP E&T services into existing career pathway systems); Brianna 
Provenzano, The Implementation of SNAP Work Requirements Could Be Hugely 
Harmful to the LGBT Community, PAC. STANDARD  (Jan. 9, 2019), https://psmag.c 
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Evidence suggests that  food and nutrition assistance is often still 
needed even when an individual is employed full time.160  In 
addition, more state demonstrations might provide better insights on 
how to provide states flexibility and other administrative supports 
necessary to meet their constituents’ food security and employment 
needs through administering SNAP, among other safety net 
programs.  Future research could also focus on how to develop, 
implement, and scale up more effective and efficient employment 
and training activities aiming to provide more than basic job 
searching tips and target developing marketable skills.161   
 
C.  Benefit Adequacy, Issuance & Redemption  
 
i.  Benefit Adequacy  
 
The 2018 Farm Bill did not significantly alter benefit 
adequacy or issuance, with the exception of establishing an interstate 
data system to prevent the simultaneous issuance of SNAP benefits 
to an individual by more than one state.162  Fortunately, the 2018 
Farm Bill did not eliminate the minimum SNAP benefit proposed in 
President Trump’s 2018 budget.163  But bipartisan support was not 
secured for the Closing the Meal Gap Act that aimed to revise the 
requirements for calculating SNAP benefits using the Low-Cost 
Food Plan instead of the Thrifty Food Plan.164 A SNAP benefit 
allotment is calculated by multiplying an individual’s or household’s 
net monthly income by 0.3 and then subtracting the result from the 
 
om/economics/the-implementation-of-snap-work-requirements-could-be-hugely-
harmful-to-the-lgbt-community (discusses how there is limited data available to 
understand potentially harmful impacts of stricter work requirements to the LGBT 
community). 
160 Sarah Bowen, et al., How Real Families Use Food Stamps: Our Research Shows 
Why It’s Counterproductive to Increase Work Rules, POLITICO, (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/04/25/food-assistance-programs-snap 
-funding-000894 (finding among 100 families studied in North Carolina that even 
when participants worked full time for usually low wages, food stamps often helped 
ensure all household members remained food secure). 
161 USDA FNS SNAP E and T Pilots, DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Aug. 24, 
2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/usda-fns-snap-e-and-t-pilots. 
162 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong § 4011 (2017-2018); 
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3042, 115th Cong. § 4019 (2018).  
163 OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS. FISCAL YEAR 2018 
10, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-20 
18-BUD.pdf. 
164 Closing the Meal Gap Act of 2017, H.R. 1276, 115th Cong. (2017-2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1276. 
164                    JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY     [Vol.15 
maximum monthly allotment for an individual or household size.165  
Allotments are different in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the US Virgin 
Islands.166  According to a 2006 USDA report, the Thrifty Food Plan 
is the basis for SNAP benefit allotments and aims to provide a 
“representative healthful and minimal cost meal plan that shows how 
a nutritious diet may be achieved with limited resources.”167  This 
2006 report updated the 1999 version of the Thrifty Food Plan.168  
The USDA also puts forth three other plans at different costs known 
as: Low-Cost, Moderate-Cost, and Liberal Food.169  On a monthly 
basis, the USDA provides weekly and monthly costs for each of the 
four food plans.170  While Closing the Meal Gap was not supported, 
the 2018 Farm Bill requires the USDA Secretary to re-evaluate and 
publish the Thrifty Food Plan every five years based on dietary 
guidance, food prices, food composition data, and consumption 
patterns.171  Recently, the Closing the Meal Gap Act was 
reintroduced in the House (H.R. 1368) to amend the Food and 
Nutrition Act of 2008 to require SNAP benefits be based on the Low 
Cost Food Plan.172  In the Senate, a bill (S.677) proposes to amend 
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to provide for participation of 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands in SNAP (instead of NAP, a block grant 
program explained earlier), which will enable equitable  nutrition 
 




167 See ANDREA CARLSON ET AL., THRIFTY FOOD PLAN, 2996, CNPP-19, CTR. ON 
BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES i (2007), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/f 
iles/usda_food_plans_cost_of_food/TFP2006Report.pdf (explains how the 2006 
Thrifty Food Plan is based on the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans as well as 
the 2005 MyPyramid Food Guidance System, uses the prices low-income people 
paid for many foods, uses the latest data on food consumption, nutrient content, and 
food prices, the 2001-2002 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey and 
the 2001-2002 Food Price Database, and offers a more realistic reflection of the time 
available for food preparation). 
168 Id. at ES-1; THE THRIFTY FOOD PLAN, 1999: ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, CNPP-7, 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y & PROMOTION (1999),  
https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/usda_food_plans_cost_of_food/Food
Plans1999ThriftyFoodPlanAdminReport.pdf. 
169 THE LOW-COST, MODERATE COST, AND LIBERAL FOOD PLANS: 2003 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, CNPP-13, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y 
& PROMOTION (2003), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/usda_food_pla 
ns_cost_of_food/FoodPlans2003AdminReport.pdf. 
170 USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y 
& PROMOTION https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/USDAFoodPlansCostofFood/reports 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2019). 
171 Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4002, 132 Stat. 
4490, 4624 (2018). 
172 Closing the Meal Gap Act of 2019, H.R. 1368, 116th Cong. (2019-2020). 
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assistance for SNAP eligible individuals and households living in US 
territories.173  A legal battle is underway against the USDA, among 
other federal agencies, regarding “policies awarding lower federal 
benefits to US citizens who reside in Puerto Rico than to similarly 
situated and equally needy US citizens residing in any of the 50 states 
of the US.”174  The plaintiffs seek an injunction and declaration that 
these federal laws violate their right to equal protection guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment.175  At the state level, starting March 1, 
2019, Maine enacted a working families supplement benefit that was 
authorized by the Maine State Legislature in 2011 and is funded 
through TANF that will more than triple benefits from $15 to $50 per 
month for approximately 13,000 working families receiving SNAP 
benefits.176 
 
A 2013 Institute of Medicine (IOM) examination of the 
evidence to define SNAP benefit adequacy concluded it is possible 
to develop a definition of allotment adequacy that factors in cost-time 
trade-offs involved in procuring and preparing a safe and nutritious 
diet, geographic price variations, and access to retail food outlets.177  
The IOM report also found the assumptions regarding a SNAP 
participant’s time built into the Thrifty Food Plan are “inconsistent 
with the time available for most households at all income levels, 
particularly those with a single working head.”178  Similarly, the ERS 
determined more attention is needed on how best to balance program 
costs with benefit adequacy and to make appropriate adjustments for 
geographic variations in food and beverage prices; cost variations 
associated with nutrient requirements of household members of 
varying life stages; and the costs of time spent in food preparation 
built into the dated Thrifty Food Plan.179  A 2018 analysis found the 
SNAP benefit does not cover the cost of a low-income meal in 
ninety-nine percent of US continental counties and the District of 
Columbia and suggested Congress consider strategies to better align 
 
173  Equitable Nutrition Assistance for the Territories Act of 2019, S. 677, 116th 
Cong. (2019-2020). 
174 Martinez v. Azar, No. 3:18-cv-01206, 2018 WL 1795786, at *2 (D. P.R. Apr. 13, 
2018); see also Martinez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191 (D. P.R. Apr. 15, 2019) 
(explaining how the complaint barely survived a motion to dismiss). 
175 Martinez, 2018 WL 1795786, at *6.  
176 News Release, Me. Dep’t Health & Hum. Serv., Maine DHHS Takes Steps to 
Support Working Families, (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/press-
release.shtml?id=1100668. 
177COMM. ON EXAMINATION ADEQUACY FOOD RES. & SNAP ALLOTMENTS, ET AL., 
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE TO 
DEFINE BENEFIT ADEQUACY 4 (Julie A. Caswell & Ann L. Yaktine, eds. 2013). 
178 Id. 
179 OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at iv. 
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the maximum SNAP benefit with county-level meal costs.180  
Another recent study determined that SNAP benefits may be 
insufficient to support eating patterns recommended by the Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans.181  Increasing SNAP benefits resulted in 
increased food expenditures, decreased levels of food insecurity, and 
modest improvements in dietary quality among school-aged children 
participating in a Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children 
demonstration.182  Similarly, increases in SNAP benefits following 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) 
were associated with increased food expenditures and decreased 
levels of food insecurity.183  Recently, the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities conducted a review of the literature on SNAP 
benefit adequacy and found families in high-cost areas find it 
especially difficult to afford a healthy diet.184  Thus, more timely and 
sufficient legislative attention is needed towards defining, 
calculating, and providing adequate SNAP benefits.  This work 
includes improving the evidence base for how minimum wage laws, 
among other improvements in the social safety net, supports impact 
SNAP benefit adequacy.   
 
ii.  Benefit Issuance  
 
Aside from benefit adequacy, further work is needed to 
explore how state authority to make decisions about the timing and 
frequency of benefit issuance impact SNAP participants.  Currently, 
households participating in SNAP receive benefits once monthly,185 
 
180 ELAINE WAXMAN ET AL., HOW FAR DO SNAP BENEFITS FALL SHORT OF 
COVERING THE COST OF A MEAL? 6, URB. INST. (2018),  https://www.urban.org/resea 
rch/publication/how-far-do-snap-benefits-fall-short-covering-cost-meal. 
181 Kranti Mulik & Lindsey Haynes-Maslow, The Affordability of MyPlate: An 
Analysis of SNAP Benefits and the Actual Cost of Eating According to the Dietary 
Guidelines, 49 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 623, 623 (2017). 
182 Ann M. Collins & Jacob A. Klerman, Improving Nutrition by Increasing 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Benefits, 52 AM. J. PREV. MED. S179, 
S181 (2017). 
183 MARK NORD & MARK PRELL, FOOD SECURITY IMPROVED FOLLOWING THE 2009 
ARRA INCREASE IN SNAP BENEFITS iii, ERR-116, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. 
SERV.  (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44839. 
184 Steven Carlson, More Adequate SNAP Benefits Would Help Millions of 
Participants Better Afford Food (July, 30 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/foo 
d-assistance/more-adequate-snap-benefits-would-help-millions-of-participants-bett 
er. 
185 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) When Are Benefits 
Available?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usd 
a.gov/snap/snap-monthly-benefit-issuance-schedule. 
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and most benefits are spent within two weeks of receipt.186  Research 
consistently shows that early exhaustion of benefits leads to food 
insecurity at the end of the SNAP benefit month.187  This monthly 
cycle of food insecurity has been called the “SNAP nutrition cycle,” 
and is linked to a host of negative health and societal outcomes, 
including reduced caloric intake and diet quality, increased hospital 
admissions for hypoglycemia, lower standardized test scores, and 
increased crime.188  More frequent issuance (e.g., distributing 
benefits every two weeks) could potentially help SNAP participants 
smooth consumption and reduce the severity of food insecurity 
experienced at the end of the month.189  In 2006, a proposal in 
Michigan aimed to do just this,190 but was halted by language in the 
2008 Farm Bill, which makes it infeasible for states to issue benefits 
more frequently than once per month absent an act of Congress.191  
By contrast, states have authority to decide when, during the course 
of the month, individual households receive their benefits.192  
Currently, there is substantial variation across states regarding 
benefit issuance.193  In seven states, all SNAP participants receive 
their benefits on a single day of the month (single-day issuance); in 
another seven states, SNAP participants receive their monthly 
benefits spread over three to seven different days; and in the 
 
186 Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), CTR. ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,  https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-the-
supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated June 25, 2019). 
187 K.S. Hamrick & M. Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns Over the 
Benefit Month: A Time Use Perspective, 11 PLOS One e0158422 (2016). 
188 C. Cotti, J. Gordanier, & O. Ozturk, When Does It Count? The Timing of Food 
Stamp Receipt and Educational Performance, 66 ECONOMICS EDUC. REV. 40-50 
(2018). 
189 A. Ammerman, T. Hartman, & M.M. DeMarco, Behavioral Economics and the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Making the Healthy Choice the Easy 
Choice, 52 AM J. PREV. MED. S145-S150 (2017); Tommy Tobin, Semi-Monthly 
Benefit Transfers Are A Simple Way to Improve Food Stamps, FORBES (Apr. 23, 
2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommytobin/2018/04/23/fixing-food-stamps-
for-families/#6ad45bc638d7. 
190 Id.; Changing the Monthly Food Stamp Cycle, U.S. FOOD POLICY (May 13, 2006), 
http://usfoodpolicy.blogspot.com/2006/05/changing-monthly-food-stamp-cycle.ht 
ml. 
191 Sec. 7. Issuance and Use of Program Benefits, (g) Alternative Benefit Delivery, 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234), https://www.agric 
ulture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/110-246%20-
%20Food,%20Conservation,%20And%20Energy%20Act%20Of%202008.pdf. 
192 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) When Are Benefits 
Available?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.us 
da.gov/snap/snap-monthly-benefit-issuance-schedule (last updated Apr. 23, 2014). 
193 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Monthly Issuance Schedule 
for All States and Territories, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Monthly-Issuance-Schedule-
All-States.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).  
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remaining thirty-six states, benefits are received on eight to twenty-
eight different days each month (each beneficiary is assigned a day 
usually by case number or last name).194  But these state issuance 
schedules continue to evolve.195  Some research suggests that 
issuance schedules affect retailer behaviors, with retailers operating 
in states with single-day or short issuance schedules increasing prices 
or targeting advertisements during the first week of the benefit 
month.196  For example, one study found in-store sugar-sweetened 
beverage marketing was 4.35 times higher during SNAP issuance 
compared with non-issuance days in census tracts with high SNAP 
enrollment.197  Shutdown implications on issuance are discussed in 
 
194 Id. 
195 Kel Dansby, Expect Changes in SNAP Issue Dates Beginning July (May 31, 
2019), https://www.8newsnow.com/news/local-news/expect-changes-in-snap-issue 
-dates-beginning-july/ (explaining how in the beginning of July 2019, the State of 
Nevada Division of Welfare and Supportive Services will spread out the issue date 
to the first 10 days of the month determined by the last digit of the recipient’s birth 
year); see also Jessica E. Todd & Christian A. Gregory, ERS’s SNAP Distribution 
Schedule Database Allows for New Research on Program Impacts, USDA ERS 
AMBER WAVES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2019/augu 
st/ers-s-snap-distribution-schedule-database-allows-for-new-research-on-program-
impacts/. 
196 E. Castellari, C. Cotti, J. Gordanier, & O. Ozturk, Does the Timing of Food Stamp 
Distribution Matter? A Panel-Data Analysis of Monthly Purchasing Patterns of US 
Households, 26 HEALTH ECON. 1380-1393 (2017); Justine S. Hasting & Ebonya L. 
Washington, The First of the Month Effect: Consumer Behavior and Store 
Responses (2008), NBER Working Paper No. 14578, https://www.nber.org/papers 
/w14578; L.A. Gennetian, R. Seshardi, N.D. Hess, A.N. Winn, & R.M. George, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefit Cycles and Student 
Disciplinary Infractions, 90 SOC. SER. REV. 403-433 (2016); P.E. Wilde & C.K. 
Ranney, The Monthly Food Stamp Cycle: Shopping Frequency and Food Intake 
Decisions in an Endogenous Switching Regression Framework, 82 AM. J. AG. ECON. 
200-213 (2000); J.M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the 
Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 303-325 (2005); J.E. Todd, Revisiting 
the Supplementation Nutrition Assistance Program Cycle of Food Intake: 
Investigating Heterogeneity, Diet Quality, and a Large Boost in Benefit Amounts, 
37 APPLIED ECON. PERSPECTIVES & POL’Y 437-458 (2015); E.D. Whiteman, B.W. 
Chrisinger, & A. Hillier, Diet Quality Over the Monthly Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Cycle, 55 AM J. PREV. MED. 205-212 (2018); K.S. Hamrick & 
M. Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns Over the Benefit Month: A Time 
Use Perspective, 11 PLOS ONE e0158422 (2016); M.A. Kuhn, Who Feels the 
Calorie Crunch and When? The Impact of School Meals on Cyclical Food 
Insecurity, 166 J. PUB. ECON. 27-38 (2018); N. Sanjeevi & J. Freeland-Graves, 
Monthly Variations in Dietary Intake of Women Participating in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, 119 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 261-271 (2019); H.K. 
Seligman, A.F. Bolger, D. Guzman, A. Lopez, & K. Bibbins-Domingo, Exhaustion 
of Food Budgets at Month’s End and Hospital Admissions for Hypoglycemia, 33 
HEALTH AFF. (Milwood) 116-123 (2014). 
197 A.J. Moran, A. Musicus, M.T. Gorski Findling, I.F. Brissette, A.A. Lowenfels, 
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the appropriations section.  More research is needed to better inform 
federal and state policy and programmatic decisions regarding 
benefit issuance, along with how best to work with retailers and 
participants to maximize benefit utilization that preserves SNAP’s 
mission to promote food security and improve nutrition.   
 
iii.  Benefit Redemption  
 
Unlike benefit adequacy and issuance, recent legislative 
actions have explored approaches to modernizing the redemption of 
SNAP benefits, particularly at farmers’ markets, restaurants, and 
through online delivery198  and during the summer months when 
child(ren) are not participating in school-based child nutrition 
assistance programs.  Indeed, more than seven thousand farmers’ 
markets and direct-marketing farmers are now SNAP authorized and 
$22.4 million (less than 0.1%) of SNAP benefits were redeemed at 
direct-marketing farmers or farmers’ markets in fiscal year 2017.199  
USDA reported SNAP redemptions at farmers’ markets increased 
from $2.7 million in fiscal year 2008 to more than $19 million in 
fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of about 620 percent and, since 
fiscal year 2008, the number of farmers’ markets authorized to accept 
SNAP increased by 587 percent.200  Community Supported 
Agriculture (CSAs) is another possible innovative mode now eligible 
to help connect local farmers with SNAP participants.201  This is 
tremendous given SNAP participants could potentially improve 
access to and consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables and these 
purchases help farmers.202   
 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Benefit Issuance in New York, 55 AM 
J. PREV. MED. 55-62 (2018). 
198 Parke Wilde & Mehreen Ismail, Beyond the Farm in the Farm Bill: What 
Nutrition Professionals Need to Know about the Nutrition Title, 52 NUTR. TODAY 
273, 277 (2017). 
199 UNITED STATES DEP’T AGRIC., COMPARISON OF SNAP AUTHORIZED FARMERS 
AND MARKETS FY2012 AND FY2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/fil 
es/snap/SNAP-Farmers-Markets-Redemptions.pdf. 
200 Dennis Pillion, Increased Food Stamp Use at Alabama Farmers Markets Puts 
Healthy Food On Tables, Officials Say, ALABAMA (Jul. 21, 2015), https://www.al.co 
m/news/index.ssf/2015/07/food_stamps_at_farmers_markets.html. 
201 UNITED STATES DEP’T. AGRIC., OPERATING A CSA AND SNAP PARTICIPATION, 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/CSA.pdf. 
202 D.A. Freedman et al., Systematic Review of Factors Influencing Farmers’ Market 
Use Overall and Among Low-Income Populations, 116 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. NUTR. 
1136, 1151 (2016); H.M. Black et al., Improving Fruit and Vegetable Consumption: 
Use of Farm-to-Consumer Venues Among US Adults, 8 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. 1, 2 
(2011); R.C. Woodruff et al., Urban Farmers Markets as a Strategy to Increase 
Access to and Consumption of Fresh Vegetables Among SNAP and Non-SNAP 
Participants: Results from an Evaluation, 8 J. AGRIC. FOOD SYSTEMS & COMM. DEV. 
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The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) requires 
authorized SNAP retailers to pay for their own electronic benefit 
transfer (EBT) equipment but provided an exception for eligible 
farmers’ markets and direct-marketing farmers, among others.203  In 
addition, appropriations were authorized to allow the USDA to 
provide EBT equipment to eligible markets and farmers.204  
Unfortunately, on July 14, 2018, the FNS Administrator responded 
to news that a major provider of mobile EBT technology for farmers’ 
markets would be discontinuing this service and outlined a variety of 
strategies available to ensure markets and farmers have the 
equipment needed to continue to process SNAP transactions.205  FNS 
recently increased the cost for markets to accept EBT and now 
requires each farmers’ market location to obtain its own EBT 
authorization number and machine, even if multiple locations are 
operated by a single organization.206  The 2018 Farm Bill only made 
modest adjustments to EBT system rules including temporarily 
banning the switching and routing of fees and easing of EBT 
authorization processes for farmers’ markets serving multiple 
locations.207  In other words, the 2018 Farm Bill allows farmers’ 
market vendors to use a single device to accept SNAP EBT at 
multiple farmers’ market locations.  The current regulations require 
one device per location.  Fortunately, a financial tech company 
provided a two million dollar lifeline to ensure continuance of EBT 
cards at farmers’ markets and the company is exploring how to 
ensure the appropriate technology is in place to enable vendors to use 
one device at multiple locations, which should lower costs and 
reduce administrative burdens.208  Farmers’ market vendors are also 
 
93, 101 (2018); A.M. Buttenheim et al., Increasing Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program/Electronic Benefit Transfer Sales at Farmers’ Markets with 
Vendor-Operated Wireless Point-of-Sale Terminals, 112 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 636, 
641 (2012); Brenda Robles et al., Dietary Behaviors Among Public Health Center 
Clients with Electronic Benefit Transfer Access at Farmers’ Markets, 117 J. ACAD. 
NUTR. DIET. 58, 65 (2017). 
203 H.R. 2642, 113th Cong (2014) (enacted). 
204 Id. 
205 USDA Statement on SNAP Access at Farmers Markets, Release No. FNS 0005-
18, UNITED STATES DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2018/fns-0005-18. 
206 UNITED STATES DEP’T. AGRIC., INFORMATION ABOUT FARMERS MARKETS AND 
DIRECT MARKETING FARMERS PARTICIPATION IN SNAP, https://fns-prod.azureedge.n 
et/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Farmers-Market-FAQs.pdf; Policy Priorities 
Request that FNS Revise its “One Site, One Permit, One Machine” Policy, FARMERS 
MARKET COALITION, https://farmersmarketcoalition.org/advocacy/snap/ (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2019).  
207 H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4006 (2018) (enacted). 
208 Jane Block, Tech Company Comes to the Rescue of Food Stamp Benefits at 
Farmers Markets, WA. POST (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes 
2019]      DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION      171 
 
 
expecting additional support through the Local Agriculture Market 
Program (LAMP), which was created in the 2018 Farm Bill and 
provides $50 million annually in permanent, mandatory funding.209  
LAMP aims to improve coordination for local and regional food 
systems funding across agencies and streamlines certain existing 
programs by putting them under one umbrella such as the Farmers 
Market and Local Food Promotion Program (FMLFPP) and Value-
Added Producer Grants (VAPG).210 
 
Restaurants’ redemption is evolving.  Back in 1971, in 
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States, the US 
Supreme Court determined the Secretary of Agriculture acted within 
his scope of authority granted under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 in 
denying the applicant fast food restaurant request to participate as a 
“retail food store” in the Food Stamp Program and only approved 
grocery establishments which stock a large number of low-cost 
staples.211  In the Food Stamp Act of 1977, states were granted 
flexibility to authorize certain restaurants as SNAP retailers to enable 
SNAP redemption for homeless, elderly, and/or disabled.212  If states 
elected to operate a Restaurant Meals Program for certain eligible 
SNAP participants, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) 
established requirements for plans and reports to help monitor the 
program’s effectiveness and integrity.213  California, Arizona, and 
Rhode Island, among others, have well developed Restaurant Meal 






209 A Closer Look at the 2018 Farm Bill: Local Agriculture Market Program, NAT’L 
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Jan. 22, 2019), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/2 
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Cir. 1971). 
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https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/09/using-snap-benefits-for-fast-
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Fast Food restaurants Accept EBT, LOW INCOME RELIEF (Feb. 18, 2017), 
https://lowincomerelief.com/fast-food-restaurants-ebt/; William Lipovsky, First 
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the List, FIRST QUARTER FINANCE (Mar. 21, 2019), https://firstquarterfinance.com/w 
hat-fast-food-places-take-ebt-food-stamps-snap/. 
213 H.R. 2642, supra note 203. 
214 Cynthia Hsu, Food Stamps Accepted in Restaurants in AZ, CA, FL, MI, FINDLAW 
(Sept. 8, 2011), https://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2011/09/food-stamps-for-
restaurants-accepted-in-az-ca-fl-mi.html; Restaurant Meals Program, CAL. DEP’T 
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Meal Program using a state SNAP website is not always 
straightforward and even if a state does participate in the program, 
identifying which restaurants are authorized could be difficult.215  
Similarly, using the USDA retailer website to determine if a 
restaurant participates can be challenging.216  Little is known about 
the health impacts of this SNAP redemption option. 
 
An emerging redemption innovation being explored is the 
Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer for Children (SEBTC) 
demonstration to study the use of SNAP and the USDA 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC) electronic benefits transfer to provide assistance to 
low-income children during the summer.217  In a recent 
demonstration project, SEBTC provided certain households with 
additional resources during the summer months when they were not 
participating in school meal programs such as the USDA National 
School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program.218  The 2010 
Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L.111-80) authorized and 
provided funding for the USDA to implement and rigorously 
evaluate demonstrations to reduce summer food insecurity for 
children.219  The SEBTC demonstration project findings indicate the 
benefit of $60 per month per child reduced the most severe category 
of food insecurity among children during the summer by one-third 
and receiving either a $30 or $60 monthly were both associated with 
higher fruit and vegetable consumption.220  The 2018 Farm Bill did 
not address the use of SNAP to provide additional benefits during the 
summer but future legislative action might occur as the Child 
Nutrition Reauthorization processes get underway. 
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216 Id.  
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Congress has taken steady legislative actions to explore the 
use of online delivery among SNAP participants, given one-third of 
SNAP participants use someone else’s car, walk, bike or use public 
transit to grocery shop.221  The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-
79) mandated Online Purchasing Pilots to test the feasibility of online 
transactions using SNAP benefits.222  FNS recently requested public 
comments about the evaluation planned for the two-year online 
transaction pilots taking place with the following retail food outlets 
(in the following states): Amazon (Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York), FreshDirect (New York), Safeway (Maryland, Oregon, 
Washington), ShopRite (Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania), Hy-
Vee, Inc. (Iowa), Hart’s Local Grocers (New York), and Dash’s 
Market (New York).223  These pilots, among other studies, can help 
better understand the challenges and motivators to successfully 
implementing an online delivery option for SNAP eligible 
individuals and families.224  The 2018 Farm Bill directs the USDA 
Secretary to authorize the use of mobile technologies for the purpose 
of accessing SNAP benefits, after conducting no more than five 
demonstration projects to pilot such technologies.225  Put another 
way, the 2018 Farm Bill requires nationwide implementation of 
 
221 Michele Ver Ploeg et al., Where Do Americans Usually Shop for Food and How 
Do They Travel To Get There? Initial Findings from the National Household Food 
Acquisition and Purchase Survey, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS, (Mar. 2015) 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=79791. 
222 H.R. 2642, supra note 203. 
223 Agency Information Collection Activities: Evaluation of Technology 
Modernization for SNAP Benefit Redemption 
Through Online Transactions for the USDA Food and Nutrition Service, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 36515, 36515 (July 30, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-07-
30/pdf/2018-16220.pdf (request for comments); USDA Announces Retailer 
Volunteers for SNAP Online Purchasing Pilot, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2017/01/05/usda-announces-retailer-vo 
lunteers-snap-online-purchasing-pilot (indicating the pilot retailers and the 
locations of each retailer); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
Online Purchasing Pilot, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns 
.usda.gov/snap/online-purchasing-pilot (last updated June 27, 2019) (indicating the 
pilot retailers and their locations). 
224 See e.g. Olivia Martinez, Barbara Tagliaferro, Noemi Rodriguez, Jessica Athens, 
Courtney Abrams, & Brian Elbel, EBT Payment for Online Grocery Orders: A 
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Barriers to and Motivators for Its Use, 50 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 396, 396 (2018) 
(examining “uptake of the pilot program and its impact on SNAP recipients’ food 
purchases” and concluding that “[e]lectronic Benefit Transfer for online grocery 
purchases has the potential to increase food access among SNAP beneficiaries,” but 
“[u]nderstanding online food shopping barriers and motivators is critical to the 
success of policies targeting the online expansion of SNAP benefits”). 
225 Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4006(e), 132 Stat. 
4490, 4635–4636 (2018). 
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online acceptance for SNAP benefits after the pilots required in the 
2014 Farm Bill are implemented.226  On April 18, 2019, participants 
in the two-year test (pilot) in New York State were the first ever to 
select and pay for their groceries online; eventually, the other pilots 
will get underway.227  Recent analyses have raised concern about the 
data privacy requirements set out in the pilot’s Request for 
Volunteers might not sufficiently safeguard against predatory 
marketing practices tailored at an already disadvantaged 
population.228  Therefore, permitting online transactions might help 
ensure home bound SNAP participants or those with limited 
transportation options have modernized redemption alternatives; 
however, much remains before nationwide implementation.  
 
Another redemption development is the recent legal battle 
over whether SNAP redemption data at the retailer level (online or 
brick or mortar) is confidential business information;229 recently 
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch stayed a lower court’s order 
requiring the disclosure of how much money retail food outlets earn 
from SNAP transactions230 until the plaintiff, Argus Leader, 
responds to the Food Marketing Institute’s request to appeal to the 
US Supreme Court.231  On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court heard 
oral arguments and, based on the Justices questions, most Justices 
appear to be leaning towards maintaining the existing standard, 
centering on the competitive harm that could result from expanding 
the types of traditional confidential business information that could 
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the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2012(o)(1)) is amended by striking ‘or 
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WL 6427347 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2018) (detailing how the Texas Retailers 
Association asked a Federal judge in Texas for an injunction to block the USDA 
from releasing the SNAP redemption data of its members). 
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be accessed through potential Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
(P.L. 89-487) requests.232  On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court held 
that commercial information submitted to the federal government 
qualifies as “confidential” under FOIA’s Exemption 4 when, at a 
minimum, it is “actually” and “customarily” “kept private” and the 
federal government provides assurances that the information will be 
maintained in confidence.233  Thus, more attention is needed to 
explore  innovative administrative data linkages and public-private 
partnerships around retail transactional data that protect SNAP 
participants’ privacy and SNAP authorized retailers’ propriety 
information while enabling a better understanding of SNAP 
participants’ purchasing patterns.   
 
D.  Appropriations 
 
i.  Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018 
 
Agriculture and related agencies’ appropriations for fiscal 
years 2017 and 2018 provided about $74 billion to SNAP in required 
mandatory spending plus a reserve fund for any unexpected 
participation increases.234  These appropriations are about four 
billion dollars below the fiscal year 2016 level and more than two 
million dollars below the President’s budget request.235  These 
budget cuts reflect declining enrollment, decreasing food costs, 
eliminating connections between the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program and SNAP, and budget cuts laid out in the 2012 
Farm Bill that put additional cost burdens on SNAP authorized 
retailers and state governments.236 
 
232 SCOTUS Hears Oral Arguments in FMI SNAP Data Case, PROGRESSIVE GROCER 
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://progressivegrocer.com/scotus-hears-oral-arguments-fmi-
snap-data-case; Ryan McCrimmon, SCOTUS Leans Towards Allowing USDA to 
Keep SNAP Data Secret, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news 
letters/morning-agriculture/2019/04/23/scotus-leans-toward-allowing-usda-to-
keep-snap-data-secret-594316. 
233 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, No. 18–481, slip op. (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf. 
234 JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45128, AGRICULTURE AND RELATED 
AGENCIES: FY2018 APPROPRIATIONS 13 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45128 
.pdf ($78,480.7 millions in 2017 and $73,610.0 millions in 2018). 
235 See id. (demonstrating that Congress appropriated $80,849.4 millions in 2016 
and $73,610.0 millions in 2018 but that the Administration requested $73,612.5 
millions). 
236 Dottie Rosenbaum, Ed Bolen, Elizabeth Wolkomir, Brynne Keith-Jennings, 
Lexin Cai, & Catlin Nchako, Administration’s 2018 Budget Would Severely Weaken 
and Cut the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/administrations-2018-
budget-would-severely-weaken-and-cut-the-supplemental. 
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ii.  Fiscal Year 2019 Including the Historic Government 
Shutdown 
 
For fiscal year 2019, the House and Senate provided 
appropriation bills in May 2018 and the House passed the four-bill 
minibus spending package, H.R. 6147(115) on September 26, 2018 
that needed and did not secure President Trump’s signature.237  For 
SNAP, H.R. 6147 provided $73.2 billion in required mandatory 
spending plus a reserve fund, which is $794 million below last year’s 
level and similar to the President’s budget request.238  Continuing 
resolutions kept USDA, among other government agencies, 
operating until December 20, 2018.239  Starting December 21, 2018, 
the government was partially closed for a record-long thirty-five days 
due to a conflict with Congress regarding the lack of funding of the 
US-Mexico border wall.240  In the first days of the 116th Congress, 
House Democrats passed legislation to reopen the government that 
put forth six of the seven remaining appropriations bills.241  To 
separate the border dispute from the shutdown, the House Democrats 
proposed funding the Department of Homeland Security through 
February 8, 2019 without funding allocated to the border wall.242  But 
Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell indicated the 
Republican-controlled Senate will only vote on a bill the President 
 
237 AGRICULTURE AND RELATED AGENCIES: FY2019 APPROPRIATIONS (2018), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180803_R45230_6b5c7527c99479ec92fe
d651f1f7af970e6e00fb.pdf. 
238 See id. at 13 (showing that the Administration requested $73,218.3 million and 
that the House and Senate approved $73, 219.3 million for SNAP in FY2019). 
239 See Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 115-298, 
132 Stat. 4382 (2018) (amending Pub. L. 115-245 to extend such appropriations 
until December 21, 2018); Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human 
Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, 132 Stat. 2981 (2018) (making such appropriations 
until December 6, 2018).  
240 See Appropriations Watch: FY 2019, COMMITTEE RESP. FED. BUDGET, 
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/appropriations-watch-fy-2019 (“On January 25, a three-
week continuing resolution was enacted to reopen the government after a 35-day 
partial government shutdown, the longest in American history.”). 
241 See Julie Grace Brufke, House Votes on 10th Bill to Reopen Government, THE 
HILL (Jan. 23, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/426666-house-passes-
eighth-bill-to-reopen-government (“The House passed a Democratic-backed 
package of six appropriations bills Wednesday that would fund the government 
through the end of the fiscal year.”). 
242 See id. (“[T]he chamber would then vote on a three-week continuing resolution 
(CR) to fund the rest of the government through Feb. 8 . . . The president has asserted 
he won’t sign legislation that doesn’t provide border wall funding while Democratic 
leaders have called on Trump to reopen the government before they negotiate on 
how to address securing the border.”). 
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will support.243  The President showed no sign of supporting any 
legislation that did not allocate funding for a border wall.244  
Ultimately, a three week short-term continuing resolution was passed 
to end the longest government shutdown.245  
 
The inability to timely finalize fiscal year 2019 Agricultural 
Appropriations resulted in unprecedented logistical challenges for 
SNAP benefit issuance.246  During the historic thirty-five day partial 
government shutdown, February SNAP benefits were issued by most 
states at the end of January; specifically January 20th.247  That is, 
 
243 Jordain Carney, McConnell Blocks House Bills to Reopen Government, THE HILL 
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/425414-mcconnell-blocks-
house-bill-to-reopen-government-for-second-time. 
244 See id. (“Roughly a quarter of the government has been shut down since Dec. 22 
over an entrenched fight on funding for Trump’s proposed wall on the U.S.-Mexico 
border wall . . . [T]he president walked out of a White House meeting last week 
when Pelosi told him that Democrats would not consider border wall funding even 
if he fully reopened the government.”). 
245 See Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 116-5, 
133 Stat. 10 (2018) (amending Pub. L. 115-245 to extend appropriations until 
February 15, 2019); Grace Segers, Trump Signs Bill to Reopen Government for 3 




246 Peter Wade, The Shutdown’s Next Victims Are America’s Poorest Families: Food 
Stamps, Housing Assistance, and Tax Refunds Are All at Risk (Jan. 6 2019), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/shutdown-affects-poor-familie 
s-775446/; Government Shutdown Puts the Public’s Health at Risk: Potential for 
Harm Increases as Impasse Continues, AMERICAN PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Jan. 10, 
2019), https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-releases/apha-news-releases/2 
019/government-shutdown-statements; Bryce Gray, Grocers Eye Government 
Shutdown’s Impact on SNAP Disbursements with Caution, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/grocers-eye-
government-shutdown-s-impact-on-snap-disbursements-with/article_e7d7e900-
1975-5f2c-a9b2-ac7d8c6ff8d1.html; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Food Stamps for 
Millions of Americans Become Pawn in Shutdown Fight, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/07/food-stamps-government-shutdown-
1062090; Tal Axelrod, Shutdown May Jeopardize Tax Refunds, Food Stamps: 
Report, THE HILL (Jan. 4, 2019),  https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/42 
3988-shutdown-may-jeopardize-tax-refunds-food-stamps-report. 
247 FNS Contingency Plan For Shutdown Due to a Lapse in Appropriations, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. (Jan. 2018), https://www.usda.gov/sites 
/default/files/documents/usda-fns-shutdown-plan.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., USDA Announces Plan to Protect SNAP Participants’ Access to SNAP in 
February (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/01/08/us 
da-announces-plan-protect-snap-participants-access-snap-february;  Helena 
Bottemiller Evich, White House Reverses Course on Food Stamp Funding, POLITICO 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/08/usda-funds-february-
snap-benefits-1069641; Jory Heckman, USDA Buys Time for SNAP Under 
Shutdown – But for How Long?, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 19, 2019), 
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some SNAP participants received February benefits more than a 
month early.248  As a result, SNAP-authorized retailers scrambled to 
meet increased demand, and about one percent of retailers who were 
not able to renew their SNAP authorization prior to the shutdown 
were not able to accept SNAP benefits until reauthorized.249  This 
 
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/government-shutdown/2019/01/usda-buys-time-
for-snap-under-shutdown-but-for-how-long/; Jeff Stein, Trump Team Promises 
Shutdown Won’t Stop Food Stamp Payments in February, Says Program Lacks 




2a5; Beth McEnoy, NBS News Center Maine, Gov. Mills Calls for End to Shutdown, 
Issues SNAP Benefits a Month Early, NEWS CTR. ME. (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/gov-mills-calls-for-end-to-shutdo 
wn-issues-snap-benefits-a-month-early/97-ce148830-6b4d-4550-aa69-5de38fc02c 
21; Impact of the Federal Government Shutdown on SNAP: What You Need to 
Know!, N.M. CTR. ON LAW AND POVERTY, http://nmpovertylaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/shutdown-and-snap-2019-01-14.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019); Government Shutdown Threatens the National Emergency for Millions of 
Hungry Households,  FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CTR., http://frac.org/news/gove 
rnment-shutdown-threatens-national-emergency-for-millions-of-hungry-household 
s-2 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); S.E. Smith, Government Shutdown Threatens 
Section 8 and Food Stamps, TRUTHOUT.ORG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://truthout.org/art 
icles/government-shutdown-threatens-section-8-and-food-stamps/;  Roberto 
Ferdman, How the Government Shutdown Hurt Millions of People on Food Stamps, 
VICE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/mbzady/how-the-
government-shutdown-hurt-millions-of-people-on-food-stamps; Ellyn Ferguson, 
States Scramble to Get February Food Stamps Out Amid Shutdown, ROLL CALL 
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/states-scramble-to-get-
february-food-stamps-out; Helena Bottemiller Evich, States Warn Food Stamp 
Recipients to Budget Early Benefit Payments Due to Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/15/state-food-stamp-benefits-shutd 
own-2491182; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Billions in Food Stamp Payments to Come 
Early Because of Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/sto 
ry/2019/01/11/shutdown-food-stamp-scramble-benifits-1081210. 
248 Joe Davidson, USDA’s SNAP Decision Means There Will Be a Gap in Food 
Assistance Program, WA. POST (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/p 
olitics/2019/02/01/oh-snap-shutdown-leads-gap-food-assistance-program/; Jeanne 
Kuang, February Food Stamps to Come Early Amid Government Shutdown, March 
Funding Uncertain, DEL. ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.delawareonline.com 
/story/news/2019/01/15/february-food-stamps-come-early-amid-government-shutd 
own/2580389002/; Joy Burton, Food Security Still An Issue Despite Government 
Reopening, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.idsnews.com/article/ 
2019/01/food-insecurity-still-an-issue-despite-government-reopening?eType=Ema 
ilBlastContent&eId=ac87bad2-4755-4f85-9bda-378ca5937cf3; Bobby Allyn, Food 
Stamp Crisis Looming in Pa. Because of Government Shutdown, WHYY.ORG (Jan. 
24, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/food-stamp-crisis-looming-in-pa-because-of-
government-shutdown-says-state-data/; Lisa L. Colangelo, Advocates Warn of 
‘SNAP Gap’ Following Government Shutdown, AMNEWYORK (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.amny.com/news/snap-government-shutdown-1.26947428. 
249 Jossie Carbonare, York County Grocery Store Unable to Process Food Stamps 
Due to Government Shutdown, FOX 43 (Jan. 16, 2019), https://fox43.com/2019/01/ 
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change in distribution or the “SNAP Gap” may provide some insight 
into the role of issuance in early exhaustion of benefits and related 
health outcomes.250  For example, in Vermont, which normally issues 
benefits to all households on the first of the month, February benefits 
came nearly two weeks early.251  On January 3rd, the average SNAP 
household in Vermont had a balance of $145; on February 3rd, it was 
only $88.252  Although it is too soon to evaluate the effects of this 
shift on participant outcomes, there are anecdotal reports of 
households running out of money weeks before receiving March 
benefits and reports of spikes in food pantry utilization.253  
 
The continuing resolution enabled the USDA to issue March 
benefits, which in most states occurred earlier than usual.254  While 
 
16/york-county-grocery-store-unable-to-process-food-stamps-due-to-government-
shutdown/; Laura Santhanam, Many Families and Stores Rely on SNAP Benefits. 
The Shutdown May Pinch Them Both, PBS (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/n 
ewshour/health/many-families-and-stores-rely-on-snap-benefits-the-shutdown-
may-pinch-them-both; Michael Chen, More Shutdown Fallout: Some Retailers Now 




250 Savannah Eadens, Government Shutdown Over, But Food-Stamp Recipients Will 
Feel Effects for Awhile, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://chicago.sunti 
mes.com/working/government-shutdown-over-but-food-stamp-recipients-will-feel-
effect-for-awhile/; Jennifer Mobilia, Advocates Distribute Food to Help Food Stamp 
Recipients Bridget ‘SNAP gap’, WHEC (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.whec.com/n 
ews/advocates-distribute-food-to-help-food-stamp-recipients-bridge-snap-gap/525 
0637/. 
251 Tiffany Tan & Bennington Banner, Vermont to Issue February Food Benefits 
Early Due to Shutdown, BENNINGTON BANNER (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.benning 
tonbanner.com/stories/vermont-to-issue-february-food-benefits-early-due-to-shutd 
own,561583. 
252 Tina Rosenberg, When It’s Hard to Make Ends Meet, Can Smart Apps Help?, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/navigat 
ing-bureaucracy-try-technology.html. 
253Id.; Mackenzie Huck, Some People Will Receive March SNAP Benefits Early, 
1011 NOW (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.1011now.com/content/news/Some-people-
will-receive-March-SNAP-benefits-early-505754131.html. 
254 Dottie Rosenbaum, SNAP Can Cover Full Benefits Through March, But 
Participants Face Big Gaps Between February and March Benefits, CTR. ON 
BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/snap-
can-cover-full-benefits-through-march-but-participants-face-big-gaps-between-feb 
ruary-and; Eric Russell, Mills Administration Will Increase Supplemental Food 
Stamp Benefit For Working Mainers, PRESS HERALD (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/02/20/mills-adminstration-will-increase-supple 
mental-food-stamp-benefit-for-working-mainers/; Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Illinois 
Food Stamp Recipients Will Get March Benefits Early to Ease Gaps Caused by 
Government Shutdown, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.chicagotri 
bune.com/business/ct-biz-food-stamps-march-benefits-illinois-20190213-story.htm 
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the status of April benefits and beyond was unclear until the 
agricultural appropriations were finally finalized, it was speculated 
that the USDA could use a similar approach as used in February, or 
some states could use their own budget to issue SNAP benefits, 
among other approaches.255  To ensure a reasonable continuation of 
benefits during a government shutdown, there are possible grounds 
for legal action by participants and state agencies, given the unique 
funding provisions of this entitlement program.256  Namely, Section 
5(a) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 gives eligible individuals 
and households a legal right to continued SNAP benefits and the only 
exception is that Section 18 allows Congress to pass an appropriation 
that is insufficient to fund full benefits, which does not apply when 
Congress has passed no appropriation for SNAP.257  States could 
potentially sue the USDA “for reimbursement of the administrative 
costs necessary to continue issuing SNAP benefits.”258  Thus, 
additional work is needed to understand the legal and policy 
implications of a government shutdown, as well as the USDA 
contingency plans for an entitlement program—but not an “essential 
 
l; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Most States Plan to Move Up Food Stamp Payments 
Due to Lingering Shutdown Pain, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.politico.c 
om/story/2019/02/15/states-move-up-snap-payments-shutdown-1180074; SNAP 
March Issuance, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-March-Issuance.pdf. 
255 Dottie Rosenbaum, USDA to Fund SNAP for February 2019, But Millions Face 
Cuts if Shutdown Continues, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/millions-face-cut-in-snap-food-
assistance-if-government-shutdown-continues; Travis Anderson, Antihunger 
Groups Tell Governor Baker to Craft “Disaster Plan” for Emergency Food 
Requests Amid Shutdown, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 16, 2019),  https://www.bostonglob 
e.com/metro/2019/01/16/anti-hunger-groups-gov-baker-craft-disaster-plan-for-eme 
rgency-food-requests-amid-shutdown/PFpOlBW72fsGcScQuA4b4M/story.html; 
Jillian Jorgensen & Marco Poggio, De Blasio Warns of ‘Full-Blown Crisis’ for New 
Yorkers on Food Stamps If Shutdown Continues, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019),  
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-deblasio-food-stamps-crisis-
shutdown-20190117-story.html; EOA Staff, Maryland Ensures Residents to 
Receive SNAP Benefits Despite Federal Shutdown, EYE ON ANNAPOLIS (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.eyeonannapolis.net/2019/01/maryland-ensures-residents-to-rec 
eive-snap-benefits-despite-federal-shutdown/. 
256 David A. Super, Continuing SNAP in a Government Shutdown, GEORGETOWN 
LAW (Jan. 9, 2019) https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ 
SNAP-Govt-Shutdown-Memo-Jan-2019.pdf; Tom Temin, USDA Says SNAP Can 
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service”—affecting food security and financial stability of more than 
forty million individuals and families each month.259   
 
Aside from SNAP benefits, USDA supported SNAP 
activities, such as SNAP-Ed or SNAP relevant research, were halted 
during the historically long shutdown.260  The shutdown also resulted 
in unpaid federal workers and contractors, among others, who had 
not been paid for almost two bimonthly pay dates that could 
potentially have been eligible for SNAP, among other federal food 
and nutrition assistance programs.261  This strain was particularly 
pronounced among Native American tribes, where federal 
employment is high and the Food Distribution Program on Indian 
Reservations (FDPIR), an alternative federal food and nutrition 
assistance program to SNAP, was disrupted.262  Moreover, these 
furloughed workers were tapping into the charitable food system that 
many SNAP participants or SNAP-eligible families depend on 
 
259 Emily Victor, Local Leaders Want Congress to Consider Food Stamps 
‘Essential’ During Shutdowns, WRAL.COM, https://www.wral.com/local-leaders-
want-congress-to-consider-food-stamps-essential-during-shutdowns/18184352/ 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019).  
260 Jeffrey Mervis, End of U.S. Shutdown Won’t Mean Return to Business As Usual 
For Research Agencies, SCIENCEMAG.ORG (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.sciencemag. 
org/news/2019/01/end-us-shutdown-won-t-mean-return-business-usual-research-
agencies. 
261 Stephanie Ebbs & Anne Flaherty, During Shutdown, Janitors, Security Guards, 
and Other Federal Contractors Receive No Back Pay, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/US/shutdown-janitors-security-
guards-federal-contractors-receive-back/story?id=60116026; Lisa Lerer, For Some, 
the Shutdown Isn’t About Politics. It’s About Bills and Groceries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/politics/on-politics-government-
shutdown-contractors.html; Lauren Egan, After Criticism He’s ‘Totally Tone Deaf’, 
Wilbur Ross Walks Back Furloughed Worker Comments, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-commerce-secretary-
i-don-t-understand-why-furloughed-workers-n962246; Jackie Prager, Children 
Impacted by Government Shutdown Qualify for New York Free School Meals 
Program, WBNG.COM (Jan. 24, 2019), https://wbng.com/news/local-news/2019/0 
1/24/children-impacted-by-government-shutdown-qualify-for-new-york-free-
school-meals-program/; Dillon Mullan, Lee County Schools Offer Help to Families 
Affected by Government Shutdown, DAILY JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.djournal.com/news/lee-county-wants-furloughed-gov-workers-to-ap 
ply-for-free/article_8f5b128d-069c-53f6-9458-da4a24771d3e.html?eType=EmailB 
lastContent&eId=ac87bad2-4755-4f85-9bda-378ca5937cf3; Jacqueline Howard, 
What an Ongoing Government Shutdown Could Mean for School Lunches, CNN 
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/24/health/government-shutdown-
school-lunch-bn/index.html. 
262 Mitch Smith & Julie Turkewitz, Shutdown Leaves Food, Medicine, and Pay in 
Doubt in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201 
9/01/01/us/native-american-government-shutdown.html. 
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regularly.263  Several unique charitable offers emerged during the 
shutdown to help provide food assistance to those affected by the 
shutdown.264  These ramifications to SNAP and the charitable food 
network are important considerations in understanding the short and 
long term implications of a government shutdown.  There are also 
intriguing short- and long-term knowledge gaps about the food 
security, health, and financial impacts this thirty-five-day shutdown 
had on furloughed workers, among others whose salary and business 
stability are closely tied to affected governmental entities.265 
 
Ultimately, four months into the fiscal year and after the 
historic shutdown, 2019 Agricultural Appropriations bill (H.J.Res.31 
(116)) was passed and appropriated about $73.5 billion dollars in 
mandatory funding to SNAP.266  As we’ll discuss in various sections 
 
263 Ian Stewart, As Shutdown Continues, Thousands of Federal Workers Visit D.C.-
Area Pop-Up Food Banks, NPR (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/13 
/684824384/as-shutdown-continues-thousands-of-federal-workers-visit-d-c-area-
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z65mQwh3qPdJ8MD25xNAbhZKRMoUKii_aktUmklmlCHEY; Patrick Madden, 
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Make Ends Meet, DCIST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://dcist.com/story/19/01/16/its-
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Claudia Boyd-Barrett, Food Banks Brace Themselves for Influx of Hungry People 
Amid Shutdown, CAL. HEALTH REPORT (Jan. 14, 2019),  https://www.calhealthrepo 
rt.org/2019/01/14/food-banks-brace-influx-hungry-people-amid-shutdown/; 2019 
Government Shutdown Operations FAQ, FEEDING AMERICA (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.feedingamerica.org/take-action/advocate/2019-Government-
Shutdown. 
264 Rachel Kurzius, 20,000 Free Pies Later, One of the Highest Profile Shutdown 
Deals Ends Before the Shutdown Does, DCIST (Jan. 23, 2019), https://dcist.com/sto 
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before-the-shutdown-does/; Tim Carman, Americans Across the Country are 
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(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/food/wp/2019/01/23/amer 
icans-across-the-country-are-helping-feed-federal-workers-as-the-shutdown-enters 
-its-second-month/?utm_term=.184d6fbf2aaa; Andrea Diaz, Chef Jose Andres will 
Serve Free Meals Daily to Furloughed Federal Workers in Washington, CNN (Jan. 
23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/15/us/chef-jose-andres-feeding-federal-
workers-shutdown-trnd/index.html; Lori McCue, Kraft – Yes, That Kraft – Is 
Opening A Pop-Up Grocery Store in D.C. for Furloughed Feds this Week, DCIST 
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://dcist.com/story/19/01/15/kraft-yes-that-kraft-is-opening-a-
pop-up-grocery-store-in-d-c-for-furloughed-feds-this-week/. 
265 Bruce Japsen, Health Risks Rise As Shutdown Hits Second Month, FORBES (Jan. 
21, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2019/01/21/as-shutdown-ente 
rs-second-month-public-health-risks-rise/#351094c4652a. 
266 Division A – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019, Congressional Directives: 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, supra note 136, at 29. 
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of this review, this appropriations bill, along with accompanying 
Congressional Directives, included a number of SNAP relevant 
mandates and funding priorities. 
 
iii.  Fiscal Year 2020 
  
The shutdown delayed the fiscal year 2020 appropriations 
process but it is moving forward in the House and the Senate.267  As 
explained further under Disaster Assistance, Congress first focused 
on finalizing a contentious disaster aid package.  Then, attention 
turned to lifting caps on the fiscal year 2020 budget set out in the 
2011 Budget Control Act  (P.L. 112-25) since there was no bicameral 
approved budget for fiscal year 2020 to guide the appropriations 
process.268  This two-year budget deal to increase budget caps (P.L. 
116-37) was critical since without one sequestration would have 
occurred in fiscal year 2020 for both defense and non-defense 
programs to meet the caps set out in the 2011 Budget Control Act.269  
The House Appropriations Committee has put forth target funding 
levels for each of the twelve fiscal year 2020 funding bills, including 
a proposed $71.1 billion in required mandatory spending for 
SNAP.270  The Senate Appropriations Committee has been 
conducting a series of hearings regarding fiscal year 2020 
appropriations.271  Another partial government shutdown is possible 
 
267 Overview of the Federal Budget Process, PRESERVATION ACTION, 
https://preservationaction.org/this-is-a-general-overview-of-the-federal-budget-pro 
cess-for-a-single-fiscal-year-october-1-through-september-30-fall-federal-agencies 
-develop-and-submit-draft-budgets-to-the-office-of-management-an/ (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2019). 
268 The United States House Committee on the Budget, Issue Brief: The Devastating 
Consequences of the 2020 and 2021 Budget Caps (Apr. 2, 2019), https://budget.hou 
se.gov/publications/report/devastating-consequences-2020-and-2021-budget-caps; 
see also Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019, P.L. 116-37, 116th Congress (2019-2020). 
269 The United States House Committee on the Budget, Issue Brief: The Devastating 
Consequences of the 2020 and 2021 Budget Caps (Apr. 2, 2019), https://budget.hous 
e.gov/publications/report/devastating-consequences-2020-and-2021-budget-caps. 
270 The United States House Committee on Appropriations, Chairwoman Lowey 
Statement at Full Committee Markup of FY 2020 302 (b) Subcommittee Allocations 
(May 8, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/news/statements/chairwoman-low 
ey-statement-at-full-committee-markup-of-fy-2020-302b-subcommittee; see also 
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations, 
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Agricultural-Rural 




271 The United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings (lists a variety of hearings to review 
the fiscal year 2020 budget requests of various federal departments and agencies); 
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as Congress works to finalize spending bills for fifteen agencies after 
its August recess.  
 
iv.  Congressional Agricultural Appropriation Summary  
 
Therefore, the agricultural appropriations and appropriation 
processes, particularly the historic fiscal year 2019 and the now 
delayed fiscal year 2020 appropriations process, have significant 
impacts on SNAP at the federal, tribal, state, and local administrative 
levels, on retailers, the charitable food network, and on those actively 
participating, eligible to participate, or who may become eligible as 
a result of not getting paid during a government shutdown.   
 
E.  Oversight 
 
Congressional oversight is derived from the implied powers 
of the US Constitution and, when conducted in a bipartisan manner, 
can be an effective strategy for maintaining the separation of 
powers.272  There is not much to report regarding the 115th Congress’ 
SNAP oversight responsibilities.  A record number of hearings 
reviewing SNAP were held over the course of the 114th Congress, 
totaling 60 witnesses in 16 hearings and a report was published 
synthesizing the findings.273  Congressional letters of inquiry have 
also been submitted to the USDA regarding the proposed agency 
moves discussed in the Trump administration section of this article.  
The 116th Congress has started to hold hearings relevant to SNAP, 
such as the House Agriculture hearing noted earlier focused on the 
implications of eliminating broad-based categorical eligibility and a 
few others which we will discuss in the Trump administration 





see also Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2020, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Y
ear+2020 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
272 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); ALISSA 
M. DOLAN ET AL., CRS., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 24 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30 
240.pdf (“Oversight and investigative authority is implied from Article I of the 
Constitution and rests with the House of Representatives and Senate.”). 
273 Past, Present, and Future of SNAP, AGNET WEST (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://agnetwest.com/past-present-future-snap/. 




F.  Strengthening SNAP’s Nutrition Impacts 
 
While not extensively during the 115th session, Congress has 
been exploring additional, more direct ways to strengthen SNAP’s 
impact on dietary quality and health; specifically, through restricting 
product eligibility, incentivizing fruit and vegetable purchases, 
enhancing minimum stocking requirements for authorized SNAP 
retailers, and supporting nutrition education and promotion through 
SNAP-Ed. 
 
i.  Restricting Product Eligibility 
 
Although the 115th Congress held a hearing focused on the 
pros and cons of restricting SNAP purchases in the initial weeks of 
their session, the 2018 Farm Bill did not put forth any provisions to 
restrict SNAP purchases.274  Historically, foods and beverages are 
eligible for purchase with SNAP benefits except alcoholic beverages 
and tobacco and hot foods or foods intended to be eaten in the store, 
except by individuals who cannot cook for themselves.275  States, 
most notably New York and Maine, have submitted unsuccessful 
waiver requests to the USDA to examine the feasibility of restricting 
the use of SNAP benefits,276 particularly sugar-sweetened beverages 
which research suggests about “20 cents out of every dollar are spent 
 
274 Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Pros and Cons of Restricting SNAP Purchases, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/pros-and-cons-
of-restricting-snap-purchases/. 
275 Determining Product Eligibility for Purchase with SNAP Benefits, U.S. DEP’T. 
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Jan. 26, 2010), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/d 
efault/files/eligibility.pdf. 
276A Proposal to Create a Demonstration Project in New York City to Modify 
Allowable Purchases Under the Federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, FOOD POLITICS, https://foodpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/Healthy-
NY-Allowable-SNAP-Purchase-Detailed-Proposal-2010-SNAPfinal-2_.doc (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2019); Patrick McGeehan, Ban on Using Food Stamps to Buy Soda 
Rejected by USDA, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/0 
8/20/nyregion/ban-on-using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html; M.C. 
Mayhew, Letter to Bonnie Brathwaite Regarding a New Approach for the SNAP-Ed 
Program and Renewal of Soda and Candy Restriction Waiver, MAINE.GOV (Feb. 17, 
2017), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/documents/FNS-Waiver-Request-2-17.pdf; 
Mike Berger, USDA Rejects Maine’s SNAP Petition to Restrict Sugar Drinks, 
Candy, SHELBY REPORT (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.theshelbyreport.com/2018/01/ 
22/usda-rejects-maine-snap-request/; N.E. Negowetti, The SNAP Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverage Debate: Restricting Purchases to Improve Health Outcomes of Low-
Income Americans, 14 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y. 83 (2018). 
186                    JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY     [Vol.15 
on sweetened beverages, desserts, salty snacks, candy, and sugar.”277  
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, among others, have also explored 
legislative options at the state level to restrict SNAP purchases.278  
Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the USDA has 
consistently responded to state SNAP waiver requests, generally 
noting concerns regarding the waivers’ rationale, feasibility, and 
potential effectiveness.279  The USDA published a summary of these 
concerns, which include: no standards exist for defining healthy 
foods and beverages; implementing restrictions would increase 
program complexity and costs; no guarantee restricting the use of 
SNAP would affect food and beverage purchases; and other ways 
exist to encourage healthier purchases without limiting participant 
choice.280   
 
SNAP is the only federal food and nutrition assistance 
program that subsidizes sugar-sweetened beverages, which are 
estimated to account for between $1.7 to $4.2 billion dollars in SNAP 
spending annually.281  A randomized trial of adults who were 
income-eligible but not participating in SNAP found that restricting 
sugar-sweetened beverages, candy, and sweets from purchase in a 
 
277 S. GARASKY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., FOODS 
TYPICALLY PURCHASED BY SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(SNAP) HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/op 
s/SNAPFoodsTypicallyPurchased.pdf. 
278 John Moritz, Arkansas Panel Backs Junk-Food Cutoff for Food-Stamp 
Recipients, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.arkansas 
online.com/news/2017/jan/18/panel-backs-junk-food-cutoff-20170118/?f=news-
politics; John Lyon, Arkansas Panel Rejects Bill to Restrict Food-Stamp Purchases, 
ARK.DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/201 
70208/arkansas-panel-rejects-bill-to-restrict-food-stamp-purchases; Sam Bloch, 
Maine’s Governor Can’t Stop Trying to Limit SNAP Purchases, Nᴇᴡ Fᴏᴏᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍʏ 
(Jan. 23, 2018) https://newfoodeconomy.org/maine-governor-paul-lepage-snap-
purchases-limit/; Florida House Rejects Food Stamp Junk Food Ban, FOOD 
NAVIGATOR USA (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/201 
2/02/24/Florida-House-rejects-food-stamps-junk-food-ban; Patrick McGeehan, 
U.S. Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy Soda, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-on-using-
food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html. 
279 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTING THE 
USE OF FOOD STAMP BENEFITS – SUMMARY (Mar. 1, 2007), https://fns-prod.azureed 
ge.net/sites/default/files/FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf. 
280 Id. 
281 R.L. Franckle, A. Moran, T. Hou, D. Blue, J. Greene, A.N. Thorndike, M. 
Polacsek, & E.B. Rimm, Transactions at a Northeastern Supermarket Chain: 
Differences by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Use, 53 AM. J. PREV. 
MED. e131-e138 (2017); T. Andreyeva, J. Luedicke, K.E. Henderson, & A.S. Tripp, 
Grocery Store Beverage Choices By Participants in Federal Food Assistance and 
Nutrition Programs, 43 AM. J. PREV. MED.. 411-418 (2012). 
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SNAP-like food benefit program led to a reduction in total energy 
intake, but no differences in consumption of added sugars or sugar-
sweetened beverages.282  One simulation study suggested restricting 
SNAP purchases could improve participant diet quality and reduce 
obesity and type 2 diabetes.283  Further, retailers have successfully 
implemented restrictions required of other federal food and nutrition 
assistance programs and for state or local tax requirements.284  But 
these possible nutrition improvements are currently deemed to be at 
the expense of limiting consumer choice and decreasing SNAP 
participation.285  Yet, a qualitative study found SNAP participants 
were supportive of prohibiting the use of SNAP benefits for 
purchasing foods and beverages high in added sugars.286  Another 
consideration is if and how SNAP participants might use their own 
money to purchase the restricted items, especially if they are 
generally inexpensive items.287  However, research has found people 
are less likely to use cash than SNAP to purchase foods and 
beverages.288  Therefore, more work remains to explore the role of 
restrictions and likely the combination of restrictions and incentives 





282 L. Harnack, J.M. Oakes, B. Elbel, T. Beatty, S. Rydell, & S. French, Effects of 
Subsidies and Prohibitions on Nutrition in a Food Benefit Program: A Randomized 
Clinical Trial, 176 J.A.M.A. INTERN. MED. 1610-1618 (2016). 
283 S. Basu et al., Ending SNAP Subsidies for Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Could 
Reduce Obesity and Type 2 Diabetes, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1032-1039 (2014).  
284 J.L. Pomeranz & J.F. Chriqui , The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: 
Analysis of Program Administration and Food Law Definitions, 49 AM. J. PREV. 
MED 428-436 (2015); but see J.E. Todd & M. Ver Ploeg, Restricting Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages from SNAP Purchases Not Likely to Lower Consumption, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON.RESEARCH SERV., (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov 
/amber-waves/2015/march/restricting-sugar-sweetened-beverages-from-snap-purc 
hases-not-likely-to-lower-consumption/. 
285 M.B. Schwartz MB, Moving Beyond the debate Over Restricting Sugary Drinks 
in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 52 AM. J. PREV. MED S199-S205 
(2017). 
286 S.A. Rydell, R.M. Turner, T.A. Lasswell, S.A. French, J.M. Oakes, B. Elbel, & 
L.J. Harnack, Participant Satisfaction with a Food Benefit Program with 
Restrictions and Incentives, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 294-300 (2018). 
287 OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64. 
288 P.E. Wilde, L.M. Troy, & B.L. Rogers, Food Stamps and Food Spending: An 
Engel Function Approach, 91 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 416-430 (2009); T.A. Smith, J.P. 
Berning, X. Yang, G. Colson, and J.H. Dorfman, The Effects of Benefit Timing and 
Income Fungibility on Food Purchasing Decisions Among Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Households, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 564-580 (2016); J.L. 
Hastings & J.M. Shapiro, How Are SNAP Benefits Spent? Evidence From a Retail 
Panel, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 3493-3540 (2018). 
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ii.  Incentivizing Fruit and Vegetable Purchases 
 
Even though Congress has not garnered significant support 
for restrictions on SNAP purchases, there has been growing 
bipartisan support for incentivizing fruit and vegetable purchases 
among SNAP participants, which evidence suggests helps increase 
SNAP participants’ fruit and vegetable purchases.289  An initial 
milestone was in the 2008 Farm Bill, which provided mandatory 
funding for the Healthy Incentives Pilot to test point-of-purchase 
incentives for fruits, vegetables, and other healthful foods.290  The 
final evaluation indicated Healthy Incentives Pilot participants 
consumed almost a quarter of a cup more targeted fruits and 
vegetables per day than did nonparticipants.291  Based on these 
findings, among others, the 2014 Farm Bill provided $100 million in 
mandatory funding over 2014 to 2018 to establish the Food 
Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) grant program.292  FINI is 
 
289 U.S. GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION 
AND FORESTRY, U.S. SENATE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: OPTIONS FOR DELIVERING 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPANTS FOR PURCHASING TARGETED FOODS, GAO-
08-415 1 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08415.pdf; M. PRELL & D. 
SMALLWOOD, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. COMPARING ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
MECHANISMS TO INCREASE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES i (2017), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/83052/eib-170.pdf?v=0; A.J. 
Cohen et al., Increasing Use of a Healthy Food Incentive: A Waiting Room 
Intervention among Low-Income Patients, 52 AM J. PREVENTATIVE. MED. FRUITS 
AND VEGETABLES: ENHANCED FEDERAL EFFORTS TO INCREASE CONSUMPTION COULD 
YIELD HEALTH BENEFITS FOR AMERICANS, 154, 154 (2017); U.S. GAO, GAO-02-
657 (2002), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235241.pdf; C.R. Young et al., 
Improving Fruit and Vegetable Consumption among Low-Income Customers at 
Farmers Markets: Philly Food Bucks, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2011, 10 PREV. 
CHRONIC DIS. E166, E166 (2013); L.E. Olsho et al., Impacts of a Farmers’ Market 
Incentive Programme on Fruit and Vegetable Access, Purchase and Consumption, 
18 PUB. HEALTH NUTR. 2712, 2712 (2015); An R, Effectiveness of Subsidies in 
Promoting Healthy Food Purchases and Consumption: A Review of Field 
Experiments, 16 PUB. HEALTH NUTR. 1215, 1215 (2013).  
290 Food Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 4141 
(2008). 
291 H.R. 2642, supra note 203; U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFFICE 
OF POLICY SUPPORT, EVALUATION OF THE HEALTHY INCENTIVES PILOT (HIP) FINAL 
REPORT – SUMMARY (2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/H 
IP-Final-Summary.pdf; L.E. Olsho et al., Financial Incentives Increase Fruit and 
Vegetable Intake among Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participants: 
A Randomized Controlled Trial of the USDA Healthy Incentives Plot, 104 AM. J. 
CLIN. NUTR. 423, 423, 430 (2016). 
292 FINI Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/FINI-Grant-Program (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); 
Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT. 
INST. FOOD & AGRIC. https://nifa.usda.gov/program/food-insecurity-nutrition-
incentive-fini-grant-program (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); see also KATE 
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administered by the USDA National Institute of Food and 
Agriculture (NIFA) in cooperation with FNS and aims to improve 
dietary quality and health by incentivizing the purchase of fruits and 
vegetables by SNAP participants.293   
 
FINI findings are still emerging but a 2015 report noted 
FINI-funded SNAP produce incentive programs operated in twenty-
seven states in rural and urban communities and at more than nine 
hundred farmers’ markets, more than fifty grocery stores, and more 
than seventy farmer-to-consumer retailers.294  A 2018 qualitative 
evaluation with FINI grantees and key stakeholders found many 
believed FINI was an opportunity for consumers to try new fruits and 
vegetables and “cited that for every $1 spent with SNAP, $1.80 was 
generated in economic growth.”295  Moreover, a randomized 
controlled study of a same-day supermarket double-dollar fruit and 
vegetable incentive program in rural Maine determined that over four 
mouths coupons were redeemed among fifty-three percent of eligible 
baskets and there was greater increases in fruit and vegetable 
spending among SNAP-eligible participants who redeemed coupons 
than among non-SNAP eligible participants who redeemed 
coupons.296  Granted, another study recommended stand-alone 
coupon incentive programs might need complementary strategies to 
build in vegetable preparation skills.297  The 2018 Farm Bill 
increased mandatory commitments to the program up to $250 million 
over five years, made the program permanent, and renamed the 
program to Gus Schumacher Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive 
 
FITZGERALD, VOICES FOR HEALTHY KIDS, SNAP INCENTIVES: SUPPORT LOCAL 
ECONOMICS AND LOCAL HEALTH EFFORTS 2-3, (2017), https://snapincentives.voices 
forhealthykids.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/07/Decision-Maker-Fact-She 
et.pdf (discusses how a SNAP incentive program can increase economic growth and 
help individuals and families reduce food insecurity). 
293 Id. 
294 K. FITZGERALD, FOOD INSECURITY NUTRITION INCENTIVE GRANT PROGRAM 
(FINI): 2015 PROGRAM RESULTS, https://fairfoodnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2 
017/03/Consolidated-2015-Report_finaldigital-.pdf. 
295 C.A. PARKS ET AL., GRETCHEN SWANSON CTR. FOR NUTRITION, A QUALITATIVE 
EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S FOOD 
INSECURITY NUTRITION INCENTIVE GRANT PROGRAM 8 (2018), https://static1.squares 
pace.com/static/58a4dda16a49633eac5e02a1/t/5baaa931e5e5f0b78f5d3ae6/15371
1107757/HER+FINI-updated.pdf. 
296 M. Polacsek et al., A Supermarket Double-Dollar Incentive Program Increases 
Purchases of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables among Low-Income Families with 
Children: The Healthy Double Study, 50 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 217, 224–25 
(2018).  
297 M.S. Wetherill et al., SNAP-Based Incentive Programs at Farmers’ Markets: 
Adaptions Considerations for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
Recipients, 49 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 743, 743 (2017).  
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Program (GusNIP) in honor of an integral champion of this program 
who recently passed away.298  In addition, Congress granted the 
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to establish the Produce 
Prescription Program and authorized $4,000,000.00 for each of fiscal 
years 2019 through 2023 (Sec. 4304).  These programs have been 
shown to improve patient-clinician communication around diet and 
contribute to patient consumption of fruits and vegetables.299 The 
GusNIP request for applications was recently announced and 
applications were due in June 2019 for the availability of $ 41 million 
in funding for fiscal year 2019 projects for three subprograms:            
1) SNAP incentives (competitive grants that use point-of-sale fruit 
and vegetable incentives); 2) Produce Prescription Program 
(competitive grants for projects that provide “prescriptions” for fruits 
and vegetables); and 3) Training, Technical Assistance, Evaluation, 
and Information Center (cooperative agreements to establish a center 
to help develop and disseminate best practices).300   
 
For retailer funded incentive programs, the 2018 Farm Bill 
requires the USDA Secretary to issue guidance clarifying the process 
for retailers to seek waivers to offer SNAP consumers incentives for 
purchasing healthy SNAP-eligible staple foods.301  Recently, Giant 
Food’s Pharmacy added fruits and vegetables to its prescription 
options at a store in Washington, DC, which is available to Medicaid 
 
298 The Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4205 (2018). 
299  See Ridberg, et al., A Pediatric Fruit and Vegetable Prescription Program 
Increases Food Security in Low-Income Households, 51 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 227 
(2019) (finding 72% of the 578 low-income families participating in a pediatric, 
clinic-based, fruit/vegetable prescription program increased their food security 
summative score over the course of the program); see also Trapl, et al., Dietary 
Impact of Produce Prescriptions for Patients with Hypertension, 15 PREV. CHRONIC 
DISEASE 138, 138 (2018) (concluding produce prescription program lead to 
significant changes in dietary behavior); see also Joshi, et al., Implementing a 
Produce Prescription Program for Hypertensive Patients in Safety Net Clinics, 20 
HEALTH PROMOTION PRACT. 94, 94 (2018) (concluding that program allows for 
adaptive treatment); see generally H. Swartz, Produce Rx Programs for Diet-Based 
Chronic Disease Prevention, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 960 (2018) (exploring the ethical 
and policy implications of produce prescription programs). 
300 A Closer Look At The 2018 Farm Bill: Gus Schumacher Nutrition Incentive 
Program, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL.,  (Jan. 24, 2019), http://sustainableag 
riculture.net/blog/closer-look-2018-farm-bill-fini/; The Gus Schumacher Nutrition 
Incentive Program: 2019 Request for Applications (RFA), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
NAT’L INST. OF FOOD AND AGRIC. (2019), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa 
/20190423-fy-2019-gus-schumacher-incentive-program-rfa.pdf. 
301 Id. at § 4008; see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Provisions of 
the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 – Informational Memorandum, U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/Farm-Bill-
Information-Memo.pdf (noting contact for discussing challenges faced by States 
implementing Section 4008 – Retail Incentives). 
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recipients and provides a weekly twenty-dollar coupon for buying 
fruits and vegetables.302  More work is needed to understand the 
short- and long-term, multi-sector benefits of these innovative efforts 
to improve the consumption of healthier foods and beverages through 
incentives and prescription programs.  
 
iii.  Combining Restricting Product Eligibility and 
Incentivizing Healthier Purchases 
 
Altogether, a combination of restrictions and incentives 
might be most effective and supported by SNAP participants, among 
other stakeholders.303  That is, a randomized clinical trial reported 
favorable dietary quality changes in the incentives for purchasing 
more fruits and vegetables plus restriction on less nutritious foods 
and beverages condition that were significantly different from 
changes in the control condition.304  Likewise, a recent 
microsimulation study found a combined incentive and disincentive 
program through SNAP resulted in the largest modeled gains in 
health and healthcare savings and was cost-effective, with a lifetime 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of approximately $5,200 per 
quality-adjusted life year.305  Future research and demonstration 
projects could further explore the feasibility and effectiveness of 
using restrictions and incentives to improve the dietary quality and 
health of SNAP participants.  More work is needed to determine how 
best to target incentives to individuals and households that would 
most benefit them.306  Additional work could help determine the 
 
302 Giant Food Announces Produce Rx Program Coming to Washington D.C. Store 
Location (Apr. 18, 2019), CISION PR NEWSWIRE,  https://www.prnewswire.com/ne 
ws-releases/giant-food-announces-produce-rx-program-coming-to-washington-dc-
store-location-300834433.html. 
303 C.W. Leung et al., Support for Policies to Improve the Nutritional Impact of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in California, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1576, 1579 (2015); Cindy W. Leung, Aviva Musicus, Walter C. Willett, & Eric B. 
Rimm, Improving the Nutritional Impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program: Perspectives from the Participants, 52 Aᴍ. J. PREV. MED.  S193, S193, 
S196–97 (2017). 
304 Lisa Harnack et al., Effects of Subsidies and Prohibitions on Nutrition in a Food 
Benefit Program: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 176 J. AM. INTERN. MED. 1610, 1610 
(2016); S.A. Rydell et al., Participant Satisfaction with a Food Benefit Program 
with Restrictions and Incentives, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 294, 294 (2018).  
305 D. Mozaffarian et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Financial Incentives and 
Disincentives for Improving Food Purchases and Health through the US 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Microsimulation Study, 15 
PLOS Mᴇᴅ. E1002661 (2018).  
306 James R. Farmer, Angela Babb, Sara Minard, & Marcia Veldman, Accessing 
Local Foods: Households Using SNAP Double Bucks and Financial Incentives at a 
Midwestern Farmers Market, 8 J. AGRIC. FOOD SYS. & COMM. DEV. 1-13 (2019). 
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optimal incentive amount and mix of eligible foods (e.g., fruits, 
vegetables, whole grains, healthy oils, etc.) that optimize diet quality 
while containing costs.   
 
 iv.  Enhancing Minimum Stocking Standards 
 
Congress granted the USDA the authority to authorize 
SNAP retailers and establish eligibility criteria.307  Over the last 
decade, the number of SNAP authorized retailers grew by fifty 
percent to 250,000, while the demand for food assistance grew 
during the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 and because an increase 
in convenience stores receiving authorization.308  Having SNAP 
authorized stores near communities with eligible SNAP participants 
is essential for promoting food security and nutrition; however, 
research indicates retailers in SNAP eligible communities tend to sell 
less fresh fruits and vegetables, whole grain-rich foods, and low-fat 
dairy products.309  As one example, a study conducted store audits in 
2014 in ninety-one randomly selected, licensed food stores in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota and found only one-third 
stocked one or more varieties of fresh vegetables and only one-
quarter stocked whole-grain-rich products.310  Another study 
assessed a sample of ninety SNAP authorized dollar stores in sixteen 
 
307 Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States, 449 F.2d 255, 256–57 
(5th Cir. 1971); The Food Stamp Act of 1977, H.R. 2649, 95th Cong. § 9 (1977); 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Is My Store Eligible?, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/my-store-
eligible. 
308 Victor Oliveira, Mark Prell, & Laura Tiehen, Eligibility Requirements for SNAP 
Retailers: Balancing Access, Nutrition, and Integrity, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS (Jan. 
25, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/januaryfebruary/eligibility 
-requirements-for-snap-retailers-balancing-access-nutrition-and-integrity/. 
309 HEALTHY EATING RESEARCH, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, MINIMUM 
STOCKING LEVELS AND MARKETING STRATEGIES OF HEALTHFUL FOODS FOR SMALL 
RETAIL FOOD STORES 1–2 (2016), http://healthyeatingresearch.org/wp-content/uplo 
ads/2016/02/her_minimum_stocking_final.pdf; C.E. Caspi et al., Differences in 
Healthy Food Supply and Stocking Practices Between Small Grocery Stores, Gas-
Marts, Pharmacies and Dollar Stores, 19 PUB. HEALTH & NUTR. 540, 540 (2016); 
E.F. Racine et al., Accessibility Landscapes of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program-Authorized Stores, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 836, 836 (2018).; C. Lorts, 
Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Dietary 
Behaviors: Role of Community Food Environment, 119 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 938-
940 (2019). 
310 M.N. Laska et al., Lack of Healthy Food in Small-Size to Mid-Size Retailers 
Participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Minnesota, 2014, 12 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. 15071, 15071 (2015) (stores selected 
did not include retailers participating in WIC that are expected to stock prescribed 
food and beverage items). 
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counties in southern and western sections of North Carolina in 2014 
and found none of these stores sold fresh fruits and vegetables.311   
 
Requiring SNAP authorized retailers to stock certain types 
of foods and beverages might affect a retailer’s interest or ability to 
be authorized and, thereby, limit a participant’s ability to redeem 
SNAP benefits or participate at all.312  Even so, the USDA requires 
WIC authorized retailers stock certain food and beverage items and 
these changes have been successfully implemented in retailers across 
the nation without much disruption to retailer or participant 
participation in the program and has had significant impacts on 
dietary quality of mothers and infants participating in WIC.313  
Informed by these findings, the Agricultural Act of 2014 required the 
USDA to update the stocking standards for authorized SNAP 
retailers, which only required a store to “sell food for home 
preparation and consumption and offer for sale at least three different 
varieties of food in each of the following four staple food groups, 
with perishable foods in at least two categories, on a daily basis: 
breads and grains; dairy; fruits and vegetables; and meat, poultry, and 
fish or at least fifty percent of the total sales (e.g., food, non-food, 
services, etc.) . . . must be from the sale of eligible staple food.”314   
 
The USDA rule making process involved hosting listening 
sessions, calls for public comments, and conducting regulatory 
impact analyses, as well as extensions, delays, and technical 
assistance.315  Ultimately, the staple food requirements put forth in 
 
311 E.R. Racine et al., Availability of Foods and Beverages in Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program-Authorized Dollar Stores in a Region of North Carolina, 116 
J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 1613, 1613, 1616 (2016).  
312 See OLIVEIRA ETAL, supra note 64, at 49–50 (summarizing the legislative debate 
on stocking requirements for SNAP authorized retailers). 
313 7 C.F.R. § 246.1 (2019); see also ANDREYEVA ET AL., RUDD CTR. FOOD POL’Y & 
OBESITY, CHANGES IN ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOODS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
WIC FOOD PACKAGE REVISIONS 3, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/48404/PDF 
(describing significantly increased availability and variety of health foods in subject 
stores). 
314 Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 4002, 128 Stat 649, 782 (2014) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(o)(1) (2019)). 
315 Enhancing Retail Food Store Eligibility—Listening Sessions, 78 Fed. Reg. 
52,899 (Aug. 27, 2013); Request for Information: Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) Enhancing Retail Food Store Eligibility, 78 Fed. Reg. 
64468 (Oct. 29, 2013); Submission for OMB Review: Comment Request, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 43706 (July 28, 2014); Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Clarification of Proposed Rule and Extension 
of Comment Period, 81 Fed. Reg. 65 (Apr. 5, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 7 CFR PARTS 271 ᴀɴᴅ 278: ENHANCING RETAILER 
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the 2016 final rule required authorized stores to meet one of two 
staple food requirements: Criterion A (staple food inventory) or 
Criterion B (staple food sales).316  According to the USDA, “staple 
foods are the basic foods that make up a significant portion of a 
person’s diet and are usually prepared at home and eaten as a meal . 
. . and do not include prepared foods, heated foods, or accessory 
foods.”317  Criterion A “requires a store to stock, on a continuous 
basis, a certain variety and quantity of staple foods in each of the four 
staple food categories, including some perishable staple foods.”318  
The majority of stores are authorized under Criterion A.319  Criterion 
B “requires a store to have more than 50 percent of its total gross 
retail sales from the sale of staple foods.”320  These new, enhanced 
stocking standards emerged despite efforts to weaken them during 
the 2017 and 2018 Agriculture Appropriations Acts and President 
Trump’s calls for regulatory rollbacks and delays, including the 
rollback of the stronger nutrition standards for the USDA National 
School Lunch Program.321   
 
Research indicates these new stocking standards are 
feasible; as one example, a recent study of 57 small stores in four 
states that are SNAP authorized determined these stores are capable 
of stocking healthy products but recommended technical and 
infrastructure support and incentives be offered to retailers.322  
Nevertheless, the fiscal year 2019 Agricultural Appropriations 
prohibited funds be used to “implement, administer, or enforce the 
 
STANDARDS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) 
(2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/RIA-Enhancing-Reta 
iler-Standards.pdf; STAFF OF H. RULES COMM., 115TH CONG., RULES COMMITTEE 
PRINT 115-TEXT OF THE HOUSE AMENDMENT TO SENATE AMENDMENT NUMBERED 1 
TO H.R. 244, THE HONORING INVESTMENTS IN RECRUITING AND EMPLOYING 
AMERICAN VETERANS ACT OF 2017, § 765, at 110.  (Comm. Print 2017) (requiring 
an expansion to the definitions of “staple food” and “variety” as applied to “staple 
food” before the funds made available by the act could be implemented); Final Rule: 
Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), 81 Fed. Reg. 90,675 (Dec. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R §§ 271, 
278).  
316 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (defining “Retail food store”); see also 7 C.F.R. § 278.1 
(providing Criteria A and Criteria B). 
317 What are Staple Foods, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge 
.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Staple-Foods.pdf. 




321 Sara N. Bleich, Food Policy in the Era of Trump – Limits to Deregulation, 113 
Aᴍ. J. PREV. MED. 13, 13 (2018). 
322 A. Karpyn et al., Examining the Feasibility of Healthy Minimum Stocking 
Standards for Small Food Stores, 118 ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 1655, 1655 (2018). 
2019]      DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION      195 
 
 
‘variety’ requirements of the final rule . . . until the Secretary of 
Agriculture amends the definition to increase the number of items 
that qualify as acceptable varieties in each staple food category. . .”323  
On April 5, 2019, the USDA published a proposed rule that would 
provide regulatory flexibility for retailers in SNAP in meeting the 
2016 final rule, by only modifying the definition of the term 
“variety” and thereby permitting “canned spray cheese, beef jerky, 
and pimiento-stuffed olives [to] count as staple foods.”324  More 
research is needed on how the SNAP authorization process and the 
new, enhanced stocking requirements affect SNAP participants’ 
access to SNAP authorized stores, stocked with affordable, healthful 
options and their dietary quality and health, taking into consideration 
the cost-benefit analysis for retailers to participate in the program.  
 
v.  Expanding Access to Foods through a National Healthy 
Food Financing Initiative 
 
Expanding on the success of local and state initiatives, the 
Healthy Food Financing Initiative (HFFI) is an innovative national 
program that works to increase access to retail food outlets in 
communities predominantly characterized as low-income, high 
racial/ethnic minority status, and/or rural which tend to have less 
access to grocery stores and supermarkets in comparison to higher-
income, white, and urban communities.325  During fiscal year 2010 
through fiscal year 2016, the Departments of Agriculture, Health and 
Human Services, and Treasury each administered HFFI projects 
independently and met periodically to share implementation 
strategies and issues.326  In the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-
79, Sec. 4206), the Secretary of Agriculture was given enhanced 
 
323 Sec. 727 of H.J.Res.31 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, https://www.co 
ngress.gov/116/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf. 
324 Providing Regulatory Flexibility for Retailers in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program SNAP, 7 CFR Parts 271 and 278 [FNS-2019-0003] (Apr. 5, 
2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fr-040519; see also Mike Dorning, Spray 
Cheese Would Count as Staple Under Trump Food Stamp Rule, BLOOMBERG (May 
30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-30/spray-cheese-wo 
uld-count-as-staple-under-trump-food-stamp-rule. 
325 Sheila E. Fleischhacker, Rebecca Flournoy, & Latetia V. Moore, Meaningful, 
Measurable, and Manageable Approaches to Evaluating Healthy Food Financing 
Initiatives: An Overview of Resources and Approaches, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. 
PRAC. 541, 541–42 (2013); see also USDA Announces New Partnership to Increase 
Rural Residents’ Access to Healthy Foods,  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL DEV., 
https://www.rd.usda.gov/newsroom/news-release/usda-announces-new-partnership 
-increase-rural-residents%E2%80%99-access-healthy-food (last updated Jan. 13, 
2017) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Agric., New Partnership]. 
326 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NEW PARTNERSHIP, supra note 325. 
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authority and appropriated $125,000,000 to establish HFFI.327  
Currently, HFFI is administered by the Reinvestment Fund on behalf 
of USDA Rural Development.328  In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, 
Congress appropriated one million to launch HFFI at USDA.329  In 
the 2018 Farm Bill (Sec. 12408), slight amendments were made to 
the HFFI established in the 2014 Farm Bill including expanding 
eligible projects beyond retail to include food hubs, mobile markets, 
direct to consumer markets, and food business incubators.330  In total, 
over the last eight years, HFFI has leveraged more than $220 million 
in grants plus more than one billion in additional financing and 
supported nearly one thousand retail food projects in more than 
thirty-five states.331  In Agricultural Appropriations 2019, not less 
than $22,000,000 is available until September 30, 2020 to provide 
financial assistance, technical assistance, training, and outreach to 
community development financial institutions for the purpose of 
offering affordable financing and technical assistance to expand the 
availability of healthy food options in distressed communities.332  In 
both the House (H.R. 1717) and Senate (S.786), bills have been 
reintroduced to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 
establish a new tax credit and grant program to stimulate investment 
and healthy retail options in food deserts.333  More multi-sectoral, 
multi-level research is needed to understand the impacts of federal 






327 Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 4206. 128 Stat. 649, 824 (2014) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6953(d) (2019)). 
328 Healthy Food Financing Initiative, REINVESTMENT FUND, https://www.reinvestm 
ent.com/initiatives/hffi (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
329 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–31, § 767, 131 Stat. 
135, 180 (2017); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44588, AGRICULTURE AND RELATED 
AGENCIES: FY2017 APPROPRIATIONS  45 (2017); Agriculture, Rural Development 
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2018, 
H.R. 3268, 115th Cong. §759 (2017). 
330 Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. §§ 4204; see id. at 
§ 12614 (establishing Food Access Liaison).  
331 Healthy Food Financing Initiative, supra note 328. 
332 Community Development Financial Institutions Fund Program Account (4) of  
H.J.Res.31 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/11 
6/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf. 
333 H.R.1717 – Healthy Food Access for All Americans Act, 116th Congress (2019-
2020); S.786 – Healthy Food Access for All Americans Act, 116th Congress (2019-
2020). 
334 Nicole Larson, Mary Story, & Melissa Nelson, Neighborhood Environments: 
Disparities in Access to Healthy Foods in the US, 36 AM. J. PREV. MED. 74, 74 
(2009). 
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vi.  Supporting Nutrition Education and Promotion 
  
 One final way that Congress could strengthen the nutrition 
impacts of SNAP is to require nutrition education be a mandatory 
part of the program, with adequate appropriations dedicated to 
evaluating the program’s impact on dietary quality and health.335  
Currently, states can participate in SNAP - Education (SNAP-Ed), a 
federally funded grant program, to develop, implement, and evaluate 
nutrition education and promotion, social marketing campaigns, and 
policies, systems, and environmental approaches to improve access 
to healthy eating (e.g., helping develop a new community garden or 
implement the federal local school wellness policy at a school or state 
level).336  However, these efforts only reach roughly about five 
percent of the SNAP population.337  SNAP-Ed has evolved since it 
began in 1988 in Wisconsin and now is being conducted in all fifty 
states with success.338  The estimated SNAP-Ed allocations for fiscal 
year 2019 illustrate the range of support states and US territories 
receive; for example, California is estimated to receive $99,284,451 
and the Virgin Islands is estimated to receive $182,243.339  SNAP-
Ed was significantly transformed during the last Child Nutrition 
Reauthorization process into a formula funded nutrition education 
and obesity prevention grants program that has increasingly 
permitted the integration of efforts to promote active living as 
well.340   
 
335 M. Mueller & E. Kennedy, The US Farm Bill: Opportunities and Challenges, 51 
Nᴜᴛʀ. Tᴏᴅᴀʏ 82, 85 (2016). 
336 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assist 
ance-program-education-snap-ed (last updated June 27, 2019); see also 
Supplemental Nutrition Education Program – Education (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., NAT’L INST. FOOD & AGRIC.,  https://nifa.usda.gov/program/supplemental-n 
utrition-education-program-education-snap-ed (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) 
(providing general overview of the scope of SNAP-ed) [hereinafter USDA, SNAP-
Ed]. 
337 S.N. Bleich et al., U.S. Nutrition Assistance, 2018 – Modifying SNAP to Promote 
Population Health, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1205, 1207 (2017). 
338 USDA, SNAP-Ed, supra note 336. 
339 SNAP-Ed Estimated Allocations for FY 2019, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NAT’L INST. 
FOOD & AGRIC.,  https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2019 
EstimatedAllocations.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
340 The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 
3183, 3227–3234 (2010); see also Nutrition Education and Obesity Prevention 
Grant Program, 81 Fed Reg. 18447, 18447–18448 (Mar. 31, 2016) (codified at 7 
C.F.R § 271) (describing goals and funding apparatus); see also U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 
EDUCATION PLAN GUIDANCE FY 2018 NUTRITION EDUCATION AND OBESITY 
PREVENTION GRANT PROGRAM, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/snap/Guidance/FY2018 
SNAP-EdPlanGuidance.pdf. 
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Over the years, various efforts have examined—with mixed 
success—the impacts of USDA investments in nutrition education 
and promotion.341  As one example, a conference that took place in 
1995 convened a broad range of stakeholders to help chart a course 
for nutrition education and promotion evaluation in USDA food 
assistance programs.342  Another milestone was the development and 
evaluation of Statewide Nutrition Education Networks (1995-1999) 
that found sixty percent of the participating networks achieved their 
stated objectives and were able to leverage more than $20 million in 
non-federal funding and identified additional in-kind contributions 
from non-governmental organizations.343  A 1999 Congressionally 
requested report identified opportunities and barriers to enhance 
USDA’s investment in nutrition education and promotion, including: 
authority and funding levels vary widely by program; state and local 
infrastructures are necessary to deliver integrated, comprehensive 
programs; and the evaluation system for USDA’s nutrition education 
is fragmented and lacks outcome measures.344 A 2000 Food Stamp 
Nutrition Education Report further illustrated the diversity of state 
administrative approaches to the program and in the delivery of 
nutrition education and promotion in addition to the need for stronger 
coordination and systematic reporting systems.345  Another report 
released in 2000 provided “circumstantial evidence” for the 
importance of nutrition education and promotion among Food Stamp 
participants but emphasized the need for additional research.346  
Furthermore, a 2002 Congressionally requested report reiterated the 
 
341 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., CHARTING THE COURSE FOR 
EVALUATION: HOW DO WE MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF NUTRITION EDUCATION AND 
PROMOTION IN FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS? (1997), https://fns-prod.azureedge.ne 
t/sites/default/files/ChartingSummary.pdf.  
342 Id. 
343 RES. TRIANGLE INST. & HEALTH SYS. RES., INC., EVALUATION OF STATEWIDE 
NUTRITION EDUCATION NETWORKS. REPORT PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND NUTRITION OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, 
NUTRITION AND EVALUATION 69 (1999), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defaul 
t/files/NetReport2.pdf. 
344 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS, DIETARY 
INTAKE AND DIETARY ATTITUDES AMONG FOOD STAMP PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER 
LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS (2000), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files 
/FSPDiet_Summary.pdf. 
345 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION IN FNS: A 
COORDINATED APPROACH FOR PROMOTING HEALTHY BEHAVIORS: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/CongressNutEd%282-
2002%29.pdf. 
346  U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION AND 
PROMOTION: THE ROLE OF FNS IN HELPING LOW-INCOME FAMILIES MAKE 
HEALTHIER EATING AND LIFESTYLE CHOICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/NutritionEdRTC.pdf . 
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needs put forth in the 1999 report regarding policy changes and 
funding disparities.347  Then, in 2010, USDA committed to Congress 
to better coordinate nutrition education efforts across its food 
assistance programs.348  A recent 2018 analysis of SNAP-Ed 
 
347 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., ANALYSIS OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EDUCATION (SNAP-ED) DATA FOR ALL STATES 
STUDY (SUMMARY) (2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/SN 
APED-Data-AllStates-Summary.pdf. 
348 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS, 
NUTRITION AND EVALUATION. NUTRITION EDUCATION: PRINCIPLES OF SOUND IMPACT 
EVALUATION (2005), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/EvaluationPr 
inciples.pdf (puts forth the following principles of impact evaluation: 1) make 
certain that the nutrition education intervention can be evaluated; 2) build on 
available research; 3) hold out for research designs with random assignment but use 
them selectively; 4) choose impact measures that fit the intervention and approach 
existing standards for credible assessment; 5) observe standards for the fair 
treatment of study participants; 6) collect impact data after start-up problems get 
resolved but before implementation rolls out; 7) report both positive and negative 
results–but do so accurately; and 8) share results to maximize their value); U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION RESEARCH REVIEW 
(2007), https://www.fns.usda.gov/nutrition-education-research-review-0 (generated 
three different reviews on message framing, use of interactive technology to tailor 
messages, and intervention intensity); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., 
OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS, SNAP EDUCATION AND EVALUATION STUDY (Wᴀᴠᴇ I): FINAL 
REPORT (2012), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/SNAPEdWaveI.pd 
f (evaluated four SNAP-Ed demonstration projects and put forth recommendations 
for SNAP-Ed program implementation and evaluation); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM EDUCATION AND EVALUATION STUDY (Wᴀᴠᴇ II) (2013), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/SNAPEdWaveII.pdf (evaluated three SNAP-
Ed demonstration projects and put forth recommendations for SNAP-Ed program 
implementation and evaluation); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF. 
POL’Y SUPPORT, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING HEALTHY FOOD PURCHASES BY 
SNAP PARTICIPANTS (2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ICF-
IHC-Final-Report-0714.pdf (evaluated possible pilot design approaches for 
promoting healthier purchases); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., 
SNAP-ED CONNECTION: SUCCESS STORIES, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/success-
stories (provides a searchable database of SNAP-Ed success stories); U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SNAP-ED CONNECTION: EDUCATION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING SYSTEM (EARS), https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/program 
-administration/ears-form-training (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (illustrates the form 
designed to provide uniform data and information about the activities of all States 
participating in SNAP-Ed); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SNAP-ED 
CONNECTION: SNAP-ED PLAN GUIDANCE AND TEMPLATES, https://snaped.fns.usda.g 
ov/program-administration/guidance-and-templates (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) 
(provides guidance on how to develop your SNAP-Ed plan); U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL 
CTR. HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION SUPPORTED BY U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., SNAP-ED TOOLKIT, https://snapedtoolkit.org/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) 
(provides resources to help States develop their SNAP-Ed plan and evaluation 
approaches); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., HHFKA 
IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH BRIEF SERIES HHFKA (2016), https://www.fns.usda.g 
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similarly reported a variety of implementing agencies delivering a 
variety of nutrition education and promotion approaches, across a 
variety of settings, and using various reporting metrics.349  Other 
efforts have explored how best to deliver nutrition education and 
promotion through USDA food and nutrition assistance programs 
and how best to evaluate SNAP-Ed at the local, state, tribal, regional, 
and national levels.350  Moreover, the Bipartisan Policy Center 
worked with a SNAP Task Force to develop recommendations to 
leverage federal programs for better health and recommended 
“enhancing technical assistance from the USDA regional offices, 
reducing planning and reporting burdens, restructuring state reports 
to focus on program impact, developing new tools and components, 
and sharing best practices.”351  The Bipartisan Policy Center SNAP 
Task Force also suggested realigning the Expanded Food and 
Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) to better enable this program 
and SNAP-Ed to “work synergistically while avoiding 
duplication.”352  An estimated $100 million over five years was 
suggested to support “pilot comprehensive, multipronged 
interventions that address the core objectives of diet quality, food 
security, and fiscal responsibility.”353  A recent GAO study found the 
USDA lacks information on whether SNAP-Ed is meeting its goals 
and recommended: 1) the Administrator of FNS improve how the 
agency gathers information on the effectiveness of SNAP-Ed 
interventions; 2) the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Under 
Secretaries for Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services and for 
Research, Education, and Economics to develop a formal 
mechanism, such as a designated individual or group of individuals, 
for providing cross-departmental leadership for USDA’s nutrition 
education efforts and facilitating cross-program information sharing; 
and 3) the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Under 
Secretaries for Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services and for 
Research, Education, and Economics to identify and implement 
 
ov/hhfka-implementation-research-brief-series (shares a series of research briefs 
examining best practices in School Food Authorities’ implementation of key 
provisions and their impacts in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, 
including fruits and vegetables, plate waste, sodium, participation, revenue, whole 
grains, smart snacks, and a special view of obesity). 
349 Leading with Nutrition: Leveraging Federal Programs for Better Health: 
Recommendations from the BPC SNAP Task Force, BIPARTISAN POL’Y. CTR. (Mar. 
12, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/leading-with-nutrition-leveraging-
federal-programs-for-better-health/. 
350 Id.  
351 Id.  
352 Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. §§ 4019. 
353 Id. 
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mechanisms to fully leverage the department’s nutrition expertise for 
its nutrition education efforts.354     
 
Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill only made modest 
modifications to SNAP-Ed.  The House proposal to merge SNAP-Ed 
and EFNEP was rejected and instead the 2018 Farm Bill encourages 
better coordination across the two programs, including requiring an 
annual report to Congress detailing the evaluation of the level of 
coordination between SNAP-Ed, EFNEP, and other USDA nutrition 
education programs.355  The 2018 Farm Bill now requires SNAP-Ed 
programs to use an electronic reporting system to measure and 
evaluate projects and account for state administrative costs.356  In 
addition, the 2018 Farm Bill establishes an online information 
clearinghouse to share best practices in planning, implementing, and 
evaluating SNAP-Ed programs.357  The USDA Secretary is required 
to provide technical assistance to state agencies in developing and 
implementing SNAP-Ed plans and state agencies are required to 
submit an annual SNAP-Ed report to the USDA Secretary.358  In the 
2019 Agricultural Appropriations, $433,000,000 was allocated to 
SNAP-Ed.359  The SNAP-Ed Plan Guidance for fiscal year 2020 has 
been posted, which provides policy guidance for states regarding the 
SNAP-Ed operations and estimates funding allocations.360 
 
Taken together, based on USDA’s analyses over the last 
three decades and the recent GAO report, adequately supported 
research and evaluation is needed to better understand the role of 
SNAP-Ed, particularly how the recent transformation of the program 
impacts SNAP participants’ dietary quality and health.  The 2018 
Farm Bill lacked strong Congressional investments into research and 
evaluation that could potentially maximize and better harmonize 
 
354 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-572, NUTRITION EDUCATION: 
USDA ACTIONS NEEDED TO ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS, COORDINATE PROGRAMS, AND 
LEVERAGE EXPERTISE (2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-572. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2019: EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, 
ACCOUNTABLE: AN AMERICAN BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u 
ploads/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf. 
358 Id. 
359 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. SNAP-ED, FY2019 FINAL 
STATE SNAP-ED ALLOCATIONS, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/FY2019SNAP-EdFinalAllocation_3.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 




0_5640af03cf-cb428b769a-709895345 (last visited May 14, 2019). 
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existing benefits in SNAP and SNAP-Ed across all fifty States and 
US territories.  But, the annual reporting on coordination between 
SNAP-Ed and EFNEP could possibly be a foundation for future 
considerations to make nutrition education across the USDA and 
across the federal government more effective and efficient.    
 
IV.  America’s Harvest Box and Other Outside of the 
Box Trump Administration Approaches with 
SNAP Implications  
 
On January 20, 2017, President Donald Trump became the 
45th President of the United States and since that date has put forth a 
variety of executive orders, initiatives, nominations, budget 
proposals, and tweets with SNAP implications (See Table 3).  On 
May 7, 2019, the Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget requested public comment on the consumer 
inflation measures produced by federal statistical agencies, which are 
used to calculate the official definition of poverty used by the Census 
Bureau to estimate the size of our nation’s poor population and used 
to determine eligibility for government benefits including SNAP.361    
 
A.  America’s Harvest Box 
 
The first and most direct proposal from the Trump 
administration to change the nature of SNAP is known as the 
America’s Harvest Box and was put forth in the President’s fiscal 
year 2019 budget.362  Under this proposed approach to support the 
President’s leadership on Buy American, all SNAP participating 
households receiving $90 per month or more in SNAP benefits 
would receive a package of nutritious, one hundred percent US 
grown and produced food and the remainder of the benefits would be 
provided via EBT cards.363  States would be given flexibility in 
distributing these boxes to participants, through “existing 
infrastructure, partnerships, and/or directly to residences through 
 
361 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Request 
for Comment on the Consumer Inflation Measures Produced by Federal Statistical 
Agencies (84 FR 19961) (May 7, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/document 
s/2019/05/07/2019-09106/request-for-comment-on-the-consumer-inflation-measur 
es-produced-by-federal-statistical-agencies; A. Karni, Trump Administration Seeks 




363 USDA America’s Harvest Box, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴛ’ Aɢʀɪᴄ., https://www.agri-
pulse.com/ext/resources/pdfs/Americas-Harvest-Box.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019). 
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commercial and/or retail delivery services.”364  Secretary of 
Agriculture Sonny Perdue believed America’s Harvest Box was “a 
bold, innovative approach to providing nutritious food to people who 
need assistance feeding themselves and their families—and all of it 
is home grown by American farmers and producers.”365  A variety of 
stakeholders criticized the idea, including negative perspectives on 
feasibility and public health impacts based on past and present efforts 
of the USDA with distributing federal commodities.366  Put simply, 
why take fresh produce, meat, and dairy options out of SNAP for a 
much higher logistical cost?367  A recent study found sixty percent of 
the SNAP participants and food-insufficient non-participants 
surveyed opposed the America’s Harvest Box proposal.368  This 
proposal was tabled but effectively stirred up attention to the 
President’s severe budget cuts proposed for SNAP during Farm Bill 
deliberations.369  Then, the concept reappeared in the Trump 
administration’s fiscal year 2020 budget.370  Recent stories discuss 
 
364  E. Goldberg, The US Already Tested Trump’s Canned Goods Idea on Native 
Americans. It was Bad, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.huffington 
post.com/entry/trump-snap-canned-goods-native-americans_us_5a8c403de4b0e1a 
cb11d833a; E. Hunzinger et al., Trump Administration Wants to Decide What Food 
SNAP Recipients Will Get, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesa 
lt/2018/02/12/585130274/trump-administration-wants-to-decide-what-food-snap-
recipients-will-get; M. Hiltzik, Economists Overwhelmingly Agree: Trump’s Food-
Box Idea is Absurd, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-economists-foodstamps-20180305-story.htm;  J. Poppendieck, 
The Trump Budget: Ignoring 75 years of Food Assistance Experience, CUNY 
URBAN FOOD POL’Y INST. (Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.cunyurbanfoodpolicy.org/ne 
ws/2018/2/18/ignoring-75-years-of-food-assistance-experience. 
365 M. Nestle, Trump’s “Blue Apron” Plan for SNAP: Real or Smokescreen?, FOOD 
POLITICS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.foodpolitics.com/2018/02/trumps-blue-
apron-plan-for-snap-real-or-a-smokescreen/. 




368 Cindy W. Leung & Julia A. Wolfson, Perspectives from Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Participants on Improving SNAP Policy, 3.1 HEALTH EQUITY 
81, 82 (2019). 
369 OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, American First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America 
Great Again, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blue 
print.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal Year 2019: Efficient, Effective, 
Accountable: An American Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploa 
ds/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf. 
370 Catherine Boudreau, Farm Bill on the Campaign Trail, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2018/10/19/farm-bill-
on-the-campaign-trail-380089; Arthur Delaney, The Trump Administration Still 
Wants to Put Food Benefits in a Box, HUFFPOST (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-harvest-box-food-assistance_n_5c8691d9e 
4b0d936162a8825; Stephanie Ebbs, Trump’s New Budget Resurrects Controversial 
‘Harvest Box’ Proposal for Food Stamps as Part of Broader Welfare Reform: The 
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the new “Meals to You” program offered through funding by the 
USDA FNS, which offers a box including the equivalent of five 
breakfasts, lunches, and snacks per student delivered to each 
participating student’s door via UPS during the summer months.371 
 
B.  SNAP Budget Cuts  
 
So, what were the proposed SNAP cuts?  Citing projected 
budget deficits, President Trump’s fiscal years 2018, 2019, and now 
2020 budgets consistently proposed massive cuts to SNAP and 
included provisions to reconfigure the program by establishing a 
state match, limit categorical eligibility and the use of waivers that 
exempt able-bodied adults without dependents from work, and 
establish application fees for retailers seeking to participate in 
SNAP.372  The President also ordered all federal agencies to cut 
spending by five percent for fiscal year 2019 and again for fiscal year 
2020.  These proposals are consistent with Trump’s Executive Order 
to reform the welfare system, Medicaid work requirements, and the 
Republican-led 115th House efforts discussed earlier that would 
significantly alter the nation’s safety net, decrease SNAP 
participation, and increase food insecurity among vulnerable 
individuals and households.373  Fortunately, the President proposes 
and Congress disposes and so far the severity of Trump’s proposed 
 
Change to Food Stamps is Part of Several Proposals to Reform Welfare, ABC NEWS 
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-budget-resurrects-harvest-
box-proposal-food-stamps/story?id=61627707. 
371 Shelli Parker, ‘A Hungry Child Can’t Learn’ – Round Table Discussions 
Examines Meal Program, ATHENS DAILY REVIEW (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.athensreview.com/news/a-hungry-child-can-t-learn---round-table/artic 
le_07610d6c-be1a-11e9-8a70-a3c4155d3ffc.html. 
372 OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, American First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America 
Great Again, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blue 
print.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal Year 2019: Efficient, Effective, 
Accountable: An American Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploa 
ds/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, A BUDGET FOR A BETTER AMERICA: PROMISES KEPT. TAXPAYERS FIRST., 
FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads 
/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf. 
373 Executive Order Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and 
Economic Mobility, OFF. WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.g 
ov/presidential-actions/executive-order-reducing-poverty-america-promoting-oppo 
rtunity-economic-mobility/; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., SMD: 18-002 RE: OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE WORK AND 
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AMONG MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf.; 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE EXEC. OFF. PRES. U.S., COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, 
EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE PROGRAMS (2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requi 
rements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf. 
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SNAP cuts have not been implemented for fiscal years 2018 and 
2019.374 Notwithstanding, as explained previously, the fiscal year 
2019 Agricultural Appropriations were part of the longest 
government shutdown in our nation’s history.  The 116th Congress is 
not giving the President’s fiscal year 2020 budget proposal much 
attention, but it does provide signals for where this administration 
stands, including consistent efforts at USDA’s sister agency, the US 
Department of Health and Human Services, to redesign assistance 
programs that focus more on promoting personal responsibility and 
self-sufficiency.375 
 
C.  Disaster Assistance through SNAP 
 
The Trump administration has responded to a variety of 
hurricanes, wild fires, floods, and other natural disasters thus far 
using the USDA’s Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (D-SNAP).376  This program, which has different income 
eligibility requirements than SNAP, provides supplemental nutrition 
assistance similar to SNAP to Americans struggling with the 
aftermaths of a natural disaster.377  Hurricanes Irma and Maria 
ravaged the island of Puerto Rico in the summer of 2017 and 
presented unique challenges for Puerto Rico’s Nutrition Assistance 
Program (NAP).  The unprecedented length and scale of power 
outages and internet connectivity issues hindered the operation of 
EBT, participants’ ability to prepare meals, and safe storage of foods 
and beverages.378  On a positive note, innovative approaches 
 
374 Ebbs, supra note 370. 
375 Id. 
376 Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP), 
DISASTERASSISTANCE.GOV, https://www.disasterassistance.gov/get-assistance/form 
s-of-assistance/5769 (last updated May 3, 2019); Steve Benen, Trump: Puerto Rico 
Disaster Response was ‘An Incredible Unsung Success’, MSNBC (Sept. 11, 2018), 
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trump-puerto-rico-disaster-response-
was-incredible-unsung-success; Avery Anapol, Houston Chronicle: Trump 
Ridiculed Hurricane Victims Instead of Helping, HILL (June 11, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/media/391708-houston-chronicle-trump-ridiculed-
hurricane-victims-instead-of-helping; Kendra Pierre-Louis, Trump’s Misleading 
Claims About California’s Fire ‘Mismanagement’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/politics/fact-check-trump-california-fire-
tweet.html. 
377 D-SNAP Resources for State Agencies and Partners, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTR. SERV.,   https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/d-snap-resources-state-agencies-and-
partners (last updated Aug. 22, 2013). 
378 N, Kishore et al., Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. 379 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 162-170 (2018); N. Weixel, Trump Officials Allow Puerto Ricans to Use 
Food Stamps for Hot Food, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
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emerged to “Feed an Island”; specifically, Chef Jose Andres, in 
collaboration with thousands of volunteers who made up Chefs for 
Puerto Rico, prepared and delivered more than three million meals 
to every part of the island for months.379  News stories reported the 
national response was often slow, uncoordinated and inadequate.380  
As noted earlier, S.677 has been introduced to enable Puerto Rico 
and other US territories to participate in SNAP and a legal battle is 
underway against the USDA regarding “policies awarding lower 
federal benefits to US citizens who reside in Puerto Rico than to 
similarly situated and equally needy US citizens residing in any of 
the 50 states of the US.”381  The Government of Puerto Rico reached 
out via a video message to President Trump pleading for support of 
the country’s NAP, which has experienced drastic increases in 
applications since Hurricane Maria.382  An estimated 670,000 Puerto 
Rico residents received a twenty-five percent decrease in their SNAP 
benefits for March 2019.383  Supplemental Congressional 
appropriations have helped provide some relief but a recent political 




379 T. Carman, Jose Andres’s Riveting ‘We Fed an Island’ Calls for a Revolution in 




380 B. Weir, 20,000 Pallets of Bottled Water Left Untouched in Storm-Ravaged 
Puerto Rico, CNN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/us/puerto-
rico-bottled-water-dump-weir/index.html; J. Wise, Donations for Puerto Rico 
Hurricane Victims Found Rotting in Parking Lot, THE HILL (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/401360-donations-for-puerto-
rico-hurricane-victims-found-rotting-in; A.D. Fragose, ‘People are Getting 
Desperate’ in Puerto Rico as Federal Response Not Equal to the Crisis, EARTH 
JUSTICE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2017-september/people-are-
getting-desperate-in-puerto-rico-as-federal-response-not-equal-to-the-crisis; 
Snopes, Did Trump Administration Refuse Puerto Rico’s Request to Allow Food 
Stamps to be Used for Hot Meals?, SNOPES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.snopes.com 
/fact-check/puerto-rico-food-stamps/. 
381 Martinez, 2018 WL 1795786, at *2; see also Martinez, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191 
(explaining how the complaint barely survived a motion to dismiss). 
382 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Puerto Rico’s Leaders Slam Trump Administration for 
Opposing Food Assistance Funding, CBS Nᴇᴡꜱ (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/puerto-rican-officials-blast-trump-administration-
for-opposing-bill-to-fund-the-islands-nutritional-program/. 
383 Jeff Stein, More than 670,000 Puerto Rico Residents Have Received Cuts to Food 
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jeopardy.384  Ultimately, on June 6, 2019, a $19.1 billion standalone 
disaster supplemental bill was enacted, which included $643 million 
for food and nutrition assistance in Puerto Rico and Pacific 
territories.385  
 
Altogether, SNAP can play an integral role in working with 
intra- and inter-departmental agencies, multi-jurisdictional agencies, 
and non-governmental organizations such as Red Cross, Feeding 
America, and the Salvation Army to develop standards and strategies 
for ensuring safe and nutritious foods and beverages reach vulnerable 
Americans in an efficient, effective, and consistent manner.386  These 
strategies need to tackle logistical barriers for preparing, storing, 
cooking, and cleaning meals and snacks utilizing traditional best 
practices and emerging technologies, as well as sensitively managing 
the strong emotional ramifications of enduring a natural disaster. 
 
D.  Immigration  
 
President Trump has taken a variety of actions ranging from 
executive orders, budget cuts, and administrative agency initiatives 
that raise concern over immigrant participation in federal food and 
nutrition assistance programs including SNAP.387  The most recent 
explicit action that involved SNAP was a proposed rulemaking 
notice by the Department of Homeland Security that indicates 
immigrants could potentially be denied “lawful permanent 
residency” if they have received certain government benefits 
 
384 Lowey, House Democrats Release Emergency Disaster Appropriations Bill (Jan. 
4, 2019), COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-
releases/lowey-house-democrats-introduce-emergency-disaster-appropriations-bill; 
Lauren Lluveras, A Political Stalemate Over Puerto Rican Aid is Leaving All US 
Disaster Funding in Limbo, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019), http://theconversation. 
com/a-political-stalemate-over-puerto-rican-aid-is-leaving-all-us-disaster-funding-
in-limbo-114498. 
385 Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2019, H.R. 
2157, 116th Congress (2019-2020). 
386 T. Abernathy, Responsibilities of the USDA-Food and Nutrition Service in 
Nutrition Assistance Response to Natural Disasters, 61 J. NUTR. SCI. VITAMIOL. S14 
(2015). 
387 President Trump’s Executive Orders on Immigration and Refugees, CTR. 
MIGRATION STUD., http://cmsny.org/trumps-executive-orders-immigration-refugee 
s/?gclid=CjwKCAjworfdBRA7EiwAKX9HeDr7Dk2m06VsUjcnRpmAV1v0X24
Zy4Q_AS3hao6m-NJalBZdKwqZaxoCK90QAvD_BwE (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019); G. Kaufmann, Why Immigrants in California are Canceling their Food 
Stamps: Confusion and Fear about an Immigration Crackdown are Causing Some 
Families to Avoid Food Banks and Public Assistance Programs, NATION (Mar. 17, 
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-immigrants-in-california-are-cancel 
ing-their-food-stamps/. 
208                    JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY     [Vol.15 
including SNAP or if the government anticipates they may seek 
government benefits in the future.388  Known as the “public charge 
rule,” the Trump administration would significantly expand the 1999 
Interim Field Guidance that defined dependence on government 
assistance as participation in cash assistance or long-term 
institutionalized care.389  An estimated 382,000 people seeking to 
adjust their immigration status could be subjected to the proposed 
rule.390  The sixty-day public comment period closed on December 
10, 2018 and more than 216,000 comments have been submitted.391  
Several anti-hunger organizations, along with local and state social 
service agencies submitted comments expressing concern regarding 
the short- and long-term implications of expanding the definition of 
dependence.392  A final rule was put forth on August 12, 2019 
detailing the factors the Department “will consider in the totality of 
the circumstances when making a public charge inadmissibility 
determination” beginning October 15, 2019.393  The rule indicates 
the Department will not consider public benefits received on behalf 
of another, such as a citizen child in the household.394  The National 
Immigration Law Center, among others, indicated it will file suit and 
others re-expressed concerns this rule will have on food insecurity 
and a range of health outcomes.395 
 
 
388 DHS Announces New Proposed Immigration Rule to Enforce Long-Standing Law 
that Promotes Self-Sufficiency and Protects American Taxpayers, U.S. DEP’T 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/09/22/dhs-
announces-new-proposed-immigration-rule-enforce-long-standing-law-promotes-
self; Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 8 CFR Parts 103, 212, 213, 214, 
245, and 248, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/publication 
/proposed-rule-inadmissibility-public-charge-grounds. 
389 Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 
64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed Mar. 26, 1999). 
390 T. Hesson, et al., Immigrants May be Denied Green Cards if They’ve Received 
Benefits, POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2018) https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/22/poo 
r-immigrants-green-cards-trump-836456; M.D. Shear & E. Baumgaertner, Trump 
Administration Aims to Sharply Restrict New Green Cards for Those on Public Aid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/us/politics/imm 
igrants-green-card-public-aid.html. 
391 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USCIS-2010-0012 (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019). 
392 Sara N. Bleich & Sheila Fleischhacker, Hunger or Deportation: Implications of 
the Trump Administration’s Proposed Public Charge Rule, 51 J. NUTR. EDUC. 
BEHAV. 501, 501 (2019). 
393 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 8 CFR Parts 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 
and 248 (Aug. 12, 2019). 
394 Id. 
395 The Latest on President Donald Trump’s New Rules for Immigrants Receiving 
Public Assistance, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/wo 
rld/articles/2019-08-12/the-latest-trump-administration-defends-green-card-rules. 
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The Trump administration indicates it is concerned about 
declining enrollments in federal food and nutrition assistance 
programs, particularly for WIC eligible mothers and infants. 396  But 
the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Food, Nutrition, and 
Consumer Services and FNS administrator Brandon Lipps noted the 
Department is mainly aware of only anecdotal evidence of decreased 
participation relating to immigration concerns.397  On March 25, 
2019, Mr. Lipps blogged about a series of roundtable meetings he is 
participating in with WIC directors, participants, retailers, and other 
partners from across the US to address the obstacles WIC 
participants and potential participants and how to better support state 
and local agency staff.398 Evidence suggests the risk of deportation 
is negatively associated with participating in WIC and that Mexican-
origin families are the most sensitive when it comes to deportations 
and program use.399  A recent news report explained how an 
unprecedented number of women and children are withdrawing from 
WIC since the proposed public charge rule last fall.400   
 
Without question, there is limited nationally representative 
monitoring and surveillance of immigrant and refugee populations 
and, particularly, scarce time-sensitive evaluation methodologies and 
funding support structures in place to objectively track food security 
or other health related outcomes among these populations as a series 
of policy actions transpire.401  More research is needed to understand 
the breadth and depth of these impacts on immigrants’ short- and 
 
396 E. Baumgaertner, Spooked by Trump Proposals, Immigrants Abandon Public 
Nutrition Services, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/0 
6/us/politics/trump-immigrants-public-nutrition-services.html. 
397 Id. 
398 B. Lipps, WIC: A Pathway to Long-Term Success, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 25, 
2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2019/03/25/wic-pathway-long-term-succ 
ess. 
399 E.D. Vargas ED & M.A. Pirog, Mixed-Status Families and WIC Uptake: The 
Effects of Risk of Deportation on Program Use, 97 SOC. SCI. 555, 568 (2016). 
400 Alfred Lubrano, More Moms and Kids Withdrawing from Nutrition Program 
Because of Deportation Fears, Administrators Say, INQUIRER (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://www.philly.com/news/wic-trump-immigration-deportation-pregnant-wom 
en-infants-20190320.html. 
401 Food Insecurity Among Immigrants, Refugees, and Asylees, FOOD RES. & ACTION 
CTR. (Feb. 2016), http://org2.salsalabs.com/o/5118/p/salsa/web/common/public/co 
ntent?content_item_KEY=13089; A.S. Venkataramani, S.J. Shah, R. O’Brien, I. 
Kawachi & A.C. Tsai, Health Consequences of the U.S. Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Immigration Programme: A Quasi-Experimental 
Study, 2 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e175, e176 (2017); M. Venkataramani, C.E. Pollack, 
L.R. DeCamp, K.M. Leifheit, Z.D. Berger & A.S. Venkataramani, Association of 
Maternal Eligiblity for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program With 
Citizen Children’s Participation in the Women, Infants, and Children Program, 172 
J. AM. PEDIAT. 699 (2018). 
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long-term health, as well as financial stability.402  Attention should 
also be directed towards evaluating the likely increased burden 
placed on the charitable food sector (e.g. food banks and soup 
kitchens) and healthcare system.403  More work is needed to 
understand if the likely deterrent effect of this rule is associated with 
increases in per capita resources available to reduce food security and 
promote public health. 
 
E.  Trade 
 
In an effort to bail out farmers affected by the President’s 
recent tariffs on Chinese imports and resulting Chinese tariffs on US 
goods, the Trump administration purchased $1.2 billion commodities 
from farmers and distributed them through the child nutrition and 
emergency food assistance programs.404  This doubles the amount 
the USDA usually distributes through its food bank network.405  The 
plan for trade aid 2.0 includes additional direct payments and 
commodity purchases.406  Time-sensitive research is needed to see 
how these unusually high contributions affect food security among 
SNAP participants in addition to SNAP eligible non-participating 
individuals and households.  Little is known at this time about the 
dietary quality of these contributions either or the logistical capacity 
of food banks to effectively and efficiently manage the influx during 
non-disaster related periods.  A recent story explained how trade 
mitigation is already shaping the menus of school lunches and food 
pantry offerings.407   
 
402 S. Calvert, Food Banks Reap Unexpected Bounty from Trade Disputes: 
Government Set to Deliver $1.2 Billion in Products Bought from Farmers as Tariff 
Relief, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/food-banks-reap-
unexpected-bounty-from-trade-disputes-1538731801; V. Pelham, Generation of 
Sicker Kids Feared Under Immigrant Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/generation-sicker-kids-n73014482133/. 
403 R. Nixon, Food Banks Anticipate Impact of Cuts to Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/us/politics/food-banks-antic 
ipate-impact-of-cuts-to-food-stamps.html. 
404 Calvert, supra note 402. 
405 Jeff Stein, Food Banks Scramble to Make Trump’s Farm Bailout Work, MSN 
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/food-banks-scrambl 
e-to-make-trumps-farm-bailout-work/ar-BBNX9IW?ocid=spartanntp. 
406 Ryan McCrimmon, Next Steps for Trade Aid 2.0 Rollout, POLITICO (June 12, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/06/12/next-
steps-for-trade-aid-20-rollout-651844; see also Laura Reiley, Trump Administration 
Reveals Details of $16 Billion Farm Bailout in U.S. Trade War, WA. POST (July 25, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/25/trump-administratio 
n-reveals-details-billion-farm-bailout-us-trade-war/?noredirect=on. 
407 Candice Choi, What’s On School Menus this Fall? Trade Mitigation, ASSOC. 
PRESS (Aug. 11, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/whats-school-menus-fall-trade-
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F.  Administrative 
 
The Trump administration has moved forward a variety of 
administrative actions affecting the capacity and skill of federal 
employees most relevant to developing the science that informs 
SNAP policy or critical to carrying out vital SNAP operations and 
evaluation.  This includes a memo ordering USDA scientists to add 
a disclaimer to peer-reviewed publications that “the findings and 
conclusions in this preliminary publication have not been formally 
disseminated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and should not 
be construed to represent any agency determination or policy.”408  
This requirement was later revised to include the more traditional 
federal agency disclaimer: “The findings and conclusions in this 
[publications/presentation/blog/report] are those of the author(s) and 
should not be construed to represent any official USDA or U.S. 
Government determination of policy.”409 Congress directed the 
Office of Budget and Program Analysis of the USDA to provide an 
organizational charge for each agency funded in the 2019 
Agricultural Appropriations.410 
 
i.  Hiring Freeze  
 
On January 23, 2017, President Trump signed a Presidential 
Memorandum instituting a ninety-day hiring freeze for United States 
federal employees.411  There is not much data to objectively 




408 Ben Guarino, USDA Orders Scientists to Say Published Research is 
‘Preliminary’, WA. POST (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/scienc 
e/2019/04/19/usda-orders-scientists-say-published-research-is-preliminary/?noredi 
rect=on&utm_term=.53f27d1640b2 (noting this disclaimer was on Colleen Helfin, 
et al.’s article analyzing SNAP benefits and childhood asthma published in January 
2019 in Social Science & Medicine). 
409 Informational Memorandum: Final Policy Guidance on Disclaimers, 
Disclosures and Acknowledgements in Outside Scientific Publications and 
Presentations, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. RESEARCH, EDUC. AND ECON. (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.ree.usda.gov/sites/www.ree.usda.gov/files/2019-05/Final%20Guidanc 
e%20-%20Scientific%20Publications%20and%20Presentations.pdf. 
410 Division A – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019, Congressional Directives: 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, supra note 136, at 2. 
411 Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Hiring Freeze, 82 Fed. Reg. 8493 (Jan. 
25, 2017). 
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cuts in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 impacted agencies’ ability to 
appropriately staff SNAP operations.412   
 
ii.  Nominations  
 
Repeated concerns have been raised about the administrative 
inexperience, lack of scientific expertise, and industry ties Trump 
nominations and (relatively few) confirmed appointees have brought 
to the USDA to date.413  Recently, the 115th Congressional Senate 
failed to vote on the USDA nominees that had been approved by the 
Senate Agriculture Committee; therefore, the process had to start 
over with re-nomination by the 116th Congressional Senate.  On 
January 16, 2019, President Trump re-nominated his selections for 
the USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety; Undersecretary for 
Research, Education, and Economics; and Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights.414  In the interim, Secretary Perdue appointed each of 
them to deputy positions that does not hold the same authority but 
does not require Senate approval.415  The Senate Agriculture 
Committee advanced these three nominations but a date for a full 
chamber vote has not been set at this time.416  No one has been 
nominated at this point to be the Undersecretary of Food, Nutrition, 
and Consumer Services, which is the mission area for all the federal 
food and nutrition assistance programs including SNAP.417  This 
 
412 E. Wagner, Trump’s Hiring Freeze Slowed Federal Retirement Processing, Gᴏᴠ. 
Exᴇᴄ. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/08/trumps-
hiring-freeze-slowed-federal-retirement-processing/140099/. 
413 M. Lewis, Inside Trump’s Cruel Campaign Against the U.S.D.A.’s Scientists, 
VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/usda-food-
stamps-school-lunch-trump-administration; J. Eilperin, Trump Agriculture Nominee 
Sam Clovis Confirms He Has No Hard-Science Credentials, Withdraws Over Ties 
to Russia Probe, WA. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/02/sam-clovis-trumps-nominee-for-usdas-top-sci 
entist-confirms-he-has-no-hard-science-credentials/?utm_term=.5bf8b633f8d1; 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENCE UNDER TRUMP: VOICES OF SCIENTISTS 
ACROSS 16 FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/center-science-
and-democracy/promoting-scientific-integrity/scientist-survey-2018#.W70Qk2hKg 
dU. 
414 Dan Flynn, Brashears, Earp, Hutchins Start Work Today at USDA, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/01/brashears-earp-
hutchins-start-work-today-at-usda/. 
415 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Secretary Perdue Selects Three Senior 
Leaders at USDA (Jan. 28, 2019), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDA 
OC/bulletins/22b518d. 
416 United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Roberts, 
Stabenow Announce Committee to Vote on Three USDA Nominees (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/newsroom/rep/press/release/roberts-stabenow-
announce-committee-to-vote-on-three-usda-nominees. 
417 Lewis, supra note 413. 
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means the mission area accounting for seventy percent of the 
USDA’s budget is not being overseen by a Senate-confirmed 
appointee.418  Notwithstanding, as described throughout this review, 
Secretary Perdue and other political appointed USDA staff have lead 
a range of significant policy and programmatic changes at the 
Department; many of which have been well-received by various 
agricultural stakeholders and Congressional Republications.419 
 
iii.  Relocation to New Department of Health and Public 
Welfare  
 
The most significant administrative proposal regarding 
SNAP President Trump has put forth thus far is relocation.  In 
Delivering Government Solutions in the 21st Century: Reform Plan 
and Reorganization Recommendations, put forth by the Executive 
Office of President Trump, one of the thirty-two organizational 
realignments to enhance mission and service delivery was to move 
the non-commodity nutrition assistance programs (i.e., the “near-
cash” benefit programs such as electronic benefit transfers or 
vouchers) from the USDA to a newly named Department of Health 
and Public Welfare, which is currently known as the Department of 
Health and Human Services.420  These non-commodity nutrition 
assistance programs include: SNAP, the Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), the 
Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), the WIC Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Program (FMNP), and the Senior Farmers’ Market 
Nutrition Program (SFMNP).  The USDA would continue to 
administer the commodity-based programs (i.e., deliver actual foods 
and beverages), including the National School Lunch Program 
(NSLP) and the School Breakfast Programs (SBP), the Emergency 
Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Commodity 
Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), among others.421  Within the 
new Department of Health and Public Welfare, SNAP would be 
moved into an expanded Administration for Children and Families 
 
418 Id. 
419 Farmers Thank Secretary Perdue for Biofuels Support; Ask for Continued 
Advocacy, NAT’L. CORN GROWERS ASS’N (Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.ncga.com/ne 
ws-and-resources/news-stories/article/2018/08/farmers-thank-secretary-perdue-for-
biofuels-support-ask-for-continued-advocacy. 
420  EXEC. OFF. PRES. U.S., DELIVERING GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: REFORM PLAN AND REORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS, 15 (2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Government-Reform-an 
d-Reorg-Plan.pdf [hereinafter DELIVERING GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS]. 
421 Id. at 28. 
214                    JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY     [Vol.15 
(ACF).422  The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services currently administers Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) and houses the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), among other social services.423   
 
This Reform Plan was informed by the Trump 
administration’s analysis and comments garnered as a result of the 
Executive Order 13781, entitled “Comprehensive Plan for 
Reorganizing the Executive Branch.”424  This Executive Order was 
issued on March 13, 2017 and directed the United States Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to propose a comprehensive plan 
to reform and reorganize the Executive Branch and for the OMB to 
seek input from Executive Branch agencies, as well as public 
comments on organizational alignment that can help reduce 
“duplication and redundancy” and improve “efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch.”425  
Reorganization, as discussed in the Reform Plan, is not a new 
Executive Branch undertaking and one recent effort highlighted was 
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence after 9/11.  Some of the 
suggestions put forth in response to the Executive Order 13781 and 
public comment period were included in the fiscal year 2019 budget 
or were adopted by agencies under existing authorities.  The 
Executive Order 13781 and the Reform Plan, among other inputs, 
informed the President’s Management Agenda: Modernizing 
Government for the 21st Century, which identified the following key 
drivers of transformation: IT modernization; Data, Accountability, 
and Transparency; and People—Workforce for the 21st Century.426 
 
The Trump administration’s rationale for moving SNAP to 
this new Department of Health and Public Welfare was to better align 
assistance programs with how they are often managed at the state and 
local levels.  Currently, some states and local governments 
administer the Federal Government’s major public assistance 
programs such as TANF and SNAP at a single state agency; 
however, this single agency has to contend with two sets of 
 
422 Id. at 27. 
423 Id. 
424 Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13781—Comprehensive Plan for 
Reorganizing the Executive Branch, 82 Fed. Reg. 13959 (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-16/pdf/2017-05399.pdf. 
425 Id. 
426 President’s Mgmt. Council & Executive Office of the President, The President’s 
Management Agenda: Modernizing Government for the 21st Century, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Presidents-Management 
-Agenda.pdf. 
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“reporting, regulatory, and other administrative requirements—one 
set imposed by HHS for TANF, and another by USDA for SNAP.”  
Therefore, the Reform Plan discussed how consolidating public 
assistance programs could potentially help reduce administrative 
burden and possible duplication; streamline processes for issuing 
guidance, putting forth new or modified regulations, and approving 
waivers; improve coordination among public assistance programs; 
and increase the likelihood that policies are applied consistently 
across public assistance programs.  In addition, the Trump 
administration’s Reform Plan proposes the establishment of a 
permanent Council on Public Assistance, housed in the new 
Department of Health and Public Welfare that would be composed 
of all intra- and inter-departmental agencies that administer public 
benefit programs, including within the new Department (e.g., TANF, 
CMS, and now SNAP and WIC), the USDA (e.g., remaining 
commodity-based programs), the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, among others.  The Council would have “statutory 
authority to establish certain cross-program policies, including on 
uniform work requirements.”427  
 
While a part of the nation’s safety net, SNAP and the other 
non-commodity nutrition assistance programs are only one 
component and attention to each individual program’s interface with 
other safety net components is essential to overall evaluation and 
planning for improvement.428  Indeed, improved coordination and 
streamlining of eligibility requirements and certification periods 
across the existing social safety net would likely improve efficiencies 
and encourage participation.  But moving the non-commodity 
nutrition assistance programs oddly separates the long-standing food 
assistance approach that now includes a suite of fifteen programs.429  
Opportunity exists to explore how best to streamline these programs 
but separating them across two Departments is likely not the most 
efficient and effective way.  These non-commodity nutrition 
assistance programs work with the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy 
and Promotion to put forth policies and programmatic approaches 
 
427 Id. 
428 MICHAEL WISEMAN, INST. RES. ON POVERTY, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: CHAPTER 3 OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS SAFETY NET IN THE 
GREAT RECESSION: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE WORKING TOGETHER 1 (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publi 
cations/dps/pdfs/dp143517.pdf. 
429 Programs and Services, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Mar. 26, 
2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/programs-and-services. 
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that aim to align with the latest Dietary Guidelines for Americans.430  
Granted, the USDA works in partnership with HHS to develop and 
integrate the Dietary Guidelines for Americans into all relevant 
federal nutrition policies and programs.431  Moreover, these non-
commodity nutrition assistance programs have a long-standing 
history of working with SNAP-Ed, operated from FNS and NIFA, 
along with other USDA research agencies including ERS and the 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which supports national food 
consumption surveys, along with eight research centers often 
concentrating on the implications of federal food and nutrition 
assistance programs.432  A Departmental divide might hinder access 
to program data, data sharing, analysts with the appropriate program 
knowledge and analytical skills, and/or introduce other 
administrative hurdles that might not justify such a significant 
reorganization.  Furthermore, an important but overlooked part of re-
envisioning our social assistance approach is how best to provide 
disaster relief.     
 
Notwithstanding, the Reform Plan acknowledges a proposed 
reorganization of this nature requires Congressional approvals and 
the 115th and initial signs from the 116th Congress have given these 
public assistance reform plans little attention.433  Therefore, 
innovative policy and programmatic approaches to strengthen and 
streamline our social assistance at the national levels to best serve 
and support tribal, state, and local efforts, as well as the role of 
charitable organizations is needed.  However, these approaches 
deserve objective, multidisciplinary analyses and rigorously 
evaluated demonstration projects to justify dismantling our domestic 






430 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Education (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://wicworks.fns.usda.gov/resources/wic-
nutrition-education-guidance (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); WIC Works Resource 
System, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://wicworks.fns.usda.go 
v/resources/wic-nutrition-education-guidance (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
431 Dietary Guidelines: Purpose, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. DISEASE 
PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/purpose.a 
sp (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
432 Supplemental Nutrition Education Program – Education (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., NAT’L INST. FOOD & AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/supplemental-
nutrition-education-program-education-snap-ed (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
433 DELIVERING GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, supra note 420, at 27–28. 
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iv.  Reorganization of ERS and Proposed Relocations of 
ERS and NIFA 
 
Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue has proposed 
significant reorganizations of ERS and relocations of ERS and 
NIFA.434  Specifically, Secretary Perdue proposed ERS move out of 
the USDA’s Research, Education, and Economics Mission Area and 
back into the Office of the Secretary, Office of the Chief Economist 
to enhance the effectiveness of economic analysis at USDA.435  In 
addition, the Secretary proposed to relocate ERS and NIFA out of 
the Washington, DC area to possibly the Midwest.436  The leases for 
the current headquarter facilities for both agencies are expiring and 
the Secretary indicated the rational for these relocations were to 
improve USDA’s ability to attract and retain highly qualified staff 
with training and interests in agriculture, place these important 
USDA resources closer stakeholders, and save on employment costs 
and rent.437  On the day of the announcement the ERS 
Administrator—a civil servant—was reassigned to another USDA 
agency and the position was posted for hire a few weeks later listing 
a Washington, DC location and this position has not yet been filled 
with a permanent hire.438   
 
Before the shutdown, USDA indicated the exact location 
would be announced in early 2019, after an external review of the 
136 possible options, and both agencies would be relocated by the 
end of fiscal year 2019.439  Key Congressional Committees have 
written to Secretary Perdue expressing concerns about these 
 
434 Notice of Request for Expression of Interest for Potential Sites for Headquarters 
Office Locations, 83 Fed. Reg. 40499 (Aug. 15, 2018),  https://www.federalregister. 
gov/documents/2018/08/15/2018-17555/notice-of-request-for-expression-of-
interest-for-potential-sites-for-headquarters-office-locations; USDA Extends 
Deadline for Expressions of Interest for New ERS and NIFA Headquarters, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/09/ 
07/usda-extends-deadline-expressions-interest-new-ers-nifa. 
435 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA to Realign ERS with Chief 





438 Administrator, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, AG-18-2019-0018, USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDeta 
ils/517636900 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
439 Hagstrom Report, Perdue Responds on ERS, NIFA Moves as Opposition 
Continues, FENCE POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.thefencepost.com/news/perdu 
e-responds-on-ers-nifa-moves-as-opposition-continues/.  
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proposals.440  Although Secretary Perdue has responded to 
Congressional members emphasizing these reorganization and 
relocation plans are sound, several former departmental and agency 
senior staff have criticized these proposals and numerous scientific 
and statistical societies, advocacy groups, among other stakeholders 
have as well.441  During a webinar held on September 20, 2018, 
former departmental and agency staff called for Congress to delay or 
stop these proposed administrative changes through the pending 
agriculture appropriations or Farm Bill.442  Additional calls were 
made for Congress to consider holding oversight hearings or request 
an independent study to evaluate the proposed changes including a 
cost-benefit analysis that examines, among other aspects of the 
move, employee hiring, recruiting, and retention data justifying the 
need for the move and the possible success of the proposed new 
location.443  On December 19, 2018, nine House Democrats 
introduced a bill aiming to prevent the USDA from reorganizing ERS 
 
440 P. Roberts, Chairman & D. Stabenow, Ranking Member, Letter to Secretary 





441 Jerry Hagstrom, Perdue Responds on ERS, NIFA Moves as Opposition 
Continues, AG POLICY BLOG (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/w 
eb/ag/perspectives/blogs/ag-policy-blog/blog-post/2018/09/25/perdue-responds-ers 
-nifa-moves; Am. Statistical Assoc. et al., USDA Research Relocation and 
Reorganization: Perspectives from Former USDA Chief Scientists and 
Administrators, ASSN. PUB. DATA USERS (Sept. 20, 2018), http://apdu.org/2018/09/2 
1/usda-research-relocation-and-reorganization-perspectives-from-former-usda-chie 
f-scientists-and-administrators/; M. Weaver, Former NIFA Chief Questions USDA 
Decision to Relocate Institute, CAPITAL PRESS (Aug. 15, 2018), http://www.capitalp 
ress.com/Nation_World/20180815/former-nifa-chief-questions-usda-decision-to-
relocate-institute; Mary Russell, Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics Letter to USDA 
on Proposed Changes to NIFA and ERS, EAT RIGHT PRO (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.eatrightpro.org/news-center/member-updates/from-our-leaders/acade 
my-letter-to-usda-on-proposed-changes-to-nifa-and-ers; Roger Johnson, Letter to 
Secretary Sonny Perdue Regarding the Proposed ERS and NIFA Moves (Sept. 18, 
2018), https://1yd7z7koz052nb8r33cfxyw5-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/u 
ploads/2018/09/09-18-18-Letter-to-Perdue-re-NIFA-and-ERS-.pdf; Agric. & 
Applied Econs. Ass’n, Letter to Chairmen, Roberts and Conaway and Ranking 
Member Stabenow and Peterson Regarding the Proposed ERS and NIFA Moves 
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aaea.org/UserFiles/file/AAEA-USDAERSLetter-
Final-AgCommittee.pdf; Christine Aschwanden, Is Trump Trying to Politicize 
Agricultural Data? Some Former USDA Officials Suspect Yes, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-trump-trying-to-politicize-
agricultural-data-some-former-usda-officials-suspect-yes/. 
442 Am. Statistical Ass’n et al., supra note 444. 
443 Id.  
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and NIFA and relocating these two agencies outside of the 
Washington, DC area.444   
 
On December 21, 2018, right before the record-setting 
government shutdown started, Secretary Perdue announced the 
criteria the Department developed to evaluate the 136 Expressions of 
Interest received from parties in thirty-five states in request to the 
Department’s public solicitation to become the new home to ERS 
and NIFA.445  With the assistance of Ernst & Young, the Department 
aims to apply a “set of guiding principles, including locations 
meeting USDA travel requirements, locations with specific labor 
force statistics, and locations with work hours most compatible with 
all USDA office schedules.”  In addition, the Department has further 
defined the following criteria to apply to the Expressions of Interests: 
quality of life (includes Diversity Index, Residential Housing, 
Access to Healthcare, and Home and Community Safety Rankings); 
Costs (Capital and Operating includes Cost of Living Adjustment, 
Commercial Real Estate Costs, Land Costs, and Wage Growth Rate); 
Workforce (includes Labor Force Growth Rate, Unemployment 
Rate, and the Labor Force Population); and Logistics/IT 
Infrastructure (includes Lodging Availability, Proximity to 
Stakeholders, and Travel Time to/from DC).   
 
The Explanatory Statement of the budget agreement that 
finalized fiscal year 2019 Agricultural Appropriations called for “an 
indefinite delay” in reorganizing ERS and required the USDA to 
include cost estimates and research benefits related to the proposed 
relocation of ERS and NIFA in the upcoming fiscal year 2020 budget 
justification.446  Subsequently, more than a dozen House Democrats 
reintroduced standalone legislation to block the proposed 
reorganization and relocations, which stipulates the authority to 
administer ERS and NIFA is with the USDA Under Secretary for 
Research, Education, and Economics mission area and cannot be 
given over to another mission area or office within the 
 
444 H.R. 7330, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018), https://pingree.house.gov/sites/pingree.h 
ouse.gov/files/NIFAERS%20Bill%20.pdf. 
445 Perdue Announces ERS, NIFA Site Selection Criteria [Release No. 0282.18], 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/201 
8/12/21/perdue-announces-ers-nifa-site-selection-criteria. 
446 DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2019, supra note 
136, at 4. 
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Department.447 Secretary Perdue testified before the House 
Agriculture Committee on the state of the rural economy on February 
27, 2019, during which time Representative Mike Conaway (R-
Texas) recognized the Secretary’s efforts to take on reorganizing the 
Department “head on.”448  Secretary Perdue responded to questions 
from the Committee’s new member, Representative Jahana Hayes 
(D-Connecticut) regarding the proposed reorganization and 
relocations by emphasizing parts of ERS and NIFA will remain in 
the Washington, DC area.449  Secretary Perdue also explained during 
his response to Representative Hayes how he believes aligning ERS 
with the Office of the Chief Economist will likely lessen any 
potential political interference since the head of both ERS and the 
Office of the Chief Economist are civil employees in contrast to ERS 
reporting to a politically appointed Under Secretary of Research, 
Education, and Economics.450  A few days later Politico scooped an 
internal list of seventy-six staffers from ERS that would remain in 
Washington, DC while the rest of the agency staff would be 
relocated.451 
 
While the President’s budget proposals have not reflected 
Congressional appropriations, the fiscal year 2020 budget released 
on March 11, 2019 asked for relocation funds, significantly reduced 
ERS’ budget, and cut staff at ERS by more than fifty percent, noting 
research that duplicates land-grant universities will be eliminated.452  
On March 27, 2019, the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and 
Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Subcommittee held a hearing regarding the ERS and NIFA 
proposal.453 During this hearing, the Subcommittee Chairman 
 
447 Press Release, Congresswoman Chellie Pingree, House Democrats Introduce Bill 
to Stop Research Agency Reorganization and Relocation (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://pingree.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=239.  




451 Ryan McCrimmon, Morning Agriculture: ERS Staff Tapped for Potential 
Relocations, POLITICO, (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.politico.com/morningagricultu 
re/; see also Charles S. Clark, GovExec: Agriculture Department Staff Given 
Marching Orders for Controversial Move, G2XCHANGEETC (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://etc.g2xchange.com/statics/govexec-agriculture-department-staff-given-mar 
ching-orders-for-controversial-move/. 
452 President’s FY 2020 Budget: Sustainable Agricultural Perspective, NAT’L 
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Mar. 19, 2019), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog 
/fy2020-presidents-budget-proposal/. 
453 USDA’s Proposed Relocation of the Economic Research Service and the 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/usda-s-
proposed-relocation-of-the-economic-research-service-and-the-national. 
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Representative Sanford Bishop (D-Ga) acknowledged thirty-two 
House Republicans wrote him and the Ranking Member a letter 
indicating their support of the Secretary’s proposed relocations while 
several House Democrats expressed opposition to appropriating 
funds to support these relocations.454  Days later during an 
appropriations hearing, Secretary Perdue contended with Chairman 
Bishop (who is from the state Perdue was once Governor) that the 
proposed reorganization and relocations “maybe one of those areas 
where you and I are friends but will have to disagree over the issue 
going forward.”455      
 
  On April 25, 2019, the Washington Post reported the Trump 
administration plans to move forward with the reorganization and 
relocations despite opposition.456  Secretary Perdue recently 
announced a “OneNeighborhood” initiative underway to consolidate 
Departmental offices into nearby workspaces.457  On May 3, 2019, 
Secretary Perdue announced a short list of three top locations with 
sufficient space to meet ERS and NIFA requirements: Indiana, 
Greater Kansas City Region, and North Carolina Research Triangle 
Region.458  During May and June 2019, ERS and NIFA voted to 
unionize and is represented by the American Federation of 
Government Employees (AFGE).459  Politico reported on how ERS 
employees feel the Trump administration is retaliating against the 
agency for publishing reports that did not support the 
 
454 USDA’s Proposed Relocation of the Economic Research Service and the 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/usda-s-propo 
sed-relocation-of-the-economic-research-service-and-the-national. 
455 Nicole Ogrysko, Lawmakers, Perdue ‘Agree to Disagree’ Over Proposed USDA 
Relocation, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2019), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/ 
agency-oversight/2019/04/lawmakers-perdue-agree-to-disagree-over-proposed-usd 
a-relocation/. 
456 Ben Guarino, Trump Administration Plans to Move USDA Research Divisions 
Despite Concerns, WA. POST (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sc 
ience/2019/04/25/trump-administration-plans-move-usda-research-divisions-despit 
e-concerns/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dbd4b74de5e0. 
457 Nicole Ogrysko, On Heels of Proposed USDA Relocation, Perdue Announces 
Plans to Realign Employee Workspaces, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2019/04/on-heels-of-proposed-usda-rel 
ocation-perdue-announces-plans-to-realign-employee-workspaces/. 
458 Perdue Announces Top Sites for ERS and NIFA Relocations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (May 3, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/05/03/per 
due-announces-top-sites-ers-and-nifa-relocations. 
459 Id. 
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administration’s agenda such as trade, farm subsidies, SNAP, and the 
environment.460   
 
On June 13, 2019, Secretary Perdue announced the Kansas 
City region as the location for ERS and NIFA and ERS would remain 
in the USDA’s Research, Education, and Economics Mission 
Area.461  ERS and NIFA employees who do not move to Kansas City 
will be terminated effective September 30, 2019.462  There continue 
to be various legislative actions expressing support for or 
alternatively exploring ways to prevent or, at least at this stage, 
monitor the relocations.463  In early August, the White House Chief 
of Staff Mick Mulvaney commented at a Republican party gala:  
 
Now, it’s nearly impossible to fire a federal worker 
. . . But simply saying to the people, you know what, 
we’re going to take you outside the bubble, outside 
the Beltway, outside this liberal haven and move you 
out into the real part of the country, and they quit. 
What a wonderful way to streamline government 
 
460 Ryan McCrimmon, Economists Flee Agriculture Dept. After Feeling Punished 
Under Trump, POLITICO (May 7, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/0 
7/agriculture-economists-leave-trump-1307146; Jacqui Fatka, ERS Employees 
Overwhelming Vote to Join Union, FEEDSTUFFS (May 9, 2019), https://www.feedstu 
ffs.com/news/ers-employees-overwhelming-vote-join-union. 
461 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Secretary Perdue Announces Kansas City 
Region as Location for ERS and NIFA (June 13, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/me 
dia/press-releases/2019/06/13/secretary-perdue-announces-kansas-city-region-loc 
ation-ers-and-nifa. 
462 Ben Guarino, Hundreds of USDA Employees to be Removed from their Jobs in 
September, WA. POST (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/20 
19/08/07/hundreds-usda-employees-be-removed-their-jobs-september/?noredirect= 
on.  
463 The House Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Biotechnology, 
Horticulture, and Research, Hearing: Examining the Impacts of Relocating USDA 
Research Agencies on Agriculture Research (June 5, 2019), https://www.congress. 
gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/109580; Press Release, U.S. House Comm. 
on Agric. Republicans, Dunn, Conaway: Relocation Discussion is a Distraction from 
Important Ag Issues (June 5, 2019), https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/news 
/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6565; Daniel J. Sernovitz, Norton Throws Up 
Potential Roadblock to USDA Relocations, WA. BUS. J. (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2019/06/26/norton-throws-up-pote 
ntial-roadblock-to-usda-moves.html; Press Release, Chris Van Hollen, Van Hollen, 
Senators Introduce Bill to Bar USDA Research Agencies From Leaving National 
Capital Region (May 23, 2019), https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/van-hollen-senators-introduce-bill-to-bar-usda-research-agencies-from-lea 
ving-national-capital-region. 
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and do what we haven’t been able to do for a long 
time.464   
 
But, the USDA Office of Inspector General, among other 
federal watchdogs, indicate the relocations may have violated the 
2018 appropriations act.465  Most recently, and after about two-thirds 
of affected employees declined relocation, the USDA agreed to key 
union demands and will allow employees who agree to relocate to 
telework through the end of the year, with an option to extend and 
these employees will also be given a bonus equal to one month’s pay 
to help compensate for the loss of income incurred by the employees 
moving from the higher wage Washington, DC area to Kansas City 
region.466   
 
Thus, it’s unknown at this time how these relocations will 
impact the quality and quantity of research used to inform SNAP 
policy and programmatic decisions or set precedent for similar 
federal agency relocations.   
 
v.  Reorganization of the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy 
and Promotion  
 
Using the authority of Executive Order 13781, Secretary 
Perdue already reorganized the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy 
and Promotion (CNPP) by eliminating the former politically-
appointed Executive Director of CNPP position and merging the 
 
464 White House Chief of Staff Offers New Reasoning for Relocations, FED. 
MANAGER (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.fedmanager.com/featured/3405-white-
house-chief-of-staff-offers-new-reasoning-for-relocations; Editorial Board, The 
Administration Said It Was Moving These Agencies For Efficiency. Now the Truth 




465 The United States Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General, 
USDA’s Proposal to Reorganize and Relocate the Economic Research Service and 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Inspection Report 918991-0001-223 
(Aug. 2019), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/91801-0001-23.pdf; see also Ben 
Guarino, USDA Science Agencies’ Relocation May Have Violated Law, Inspector 
General Report Says, WA. POST (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/s 
cience/2019/08/05/usda-science-agencies-relocation-may-have-violated-law-inspe 
ctor-general-report-says/?noredirect=on; Eric Katz, USDA Office Relocations Are 
Illegal, IG Says, GOV’T EXEC. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/oversight 
/2019/08/usda-relocations-are-illegal-ig-says/158955/. 
466 Rebecca Beitsch, USDA Eases Relocation Timeline as Researchers Flee Agency, 
THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/usda-eases-
relocation-timeline-as-researchers-flee-agency/ar-AAFAzHp. 
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Center into the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).467  The Bipartisan 
Policy Center SNAP Task Force urged that this CNPP reorganization 
be better leveraged to “consolidate responsibility for overseeing the 
Food and Nutrition Service’s nutrition and public health missions 
through a new Food and Nutrition Service deputy 
administrator/CNPP director position.”468  Only recently was this 
new Deputy Administrator, CNPP position announced for hire; there 
is no requirement for an advanced nutrition or public health degree 
in the position description.469  CNPP works with the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of Health Promotion and Disease 
Prevention to develop the Dietary Guidelines for Americans that 
underlay SNAP nutrition policy.470  This work includes housing the 
USDA’s Nutrition Evidence Library (NEL), which “has dedicated 
staff that collaborates with leading scientists to objectively review, 
evaluate, and synthesize research using state-of-the-art methodology 
to answer important food- and nutrition-related public health 
questions.”471  NEL was recently renamed to the Nutrition Evidence 
Systematic Review (NESR).472   
 
In the Agricultural Act of 2014, Congress mandated the 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans expand to infants and toddlers 
from birth to age two and provide additional guidance for pregnant 
and lactating women.473  In addition, as part of fiscal year 2016 
appropriations, Congress mandated the review of the guidelines’ 
developmental process, which resulted in two study reports from the 
National Academies of Science recommending significant 
 
467 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Secretary Perdue Announces USDA 
Improvements for Consumer Service & Efficiency (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2017/09/07/secretary-perdue-announce 
s-usda-improvements-customer-service; see also Improving Customer Service, 82 
F.R. 42,781 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/09/1 
2/2017-19337/improving-customer-service. 
468 LEADING WITH NUTRITION: LEVERAGING FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR BETTER 
HEALTH: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE BPC SNAP TASK FORCE 7, BIPARTISAN 
POL’Y CTR. (2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/leading-with-nutrition-
leveraging-federal-programs-for-better-health/. 
469 Deputy Administrator, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, FNS-SES-2019-1301, 
USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/531510600 (last visited  
Aug. 30, 2019). 
470 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. 
(Dec. 19, 2018),  https://www.fns.usda.gov/resource/dietary-guidelines-americans. 
471 Julie E. Obbagy, et al., Systematic Review Methods for Pregnancy and Birth to 
24 Month Project, 109 J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 698s, 698s (Mar. 2019), 
https://academic.oup.com/ajcn/article/109/Supplement_1/698S/5184397. 
472 About NESR, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NUTRITION EVIDENCE SYSTEMATIC REV., 
https://nesr.usda.gov/ (last visited May 14, 2019). 
473 H.R. 2642, supra note 203. 
2019]      DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION      225 
 
 
opportunities for improving the overall process.474  In the fiscal year 
2019 Agricultural Appropriations package, Congress asked the 
USDA to report within six months on how it is modifying its 
approach to drafting the Dietary Guidelines for Americans and 
appropriated more than twelve million dollars through September 
2021 towards this developmental process.475  The process for 
developing the Dietary Guidelines for Americans is behind schedule 
and was impacted by the historic shutdown.476  Recently, the twenty-
member 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee was 
announced.477  Known as the DGAC, this Federal advisory 
committee kicked off about eighteen months of work at their first 
public meeting this past March 2019.478  While the new Dietary 
Guidelines will come out sometime closer to 2020 and CNPP will 
subsequently roll out relevant nutrition messages and materials, 
Secretary Perdue recently introduced the Start Simple with MyPlate 
campaign since most Americans “lack the motivation and skills to 
make changes to their eating routines.”479  In May 2019, Secretary 
Perdue met with developers of mobile technology and leaders of 
rescue missions, among other stakeholders, to discuss how to help 
people get access to nutritious food and achieve self-sufficiency.480  
More work is needed to understand the impacts the dietary guidelines 
process, messages, and related activities on SNAP and SNAP-Ed 
policy and programmatic approaches has on the participation, eating 
patterns, and health outcomes of SNAP participants and those 
eligible to participate.  
 
474 Review of the Process to Update the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. ENG’G & MED. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/Activi 
ties/Nutrition/DietaryGuidelinesforAmericans.aspx. 
475 DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, supra note 136.  
476 Sarah Reinhardt, What’s for Dinner? A Preview of the People, Process, and 
Politics Updating Federal Dietary Guidelines, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://blog.ucsusa.org/sarah-reinhardt/whats-for-dinner-a-previe 
w-of-the-people-process-and-politics-updating-federal-dietary-guidelines.  
477Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Members of the 2020 Dietary Guidelines 
Advisory Committee Announced (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/pre 
ss-releases/2019/02/21/members-2020-dietary-guidelines-advisory-committee-ann 
ounced. 
478 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, DIETARY GUIDELINES COMM., 
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/work-under-way/review-science/public-meetin 
gs/meeting-1 (last visited May 14, 2019); NAT’L ACAD. SCI. ENG’G & MED. , 
REDESIGNING THE PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING THE DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR 
AMERICANS 26 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/24883/chapter/3#26.  
479 U.S. Dep’t Agric., Start Simple with MyPlate, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7_i5tY-5BY&feature=youtu.be. 
480Perdue Enlists American Innovators to Advance Self-Sufficiency,  U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (May 8, 2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/pressre 
lease/2019/fns-000419. 
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vi.  Reorganization of the USDA Civil Rights Activities  
 
Consistent with Executive Order 13781 calling for 
Executive Branch reorganization, Secretary Perdue is reorganizing 
the USDA’s civil rights activities.481  These activities include 
managing complaints regarding the fair and equitable treatment of 
USDA customers and employees participating in or working on the 
suite of fifteen federal food and nutrition assistance programs the 
USDA administers.482      
 
vii.  President Trump’s Administrative Actions Summary  
 
Altogether, a variety of administrative proposals and actions 
taken by the Trump administration to date have direct and indirect 
SNAP implications and should be monitored to ensure the relevant 
SNAP personnel and agencies produce the most efficient, effective, 
and positive impacts on SNAP participants and SNAP-eligible 
individuals and households.  In particular, the short-and long-term 
implications of the CNPP and Civil Rights activities reorganizations 
merit further attention and could provide timely insights on the 
Department’s capacity to reorganize and move much larger agencies, 
ERS and NIFA.   
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
The evolution of the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
actions aiming to address food insecurity and improve nutrition 
through the Food Stamp Program now known as SNAP provides 
fundamental insights.  Together, these insights help to analyze the 
strengths and limitations of the SNAP provisions of the 2018 Farm 
Bill, recent and pending agricultural appropriations, Congressional 
oversight (in)activities, along with the actions taken thus far by the 
Trump administration.  Without question, ensuring SNAP promotes 
food security and improves nutrition requires innovative approaches.  
Multidisciplinary data from independent, objective sources is a 
critical ingredient to help sustain or implement new federal food and 
nutrition assistance policy and programmatic approaches at the 
federal, tribal, state, and local levels.  Evidence demonstrates SNAP 
directly and indirectly affects participants, farmers, food retailers, 
food and beverage manufacturers, and taxpayers in the short- and 
 




2019]      DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION      227 
 
 
long-term across a variety of economic and health outcomes.  More 
data driven, bipartisan work is needed to positively shape SNAP’s 
public health impacts—from participation, product, and retailer 
eligibility to infrastructural, technical assistance, and innovative 
nutrition education and obesity prevention grant funding.  This data 
must garner interdepartmental and multi-jurisdictional insights and 
ideally factor in participant and retailer perspectives.  And gradually, 
we will hopefully see an evolution of SNAP and the nation’s social 
safety net that better meets participant and stakeholder needs and 




Table 1: Selected policy and programmatic developments emerging 
from the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the United 
States Government shaping the United States Department of 




483 See A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Sept. 
17, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap; Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Legislation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTRITION SERV. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/legislation; 
COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF FOOD RESOURCES AND SNAP 
ALLOTMENTS ET AL., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: EXAMINING 
THE EVIDENCE TO DEFINE BENEFIT ADEQUACY (Caswell JA & Yaktine AL eds., 
2013); AUSSENBERG RA & COLELLO KJ, CRS, DOMESTIC FOOD ASSISTANCE: 
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42353.pdf; Rachel 
Ehrenberg, The Growth of US farming and the Farm Bill, KNOWABLE MAGAZINE 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.knowablemagazine.org/article/society/2018/growth-
us-farming-and-farm-bill. 
Agricultural Adjustment Act – 1935 (P.L. 74-320) 
Provided funding to encourage domestic consumption of 
agricultural commodities. 
The First Food Stamp Program (FSP) – 1939 
Secretary of Agriculture cites problems with the commodity 
distribution program and initiates the first, experimental food 
stamp program where people on relief were able to buy orange 
stamps equal to their normal food expenditures and for every $1 
worth of orange stamps purchased that could be used to buy any 
food, 50 cents worth of blue stamps were received and could be 
used to buy food determined by the Department to be surplus. 
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Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act – 1959 
(P.L. 86-341) 
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to distribute surplus food 
and issue food stamps redeemable by eligible needy persons 
through January 31, 1962. But this authority was not used by the 
Eisenhower administration. 
President Kennedy’s First Executive Order 10914 – Providing 
for an Expanded Program of Food Distribution to Needy 
Families - 1961 
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to expand and improve 
the program of food distribution throughout the US and initiated 
Food Stamp pilot programs which required participants to 
purchase food stamps but eliminated special stamps for surplus 
foods and ultimately expanded to forty counties and three cities in 
twenty-two states with 380,000 participants. 
Food Stamp Act – 1964 (P.L. 88-535) 
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to administer a permanent 
food stamp program that would provide eligible households to 
obtain a nutritionally adequate diet through the issuance of a 
coupon allotment which shall have a greater monetary value than 
their normal expenditures for food; required states to develop 
participant eligibility standards; and established eligibility 
standards for foods permitted to be purchased with food stamps. 
The Food Stamp Act Amendment – 1970 (P.L. 91-671) 
Established uniform national standards for eligibility and work 
registration requirements; required that allotments be equivalent 
to the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet; and instituted an 
outreach requirement. 
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States – 1971 
(449 F.2d 255) 
Secretary of Agriculture acted within his scope of authority 
granted under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 in denying the 
applicant fast-food restaurant request to participate as a “retail 
food store” in the Food Stamp Program and only approved grocery 
establishments which stock a large number of low-cost staples. 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno – 1973 
(413 U.S. 528, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 37 L. Ed. 2d 782, 1973) 
An amendment to the Food Stamp Act prevented households made 
up of unrelated individuals from participating in the federal food 
stamp program and a class action suit was brought and the 
amendment was found to violate the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment since it is without any rational basis for not 
allowing unrelated people to participate in the program. 
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Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act – 1973 (P.L. 93-86) 
Required states to expand the program to every political 
jurisdiction; expanded program to individuals in treatment and 
rehabilitation centers for substance abuse; established bi-monthly 
issuance; authorized the USDA to establish temporary eligibility 
standards for disasters; and added a new category of seeds and 
plants as eligible purchases with SNAP benefits. 
Agriculture and Consumer Act Amendments – 1974 (P.L. 93-
347)  
Authorized the USDA to pay fifty percent of all states’ costs for 
administrating the program and established the requirement for 
efficient and effective administration by the states.  
 
The Agricultural Act of 1970 Amendments – 1974 (P.L. 93-86) 
Authorized the food stamp program to operate nationwide. 
The Food and Agriculture Act – 1977 (P.L. 95-113) 
Eliminated the purchase requirement; eliminated categorical 
eligibility; established statutory income eligibility guidelines at 
the poverty line and a number of other provisions related to 
eligibility; established a job search requirement for nonexempt 
work registrants; restricted eligibility for students and aliens; 
established that authorized stores must sell a substantial amount of 
staple foods; introduced demonstration project authority; and 
established various access and integrity provisions. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act – 1981 (P.L. 97-35) 
Established various income eligibility provisions and prohibited 
program funds supporting outreach activities. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act – 1982 (P.L. 97-253)  
Established various income eligibility provisions; adjusted the 
Thrifty Food Plan; and permits alternative issuance system. 
Emergency Food Assistance Act – 1983 (P.L. 93-86)   
Grants authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish 
temporary emergency standards of eligibility for the direction of 
an emergency without regard to income and other financial 
resources. 
The Food Stamp Act – 1985 (P.L. 99-198) 
Required states to implement an Employment and Training 
program.  
The Hunger Prevention Act – 1988 (P.L. 100-435) 
Permitted pilot projects to test whether the use of benefit cards or 
other automated or electronic benefit delivery systems could 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness of operations for both 
program administrators and receipts. 
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The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act – 1990 
(P.L. 101-624) 
Established electronic benefit transfers as an issuance alternative 
and allowed for electronic benefit transfer demonstration projects; 
and authorized food stamp program nutrition education cost 
sharing option with states, which only seven states utilized in 
fiscal year 1992. 
The Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act – 1993 (P.L. 
103-66) 
Encourages state agencies to develop and establish electronic 
benefit transfer systems. 
Aiman Ghatts, Doing Business as A & M Food Shop v. United 
States Department of Agriculture – 1994 (40 F.3d 281, 8th Cir. 
1994) 
The court reversed the Secretary of Agriculture’s permanent 
retailer disqualification of the plaintiff that was imposed by the 
Secretary under the authority granted by the Food Stamp Act, as a 
result of the plaintiff’s employee’s role in trafficking benefits and 
remanded the case for further administrative proceedings 
addressing the alternative monetary sanction issue.   
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act and Other Legislative Actions – 1996 (P.L. 
104-193) 
Mandated states implement electronic benefit transfer systems; 
placed a time limit on able-bodied adults without dependents who 
are not working at least twenty hours a week or participating in a 
work program; restricted benefits for legal immigrants; and 
reduced maximum benefits. 
The Balanced Budget Act – 1997 (P.L. 105-33) 
Put forth provisions for how to fund state agencies’ nutrition 
education plans and employment and training activities.  
The Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension Act – 
1998 (P.L. 105-185) 
Reduces funding of employment and training programs and 
payments for administrative costs to State agencies; revises 
eligibility for certain disabled aliens, Indians, elderly individuals, 
children, and Hmong and Highland Laotians. 
The Electronic Benefit Transfer Interoperability and 
Portability Act – 2000 (P.L. 106-171) 
Puts forth a national standard for electronic benefit transfer 
systems. 
Agriculture Appropriations – 2001 (P.L. 106-387) 
Increased the excess shelter cap and indexed the cap to changes in 
the Consumer Price Index for all consumers; and allowed states 
flexibility in the vehicle limit. 
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act – 2002 (P.L. 107-
171) 
Restored eligibility to qualified aliens and immigrants meeting 
specified criteria; allowed states options to simplify the program; 
reduced employment and training funding; eliminated the cost 
neutrality requirement for electronic benefit transfer systems; and 
allowed group homes and institutions to redeem electronic benefit 
transfer benefits through banks in areas where electronic benefit 
transfer systems had not been implemented. 
The Food, Conversation, and Energy Act – 2008 (P.L. 110-234) 
Changed the name of the Food Stamp Program to the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to emphasize 
the program’s nutrition impacts; institutionalized various policies 
to enhance program access, administration, and integrity; provided 
mandatory funding for the Healthy Incentives Pilot to test point-
of-purchase incentives for healthful foods; and stipulated states 
must issue monthly benefit allotments to individuals in one lump 
sum unless a benefit correction is necessary. 
American Recovery & Reinvestment Act – 2009 (P.L. 111-5) 
Increased SNAP benefit levels between April 1, 2009 and October 
31, 2013. 
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act – 2010 (P.L. 111-296) 
Restructured SNAP-Ed as the Nutrition Education and Obesity 
Prevention Grant Program, allowing states to focus on policy, 
systems, and environmental change interventions. 
Agricultural Act – 2014 (P.L. 113-79) 
Required the USDA to update the stocking standards for 
authorized SNAP retailers; required retailers pay for electronic 
benefit transfer equipment; required states to submit plans and 
reports if they elect to operate a restaurant meals program for the 
homeless, elderly, and/or disabled; and permitted physical activity 
as a nutrition education activity. 
Workforce Investment Act – 1998 (P.L. 113-128) 
Amended employment and training program provisions of the 
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. 
Argus Leader v. United States Department of Agriculture – 
2018 (740 F.3d 1172-75 (8th Cir. 2014) and 2018 appeal from 
Intervenor Defendant, Food Marketing Institute) 
Ruled Exemption 3 and 4 of the Freedom of Information Act does 
not apply to data showing how much retailers participating in 
SNAP receive each year. The Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch 
stayed the lower court’s order requiring the disclosure of how 
much money retail food outlets earn from SNAP transactions until 
the plaintiff, Argus Leader, responds to the Food Marketing 
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Table 2: A summation of the emerging legislative branch 
developments affecting the United States Department of Agriculture 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program  
 
Institute’s request to appeal to the US Supreme Court. On June 24, 
2019, the Supreme Court held that commercial information 
submitted to the federal government qualifies as “confidential” 
under the Freedom of Information Act’s Exemption 4 when, at a 
minimum, it is “actually” and “customarily” “kept private” and the 
federal government provides assurances that the information will 
be maintained in confidence. 
The Agricultural Improvement Act – 2018 (P.L. 115-334) 
Establishes an interstate data system to prevent the simultaneous 
issuance of SNAP benefits to an individual by more than one state; 
increased mandatory commitments to the Food Insecurity 
Nutrition Incentive Program over five years and proposed to 
rename the program to Gus Schumacher Food Insecurity Nutrition 
Incentive Program in honor of an integral champion of this 
program who recently passed away and requires the USDA 
Secretary to issue guidance clarifying the process for retailers to 
seek waivers to offer SNAP consumers incentives for purchasing 
SNAP-eligible staple foods, which were expanded to include 
whole grains and dairy; preserves states’ option to eliminate asset 
tests; enhances and increases funding for SNAP Employment and 
Training operations; requires Secretary of Agriculture to 
reevaluate and publish The Thrifty Food Plan every five years; 
makes slight modifications to SNAP Nutrition Education (SNAP-
Ed) including directs the Administrator of USDA’s Food and 
Nutrition Service to consult with the Director of the National 
Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA); eliminates state 
performance bonuses; makes slight adjustments to electronic 
benefit transfer system rules; and establishes a pilot Produce 
Prescription Program. 




Initial 2018 Farm Bill discussions 
re-explored combining safety net 
programs into a meta-block grant to 
States where each State would 
receive a fixed, annual amount of 
funding for several safety net 
programs including SNAP, an 
entitlement program. The 2018 
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Farm Bill did not convert SNAP to 
a block grant program. 












































Since 2000, States have been 
permitted to use Broad-Based 
Categorical Eligibility (BBCE), 
which allows States to grant 
automatic eligibility for families 
that receive TANF assistance and 
meet State-determined income 
limits. A preliminary House 
version of the 2018 Farm Bill 
(H.R.2) eliminated BBCE and 
proposed changes to countable 
resources. On the other hand, the 
preliminary Senate version of the 
Farm Bill (S.3042) did not propose 
significant changes to participant 
eligibility. Ultimately, the 2018 
Farm Bill did not eliminate BBCE.  
However, on July 23, 2019, the 
USDA published a proposed rule to 
limit SNAP/TANF automatic 
eligibility. Any final rule could 
potentially evoke legislative 
response, recognizing BBCE was 
not put forth in the 2018 Farm Bill. 
 
The preliminary House version of 
the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2) 
proposed stricter work 
requirements for almost all able-
bodied adults without dependents 
(ABAWD) unable to find work and 
permitted States to target limited 
resources to those who they deem 
may benefit most from 
employment and training programs 
but ultimately was not a part of 
2018 Farm Bill. Shortly after the 
President signed the 2018 Farm 
Bill, the USDA Food and Nutrition 
Service issued a new proposed rule 




















aiming to strengthen the criteria for 
mandatory SNAP work 
requirements and significantly 
restrict State waiver allowance. 
Legislation has been introduced to 
prevent the USDA from 
implementing the proposed rule. In 
addition, Title 1 of a Rules 
Committee package (H.Res. 6) 
directs the House of 
Representatives’ Office of General 
Counsel to explore legal options for 
responding to the proposed SNAP 
rule, recognizing, in part, Congress 
had the opportunity to address 
work requirements in the 2018 
Farm Bill and did not. 
 
Other eligibility related legislative 
actions in the 2018 Farm Bill 
included simplifying homeless 
housing cost provisions, preserving 
states’ option to coordinate SNAP 
benefits with low-income energy 
payments assistance (i.e., helping 
households “afford to heat and 
eat”), rejecting a lifetime ban on 
individuals convicted of certain 
felonies, and eliminating state 
performance bonuses to recognize 
best or most-improved in SNAP 
operations that have been 
historically reinvested in 














The 2018 Farm Bill requires the 
USDA Secretary to re-evaluate and 
publish the Thrifty Food Plan every 
five years based on dietary 
guidance, food prices, food 
composition data, and consumption 
patterns. A legal battle is underway 
against the USDA regarding SNAP 



































awarding lower benefits to US 
citizens who reside in Puerto Rico 
than to similarly situated and 
equally needy US citizens residing 
in any of the fifty states of the US. 
The Closing the Map Gap Act 
(H.R. 1368) was reintroduced in 
the House to amend the Food and 
Nutrition Act of 2008 to require 
SNAP benefits be based on the 
Low Cost Food Plan. In the Senate, 
a bill (S.677) proposes to amend 
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 
to provide for participation of 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and 
the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands in SNAP instead 
of the Nutrition Assistance 
Program (NAP), a block grant 
program. 
 
The 2008 Farm Bill prohibited 
jurisdictions from issuing SNAP 
benefits more than once per month 
absent special circumstances. The 
2018 Farm Bill established an 
interstate data system to prevent the 
simultaneous issuance of SNAP 
benefits to an individual by more 
than one state.  
 
The 2018 Farm Bill only makes 
modest adjustments to electronic 
benefit transfer system rules, 
including temporarily banning the 
switching and routing of fees and 
easing of EBT authorization 
processes for farmers’ markets 
serving multiple locations. The 
2018 Farm Bill makes no changes 
to the SNAP Restaurant Meal 
Program. The 2018 Farm Bill did 
not address the use of SNAP to 
provide additional benefits during 
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the summer but future legislative 
action might occur as the Child 
Nutrition Reauthorization 
processes get underway. The 2018 
Farm Bill requires nationwide 
implementation of online 
acceptance for SNAP benefits after 
the pilots required in the 2014 Farm 
Bill are implemented. A Supreme 
Court decision protected SNAP 
redemption data at the retailer level 
(online or brick or mortar) as 
confidential business information; 
maintaining the existing standard 
and protecting traditional 
confidential business information 
that could be accessed through 
Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests. 
Appropriations Agriculture and related agencies’ 
appropriations for fiscal year 2017 
and fiscal year 2018 provided about 
$74 billion to SNAP in required 
mandatory spending plus a reserve 
fund for any unexpected 
participation increases. For fiscal 
year 2019, the government was 
partially closed for a record-long 
thirty-five days due to a conflict 
between President Trump and 
Congress regarding the lack of 
funding of the US-Mexico border 
wall. Ultimately, a three week 
short-term continuing resolution 
was passed to end the shutdown. 
The inability to timely finalize 
fiscal year 2019 Agricultural 
Appropriations resulted in 
unprecedented SNAP benefit 
issuance logistical, 
communication, and health 
implications. In addition, the 
record long shutdown resulted in 
unpaid federal workers, 
contractors, among others, who had 
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not been paid for almost two 
bimonthly paid dates that could 
potentially have been eligible for 
SNAP, among other federal food 
and nutrition assistance programs. 
Moreover, these furloughed 
workers were tapping into the 
charitable food system that many 
SNAP participants or SNAP 
eligible families depend on 
regularly. Near the end of the short-
term resolution, fiscal year 2019 
appropriations were finally passed 
and provided about $74 million to 
SNAP plus a reserve fund, along 
with accompanying Congressional 
Directives relevant to SNAP. A 
two year budget deal was approved 
to increase budget caps (P.L. 116-
37). The House Appropriations 
Committee proposed $71.1 billion 
in required mandatory spending for 
SNAP. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee has conducted hearings 
regarding fiscal year 2020 
appropriations. Another partial 
government shutdown is possible 
as Congress works to finalize bills 
for fifteen agencies after its August 
recess.  
Oversight  A record number of hearings 
reviewing SNAP were held over 
the course of the 114th Congress, 
totaling sixty witnesses in sixteen 
hearings and a report was published 
synthesizing the findings. 
Congressional letters of inquiry 
have been submitted to the USDA 
regarding the proposed relocation 
of the Economic Research Service 
(ERS) and the National Institute of 
Food and Agriculture (NIFA) and a 
recent hearing regarding the 
proposed changes was held by the 
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116th Congress. The 116th Congress 
has held a few other hearings 














































The 115th Congress held a hearing 
focused on the pros and cons of 
restricting SNAP purchases in the 
initial weeks of their session but the 
2018 Farm Bill did not put forth 
any provisions to restrict SNAP 
purchases.   
 
The 2018 Farm Bill increased 
mandatory commitments up to 
$250 million over five years to the 
program, made the program 
permanent, and renamed the 
program to Gus Schumacher Food 
Insecurity Nutrition Incentive 
Program in honor of an integral 
champion of this program who 
recently passed away. The 
implementation timeline for the 
new Gus Schumacher Nutrition 
Incentive Program was impacted 
by the recent government 
shutdown and the uncertainty 
regarding the relocation of the 
NIFA. The 2018 Farm Bill also 
established a pilot Produce 
Prescription Program. Specifically, 
the Secretary of Agriculture was 
granted authority to establish a 
grant program, in coordination with 
the Department of Health and 
Human Services, to award eligible 
entities such as federally qualified 
health centers to conduct pilot 
projects that demonstrate and 
evaluate the impacts of a produce 
prescription program. The 















































Secretary of Agriculture was 
authorized to use $4,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2019 through 
2023. For retailer funded incentive 
programs, the 2018 Farm Bill 
requires the USDA Secretary to 
issue guidance clarifying the 
process for retailers to seek waivers 
to offer SNAP consumers 
incentives for purchasing healthy 
SNAP-eligible staple foods.   
  
The Agricultural Act of 2014 
required the USDA to update the 
stocking standards for authorized 
SNAP retailers. The USDA rule 
making process involved hosting 
listening sessions, calls for public 
comments, and conducting 
regulatory impact analyses, as well 
as extensions, delays, and technical 
assistance. Implementation of the 
final rule that now requires SNAP 
authorized stores to meet one of 
two staple food requirements was 
completed in January 2018. Fiscal 
Year 2019 Agricultural 
Appropriations prohibited the use 
of any funds to be used to 
implement, administer, or enforce 
the “variety” requirements of this 
final rule until the Secretary of 
Agriculture amends the definition 
of the term to increase the number 
of items that qualify as acceptable 
varieties in each staple food 
category. On April 5, 2019, the 
USDA published a proposed rule 
that would provide regulatory 
flexibility for retailers in SNAP in 
meeting the 2016 final rule, by only 
modifying the definition of the 
term “variety”. 
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Nutrition Education and 
Promotion 
 
In the Agricultural Act of 2014, the 
Secretary of Agriculture was given 
enhanced authority and 
appropriated $125,000,000 to 
establish HFFI. In fiscal years 2017 
and 2018, Congress appropriated 
one million to launch HFFI at 
USDA. The 2018 Farm Bill made 
slight amendments to the HFFI, 
including expanding eligible 
projects beyond retail to include 
food hubs, mobile markets, direct 
to consumer markets, and food 
business incubators. In fiscal year 
2019, not less than $22,000,000 
was appropriated. In both the 
House (H.R. 1717) and Senate 
(S.786), bills have been 
reintroduced to amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to establish 
a new tax credit and grant program 
to stimulate investment and healthy 
retail options in food deserts.   
 
The 2018 Farm Bill only made 
modest modifications to SNAP-Ed.  
The House proposal to merge 
SNAP-Ed and the Expanded Food 
and Nutrition Education Program 
(EFNEP) was rejected and instead 
the 2018 Farm Bill encourages 
better coordination across the two 
programs, including requiring an 
annual report to Congress detailing 
the evaluation of the level of 
coordination between SNAP-Ed, 
EFNEP, and other USDA nutrition 
education programs. The 2018 
Farm Bill requires SNAP-Ed 
programs to use an electronic 
reporting system to measure and 
evaluate projects and account for 
state administrative costs. In 
addition, the 2018 Farm Bill 
establishes an online information 





Table 3: A summation of the emerging executive branch 
developments affecting the United States Department of Agriculture 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program  
 
clearinghouse to share best 
practices in planning, 
implementing, and evaluating 
SNAP-Ed programs. The USDA 
Secretary is required to provide 
technical assistance to state 
agencies in developing and 
implementing SNAP-Ed plans and 
state agencies are required to 
submit an annual SNAP-Ed report 
to the USDA Secretary. For fiscal 
year 2019, $433,000,000 was 
appropriated for nutrition 
education services. 
Executive Development  Status 
America’s Harvest Box The America’s Harvest Box was 
put forth in the President’s fiscal 
year 2019 budget and reappeared 
again in Secretary Perdue’s fiscal 
year 2020 budget discussions. 
Under this proposed approach to 
support the President’s 
leadership on Buy American, all 
SNAP participating households 
receiving $90 per month or more 
in SNAP benefits would receive 
a package of nutritious, one 
hundred percent US grown and 
produced food and the remainder 
of the benefits would be provided 
via electronic benefit transfer 
cards. States would be given 
flexibility in distributing these 
boxes to participants. Recent 
stories discuss the new “Meals to 
You” program offered through 
funding by the USDA FNS, 
which offers a box including the 
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equivalent of five breakfasts, 
lunches, and snacks per student 
delivered to each participating 
student’s door via UPS during 
the summer months. 
SNAP Budget Cuts  President Trump’s fiscal years 
2018, 2019, and 2020 budgets 
consistently proposed massive 
cuts to SNAP and included 
provisions to reconfigure the 
program by establishing a State 
match, limit categorical 
eligibility and the use of waivers 
that exempt able-bodied adults 
without dependents from work, 
and establish application fees for 
retailers seeking to participant in 
SNAP. The President also 
ordered all federal agencies to 
cut spending by five percent for 
fiscal year 2019 and again for 
fiscal year 2020.  
Disaster Assistance through 
SNAP 
The Trump administration has 
responded to a variety of 
hurricanes, wild fires, floods, and 
other natural disasters thus far 
using the USDA’s Disaster 
Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (D-SNAP). 
Congressional supplemental 
appropriations have also helped 
provide relief and on June 6, 
2019 a $19.1 billion standalone 
disaster supplemental bill was 
enacted. 
Immigration  President Trump has taken a 
variety of actions ranging from 
executive orders, budget cuts, 
and administrative agency 
initiatives that raise concern over 
immigrant participation in 
federal food and nutrition 
assistance programs including 
SNAP.  The most recent explicit 
action that involved SNAP was a 
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proposed rulemaking notice by 
the Department of Homeland 
Security that indicates 
immigrants could potentially be 
denied “lawful permanent 
residency” if they have received 
certain government benefits, 
including SNAP, or if the 
government anticipates they may 
seek government benefits in the 
future.  Known as the “public 
charge rule,” the Trump 
administration would 
significantly expand the 1999 
Interim Field Guidance that 
defined dependence on 
government assistance as 
participation in cash assistance 
or long-term institutionalized 
care. The sixty-day public 
comment period closed on 
December 10, 2018 and more 
than 216,000 comments have 
been submitted. A final rule was 
put forth on August 12, 2019. 
Trade In an effort to bail out farmers 
affected by the President’s recent 
tariffs on Chinese imports and 
resulting Chinese tariffs on US 
goods, the Trump administration 
purchased $1.2 billion 
commodities from farmers and 
distributed them through the 
child nutrition and emergency 
food assistance programs.  
Another similar bailout 
followed. 









On January 23, 2017, President 
Trump signed a Presidential 
Memorandum instituting a 
ninety-day hiring freeze for 
United States federal employees. 









































Proposed Relocation to New 
Department of Health and 
Public Welfare  
 
 
There is not much data to 
objectively understand the 
impacts of this hiring freeze or 
how severe budget cuts in fiscal 
years 2018 and 2019 impacted 
agencies’ ability to appropriately 
staff SNAP operations.   
 
Recently, the 115th Congress 
Senate failed to vote on the 
USDA nominees that had been 
approved by the Senate 
Agriculture Committee; 
therefore, the process had to start 
over with re-nomination by the 
116th Congress Senate. On 
January 16, 2019, President 
Trump re-nominated his 
selections for the USDA 
Undersecretary for Food Safety; 
Undersecretary for Research, 
Education, and Economics; and 
Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights. And, Secretary Perdue 
appointed each of them to deputy 
positions in the interim that does 
not hold the same authority but 
does not require Senate approval. 
The date of a full chamber vote 
has not been set at this time. No 
one has been nominated at this 
point to be the Undersecretary of 
Food, Nutrition, and Consumer 
Services (the mission area for 
SNAP), resulting in a mission 
area accounting for seventy 
percent of the USDA’s budget 
not being overseen by a Senate 
confirmed appointee. 
 
In Delivering Government 
Solutions in the 21st Century: 
Reform Plan and Reorganization 
Recommendations put forth by 
the Executive Office of President 















































Trump, one of the thirty-two 
organizational realignments to 
enhance mission and service 
delivery was to move the non-
commodity nutrition assistance 
programs (i.e., the “near-cash” 
benefit programs such as 
electronic benefit transfers or 
vouchers) from the USDA to a 
newly named Department of 
Health and Public Welfare, 
which is currently known as the 
Department of Health and 
Human Services. These non-
commodity nutrition assistance 
programs include: SNAP, the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants, 
and Children (WIC), the Child 
and Adult Care Food Program 
(CACFP), and the Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Programs. In 
addition, the Trump 
Administration’s Reform Plan 
proposes the establishment of a 
permanent Council on Public 
Assistance, housed in the new 
Department of Health and Public 
Welfare that would be composed 
of all intra- and inter-
departmental agencies that 
administer public benefit 
programs, including within the 
new Department (e.g., TANF, 
CMS, and now SNAP and WIC), 
the USDA (e.g., remaining 
commodity-based programs), 
and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, among 
others.  The Council would have 
statutory authority to establish 
certain cross-program policies, 
including on uniform work 
requirements. The Reform Plan 










Reorganization of ERS and 
Proposed Relocations of ERS 





















Reorganization of the USDA 
Center for Nutrition Policy 





Reorganization of the USDA 
Civil Rights Activities  
acknowledges a proposed 
reorganization of this nature 
requires Congressional 
approvals and the 115th and 
initial signs from the 116th 
Congress have given these public 
assistance reform plans little 
attention. 
 
Secretary Perdue proposed ERS 
move out of the USDA’s 
Research, Education, and 
Economics (REE) Mission Area 
and back into the Office of the 
Secretary, Office of the Chief 
Economist to enhance the 
effectiveness of economic 
analysis at USDA.  In addition, 
the Secretary proposed to 
relocate ERS and NIFA out of 
the Washington, District of 
Columbia area to possibly the 
Midwest. Congressional letters 
of inquiry and a recent hearing 
have debated the rationale for 
these proposals. On June 13, 
2019, Secretary Perdue 
announced the Kansas City 
region as the new location for 
ERS and NIFA and that ERS will 
remain in the REE Mission Area.  
 
Consistent with Executive Order 
13781 calling for Executive 
Branch reorganization, Secretary 
Perdue already reorganized the 
USDA Center for Nutrition 
Policy and Promotion (CNPP).  
 
Consistent with Executive Order 
13781 calling for Executive 
Branch reorganization, Secretary 
Perdue is reorganizing the 
USDA’s civil rights activities, 
which would include complaints 





from the suite of federal food and 
nutrition assistance programs it 
administers. 
